Becoming a Character: Dissociation in Conservatory Acting Students.

Actors must realistically portray imagined characters in imaginary circumstances by "becoming" their characters. What is it that allows them to do this? We suggest that acting is related to dissociation, a trait typically related to psychopathology. We measured dissociation in 53 conservatory acting students before and after six months of training, using the Dissociative Experiences Scale-II (DES-II). Although no significant changes occurred over time, acting students scored significantly higher than the general population on the DES-II. These scores were driven by just one of the subscales - absorption and imaginative involvement. We argue here that this subscale measures a trait central to the creative process. Furthermore, although the DES-II was designed to measure psychopathology, we found that it is also related to flow (a positive experience). Certain flow dimensions were predictive of dissociation and of its absorption and imaginative involvement subscale. We conclude that total DES-II scores may not necessarily indicate psychopathology in actors. At the very least, these results suggest that clinicians should take extra precaution when diagnosing dissociation in actors using the DES-II.

Rating the Acting Moment: Exploring Characteristics for Realistic Portrayals of Characters.

Good actors appear to become their characters, making them come alive, as if they were real. Is this because they have succeeded in merging themselves with their character? Are there any positive or negative psychological effects of this experience? We examined the role of three characteristics that may make this kind of merging possible: dissociation, flow, and empathy. We also examined the relation of these characteristics to acting quality. Acting students (n = 44) and non-acting students (n = 43) completed a dissociation measure, and then performed a monologue that was recorded and rated on the dimensions of acting. Participants were then reassessed on dissociation to determine whether it increased as a function of performance. They were also then assessed on flow and empathy. Actors did not differ from non-actors on dissociation, but did score significantly higher than non-actors on some flow and empathy subscales, indicating a positive psychological experience and outcome. While non-actors' dissociation marginally increased post-performance, actors' dissociation rose significantly, which could indicate a negative psychological experience. Surprisingly, acting ratings were unrelated to the levels of dissociation, flow, or empathy. We concluded that, while these are tools used by actors to immerse themselves fully in their characters, they may not be necessary to create the illusion of an imaginary character come to life on stage.

No support for the claim that literary fiction uniquely and immediately improves theory of mind: A reply to Kidd and Castano's commentary on Panero et al. (2016).

Kidd and Castano (in press) critique our failure to replicate Kidd and Castano (2013) on 3 grounds: failure to exclude people who did not read the texts, failure of random assignment, and failure to exclude people who did not take the Author Recognition Test (ART). This response addresses each of these critiques. Most importantly, we note that even when Kidd and Castano reanalyzed our data in the way that they argue is most appropriate, they still failed to replicate the pattern of results reported in their original study. We thus reaffirm that our replication of Kidd and Castano (2013) found no evidence that literary fiction uniquely and immediately improves theory of mind. Our objective remains not to prove that reading literary fiction does not benefit social cognition, but to call for in-depth research addressing the difficulties in measuring any potential effect and to note the need to temper claims accordingly. (PsycINFO Database Record

Does reading a single passage of literary fiction really improve theory of mind? An attempt at replication.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 111(5) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2016-50315-003). In the article, due to an error in stimulus construction, four items (three authors, one foil) were omitted from the ART presented to all participants tested by Research Group 1. These omissions do not undermine the results in the primary analyses, which all included ART and ART Condition (as covariates). Any variation across research groups, including this difference in reading exposure measurement, is accounted for in the multilevel analyses. Therefore, the Table 2 title should appear as Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) Scores by Condition and Overall Unadjusted Means for the Current Study and Kidd and Castano (2013), as Well as the Zero-Order Pearson's Correlations Between RMET and ART Scores Overall and by Condition. The ART data columns should be deleted, and the table note should begin as follows: RMET scores were transformed to correct for skew prior to correlational analyses. The section title above the Discussion section should appear as Comparison of Our RMET Scores to Kidd and Castano Data, with the first two sentences appearing as follows: To determine whether the responses in our sample were similar to what Kidd and Castano (2013) found, we compared our mean performance on the RMET to theirs. Our grand mean (26.28) was significantly higher than theirs (25.18), t(1=, 374) = 3.71, p< .001, d = 0.21. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Fiction simulates the social world and invites us into the minds of characters. This has led various researchers to suggest that reading fiction improves our understanding of others' cognitive and emotional states. Kidd and Castano (2013) received a great deal of attention by providing support for this claim. Their article reported that reading segments of literary fiction (but not popular fiction or nonfiction) immediately and significantly improved performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), an advanced theory-of-mind test. Here we report a replication attempt by 3 independent research groups, with 792 participants randomly assigned to 1 of 4 conditions (literary fiction, popular fiction, nonfiction, and no reading). In contrast to Kidd and Castano (2013), we found no significant advantage in RMET scores for literary fiction compared to any of the other conditions. However, as in Kidd and Castano and previous research, the Author Recognition Test, a measure of lifetime exposure to fiction, consistently predicted RMET scores across conditions. We conclude that the most plausible link between reading fiction and theory of mind is either that individuals with strong theory of mind are drawn to fiction and/or that a lifetime of reading gradually strengthens theory of mind, but other variables, such as verbal ability, may also be at play. (PsycINFO Database Record