What I think she thinks about my paralysed body: Social inferences about disability-related content in anosognosia for hemiplegia.

The neuropsychological disorder of anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) can offer unique insights into the neurocognitive processes of body consciousness and representation. Previous studies have found associations between selective social cognition deficits and anosognosia. In this study, we examined how such social cognition deficits may directly interact with representations of one's body as disabled in AHP. We used a modified set of previously validated Theory of Mind (ToM) stories to create disability-related content that was related to post-stroke paralysis and to investigate differences between right hemisphere damage patients with (n = 19) and without (n = 19) AHP. We expected AHP patients to perform worse than controls when trying to infer paralysis-related mental states in the paralysis-related ToM stories and explored whether such differences depended on the inference patients were asked to perform (e.g. self or other referent perspective-taking). Using an advanced structural neuroimaging technique, we expected selective social cognitive deficits to be associated with posterior parietal cortex lesions and deficits in self-referent perspective-taking in paralysis-related mentalising to be associated with frontoparietal disconnections. Group- and individual-level results revealed that AHP patients performed worse than HP controls when trying to infer paralysis-related mental states. Exploratory lesion analysis results revealed some of the hypothesised lesions, but also unexpected white matter disconnections in the posterior body and splenium of the corpus collosum associated with a self-referent perspective-taking in paralysis-related ToM stories. The study has implications for the multi-layered nature of body awareness, including abstract, social perspectives and beliefs about the body.

Arousal coherence, uncertainty, and well-being: an active inference account.

Here we build on recent findings which show that greater alignment between our subjective experiences (how we feel) and physiological states (measurable changes in our body) plays a pivotal role in the overall psychological well-being. Specifically, we propose that the alignment or 'coherence' between affective arousal (e.g. how excited we 'feel') and autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate or pupil dilation) may be key for maintaining up-to-date uncertainty representations in dynamic environments. Drawing on recent advances in interoceptive and affective inference, we also propose that arousal coherence reflects interoceptive integration, facilitates adaptive belief updating, and impacts our capacity to adapt to changes in uncertainty, with downstream consequences to well-being. We also highlight the role of meta-awareness of arousal, a third level of inference, which may permit conscious awareness, learning about, and intentional regulation of lower-order sources of arousal. Practices emphasizing meta-awareness of arousal (like meditation) may therefore elicit some of their known benefits via improved arousal coherence. We suggest that arousal coherence is also likely to be associated with markers of adaptive functioning (like emotional awareness and self-regulatory capacities) and discuss mind-body practices that may increase coherence.