Epidemiologic and Genomic Evidence for Zoonotic Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among People and Animals on a Michigan Mink Farm, United States, 2020.

Farmed mink are one of few animals in which infection with SARS-CoV-2 has resulted in sustained transmission among a population and spillback from mink to people. In September 2020, mink on a Michigan farm exhibited increased morbidity and mortality rates due to confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. We conducted an epidemiologic investigation to identify the source of initial mink exposure, assess the degree of spread within the facility's overall mink population, and evaluate the risk of further viral spread on the farm and in surrounding wildlife habitats. Three farm employees reported symptoms consistent with COVID-19 the same day that increased mortality rates were observed among the mink herd. One of these individuals, and another asymptomatic employee, tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-qPCR) 9 days later. All but one mink sampled on the farm were positive for SARS-CoV-2 based on nucleic acid detection from at least one oral, nasal, or rectal swab tested by RT-qPCR (99%). Sequence analysis showed high degrees of similarity between sequences from mink and the two positive farm employees. Epidemiologic and genomic data, including the presence of F486L and N501T mutations believed to arise through mink adaptation, support the hypothesis that the two employees with SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid detection contracted COVID-19 from mink. However, the specific source of virus introduction onto the farm was not identified. Three companion animals living with mink farm employees and 31 wild animals of six species sampled in the surrounding area were negative for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-qPCR. Results from this investigation support the necessity of a One Health approach to manage the zoonotic spread of SARS-CoV-2 and underscores the critical need for multifaceted public health approaches to prevent the introduction and spread of respiratory viruses on mink farms.

Benchmark datasets for SARS-CoV-2 surveillance bioinformatics.

Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the cause of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has spread globally and is being surveilled with an international genome sequencing effort. Surveillance consists of sample acquisition, library preparation, and whole genome sequencing. This has necessitated a classification scheme detailing Variants of Concern (VOC) and Variants of Interest (VOI), and the rapid expansion of bioinformatics tools for sequence analysis. These bioinformatic tools are means for major actionable results: maintaining quality assurance and checks, defining population structure, performing genomic epidemiology, and inferring lineage to allow reliable and actionable identification and classification. Additionally, the pandemic has required public health laboratories to reach high throughput proficiency in sequencing library preparation and downstream data analysis rapidly. However, both processes can be limited by a lack of a standardized sequence dataset. Methods: We identified six SARS-CoV-2 sequence datasets from recent publications, public databases and internal resources. In addition, we created a method to mine public databases to identify representative genomes for these datasets. Using this novel method, we identified several genomes as either VOI/VOC representatives or non-VOI/VOC representatives. To describe each dataset, we utilized a previously published datasets format, which describes accession information and whole dataset information. Additionally, a script from the same publication has been enhanced to download and verify all data from this study. Results: The benchmark datasets focus on the two most widely used sequencing platforms: long read sequencing data from the Oxford Nanopore Technologies platform and short read sequencing data from the Illumina platform. There are six datasets: three were derived from recent publications; two were derived from data mining public databases to answer common questions not covered by published datasets; one unique dataset representing common sequence failures was obtained by rigorously scrutinizing data that did not pass quality checks. The dataset summary table, data mining script and quality control (QC) values for all sequence data are publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/CDCgov/datasets-sars-cov-2. Discussion: The datasets presented here were generated to help public health laboratories build sequencing and bioinformatics capacity, benchmark different workflows and pipelines, and calibrate QC thresholds to ensure sequencing quality. Together, improvements in these areas support accurate and timely outbreak investigation and surveillance, providing actionable data for pandemic management. Furthermore, these publicly available and standardized benchmark data will facilitate the development and adjudication of new pipelines.

Invasive Meningococcal Disease Among People Experiencing Homelessness-United States, 2016-2019.

