Optimism, pessimism, and positive and negative affectivity in middle-aged adults: a test of a cognitive-affective model of psychological adjustment.

This study attempted to address limitations in the understanding of optimism and pessimism among middle-aged adults. Specifically, a model of affectivity as a mediator of the link between outcome expectancies and psychological adjustment (life satisfaction and depressive symptoms) was presented and examined in a sample of 237 middle-aged adults. Consistent with a mediation model, results of path analyses indicated that optimism and pessimism (particularly the former) had significant direct and indirect links (by means of positive and negative affectivity) with depressive symptoms and life satisfaction. These results add to the small but growing literature identifying optimism and pessimism as important concomitants of psychological adjustment in more mature adults.

Cultural variations in optimistic and pessimistic bias: do Easterners really expect the worst and Westerners really expect the best when predicting future life events?

The authors compared levels of optimistic and pessimistic bias in the prediction of positive and negative life events between European Americans and Japanese. Study 1 showed that European Americans compared with Japanese were more likely to predict positive events to occur to self than to others. The opposite pattern emerged in the prediction of negative events. Study 2 replicated these cultural differences. Furthermore, positive associations emerged between predictions and occurrence of life events 2 months later for both European Americans and Japanese. Across both studies, results of within-groups analyses indicated that both groups expected negative events to be more likely to occur to others than to self (optimistic bias). In addition, Japanese expected positive events to be more likely to occur to others than to self (pessimistic bias). However, European Americans failed to show the expected optimistic bias for positive events.

Counterfactuals and motivation: mood as input to affective enjoyment and preparation.

Two studies demonstrated that moods, in interaction with motivational goals, can influence counterfactual thinking (mental simulations of 'what might have been'). This was shown for performances on laboratory tasks (Study 1) and for real-life course exams (Study 2). In Study 1, with enjoyment goals, participants in good moods generated the greatest number of downward (worse than actuality) counterfactuals; with performance goals, participants in bad moods generated the greatest number of upward (better than actuality) counterfactuals. Downward counterfactuals in good moods with enjoyment goals was reflected in concern with affective motives, positive moods and low preparation. Upward counterfactuals in bad moods with performance goals was reflected in concern with preparative motives, negative moods and high preparation. In Study 2, affective and preparative goals were manipulated directly, mirroring Study 1. After success, participants with affective goals generated the greatest number of downward counterfactuals, which was reflected in high enjoyment, positive moods and low preparation. After failure, participants with preparative goals generated the greatest number of upward counterfactuals, which was reflected in concern with performance, negative moods and high preparation. Discussion centres on implications for counterfactuals, self-motives and mood-as-input research.

Mood, self-esteem, and simulated alternatives: thought-provoking affective influences on counterfactual direction.

Four studies indicated that moods and self-esteem can influence counterfactual thoughts. This was shown for counterfactuals generated for hypothetical situations (Study 1), for recalled life events (Study 2), and for agreement with counterfactual statements after laboratory tasks (Studies 3 and 4). High self-esteem (HSE) and low self-esteem (LSE) persons generated (Studies 1 and 2) or agreed to (Studies 3 and 4) more downward (worse than actuality) than upward (better than actuality) counterfactuals when in good moods, but they diverged in reactions to bad moods: HSE persons thought more about downward counterfactuals, whereas LSE persons thought more about upward counterfactuals. HSE persons felt better after generating downward counterfactuals (Study 2) and took longer to agree to analogous statements (Studies 3 and 4) in bad moods, suggesting attempts at mood repair.

Defensive pessimism, optimism, and simulating alternatives: some ups and downs of prefactual and counterfactual thinking.

Four studies investigated the prefactual (alternative preoutcome predictions) and counterfactual (alternative postoutcome "what might have beens") mental simulations of defensive pessimists and optimists. In Study 1, defensive pessimists engaged in upward (better than expected) prefactual thinking, whereas optimists engaged in downward (worse than actuality) counterfactual thinking in reaction to a course exam. In Study 2, defensive pessimists preferred upward prefactual thinking and optimists preferred no prefactual thinking when prefactual thoughts were directly manipulated. In Studies 3 and 4, defensive pessimists and optimists differed in reactions to manipulated success and failure, and these reactions were further moderated by the opportunity to engage in prefactual thinking and the possibility of a second try. Individual differences in strategies of prefactual and counterfactual thinking are discussed.