Pulmonary Illness Related to E-Cigarette Use in Illinois and Wisconsin - Final Report.

BACKGROUND: E-cigarettes are battery-operated devices that heat a liquid and deliver an aerosolized product to the user. Pulmonary illnesses related to e-cigarette use have been reported, but no large series has been described. In July 2019, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services and the Illinois Department of Public Health received reports of lung injury associated with the use of e-cigarettes (also called vaping) and launched a coordinated public health investigation. METHODS: We defined case patients as persons who reported use of e-cigarette devices and related products in the 90 days before symptom onset and had pulmonary infiltrates on imaging and whose illnesses were not attributed to other causes. Medical record abstraction and case patient interviews were conducted with the use of standardized tools. RESULTS: There were 98 case patients, 79% of whom were male; the median age of the patients was 21 years. The majority of patients presented with respiratory symptoms (97%), gastrointestinal symptoms (77%), and constitutional symptoms (100%). All case patients had bilateral infiltrates on chest imaging. A total of 95% of the patients were hospitalized, 26% underwent intubation and mechanical ventilation, and two deaths were reported. A total of 89% of the patients reported having used tetrahydrocannabinol products in e-cigarette devices, although a wide variety of products and devices was reported. Syndromic surveillance data from Illinois showed that the mean monthly rate of visits related to severe respiratory illness in June through August of 2019 was twice the rate that was observed in the same months in 2018. CONCLUSIONS: Case patients presented with similar clinical characteristics. Although the definitive substance or substances contributing to injury have not been determined, this initial cluster of illnesses represents an emerging clinical syndrome or syndromes. Additional work is needed to characterize the pathophysiology and to identify the definitive causes.

National surveillance for radiological exposures and intentional potassium iodide and iodine product ingestions in the United States associated with the 2011 Japan radiological incident.

BACKGROUND: In March of 2011, an earthquake struck Japan causing a tsunami that resulted in a radiological release from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Surveillance for potential radiological and any iodine/iodide product exposures was initiated on the National Poison Data System (NPDS) to target public health messaging needs within the United States (US). Our objectives are to describe self-reported exposures to radiation, potassium iodide (KI) and other iodine/iodide products which occurred during the US federal response and discuss its public health impact. METHODS: All calls to poison centers associated with the Japan incident were identified from March 11, 2011 to April 18, 2011 in NPDS. Exposure, demographic and health outcome information were collected. Calls about reported radiation exposures and KI or other iodine/iodide product ingestions were then categorized with regard to exposure likelihood based on follow-up information obtained from the PC where each call originated. Reported exposures were subsequently classified as probable exposures (high likelihood of exposure), probable non-exposures (low likelihood of exposure), and suspect exposure (unknown likelihood of exposure). RESULTS: We identified 400 calls to PCs associated with the incident, with 340 information requests (no exposure reported) and 60 reported exposures. The majority (n = 194; 57%) of the information requests mentioned one or more substances. Radiation was inquired about most frequently (n = 88; 45%), followed by KI (n = 86; 44%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 47; 24%). Of the 60 reported exposures, KI was reported most frequently (n = 25; 42%), followed by radiation (n = 22; 37%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 13; 22%). Among reported KI exposures, most were classified as probable exposures (n = 24; 96%); one was a probable non-exposure. Among reported other iodine/iodide product exposures, most were probable exposures (n = 10, 77%) and the rest were suspect exposures (n = 3; 23%). The reported radiation exposures were classified as suspect exposures (n = 16, 73%) or probable non-exposures (n = 6; 27%). No radiation exposures were classified as probable exposures. A small number of the probable exposures to KI and other iodide/iodine products reported adverse signs or symptoms (n = 9; 26%). The majority of probable exposures had no adverse outcomes (n = 28; 82%). These data identified a potential public health information gap regarding KI and other iodine/iodide products which was then addressed through public health messaging activities. CONCLUSION: During the Japan incident response, surveillance activities using NPDS identified KI and other iodine/iodide products as potential public health concerns within the US, which guided CDC's public health messaging and communication activities. Regional PCs can provide timely and additional information during a public health emergency to enhance data collected from surveillance activities, which in turn can be used to inform public health decision-making.

Using poison center data for national public health surveillance for chemical and poison exposure and associated illness.

The National Poison Data System (NPDS) is a national near-real-time surveillance system that improves situational awareness for chemical and poison exposures, according to data from US poison centers. NPDS is the successor to the Toxic Exposure Surveillance System. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) use these data, which are owned and managed by the American Association of Poison Control Centers, to improve public health surveillance for chemical and poison exposures and associated illness, identify early markers of chemical events, and enhance situational awareness during outbreaks. Information recorded in this database is from self-reported calls from the public or health care professionals. In 2009, NPDS detected 22 events of public health significance and CDC used the system to monitor several multistate outbreaks. One of the limitations of the system is that exposures do not necessarily represent a poisoning. Incorporating NPDS data into the public health surveillance network and subsequently using NPDS to rapidly identify chemical and poison exposures exemplifies the importance of the poison centers and NPDS to public health surveillance. This integration provides the opportunity to improve the public health response to chemical and poison exposures, minimizes morbidity and mortality, and serves as an important step forward in surveillance technology and integration.