BACKGROUND: Recently, several invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) outbreaks caused by Neisseria meningitidis have occurred among people experiencing homelessness (PEH). However, overall IMD risk among PEH is not well described. We compared incidence and characteristics of IMD among PEH and persons not known to be experiencing homelessness (non-PEH) in the United States. METHODS: We analyzed 2016-2019 IMD data from the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System and enhanced meningococcal disease surveillance. Incidence was calculated using US census data and point-in-time counts from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. RESULTS: Of cases from states participating in enhanced surveillance during 2016-2019 (n = 1409), 45 cases (3.2%) occurred among PEH. Annual incidence was higher among PEH (2.12 cases/100 000) than non-PEH (0.11 cases/100 000; relative risk, 19.8; 95% confidence interval [CI], 14.8-26.7). Excluding outbreak-associated cases (PEH n = 18, 40%; non-PEH n = 98, 7.2%), incidence among PEH remained elevated compared to incidence in non-PEH (relative risk, 12.8; 95% CI, 8.8-18.8). Serogroup C was identified in 68.2% of PEH cases compared to 26.4% in non-PEH (P < .0001). CONCLUSIONS: PEH are at increased risk for IMD. Further assessment is needed to determine the feasibility and potential impact of meningococcal vaccination for PEH in the United States.

Antimicrobial Susceptibility Survey of Invasive Haemophilus influenzae in the United States in 2016.

Antibiotics are important for the treatment and prevention of invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease. Reduced susceptibility to clinically relevant drugs, except ampicillin, has been uncommon in the United States. Susceptibility of 700 invasive H. influenzae isolates, collected through population-based surveillance during 2016, was assessed for 15 antibiotics using broth microdilution, according to the CLSI guidelines; a subset of 104 isolates were also assessed for rifampin susceptibility using Etest. Genomes were sequenced to identify genes and mutations known to be associated with reduced susceptibility to clinically relevant drugs. A total of 508 (72.6%) had reduced susceptibility to at least one antibiotic and more than half of the isolates exhibited reduced susceptibility to only one (33.6%) or two (21.6%) antibiotic classes. All tested isolates were susceptible to rifampin, a chemoprophylaxis agent, and <1% (n = 3) of isolates had reduced susceptibility to third generation cephalosporins, which are recommended for invasive disease treatment. In contrast, ampicillin resistance was more common (28.1%) and predominantly associated with the detection of a ß-lactamase gene; 26.2% of isolates in the collection contained either a TEM-1 or ROB-1 ß-lactamase gene, including 88.8% of ampicillin-resistant isolates. ß-lactamase negative ampicillin-resistant (BLNAR) isolates were less common and associated with ftsI mutations; resistance to amoxicillin-clavulanate was detected in <2% (n = 13) of isolates. The proportion of reduced susceptibility observed was higher among nontypeable H. influenzae and serotype e than other serotypes. US invasive H. influenzae isolates remain predominantly susceptible to clinically relevant antibiotics except ampicillin, and BLNAR isolates remain uncommon. IMPORTANCE Antibiotics play an important role for the treatment and prevention of invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease. Antimicrobial resistance survey of invasive H. influenzae isolates collected in 2016 showed that the US H. influenzae population remained susceptible to clinically relevant antibiotics, except for ampicillin. Detection of approximately a quarter ampicillin-resistant and ß-lactamase containing strains demonstrates that resistance mechanisms can be acquired and sustained within the H. influenzae population, highlighting the continued importance of antimicrobial resistance surveillance for H. influenzae to monitor susceptibility trends and mechanisms of resistance.

Household Transmission and Symptomology of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Alpha Variant among Children-California and Colorado, 2021.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the household secondary infection risk (SIR) of B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and non-Alpha lineages of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children. STUDY DESIGN: During January to April 2021, we prospectively followed households with a SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected questionnaires, serial nasopharyngeal swabs for reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing and whole genome sequencing, and serial blood samples for serology testing. We calculated SIRs by primary case age (pediatric vs adult), household contact age, and viral lineage. We evaluated risk factors associated with transmission and described symptom profiles among children. RESULTS: Among 36 households with pediatric primary cases, 21 (58%) had secondary infections. Among 91 households with adult primary cases, 51 (56%) had secondary infections. SIRs among pediatric and adult primary cases were 45% and 54%, respectively (OR, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.41-1.54). SIRs among pediatric primary cases with Alpha and non-Alpha lineage were 55% and 46%, respectively (OR, 1.52; 95% CI, 0.51-4.53). SIRs among pediatric and adult household contacts were 55% and 49%, respectively (OR, 1.01; 95% CI, 0.68-1.50). Among pediatric contacts, no significant differences in the odds of acquiring infection by demographic or household characteristics were observed. CONCLUSIONS: Household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from children and adult primary cases to household members was frequent. The risk of secondary infection was similar among child and adult household contacts. Among children, household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the risk of secondary infection was not influenced by lineage. Continued mitigation strategies (eg, masking, physical distancing, vaccination) are needed to protect at-risk groups regardless of virus lineage circulating in communities.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant (B.1.617.2) from a fully vaccinated human to a canine in Georgia, July 2021.

