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IntroductionNew York City (NYC) was a global epicenter of COVID-19. Vaccines against COVID-19 became available in December 2020 with limited supply, resulting in the need for policies regarding prioritization. The next month, SARS-CoV-2 variants were detected that were more transmissible but still vaccine-susceptible, raising scrutiny of these policies. In particular, prioritization of higher-risk people could prevent more deaths per dose of vaccine administered but could also delay herd immunity if the prioritization introduced bottlenecks that lowered vaccination speed (the number of doses that could be delivered per day). We used mathematical modeling to examine the trade-off between prioritization and the vaccination speed. MethodsA stochastic, discrete-time susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR) model with age- and comorbidity-adjusted COVID-19 outcomes (infections, hospitalizations, and deaths by July 1, 2021) was used to examine the trade-off between vaccination speed and whether or not vaccination was prioritized to individuals age 65+ and "essential workers," defined as including first responders and healthcare, transit, education, and public safety workers. The model was calibrated to COVID-19 hospital admissions, hospital census, ICU census, and deaths in NYC. Vaccination speed was assumed to be 10,000 doses per day starting December 15th, 2020 targeting healthcare workers and nursing home populations, and to subsequently expand at alternative starting times and speeds. We compared COVID-outcomes across alternative expansion starting times (January 15th, January 21st, or February 1st) and speeds (20,000, 30,000, 50,000, 100,000, 150,000, or 200,000 doses per day for the first dose), as well as alternative prioritization options ("yes" versus "no" prioritization of essential workers and people age 65+). Model projections were produced with and without considering the emergence of a SARS-COV-2 variant with 56% greater transmissibility over January and February, 2021. ResultsIn the absence of a COVID-19 vaccine, the emergence of the more transmissible variant would triple the peak in infections, hospitalizations, and deaths and more than double cumulative infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. To offset the harm from the more transmissible variant would require reaching a vaccination speed of at least 100,000 doses per day by January 15th or 150,000 per day by January 21st. Prioritizing people ages 65+ and essential workers increased the number of lives saved per vaccine dose delivered: with the emergence of a more transmissible variant, 8,000 deaths could be averted by delivering 115,000 doses per day without prioritization or 71,000 doses per day with prioritization. If prioritization were to cause a bottleneck in vaccination speed, more lives would be saved with prioritization only if the bottleneck reduced vaccination speed by less than one-third of the maximum vaccine delivery capacity. These trade-offs between vaccination speed and prioritization were robust over a wide range of delivery capacity. ConclusionsThe emergence of a more transmissible variant of SARS-CoV-2 has the potential to triple the 2021 epidemic peak and more than double the 2021 COVID-19 burden in NYC. Vaccination could only offset the harm of the more transmissible variant if high speed were achieved in mid-to late January. Prioritization of COVID-19 vaccines to higher-risk populations saves more lives only if it does not create an excessive vaccine delivery bottleneck.
RESUMEN
IntroductionNew York City (NYC) has the largest public school system in the United States (US). During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, NYC was the first major US city to open schools for in-person learning in the 2020-2021 academic year. Several policies were implemented to reduce the risk of in-school transmission, including infection control measures (facemasks, physical distancing, enhanced indoor ventilation, cohorting of small groups, and hand hygiene), option of all-remote instruction, alternative options for how class schedules would rotate in-person and remote instruction, daily symptom screening, and testing 10-20% of students and staff weekly or monthly depending on local case rates. We sought to determine which of these policies had the greatest impact on reducing the risk of in-school transmission. MethodsWe evaluated the impact of each policy by referring to global benchmarks for the secondary attack rate (SAR) of SARS-CoV-2 in school settings and by simulating the potential for transmission in NYCs rotating cohort schedules, in which teachers could act as "bridges" across rotating cohorts. We estimated the impact of (1) infection control measures, (2) providing an option of all-remote instruction, (3) choice of class scheduling for in-person learners, (4) daily symptom screening, (5) testing to curtail transmission, and (6) testing to identify school outbreaks. Each policy was assessed independently of other policies, with the exception of symptom screening and random testing, which were assessed both independently and jointly. ResultsAmong the policies analyzed, the greatest transmission reduction was associated with the infection control measures, followed by small class cohorts with an option for all-remote instruction, symptom screening, and finally randomly testing 10-20% of school attendees. Assuming adult staff are the primary source of within-school SARS-CoV-2 transmission, weekly testing of staff could be at least as effective as symptom screening, and potentially more so if testing days occur in the beginning of the workweek with results available by the following day. A combination of daily symptom screening and testing on the first workday of each week could reduce transmission by 70%. ConclusionsAdherence to infection control is the highest priority for safe school re-opening. Further transmission reduction can be achieved through small rotating class cohorts with an option for remote learning, widespread testing at the beginning of the work week, and daily symptom screening and self-isolation. Randomly testing 10-20% of attendees weekly or monthly does not meaningfully curtail transmission and may not detect outbreaks before they have spread beyond a handful of individuals. School systems considering re-opening during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic or similarly virulent respiratory disease outbreaks should consider these relative impacts when setting policy priorities.