A Capabilities Approach to Prenatal Screening for Fetal Abnormalities.

International guidelines recommend that prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities should only be offered within a non-directive framework aimed at enabling women in making meaningful reproductive choices. Whilst this position is widely endorsed, developments in cell-free fetal DNA based Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing are now raising questions about its continued suitability for guiding screening policy and practice. This issue is most apparent within debates on the scope of the screening offer. Implied by the aim of enabling meaningful reproductive choices is the idea that screening services should support women in accessing prenatal tests that best enable them to realize the types of reproductive choice that they find important. However, beyond whatever options meet the quality standards required for facilitating an informed decision, the remaining criteria of facilitating autonomous choice is strictly non-directive. As a result, policy makers receive little indication prior to consultation with each individual woman, about what conditions should be prioritized during the offer of screening. In this paper we try to address this issue by using the capabilities approach to further specify the non-directive aim of enabling meaningful reproductive choice. The resulting framework is then used to assess the relative importance of offering prenatal screening where concerning different types of genetic condition. We conclude that greater priority may be ascribed to offering prenatal screening for conditions that more significantly diminish a woman's central capabilities. It follows that serious congenital and earlier-onset conditions are more likely to fulfill these criteria.

Just choice: a Danielsian analysis of the aims and scope of prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities.

Developments in Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) and cell-free fetal DNA analysis raise the possibility that antenatal services may soon be able to support couples in non-invasively testing for, and diagnosing, an unprecedented range of genetic disorders and traits coded within their unborn child's genome. Inevitably, this has prompted debate within the bioethics literature about what screening options should be offered to couples for the purpose of reproductive choice. In relation to this problem, the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) and American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) tentatively recommend that any expansion of this type of screening, as facilitated by NIPT, should be limited to serious congenital and childhood disorders. In support of this recommendation, the ESHG and ASHG cite considerations of distribution justice. Notably, however, an account of justice in the organization and provision of this type of screening which might substantiate this recommendation has yet to be developed. This paper attempts to redress this oversight through an investigation of Norman Daniels' theory of Just health: meeting health needs fairly. In line with this aim, the paper examines what special moral importance (for Just health) screening for the purpose of reproductive choice might have where concerning serious congenital and childhood disorders in particular. The paper concludes that screening for reproductive choice where concerning serious congenital and childhood disorders may be important for providing women with fair opportunity to protect their health (by either having or not having an affected child).

Qualifying choice: ethical reflection on the scope of prenatal screening.

In the near future developments in non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) may soon provide couples with the opportunity to test for and diagnose a much broader range of heritable and congenital conditions than has previously been possible. Inevitably, this has prompted much ethical debate on the possible implications of NIPT for providing couples with opportunities for reproductive choice by way of routine prenatal screening. In view of the possibility to test for a significantly broader range of genetic conditions with NIPT, the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) and American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) recommend that, pending further debate, prenatal screening for reproductive choice should only be offered where concerning serious congenital conditions and childhood disorders. In support of this recommendation, the ESHG and ASHG discuss a number of ethical issues on which they prompt further debate: the informational privacy of the future child, the trivialization of abortion, the risk of information overload, and issues of distributive justice. This paper responds to this call with further reflection on each ethical issue and how it relates to the moral justification of providing couples with opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice. The paper concludes that whilst there may be good reasons for qualifying the scope of any unsolicited prenatal screening offer to serious congenital conditions and childhood disorders, if prenatal screening is justified for providing couples with opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice, then health services may have obligations to empower couples with the same opportunity where concerning other conditions.

Global health ethics: an introduction to prominent theories and relevant topics.

Global health ethics is a relatively new term that is used to conceptualize the process of applying moral value to health issues that are typically characterized by a global level effect or require action coordinated at a global level. It is important to acknowledge that this account of global health ethics takes a predominantly geographic approach and may infer that the subject relates primarily to macro-level health phenomena. However, global health ethics could alternatively be thought of as another branch of health ethics. It may then relate to specific topics in themselves, which might also include micro-level health phenomena. In its broadest sense, global health ethics is a normative project that is best characterized by the challenge of developing common values and universal norms for responding to global health threats. Consequently, many subjects fall within its scope. Whilst several accounts of global health ethics have been conceptualized in the literature, a concise demarcation of the paradigm is still needed. Through means of a literature review, this paper presents a two-part introduction to global health ethics. First, the framework of 'borrowed' ethics that currently form the core of global health ethics is discussed in relation to two essential ethical considerations: 1) what is the moral significance of health and 2) what is the moral significance of boundaries? Second, a selection of exemplar ethical topics is presented to illustrate the range of topics within global health ethics.

Health inequalities and regional specific scarcity in primary care physicians: ethical issues and criteria.

OBJECTIVES: A substantial body of evidence supports the beneficial health impact of an increase in primary care physicians for underserved populations. However, given that in many countries primary care physician shortages persist, what options are available to distribute physicians and how can these be seen from an ethical perspective? METHODS: A literature review was performed on the topic of primary care physician distribution. An ethical discussion of conceivable options for decision makers that applied prominent theories of ethics was held. RESULTS: Examples of distributing primary care physicians were categorised into five levels depending upon levels of incentive or coercion. When analysing these options through theories of ethics, contrasting, and even controversial, moral issues were identified. However, the different morally salient criteria identified are of prima facie value for decision makers. CONCLUSIONS: The discussion provides clear criteria for decision makers to consider when addressing primary care physician shortages. Yet, decision makers will still need to assess specific situations by these criteria to ensure that any decisions they make are morally justifiable.