SARS-CoV-2 infection has been described in a wide range of species, including domestic animals such as dogs and cats. Illness in dogs is usually self-limiting, and further diagnostics may not be pursued if clinical signs resolve or they respond to empirical treatment. As new variants emerge, the clinical presentation and role in transmission may vary in animals. This report highlights different clinical presentations and immunological responses in two SARS-CoV-2 Delta-variant-positive dogs with similar exposure to the same fully vaccinated human with a SARS-CoV-2 infection and emphasizes the need for active surveillance and additional One Health research on SARS-CoV-2 variant infections in companion animals and other species.

Genomic Insights on Variation Underlying Capsule Expression in Meningococcal Carriage Isolates From University Students, United States, 2015-2016.

In January and February 2015, Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B (NmB) outbreaks occurred at two universities in the United States, and mass vaccination campaigns using MenB vaccines were initiated as part of a public health response. Meningococcal carriage evaluations were conducted concurrently with vaccination campaigns at these two universities and at a third university, where no NmB outbreak occurred. Meningococcal isolates (N = 1,514) obtained from these evaluations were characterized for capsule biosynthesis by whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Functional capsule polysaccharide synthesis (cps) loci belonging to one of seven capsule genogroups (B, C, E, W, X, Y, and Z) were identified in 122 isolates (8.1%). Approximately half [732 (48.4%)] of isolates could not be genogrouped because of the lack of any serogroup-specific genes. The remaining 660 isolates (43.5%) contained serogroup-specific genes for genogroup B, C, E, W, X, Y, or Z, but had mutations in the cps loci. Identified mutations included frameshift or point mutations resulting in premature stop codons, missing or fragmented genes, or disruptions due to insertion elements. Despite these mutations, 49/660 isolates expressed capsule as observed with slide agglutination, whereas 45/122 isolates with functional cps loci did not express capsule. Neither the variable capsule expression nor the genetic variation in the cps locus was limited to a certain clonal complex, except for capsule null isolates (predominantly clonal complex 198). Most of the meningococcal carriage isolates collected from student populations at three US universities were non-groupable as a result of either being capsule null or containing mutations within the capsule locus. Several mutations inhibiting expression of the genes involved with the synthesis and transport of the capsule may be reversible, allowing the bacteria to switch between an encapsulated and non-encapsulated state. These findings are particularly important as carriage is an important component of the transmission cycle of the pathogen, and understanding the impact of genetic variations on the synthesis of capsule, a meningococcal vaccine target and an important virulence factor, may ultimately inform strategies for control and prevention of disease caused by this pathogen.

Antimicrobial Susceptibility Survey of Invasive Neisseria meningitidis, United States 2012-2016.

BACKGROUND: Historically, antimicrobial resistance has been rare in US invasive meningococcal disease cases. METHODS: Meningococcal isolates (n = 695) were collected through population-based surveillance, 2012-2016, and national surveillance, 2015-2016. Antimicrobial susceptibility was assessed by broth microdilution. Resistance mechanisms were characterized using whole-genome sequencing. RESULTS: All isolates were susceptible to 6 antibiotics (cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, meropenem, rifampin, minocycline, and azithromycin). Approximately 25% were penicillin or ampicillin intermediate; among these, 79% contained mosaic penA gene mutations. Less than 1% of isolates were penicillin, ampicillin, ciprofloxacin, or levofloxacin resistant. CONCLUSIONS: Penicillin- and ampicillin-intermediate isolates were common, but resistance to clinically relevant antibiotics remained rare.

Risk Factors for Invasive Meningococcal Disease Belonging to a Novel Urethritis Clade of Neisseria meningitidis-United States, 2013-2017.

We describe cases of invasive meningococcal disease caused by nongroupable Neisseria meningitidis belonging to a novel phylogenetic clade associated with urethritis. Seven cases were identified, comprising 0.6% of sequenced invasive meningococcal disease isolates from 2013 to 2017. Five patients had a known or likely immunocompromising condition, including 2 with a complement deficiency.

Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants: Predominance of the Delta (B.1.617.2) and Omicron (B.1.1.529) Variants - United States, June 2021-January 2022.

