States of epistemic curiosity interfere with memory for incidental scholastic facts.

Curiosity can be a powerful motivator to learn and retain new information. Evidence shows that high states of curiosity elicited by a specific source (i.e., a trivia question) can promote memory for incidental stimuli (non-target) presented close in time. The spreading effect of curiosity states on memory for other information has potential for educational applications. Specifically, it could provide techniques to improve learning for information that did not spark a sense of curiosity on its own. Here, we investigated how high states of curiosity induced through trivia questions affect memory performance for unrelated scholastic facts (e.g., scientific, English, or historical facts) presented in close temporal proximity to the trivia question. Across three task versions, participants viewed trivia questions closely followed in time by a scholastic fact unrelated to the trivia question, either just prior to or immediately following the answer to the trivia question. Participants then completed a surprise multiple-choice memory test (akin to a pop quiz) for the scholastic material. In all three task versions, memory performance was poorer for scholastic facts presented after trivia questions that had elicited high versus low levels of curiosity. These results contradict previous findings showing curiosity-enhanced memory for incidentally presented visual stimuli and suggest that target information that generates a high-curiosity state interferes with encoding complex and unrelated scholastic facts presented close in time.

Aha! and D'oh! experiences enhance learning for incidental information-new evidence supports the insight memory advantage.

Research on creative problem-solving finds that solutions achieved via spontaneous insight (i.e., Aha! moment) are better remembered than solutions reached without this sense of epiphany, referred to as an "insight memory advantage." We hypothesized that the insight memory advantage can spread to incidental information encoded in the moments surrounding insight as well. Participants (N = 291) were first given Rebus puzzles. After they indicated that they had found a solution, but before they could submit this solution, they were presented with scholastic facts that were incidental and unrelated to the problem at hand. Participants indicated whether they reached the solution via either insight or a step-by-step analysis. Memory results showed better performance for incidental scholastic facts presented when problem solving was accompanied by a spontaneous (Aha! experience) and induced (D'oh! experience) insight compared with solutions reached with analysis. This finding suggests that the memory advantage for problems solved via insight spreads to other unrelated information encoded in close temporal proximity and has implications for novel techniques to enhance learning in educational settings.

Gestalt's Perspective on Insight: A Recap Based on Recent Behavioral and Neuroscientific Evidence.

The Gestalt psychologists' theory of insight problem-solving was based on a direct parallelism between perceptual experience and higher-order forms of cognition (e.g., problem-solving). Similarly, albeit not exclusively, to the sudden recognition of bistable figures, these psychologists contended that problem-solving involves a restructuring of one's initial representation of the problem's elements, leading to a sudden leap of understanding phenomenologically indexed by the "Aha!" feeling. Over the last century, different scholars have discussed the validity of the Gestalt psychologists' perspective, foremost using the behavioral measures available at the time. However, in the last two decades, scientists have gained a deeper understanding of insight problem-solving due to the advancements in cognitive neuroscience. This review aims to provide a retrospective reading of Gestalt theory based on the knowledge accrued by adopting novel paradigms of research and investigating their neurophysiological correlates. Among several key points that the Gestalt psychologists underscored, we focus specifically on the role of the visual system in marking a discrete switch of knowledge into awareness, as well as the perceptual experience and holistic standpoints. While the main goal of this paper is to read the previous theory in light of new evidence, we also hope to initiate an academic discussion and encourage further research about the points we raise.

Insight Problem Solving Ability Predicts Reduced Susceptibility to Fake News, Bullshit, and Overclaiming.

The information humans are exposed to has grown exponentially. This has placed increased demands upon our information selection strategies resulting in reduced fact-checking and critical-thinking time. Prior research shows that problem solving (traditionally measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test-CRT) negatively correlates with believing in false information. We argue that this result is specifically related to insight problem solving. Solutions via insight are the result of parallel processing, characterized by filtering external noise, and, unlike cognitively controlled thinking, it does not suffer from the cognitive overload associated with processing multiple sources of information. We administered the Compound Remote Associate Test (problems used to investigate insight problem solving) as well as the CRT, 20 fake and real news headlines, the bullshit, and overclaiming scales to a sample of 61 participants. Results show that insight problem solving predicts better identification of fake news and bullshit (over and above traditional measures i.e., the CRT), and is associated with reduced overclaiming. These results have implications for understanding individual differences in susceptibility to believing false information.

