RESUMEN
The present paper advances the proposition that level of opposition to immigration (i.e., endorsement of closure or exclusion) and its sources are not uniform and vary across immigrant groups. To test this proposition we utilize data from the 2014 European Social Survey for 20 countries and apply the analysis to the following groups: immigrants of same race/ethnic group as a majority population, immigrants of different race/ethnic group, Muslim, Jewish, and Roma immigrants. The analysis reveals that level of opposition to immigration of different ethno-religious groups in Europe is hierarchical, being most extreme toward Muslims and Roma and quite minor toward people of the same ethnic/race groups as well as toward Jews. Further analysis reveals that not only the level of opposition varies across groups but also the sources that drive such opposition. In general, the sources of opposition to immigration can be divided to 2 major categories: universal sources and group-specific sources. The universal sources (sources which increase opposition toward all immigrants regardless of their origin) pertain to threat of competition over socio-economic and symbolic resources. The group-specific sources consist of racism, fear of crime, and inter-group contact. Racism and lack of inter-group contact tend to increase opposition that is exclusive to Muslim and to Roma immigrants. Racism, however, does not increase opposition that is exclusive to immigrants belonging to a race/ethnicity, which is different from most country people. Fear of crime is likely to prompt opposition that is exclusive to immigrants of different race/ethnic group and to Roma but not toward Muslims. The findings underscore the multiple sources underlying emergence of anti-immigrant sentiment, in general, and opposition to specific groups of immigrants, in particular.
RESUMEN
The study focuses on over-time change in anti-immigrant attitudes across European societies and on the role played by cohorts in producing the change in attitudes. We assembled data from four waves of the European Social Surveys for 14 countries between 2002 and 2014. The data analysis is conducted within the framework of a hierarchical age-period-cohort model (HAPC) to estimate the dynamic relations between anti-immigrant sentiment and country's social and economic conditions, while taking into consideration variations across individuals and birth-cohorts. The analysis lends support to expectations derived from the 'competitive threat' theoretical model. The findings show that a higher share of non-European ethnic minorities in the country's population is associated with a higher level of ant-immigrant attitudes. Anti-immigrant sentiment was found to be more pronounced in the 'old immigration countries' than in the 'new immigration countries.' The impact of economic conditions on anti-immigrant sentiment becomes evident through the effect of cohort in the 'new immigration countries': cohorts that entered the labor market when the unemployment rate was high are likely to hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants.
RESUMEN
The present paper examines modes of immigrants' labor market incorporation into European societies with specific emphasis on the role played by immigrant status (i.e. first-generation immigrants, immigrant descendants and native born without migrant background), region of origin, and gender. The data were obtained from the European Union Labour Forces Survey 2008 Ad-Hoc Module for France, Belgium, UK and Sweden. In order to supplement the results from the country-specific analysis, we replicated the analysis using pooled data from the five rounds of the European Social Survey conducted between 2002 and 2010, for nine 'old immigration' Western European countries together. The analysis centered on two aspects of incorporation: labor force status and occupation. Multinominal, binary logistic as well as linear probability regression models were estimated. The findings suggest that in all countries non-European origin is associated with greater disadvantage in finding employment not only among first-generation immigrants, but also among sons and daughters of immigrants (i.e. second-generation). Moreover, the relative employment disadvantage among immigrant men of non-European origin is especially pronounced in the second-generation. The likelihood of attaining a high-status job is influenced mostly by immigrant status, regardless of region of origin and gender. The results of the study reveal that patterns of labor force incorporation vary considerably across origin groups and across generations. The patterns do not vary as much across countries, despite cross-country differences in welfare state regimes, migration integration policy and composition of migration flows.
Asunto(s)
Emigrantes e Inmigrantes , Empleo , Ocupaciones , Desempleo , Unión Europea , Reino UnidoRESUMEN
Using data from the IPUMS-USA, the present research focuses on trends in the gender earnings gap in the United States between 1970 and 2010. The major goal of this article is to understand the sources of the convergence in men's and women's earnings in the public and private sectors as well as the stagnation of this trend in the new millennium. For this purpose, we delineate temporal changes in the role played by major sources of the gap. Several components are identified: the portion of the gap attributed to gender differences in human-capital resources; labor supply; sociodemographic attributes; occupational segregation; and the unexplained portion of the gap. The findings reveal a substantial reduction in the gross gender earnings gap in both sectors of the economy. Most of the decline is attributed to the reduction in the unexplained portion of the gap, implying a significant decline in economic discrimination against women. In contrast to discrimination, the role played by human capital and personal attributes in explaining the gender pay gap is relatively small in both sectors. Differences between the two sectors are not only in the size and pace of the reduction but also in the significance of the two major sources of the gap. Working hours have become the most important factor with respect to gender pay inequality in both sectors, although much more dominantly in the private sector. The declining gender segregation may explain the decreased impact of occupations on the gender pay gap in the private sector. In the public sector, by contrast, gender segregation still accounts for a substantial portion of the gap. The findings are discussed in light of the theoretical literature on sources of gender economic inequality and in light of the recent stagnation of the trend.
Asunto(s)
Ocupaciones/estadística & datos numéricos , Salarios y Beneficios/estadística & datos numéricos , Sexismo/estadística & datos numéricos , Adulto , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Sector Público , Factores Sexuales , Factores Socioeconómicos , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
Researchers have long demonstrated that persons of high economic status are likely to be healthier than persons of low socioeconomic standing. Cross-national studies have also demonstrated that health of the population tends to increase with country's level of economic development and to decline with level of economic inequality. The present research utilizes data for 16 national samples (of populations fifty years of age and over) to examine whether the relationship between wealth and health at the individual-level is systematically associated with country's level of economic development and country's level of income inequality. The analysis reveals that in all countries rich persons tend to be healthier than poor persons. Furthermore, in all countries the positive association between wealth and health holds even after controlling for socio-demographic attributes and household income. Hierarchical regression analysis leads to two major conclusions: first, country's economic resources increase average health of the population but do not weaken the tie between wealth and health; second, a more equal distribution of economic resources (greater egalitarianism) does not raise health levels of the population but weakens the tie between wealth and health. The latter findings can be mostly attributed to the uniqueness of the US case. The findings and their significance are discussed in light of previous research and theory.