Genomic surveillance is a critical tool for tracking emerging variants of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19), which can exhibit characteristics that potentially affect public health and clinical interventions, including increased transmissibility, illness severity, and capacity for immune escape. During June 2021-January 2022, CDC expanded genomic surveillance data sources to incorporate sequence data from public repositories to produce weighted estimates of variant proportions at the jurisdiction level and refined analytic methods to enhance the timeliness and accuracy of national and regional variant proportion estimates. These changes also allowed for more comprehensive variant proportion estimation at the jurisdictional level (i.e., U.S. state, district, territory, and freely associated state). The data in this report are a summary of findings of recent proportions of circulating variants that are updated weekly on CDC's COVID Data Tracker website to enable timely public health action.† The SARS-CoV-2 Delta (B.1.617.2 and AY sublineages) variant rose from 1% to >50% of viral lineages circulating nationally during 8 weeks, from May 1-June 26, 2021. Delta-associated infections remained predominant until being rapidly overtaken by infections associated with the Omicron (B.1.1.529 and BA sublineages) variant in December 2021, when Omicron increased from 1% to >50% of circulating viral lineages during a 2-week period. As of the week ending January 22, 2022, Omicron was estimated to account for 99.2% (95% CI = 99.0%-99.5%) of SARS-CoV-2 infections nationwide, and Delta for 0.7% (95% CI = 0.5%-1.0%). The dynamic landscape of SARS-CoV-2 variants in 2021, including Delta- and Omicron-driven resurgences of SARS-CoV-2 transmission across the United States, underscores the importance of robust genomic surveillance efforts to inform public health planning and practice.

Household Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Alpha Variant-United States, 2021.

BACKGROUND: In Spring 2021, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.1.7 (Alpha) became the predominant variant in the United States. Research suggests that Alpha has increased transmissibility compared with non-Alpha lineages. We estimated household secondary infection risk (SIR), assessed characteristics associated with transmission, and compared symptoms of persons with Alpha and non-Alpha infections. METHODS: We followed households with SARS-CoV-2 infection for 2 weeks in San Diego County and metropolitan Denver, January to April 2021. We collected epidemiologic information and biospecimens for serology, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and whole-genome sequencing. We stratified SIR and symptoms by lineage and identified characteristics associated with transmission using generalized estimating equations. RESULTS: We investigated 127 households with 322 household contacts; 72 households (56.7%) had member(s) with secondary infections. SIRs were not significantly higher for Alpha (61.0% [95% confidence interval, 52.4-69.0%]) than non-Alpha (55.6% [44.7-65.9%], P = .49). In households with Alpha, persons who identified as Asian or Hispanic/Latino had significantly higher SIRs than those who identified as White (P = .01 and .03, respectively). Close contact (eg, kissing, hugging) with primary cases was associated with increased transmission for all lineages. Persons with Alpha infection were more likely to report constitutional symptoms than persons with non-Alpha (86.9% vs 76.8%, P = .05). CONCLUSIONS: Household SIRs were similar for Alpha and non-Alpha. Comparable SIRs may be due to saturation of transmission risk in households due to extensive close contact, or true lack of difference in transmission rates. Avoiding close contact within households may reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission for all lineages among household members.

Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated With a Large Indoor Convention - New York City, November-December 2021.

During November 19-21, 2021, an indoor convention (event) in New York City (NYC), was attended by approximately 53,000 persons from 52 U.S. jurisdictions and 30 foreign countries. In-person registration for the event began on November 18, 2021. The venue was equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, and attendees were required to wear a mask indoors and have documented receipt of at least 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.* On December 2, 2021, the Minnesota Department of Health reported the first case of community-acquired COVID-19 in the United States caused by the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant in a person who had attended the event (1). CDC collaborated with state and local health departments to assess event-associated COVID-19 cases and potential exposures among U.S.-based attendees using data from COVID-19 surveillance systems and an anonymous online attendee survey. Among 34,541 attendees with available contact information, surveillance data identified test results for 4,560, including 119 (2.6%) persons from 16 jurisdictions with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Most (4,041 [95.2%]), survey respondents reported always wearing a mask while indoors at the event. Compared with test-negative respondents, test-positive respondents were more likely to report attending bars, karaoke, or nightclubs, and eating or drinking indoors near others for at least 15 minutes. Among 4,560 attendees who received testing, evidence of widespread transmission during the event was not identified. Genomic sequencing of 20 specimens identified the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant (AY.25 and AY.103 sublineages) in 15 (75%) cases, and the Omicron variant (BA.1 sublineage) in five (25%) cases. These findings reinforce the importance of implementing multiple, simultaneous prevention measures, such as ensuring up-to-date vaccination, mask use, physical distancing, and improved ventilation in limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission, during large, indoor events.†.