Insight and the selection of ideas.

Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.

Does social rigidity predict cognitive rigidity? Profiles of socio-cognitive polarization.

Recent research has proposed a relationship between rigid political ideologies and underlying 'cognitive styles'. However, there remain discrepancies in how both social and cognitive rigidity are defined and measured. Problem-solving, or the ability to generate novel ideas by exploring unusual reasoning paths and challenging rigid perspectives around us, is often used to operationalize cognitive flexibility. Thus, we hypothesized a relation between forms of social rigidity, including Socio-cognitive polarization (i.e., a factor capturing conservative political ideology, absolutism/intolerance of ambiguity, and xenophobia), bullshit receptivity (i.e., overestimating pseudo-profound statements), overclaiming (tendency to self-enhance), and cognitive rigidity (i.e., problem-solving). Our results showed differences in performance on problem-solving tasks between four latent profiles of social rigidity identified in our sample. Specifically, those low in socio-cognitive polarization, bullshit, and overclaiming (i.e., less rigid) performed the best on problem-solving. Thus, we conclude that social and cognitive rigidity may share an underlying socio-cognitive construct, wherein those who are more socially rigid are also more likely to be also cognitively rigid when processing non-social information.

Not Getting Vaccinated? It Is a Matter of Problem-Solving Abilities and Socio-Cognitive Polarization.

The anti-COVID-19 vaccination campaign in the United States provided a significant contribution to the control of the virus spread. Despite the recommendations by public health institutions, vaccine skepticism and hesitancy contributed to low vaccine uptake, thus possibly disrupting the management of preventable diseases associated with the COVID-19 infection. The process that led individuals to accept COVID-19 vaccines required the ability to gather, synthesize, and weigh-up information within a novel, dynamically changing, complex, and ambiguous context. To deal with such complexity, we hypothesized that both the ability of reflection and flexible adaptation played a fundamental role. Based on previous research on cognitive predictors of vaccine refusal, we decided to investigate the combined role of two constructs, namely, problem-solving skills and socio-cognitive polarization (SCP), on vaccine acceptance and uptake. Two-hundred-seventy-seven US participants completed an online survey aimed to measure problem-solving ability, through a rebus puzzles task, and SCP, through a composite measure of absolutist thinking, political conservatism, and xenophobia. Mediation analyses indicated that SCP mediated the association between problem-solving ability and vaccine acceptance, so lower problem-solving abilities associated with higher polarization predicted vaccine rejection. Thus, our findings suggested that low problem-solving skills may represent a risk factor for COVID-19 vaccine refusal, with cognitive and social rigidity playing a crucial role in undermining the anti-COVID-19 vaccine uptake.

Executive functioning and divergent thinking predict creative problem-solving in young adults and elderlies.

The role of executive functioning in creative thinking is under debate. Some authors suggested that increased inhibitory control, a component of executive functioning, is detrimental to creative solutions, whereas others argued that executive functions are central to creative problem-solving, thus questioning Guilford's classical distinction between divergent and convergent thinking. Executive functions decline with age. In this study, we investigated the contributions of executive functioning and its age-related decline and divergent thinking to creative problem-solving. To this aim, we divided our sample of sixty healthy adults into two age groups of young adults (20-26 years) and elderly (60-70 years) and we assessed their creative problem-solving abilities (using the compound remote associate problems) as well as other potential cognitive predictors of creative problem-solving (i.e., impulsivity, divergent thinking, verbal working memory, and decision-making style). A linear regression model revealed that the ability to solve problems creatively is negatively predicted by older age and impulsivity, while positively predicted by divergent thinking and verbal working memory. These findings reveal a combined contribution of executive functions and divergent thinking to creative problem-solving, suggesting that both convergent and divergent processes should be considered in interventions to contrast age-related decline.

The Effect of Dopaminergic Replacement Therapy on Creative Thinking and Insight Problem-Solving in Parkinson's Disease Patients.

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo. Here, we tested a group of PD patients when "on" and "off" dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving (Alternative Uses Task, Compound Remote Associates, Rebus Puzzles), and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients "on" medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall (by making more errors) than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were "on" medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while "on" medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity (i.e., an art-bias).

Validation of the Italian Remote Associate Test.

