RESUMEN
Countries differ markedly in their production of climate science. While richer nations are often home to a variety of climate models, data infrastructures and climate experts, poorer sovereigns often lack these attributes. However, less is known about countries' capacity to use global climate science and customise it into products informing national adaptation. We use a unique global dataset, the UNFCCC National Communications, to perform a global documentary analysis of scientific submissions from individual countries (n = 189). Comparing countries' climate projections with their competence in publishing climate science, our research examines the existence of geographical divides. Although countries proficient in publishing climate science use more complex climate modelling techniques, key characteristics of climate projections are highly similar around the globe, including multi-model ensembles of Global Circulation Models (GCMs). This surprising result is made possible because of the use of pre-configured climate modelling software packages. One concern is that these tools restrict customisation, such as country-specific observations, modelling information, and visualisation. Such tools may therefore hide a new geographical divide where countries with higher scientific capacities are able to inform what goes into these software packages, whereas lower scientific capacity countries are dependent upon these choices - whether beneficial for them or not. Our research suggests that free-to-use modelling and training efforts may unwittingly restrict, rather than foster, countries' capacity to customise global climate science into nationally relevant and legitimate climate information.
RESUMEN
This paper seeks to understand why climate information is produced differently from country to country. To do this, we critically examined and compared the social and scientific values that shaped the production of three national climate scenarios in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. A comparative analysis of documentary materials and expert interviews linked to the climate scenarios was performed. Our findings reveal a new typology of use-inspired research in climate science for decision-making: (i) innovators, where the advancement of science is the main objective; (ii) consolidators, where knowledge exchanges and networks are prioritised; and (iii) collaborators, where the needs of users are put first and foremost. These different values over what constitutes 'good' science for decision-making are mirrored in the way users were involved in the production process: (i) elicitation, where scientists have privileged decision-making power; (ii) representation, where multiple organisations mediate on behalf of individual users; and (iii) participation, where a multitude of users interact with scientists in an equal partnership. These differences help explain why climate knowledge gains its credibility and legitimacy differently even when the information itself might not be judged as salient and usable. If the push to deliberately co-produce climate knowledge is not sensitive to the national civic epistemology at play in each country, scientist-user interactions may fail to deliver more 'usable' climate information.
RESUMEN
The UK Government's first National Adaptation Programme seeks to create a 'climate-ready society' capable of making well-informed and far-sighted decisions to address risks and opportunities posed by a changing climate, where individual households are expected to adapt when it is in their interest to do so. How, and to what extent, households are able to do this remains unclear. Like other developed countries, research on UK adaptation has focused predominately on public and private organisations. To fill that gap, a systematic literature review was conducted to understand what actions UK households have taken in response to, or in anticipation of, a changing climate; what drives or impedes these actions; and whether households will act autonomously. We found that UK households struggle to build long-term adaptive capacity and are reliant upon traditional reactive coping responses. Of concern is that these coping responses are less effective for some climate risks (e.g. flooding); cost more over the long-term; and fail to create household capacity to adapt to other stresses. While low-cost, low-skill coping responses were already being implemented, the adoption of more permanent physical measures, behavioural changes, and acceptance of new responsibilities are unlikely to happen autonomously without further financial or government support. If public policy on household adaptation to climate change is to be better informed than more high-quality empirical research is urgently needed.