Evaluation of Urethrotropic-Clade Meningococcal Infection by Urine Metagenomic Shotgun Sequencing.

Urethral infections caused by an emerging nongroupable (NG) urethrotropic clade of Neisseria meningitidis were first reported in the United States in 2015 (the "U.S. NmNG urethritis clade"). Here, we evaluate for the presence of other urethral pathogens in men with U.S. NmNG urethritis clade infection. We evaluated 129 urine specimens collected from men at a sexual health clinic, including 33 from patients with culture-confirmed or suspected urethral N. meningitidis infection and 96 specimens in which nucleic acid amplification test detected Neisseria gonorrhoeae, Chlamydia trachomatis, both pathogens, or neither pathogen. N. meningitidis was detected first by real-time PCR, followed by metagenomic shotgun sequencing of 91 specimens to identify coinfections. N. meningitidis genomes were sequenced following selective whole-genome amplification when possible. Metagenomic sequencing detected N. meningitidis in 16 of 17 specimens from culture-confirmed N. meningitidis cases, with no coinfection by other conventional urethral pathogens. Metagenomic sequencing also detected N. meningitidis in three C. trachomatis-positive specimens, one specimen positive for both N. gonorrhoeae and C. trachomatis, and nine specimens with negative N. gonorrhoeae and C. trachomatis results, eight of which had suspected Neisseria infections. N. meningitidis from culture-confirmed N. meningitidis cases belonged to the U.S. NmNG urethritis clade, while N. meningitidis identified in other specimens belonged to multiple clonal complexes. Additional urethral pathogens were predominant in non-N. meningitidis specimens, including N. gonorrhoeae, C. trachomatis, Mycoplasma genitalium, Ureaplasma urealyticum, and herpes simplex virus 2. Coinfection with other conventional urethral pathogens is rare in men with culture-confirmed U.S. NmNG urethritis clade infection and points to the strong association of this clade with disease.

Infection With the US Neisseria meningitidis Urethritis Clade Does Not Lower Future Risk of Urethral Gonorrhea.

BACKGROUND: Cross-protective immunity between Neisseria meningitidis (Nm) and Neisseria gonorrhoeae (Ng) may inform gonococcal vaccine development. Meningococcal serogroup B (MenB) outer membrane vesicle (OMV) vaccines confer modest protection against gonorrhea. However, whether urethral Nm infection protects against gonorrhea is unknown. We examined gonorrhea risk among men with US Nm urethritis clade (US_NmUC) infections. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective cohort study of men with urethral US_NmUC (n = 128) between January 2015 and April 2018. Using diagnosis date as the baseline visit, we examined Ng status at return visits to compute urethral Ng risk. We compared these data to 3 referent populations: men with urethral Ng (n = 253), urethral chlamydia (Ct) (n = 251), and no urethral Ng or Ct (n = 255). We conducted sensitivity analyses to assess varied approaches to censoring, missing data, and anatomical site of infection. We also compared sequences of protein antigens in the OMV-based MenB-4C vaccine, US_NmUC, and Ng. RESULTS: Participants were primarily Black (65%) and heterosexual (82%). Over follow-up, 91 men acquired urethral Ng. Men with urethral US_NmUC had similar Ng risk to men with prior urethral Ng (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR]: 1.27; 95% CI: .65-2.48). Men with urethral US_NmUC had nonsignificantly increased Ng risk compared with men with urethral Ct (aHR: 1.51; 95% CI: .79-2.88), and significantly increased Ng risk compared with men without urethral Ng or Ct (aHR: 3.55; 95% CI: 1.27-9.91). Most of the protein antigens analyzed shared high sequence similarity. CONCLUSIONS: Urethral US_NmUC infection did not protect against gonorrhea despite substantial sequence similarities in shared protein antigens.

One Health Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 in People and Animals on Multiple Mink Farms in Utah.