The scientific approach to the study of creative problem solving has shifted from using classic insight problems (e.g., the Nine-dots problem), towards sets of problems that have more robust psychometric properties, such as the Remote Associate Test (RAT). Because it is homogeneous, compact, quickly solvable, and easy to score, the RAT has been used more frequently in recent creativity studies. We applied the Item Response Theory (IRT) to develop an Italian version of this task. The final 51-item test was reliable (α = .89) and provided information over a wide range of ability levels, as revealed by the IRT analysis. The RAT correlated with five measures of creative performance: The Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), three classic insight problems, a set of anagrams purposefully developed, the fluency and flexibility scores of the Alternative Uses Task (AUT), and the Creative Achievements Questionnaire (CAQ). The new measure provided is meant to encourage the study of creativity and problem solving in the Italian language.

Oculometric signature of switch into awareness? Pupil size predicts sudden insight whereas microsaccades predict problem-solving via analysis.

According to the Gestalt theorists, restructuring is an essential component of insight problem-solving, contributes to the "Aha!" experience, and is similar to the perceptual switch experienced when reinterpreting ambiguous figures. Previous research has demonstrated that pupil diameter increases during the perceptual switch of ambiguous figures, and indexes norepeinephrine functioning mediated by the locus coeruleus. In this study, we investigated if pupil diameter similarly predicts the switch into awareness people experience when solving a problem via insight. Additionally, we explored eye movement dynamics during the same task to investigate if the problem-solving strategies used are linked to specific oculomotor behaviors. In 38 participants, pupil diameter increased about 500 msec prior to solution only in trials for which subjects report having an insight. In contrast, participants increased their microsaccade rate only prior to non-insight solutions. Pupil dilation and microsaccades were not reliably related, but both appear to be robust markers of how people solve problems (with or without insight). The pupil size change seen when people have an "Aha!" moment represents an indicator of the switch into awareness of unconscious processes humans depend upon for insight, and suggests important involvement of norepinephrine, via the locus coeruleus, in sudden insight.

TDCS to the right anterior temporal lobe facilitates insight problem-solving.

Problem-solving is essential for advances in cultural, social, and scientific knowledge. It is also one of the most challenging cognitive processes to facilitate. Some problem-solving is deliberate, but frequently people solve problems with a sudden insight, also known as a Eureka or "Aha!" moment. The advantage of solving problems via insight is that these solutions are more accurate, relying on a unique pattern of neural activity, compared to deliberative strategies. The right Anterior Temporal Lobe (rATL), putatively involved in semantic integration, is distinctively activated when people experience an insight. The rATL may contribute to the recognition of distant semantic relations that support insight solutions, although fMRI and EEG evidence for its involvement is, by nature, correlational. In this study, we investigate if focal sub-threshold neuromodulation to the rATL facilitates insight problem-solving. In three different groups, using a within- and between-subjects design, we tested the causal role of this brain region in problem-solving, by applying High Definition Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation to the rATL (active and sham condition) or the left frontopolar region while participants attempted to solve Compound Remote Associates problems before, during and after stimulation. Participants solved a higher percentage of problems, overall, and specifically by insight when they received rATL stimulation, compared to pre-stimulation, and compared to sham and left frontopolar stimulation. These results confirm the crucial role played by the rATL in insight problem-solving.

The relation between state and trait risk taking and problem-solving.

People can solve problems in two main styles: through a methodical analysis, or by a sudden insight (also known as 'Aha!' or 'Eureka!' experience). Analytical solutions are achieved primarily with conscious deliberation in a trial-and-error fashion. 'Aha!' moments, instead, happen suddenly, often without conscious deliberation and are considered a critical facet of creative cognition. Previous research has indicated an association between creativity and risk taking (a personality trait); however, few studies have investigated how a short-term situational state of risk modulates these two different problem-solving styles. In this research, we looked at how both state and trait risks taking is related to different problem-solving styles. To measure risk as a personality trait, we administered the Balloon Analog Risk Task. To investigate risk as a state, we created a scenario, where people had to bet on their problem-solving performance at the beginning of each trial, and we compared the performance of this group with a control group that did not have to bet. The results show no association between risk as a trait and problem-solving style; however, the risk state scenario did produce a shift in dominant problem-solving style with participants in the risk scenario group solving more problems via analysis. We also found that two factors are related to problem-solving accuracy: the amount bet (i.e., when people place higher bets, they solve more problems), and success on the previous trial, especially if the solution was achieved via analysis. Furthermore, the data reveal that when under risk, females are better problem solvers than males.

