RESUMEN
Theories of semantic organization have historically prioritized investigation of concrete concepts pertaining to inanimate objects and natural kinds. As a result, accounts of the conceptual representation of emotions have almost exclusively focused on their juxtaposition with concrete concepts. The present study aims to fill this gap by deriving a large set of normative feature data for emotion concepts and assessing similarities and differences between the featural representation of emotion, nonemotion abstract, and concrete concepts. We hypothesized that differences between the experience of emotions (e.g., happiness and sadness) and the experience of other abstract concepts (e.g., equality and tyranny), specifically regarding the relative importance of interoceptive states, might drive distinctions in the dimensions along which emotion concepts are represented. We also predicted, based on constructionist views of emotion, that emotion concepts might demonstrate more variability in their representation than concrete and other abstract concepts. Participants listed features which we coded into discrete categories and contrasted the feature distributions across conceptual types. Analyses revealed statistically significant differences in the distribution of features among the category types by condition. We also examined variability in the features generated, finding that, contrary to expectation, emotion concepts were associated with less variability. Our results reflect subtle differences between the structure of emotion concepts and the structure of, not only concrete concepts, but also other abstract concepts. We interpret these findings in the context of our sample, which was restricted to native English speakers, and discuss the importance of validating these findings across speakers of different languages. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
RESUMEN
Background An aphasia treatment was designed to shift laterality from the left to right lateral frontal lobe during word production by initiating word-finding trials with complex left-hand movements. Previous findings indicated successful relateralization. Objective The current study was designed to ascertain whether the shift was attributable to the left-hand movement. Methods Using stratified random sampling, 14 subjects were equally divided between Intention (IT) and Control (CT) treatments. CT was identical to IT, except with no left-hand movements. Both treatments trained picture naming (phases 1 and 2) and category-member generation (phase 3), each phase lasting 10 sessions. Functional magnetic resonance imaging of category member generation occurred at pretreatment, posttreatment, and 3-month follow-up. Results IT shifted lateral frontal activity rightward compared with pretreatment both at posttreatment (t = -2.602, df = 6, P < .05) and 3-month follow-up (t = -2.332, df = 5, P < .05), but CT did not. IT and CT yielded similar changes for all picture-naming and category probes. However, IT patients showed gains for untrained category (t = 3.33, df = 6, P < .01) and picture-naming probes (t = 3.77, df = 5, P < .01), but CT patients did not. Conclusions The rightward shift in lateral frontal activity for IT was because of the left-hand movements. IT evoked greater generalization than CT.