The social underpinnings of mental distress in the time of COVID-19 - time for urgent action.

We argue that predictions of a 'tsunami' of mental health problems as a consequence of the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and the lockdown are overstated; feelings of anxiety and sadness are entirely normal reactions to difficult circumstances, not symptoms of poor mental health.  Some people will need specialised mental health support, especially those already leading tough lives; we need immediate reversal of years of underfunding of community mental health services.  However, the disproportionate effects of COVID-19 on the most disadvantaged, especially BAME people placed at risk by their social and economic conditions, were entirely predictable. Mental health is best ensured by urgently rebuilding the social and economic supports stripped away over the last decade. Governments must pump funds into local authorities to rebuild community services, peer support, mutual aid and local community and voluntary sector organisations.  Health care organisations must tackle racism and discrimination to ensure genuine equal access to universal health care.  Government must replace highly conditional benefit systems by something like a universal basic income. All economic and social policies must be subjected to a legally binding mental health audit. This may sound unfeasibly expensive, but the social and economic costs, not to mention the costs in personal and community suffering, though often invisible, are far greater.

The right to live independently and be included in the community.

The segregation and isolation of people with disabilities are global problems, rooted in legislation and policy, social norms and traditional practices. The right to live independently and be included in the community, contained in article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, was created to combat the phenomenon of institutionalization and to spur efforts towards its eventual eradication. This essay offers a commentary on article 19, drawing on its drafting history, on the interpretation provided by the responsible UN body and on the efforts by that body to monitor and encourage compliance. It emphasizes the extent of the transformation required to realize the full ambition of the article and the need for cooperation across UN treaty bodies.

Decision-making capacity for treatment in psychiatric and medical in-patients: cross-sectional, comparative study.

BACKGROUND: Is the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC) for treatment significantly different in medical and psychiatric patients? AIMS: To compare the abilities relevant to DMC for treatment in medical and psychiatric patients who are able to communicate a treatment choice. METHOD: A secondary analysis of two cross-sectional studies of consecutive admissions: 125 to a psychiatric hospital and 164 to a medical hospital. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool - Treatment and a clinical interview were used to assess decision-making abilities (understanding, appreciating and reasoning) and judgements of DMC. We limited analysis to patients able to express a choice about treatment and stratified the analysis by low and high understanding ability. RESULTS: Most people scoring low on understanding were judged to lack DMC and there was no difference by hospital (P = 0.14). In both hospitals there were patients who were able to understand yet lacked DMC (39% psychiatric v. 13% medical in-patients, P<0.001). Appreciation was a better 'test' of DMC in the psychiatric hospital (where psychotic and severe affective disorders predominated) (P<0.001), whereas reasoning was a better test of DMC in the medical hospital (where cognitive impairment was common) (P = 0.02). CONCLUSIONS: Among those with good understanding, the appreciation ability had more salience to DMC for treatment in a psychiatric setting and the reasoning ability had more salience in a medical setting.

Mired in confusion: making sense of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards.

INTRODUCTION: There is uncertainty about how to identify deprivation of liberty and the interface of the Mental Health Act and Mental Capacity Act Safeguards. OBJECTIVE To increase current understanding by exploring how an expert legal panel interpret existing case law relating to deprivation of liberty in the clinical setting. Design Clinical vignettes of real patients were used to explore lawyers' thinking about important factors that: (1) distinguish lawful restriction from deprivation of liberty and (2) govern the choice between safeguard regimes when there is deprivation of liberty. The relative importance of such factors was discussed in a consensus meeting using a modified nominal group approach. Participants and setting Six eminent barristers and solicitors with expertise in mental health law attended a consensus meeting after making individual judgements about vignettes describing the situations of 28 incapacitated patients who had been admitted informally to a range of psychiatric inpatient units in South East London. RESULTS: Lawyers attributed key importance to a patient's 'freedom to leave' and suggested that patients' subjective experiences should be considered when identifying deprivation of liberty. CONCLUSIONS Clarification of deprivation of liberty and its safeguards will develop with future case law. Based on current available case law, the lawyers' expert views represented a divergence from Code of Practice guidance. We suggest that clinicians give consideration to this.

Publishing SNP genotypes of human embryonic stem cell lines: policy statement of the International Stem Cell Forum Ethics Working Party.

Novel methods and associated tools permitting individual identification in publicly accessible SNP databases have become a debatable issue. There is growing concern that current technical and ethical safeguards to protect the identities of donors could be insufficient. In the context of human embryonic stem cell research, there are no studies focusing on the probability that an hESC line donor could be identified by analyzing published SNP profiles and associated genotypic and phenotypic information. We present the International Stem Cell Forum (ISCF) Ethics Working Party's Policy Statement on "Publishing SNP Genotypes of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines (hESC)". The Statement prospectively addresses issues surrounding the publication of genotypic data and associated annotations of hESC lines in open access databases. It proposes a balanced approach between the goals of open science and data sharing with the respect for fundamental bioethical principles (autonomy, privacy, beneficence, justice and research merit and integrity).

Retrospective views of psychiatric in-patients regaining mental capacity.

BACKGROUND: An individual's right to self-determination in treatment decisions is a central principle of modern medical ethics and law, and is upheld except under conditions of mental incapacity. When doctors, particularly psychiatrists, override the treatment wishes of individuals, they risk conflicting with this principle. Few data are available on the views of people regaining capacity who had their treatment wishes overridden. AIMS: To investigate individuals' views on treatment decisions after they had regained capacity. METHOD: One hundred and fifteen people who lacked capacity to make treatment decisions were recruited from a sample of consecutively admitted patients to a large psychiatric hospital. After 1 month of treatment we asked the individuals for their views on the surrogate treatment decisions they received. RESULTS: Eighty-three per cent (95% CI 66-93) of people who regained capacity gave retrospective approval. Approval was no different between those admitted informally or involuntarily using Mental Health Act powers (chi(2) = 1.52, P = 0.47). Individuals were more likely to give retrospective approval if they regained capacity (chi(2) = 14.2, P = 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: Most people who regain capacity following psychiatric treatment indicate retrospective approval. This is the case even if initial treatment wishes are overridden. These findings moderate concerns both about surrogate decision-making by psychiatrists and advance decision-making by people with mental illness.