Gamma tACS over the temporal lobe increases the occurrence of Eureka! moments.

The solution to a problem might manifest itself as a burst of unexpected, unpredictable clarity. Such Eureka! events, or Insight moments, are among the most fascinating mysteries of human cognition, whose neurophysiological substrate seems to include a role for oscillatory activity within the α and γ bands in the right parietal and temporal brain regions. We tested this hypothesis on thirty-one healthy participants using transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation (tACS) to externally amplify α (10 Hz) and γ (40 Hz) activity in the right parietal and temporal lobes, respectively. During γ-tACS over the right temporal lobe, we observed an increase in accuracy on a verbal insight task. Furthermore, electroencephalography (EEG) data revealed an increase in γ spectral power over bilateral temporal lobes after stimulation. Additionally, resting-state functional MRI data acquired before the stimulation session suggested a correlation between behavioral response to right temporal lobe tACS and functional connectivity of bilateral temporal lobes, in line with the bilateral increase in γ band revealed by EEG. Overall, results suggest the possibility of enhancing the probability of generating Eureka! moments in humans by means of frequency-specific noninvasive brain stimulation.

The effects of expected reward on creative problem solving.

Creative problem solving involves search processes, and it is known to be hard to motivate. Reward cues have been found to enhance performance across a range of tasks, even when cues are presented subliminally, without being consciously detected. It is uncertain whether motivational processes, such as reward, can influence problem solving. We tested the effect of supraliminal and subliminal reward on participant performance on problem solving that can be solved by deliberate analysis or by insight. Forty-one participants attempted to solve 100 compound remote associate problems. At the beginning of each problem, a potential reward cue (1 or 25 cents) was displayed, either subliminally (17 ms) or supraliminally (100 ms). Participants earned the displayed reward if they solved the problem correctly. Results showed that the higher subliminal reward increased the percentage of problems solved correctly overall. Second, we explored if subliminal rewards preferentially influenced solutions that were achieved via a sudden insight (mostly processed below awareness) or via a deliberate analysis. Participants solved more problems via insight following high subliminal reward when compared with low subliminal reward, and compared with high supraliminal reward, with no corresponding effect on analytic solving. Striatal dopamine (DA) is thought to influence motivation, reinforce behavior, and facilitate cognition. We speculate that subliminal rewards activate the striatal DA system, enhancing the kinds of automatic integrative processes that lead to more creative strategies for problem solving, without increasing the selectivity of attention, which could impede insight.

Intelligence across the seventh decade in patients with brain injuries acquired in young adulthood.

In this longitudinal study, we examined intelligence in a group of Vietnam veterans in their 60 s who suffered combat-related penetrating traumatic brain injuries (pTBI) in their 20 s (n = 120), as well as matched veterans with no brain damage (n = 33). Intelligence was evaluated using the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) administered before the injury occurred and then again at three points in time over the following 45 years. We tested for potential predictors and correlates of late midlife intelligence score, as well as the recent change in score over the seventh decade. The pTBI group had lower intelligence scores than the control group when currently evaluated. Pre-injury intelligence and the presence of a pTBI were the most consistent predictors of current intelligence scores. While exacerbated intellectual decline occurs following a young-adulthood pTBI and affects everyday life, no evidence for late midlife accelerated cognitive decline or dementia was found.

Insight solutions are correct more often than analytic solutions.

How accurate are insights compared to analytical solutions? In four experiments, we investigated how participants' solving strategies influenced their solution accuracies across different types of problems, including one that was linguistic, one that was visual and two that were mixed visual-linguistic. In each experiment, participants' self-judged insight solutions were, on average, more accurate than their analytic ones. We hypothesised that insight solutions have superior accuracy because they emerge into consciousness in an all-or-nothing fashion when the unconscious solving process is complete, whereas analytic solutions can be guesses based on conscious, prematurely terminated, processing. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that participants' analytic solutions included relatively more incorrect responses (i.e., errors of commission) than timeouts (i.e., errors of omission) compared to their insight responses.