Understanding Side-Effect Intentionality Asymmetries: Meaning, Morality, or Attitudes and Defaults?

People frequently label harmful (but not helpful) side effects as intentional. One proposed explanation for this asymmetry is that moral considerations fundamentally affect how people think about and apply the concept of intentional action. We propose something else: People interpret the meaning of questions about intentionally harming versus helping in fundamentally different ways. Four experiments substantially support this hypothesis. When presented with helpful (but not harmful) side effects, people interpret questions concerning intentional helping as literally asking whether helping is the agents' intentional action or believe questions are asking about why agents acted. Presented with harmful (but not helpful) side effects, people interpret the question as asking whether agents intentionally acted, knowing this would lead to harm. Differences in participants' definitions consistently helped to explain intentionality responses. These findings cast doubt on whether side-effect intentionality asymmetries are informative regarding people's core understanding and application of the concept of intentional action.

Reconstructing the side-effect effect: A new way of understanding how moral considerations drive intentionality asymmetries.

People typically apply the concept of intentionality to actions directed at achieving desired outcomes. For example, a businessperson might intentionally start a program aimed at increasing company profits. However, if starting the program leads to a foreknown and harmful side effect (e.g., to the environment), the side effect is frequently labeled as intentional even though it was not specifically intended or desired. In contrast, positive side effects (e.g., helping the environment) are rarely labeled as intentional. One explanation of this side-effect effect-that harmful (but not helpful) side effects are labeled as intentional-is that moral considerations influence whether people view actions as intentional or not, implying that bad outcomes are perceived as more intentional than good outcomes. The present research, however, shows that people redefine questions about intentionality to focus on agents' foreknowledge in harming cases and on their lack of desire or intention in helpful cases, suggesting that the same intentionality question is being interpreted differently as a function of side effect valence. Consistent with this, removing foreknowledge lowers the frequency of labeling harming as intentional without affecting whether people label helping as intentional. Likewise, increasing agents' desire to help or avoid harming increases rates of labeling helping as intentional without affecting rates of labeling harming as intentional. In summary, divergent decisions to label side effects as intentional or not appear to reflect differences in the criteria people use to evaluate each case, resulting in different interpretations of what questions about intentionality are asking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Implicit Bias Predicts Liking of Ingroup Members Who Are Comfortable With Intergroup Interaction.

We test a novel framework for how ingroup members are perceived during intergroup interaction. Across three experiments, we found that, above and beyond egalitarian attitudes and motivations, White observers' automatic responses to Blacks (i.e., their implicit anti-Black bias) shaped their affiliation toward ingroup targets who appeared comfortable engaging in interracial versus same-race interaction. White observers' implicit anti-Black bias negatively correlated with liking of White targets who were comfortable with Blacks (Experiments 1-3). The relationship between implicit bias and liking varied as a function of targets' nonverbal comfort in interracial interactions (Experiment 1). Specifically, implicit bias negatively correlated with liking of targets when targets' nonverbal behaviors revealed observers felt comfortable with interracial contact, irrespective of the nature of those behaviors (Experiment 2). Finally, the relationship between implicit bias and target liking was mediated by perceived similarity (Experiment 3). Theoretical implications for stigma-by-association, social network homogeneity, and extended contact are discussed.

Self-Esteem Depends on the Beholder: Effects of a Subtle Social Value Cue.

The idea that self-esteem functions as a gauge or "sociometer" of social value (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) is supported by research on direct social feedback. To examine if the sociometer model is relevant to more subtle social value cues, the implicit self-esteem of women was assessed a week after an interaction with an experimenter. Consistent with the sociometer model, Week 2 self-esteem depended on a subtle social value cue encountered during Week 1. When the Week 1 experimenter wore a t-shirt celebrating larger bodies (i.e., "everyBODY is beautiful"), heavier women had higher self-esteem than lighter women in Week 2. As hypothesized, this effect was relationship-specific, occurring only when the same experimenter administered Week 1 and 2 sessions.