Mental capacity and psychiatric in-patients: implications for the new mental health law in England and Wales.

BACKGROUND: In England and Wales mental health services need to take account of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983. The overlap between these two causes dilemmas for clinicians. AIMS: To describe the frequency and characteristics of patients who fall into two potentially anomalous groups: those who are not detained but lack mental capacity; and those who are detained but have mental capacity. METHOD: Cross-sectional study of 200 patients admitted to psychiatric wards. We assessed mental capacity using a semi-structured interview, the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T). RESULTS: Of the in-patient sample, 24% were informal but lacked capacity: these patients felt more coerced and had greater levels of treatment refusal than informal participants with capacity. People detained under the Mental Health Act with capacity comprised a small group (6%) that was hard to characterise. CONCLUSIONS: Our data suggest that psychiatrists in England and Wales need to take account of the Mental Capacity Act, and in particular best interests judgments and deprivation of liberty safeguards, more explicitly than is perhaps currently the case.

Mental capacity to make decisions on treatment in people admitted to psychiatric hospitals: cross sectional study.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the prevalence of mental capacity to make decisions on treatment in people from different diagnostic and legal groups admitted to psychiatric hospital. DESIGN: Cross sectional study. SETTING: General adult acute psychiatric inpatient units. PARTICIPANTS: 350 consecutive people admitted to psychiatric wards from the community over 16 months. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Mental capacity assessed by clinical interview and the MacArthur competence assessment tool for treatment. RESULTS: Estimates of mental capacity were obtained on 97% (n=338) of the 350 people admitted. Of those an estimated 60% (95% confidence interval 55% to 65%) lacked mental capacity to make decisions on treatment. This proportion varied according to diagnosis, ranging from 97% (n=36) in people with mania to 4% (n=24) in people with personality disorder. Mental incapacity was common in patients admitted informally to the psychiatric wards (n=188; 39%, 32% to 46%). Incapacity and detention are closely associated under non-capacity based mental health law. CONCLUSIONS: Mental incapacity to make decisions on treatment is common in people admitted to psychiatric wards from the community but cannot be presumed. It is usual in those detained under the Mental Health Act and common in those admitted voluntarily.

Balancing autonomy and risk: a failure of nerve in England and Wales?

Specialised mental health legislation typically provides for the hospitalisation and treatment of those with mental disorders in the absence of their consent. The article examines the possible justifications for the existence of these special powers and argues that two of the most common justifications, the protection of the patient and the protection of others, do discriminate against those with a mental, as opposed to a physical, disorder. The relationship between mental health and mental capacity, or guardianship, legislation is then considered and possible ways forward are discussed with particular reference to the current reform debate in England and Wales.

Reliability of mental capacity assessments in psychiatric in-patients.

BACKGROUND: Previous work on the reliability of mental capacity assessments in patients with psychiatric illness has been limited. AIMS: To describe the interrater reliability of two independent assessments of capacity to consent to treatment, as well as assessments made by a panel of clinicians based on the same interview. METHOD: Fifty-five patients were interviewed by two interviewers 1-7 days apart and a binary (yes/no) capacity judgement was made, guided by the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T). Four senior clinicians used transcripts of the interviews to judge capacity. RESULTS: There was excellent agreement between the two interviewers for capacity judgements made at separate interviews (kappa=0.82). A high level of agreement was seen between senior clinicians for capacity judgements of the same interview (mean kappa=0.84). CONCLUSIONS: In combination with a clinical interview, the MacCAT-T can be used to produce highly reliable judgements of capacity.

Prevalence and predictors of mental incapacity in psychiatric in-patients.

BACKGROUND: Little is known about the proportion of psychiatric in-patients who lack capacity to make treatment decisions, or the associations of lack of capacity. AIMS: To determine the prevalence of psychiatric in-patients who lack capacity to make decisions about current treatment and to identify demographic and clinical associations with lack of mental capacity. METHOD: Patients (n=112) were interviewed soon after admission to hospital and a binary judgement of capacity was made, guided by the MacArthur Competence Tool for Treatment. Demographic and clinical information was collected from an interview and case notes. RESULTS: Of the 112 participants, 49 (43.8%) lacked treatment-related decisional capacity. Mania and psychosis, poor insight, delusions and Black and minority ethnic group were associated with mental incapacity. Of the 49 patients lacking capacity, 30 (61%) were detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. Of the 63 with capacity, 6 (9.5%) were detained. CONCLUSIONS: Lack of treatment-related decisional capacity is a common but by no means inevitable correlate of admission to a psychiatric in-patient unit.

Autonomy, guardianship and mental disorder: one problem, two solutions.

The law in England and Wales governing both the provision of medical care in the case of adults with incapacity and the provision of care and treatment for mental disorder presents serious problems for the principle of patient autonomy. The adult with incapacity has no competence either to consent to or refuse medical treatment but the law provides no statutory structure for substitute decision making on that adult's behalf. On the other hand the law does allow a person with mental disorder to be treated for that disorder despite his or her competent refusal. The nature of these inconsistencies is considered and the implications which flow from the singling out of mental disorder are examined with reference to experience in two Australian jurisdictions. The current proposals for reform of the Mental Health Act are then considered in the light of the conclusions drawn.