From July−November 2020, mink (Neogale vison) on 12 Utah farms experienced an increase in mortality rates due to confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. We conducted epidemiologic investigations on six farms to identify the source of virus introduction, track cross-species transmission, and assess viral evolution. Interviews were conducted and specimens were collected from persons living or working on participating farms and from multiple animal species. Swabs and sera were tested by SARS-CoV-2 real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and serological assays, respectively. Whole genome sequencing was attempted for specimens with cycle threshold values <30. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection was detected by rRT-PCR or serology in ≥1 person, farmed mink, dog, and/or feral cat on each farm. Sequence analysis showed high similarity between mink and human sequences on corresponding farms. On farms sampled at multiple time points, mink tested rRT-PCR positive up to 16 weeks post-onset of increased mortality. Workers likely introduced SARS-CoV-2 to mink, and mink transmitted SARS-CoV-2 to other animal species; mink-to-human transmission was not identified. Our findings provide critical evidence to support interventions to prevent and manage SARS-CoV-2 in people and animals on mink farms and emphasizes the importance of a One Health approach to address emerging zoonoses.

Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants Circulating in the United States, December 2020-May 2021.

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is constantly mutating, leading to new variants (1). Variants have the potential to affect transmission, disease severity, diagnostics, therapeutics, and natural and vaccine-induced immunity. In November 2020, CDC established national surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants using genomic sequencing. As of May 6, 2021, sequences from 177,044 SARS-CoV-2-positive specimens collected during December 20, 2020-May 6, 2021, from 55 U.S. jurisdictions had been generated by or reported to CDC. These included 3,275 sequences for the 2-week period ending January 2, 2021, compared with 25,000 sequences for the 2-week period ending April 24, 2021 (0.1% and 3.1% of reported positive SARS-CoV-2 tests, respectively). Because sequences might be generated by multiple laboratories and sequence availability varies both geographically and over time, CDC developed statistical weighting and variance estimation methods to generate population-based estimates of the proportions of identified variants among SARS-CoV-2 infections circulating nationwide and in each of the 10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) geographic regions.* During the 2-week period ending April 24, 2021, the B.1.1.7 and P.1 variants represented an estimated 66.0% and 5.0% of U.S. SARS-CoV-2 infections, respectively, demonstrating the rise to predominance of the B.1.1.7 variant of concern† (VOC) and emergence of the P.1 VOC in the United States. Using SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance methods to analyze surveillance data produces timely population-based estimates of the proportions of variants circulating nationally and regionally. Surveillance findings demonstrate the potential for new variants to emerge and become predominant, and the importance of robust genomic surveillance. Along with efforts to characterize the clinical and public health impact of SARS-CoV-2 variants, surveillance can help guide interventions to control the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.

Genetic Diversity of Meningococcal Serogroup B Vaccine Antigens among Carriage Isolates Collected from Students at Three Universities in the United States, 2015-2016.

Carriage evaluations were conducted during 2015 to 2016 at two U.S. universities in conjunction with the response to disease outbreaks caused by Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B and at a university where outbreak and response activities had not occurred. All eligible students at the two universities received the serogroup B meningococcal factor H binding protein vaccine (MenB-FHbp); 5.2% of students (181/3,509) at one university received MenB-4C. A total of 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates were obtained from 8,905 oropharyngeal swabs from 7,001 unique participants. Whole-genome sequencing data were analyzed to understand MenB-FHbp's impact on carriage and antigen genetic diversity and distribution. Of 1,422 isolates from carriers with known vaccination status (726 [51.0%] from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated, 42 [3.0%] from MenB-4C-vaccinated, and 654 [46.0%] from unvaccinated participants), 1,406 (98.9%) had intact fHbp alleles (716 from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated participants). Of 726 isolates from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated participants, 250 (34.4%) harbored FHbp peptides that may be covered by MenB-FHbp. Genogroup B was detected in 122/1,422 (8.6%) and 112/1,422 (7.9%) isolates from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated and unvaccinated participants, respectively. FHbp subfamily and peptide distributions between MenB-FHbp-vaccinated and unvaccinated participants were not statistically different. Eighteen of 161 MenB-FHbp-vaccinated repeat carriers (11.2%) acquired a new strain containing one or more new vaccine antigen peptides during multiple rounds of sample collection, which was not statistically different (P = 0.3176) from the unvaccinated repeat carriers (1/30; 3.3%). Our findings suggest that lack of MenB vaccine impact on carriage was not due to missing the intact fHbp gene; MenB-FHbp did not affect antigen genetic diversity and distribution during the study period.IMPORTANCE The impact of serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccines on carriage is not completely understood. Using whole-genome sequencing data, we assessed the diversity and distribution of MenB vaccine antigens (particularly FHbp) among 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates recovered from vaccinated and unvaccinated students at three U.S. universities, two of which underwent MenB-FHbp mass vaccination campaigns following meningococcal disease outbreaks. The majority of carriage isolates recovered from participants harbored intact fHbp genes, about half of which were recovered from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated participants. The distribution of vaccine antigen peptides was similar among carriage isolates recovered from vaccinated and unvaccinated participants, and almost all strains recovered from repeat carriers retained the same vaccine antigen profile, suggesting insignificant vaccine selective pressure on the carriage population in these universities.

Using Neisseria meningitidis genomic diversity to inform outbreak strain identification.

Meningococcal disease is a life-threatening illness caused by the human-restricted bacterium Neisseria meningitidis. Outbreaks in the USA involve at least two cases in an organization or community caused by the same serogroup within three months. Genome comparisons, including phylogenetic analysis and quantification of genome distances can provide confirmatory evidence of pathogen transmission during an outbreak. Interpreting genome distances depends on understanding their distribution both among isolates from outbreaks and among those not from outbreaks. Here, we identify outbreak strains based on phylogenetic relationships among 141 N. meningitidis isolates collected from 28 outbreaks in the USA during 2010-2017 and 1516 non-outbreak isolates collected through contemporaneous meningococcal surveillance. We show that genome distance thresholds based on the maximum SNPs and allele distances among isolates in the phylogenetically defined outbreak strains are sufficient to separate most pairs of non-outbreak isolates into separate strains. Non-outbreak isolate pairs that could not be distinguished from each other based on genetic distances were concentrated in the clonal complexes CC11, CC103, and CC32. Within each of these clonal complexes, phylodynamic analysis identified a group of isolates with extremely low diversity, collected over several years and multiple states. Clusters of isolates with low genetic diversity could indicate increased pathogen transmission, potentially resulting in local outbreaks or nationwide clonal expansions.

Acquisition of Ciprofloxacin Resistance Among an Expanding Clade of ß-Lactamase-Positive, Serogroup Y Neisseria meningitidis in the United States.

BACKGROUND: Penicillin and ciprofloxacin are important for invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) management and prevention. IMD cases caused by penicillin- and ciprofloxacin-resistant Neisseria meningitidis containing a ROB-1 ß-lactamase gene (blaROB-1) and a mutated DNA gyrase gene (gyrA) have been recently reported in the United States. METHODS: We examined 2097 meningococcal genomes collected through US population-based surveillance from January 2011 to February 2020 to identify IMD cases caused by strains with blaROB-1- or gyrA-mediated resistance. Antimicrobial resistance was confirmed phenotypically. The US isolate genomes were compared to non-US isolate genomes containing blaROB-1. Interspecies transfer of ciprofloxacin resistance was assessed by comparing gyrA among Neisseria species. RESULTS: Eleven penicillin- and ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates were identified after December 2018; all were serogroup Y, sequence type 3587, clonal complex (CC) 23, and contained blaROB-1 and a T91I-containing gyrA allele. An additional 22 penicillin-resistant, blaROB-1- containing US isolates with wild-type gyrA were identified from 2013 to 2020. All 33 blaROB-1-containing isolates formed a single clade, along with 12 blaROB-1-containing isolates from 6 other countries. Two-thirds of blaROB-1-containing US isolates were from Hispanic individuals. Twelve additional ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates with gyrA T91 mutations were identified. Ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates belonged to 6 CCs and contained 10 unique gyrA alleles; 7 were similar or identical to alleles from Neisseria lactamica or Neisseria gonorrhoeae. CONCLUSIONS: Recent IMD cases caused by a dual resistant serogroup Y suggest changing antimicrobial resistance patterns in the United States. The emerging dual resistance is due to acquisition of ciprofloxacin resistance by ß-lactamase-containing N. meningitidis. Routine antimicrobial resistance surveillance will effectively monitor resistance changes and spread.

ß-Lactamase-Producing, Ciprofloxacin-Resistant Neisseria meningitidis Isolated From a 5-Month-Old Boy in the United States.

Worldwide, there have been few reports of ß-lactamases causing penicillin resistance in Neisseria meningitidis. The first known case of disease in the United States due to a ß-lactamase-producing, ciprofloxacin-resistant N. meningitidis was recently identified. This has potential implications on standard laboratory testing and empiric management of meningococcal disease.