Eliminating the Low-Prevalence Effect in Visual Search With a Remarkably Simple Strategy.

The low-prevalence effect in visual search occurs when rare targets are missed at a disproportionately high rate. This effect has enormous significance for health and public safety and has proven resistant to intervention. In three experiments (Ns = 41, 40, and 44 adults), we documented a dramatic reduction of the effect using a simple cognitive strategy requiring no training. Instead of asking participants to search for the presence or absence of a target, as is typically done in visual search tasks, we asked participants to engage in "similarity search"-to identify the display element most similar to a target on every trial, regardless of whether a target was present. When participants received normal search instructions, we observed strong low-prevalence effects. When participants used similarity search, we failed to detect the low-prevalence effect under identical visual conditions across three experiments.

Artificial cognition: How experimental psychology can help generate explainable artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence powered by deep neural networks has reached a level of complexity where it can be difficult or impossible to express how a model makes its decisions. This black-box problem is especially concerning when the model makes decisions with consequences for human well-being. In response, an emerging field called explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to increase the interpretability, fairness, and transparency of machine learning. In this paper, we describe how cognitive psychologists can make contributions to XAI. The human mind is also a black box, and cognitive psychologists have over 150 years of experience modeling it through experimentation. We ought to translate the methods and rigor of cognitive psychology to the study of artificial black boxes in the service of explainability. We provide a review of XAI for psychologists, arguing that current methods possess a blind spot that can be complemented by the experimental cognitive tradition. We also provide a framework for research in XAI, highlight exemplary cases of experimentation within XAI inspired by psychological science, and provide a tutorial on experimenting with machines. We end by noting the advantages of an experimental approach and invite other psychologists to conduct research in this exciting new field.

Simple random-interval generation reveals the irresistibly periodic structure of perceived time.

Whole-integer ratios in musical rhythm are culturally universal. The reliable periodicity of rhythm inspired us to determine whether time perception, which is foundational to and inherently less structured than rhythm, is subject to similar biases. We created a random-interval generation task that exploits the nonrandom tendencies in perception and action in order to uncover the structural biases underlying temporal duration perception. Participants listened to and watched an audiovisual suprasecond temporal cue and were asked to subdivide it as randomly as possible in a prescribed number of responses. The results showed that the subdivision probability distributions were distinctly nonrandom, and closely resembled multimodal distributions with a number of equally spaced, symmetrical peaks equal to the number of subdivisions required. These patterns were thus highly periodic and isochronous, despite explicit instructions to act as randomly as possible. We interpreted this bias as an organizing heuristic that divides perceived time into smaller, equal-duration chunks in order to facilitate representation.

Out with the new, in with the old: Exogenous orienting to locations with physically constant stimulation.

Dominant methods of investigating exogenous orienting presume that attention is captured most effectively at locations containing new events. This is evidenced by the ubiquitous use of transient stimuli as cues in the literature on exogenous orienting. In the present study, we showed that attention can be oriented exogenously toward a location containing a completely unchanging stimulus by modifying Posner's landmark exogenous spatial-cueing paradigm. Observers searched a six-element array of placeholder stimuli for an onset target. The target was preceded by a decrement in luminance to five of the six placeholders, such that one location remained physically constant. This "nonset" stimulus (so named to distinguish it from a traditional onsetting transient) acted as an exogenous cue, eliciting patterns of facilitation and inhibition at the nonset location and demonstrating that exogenous orienting is not always evident at the location of a visual transient. This method eliminates the decades-long confounding of orienting to a location with the processing of new events at that location, permitting alternative considerations of the nature of attentional selection.

A different kind of weapon focus: simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness.

Attentional allocation is flexibly altered by action-related priorities. Given that tools - and specifically weapons - can affect attentional allocation, we asked whether training with a weapon or holding a weapon during search would affect change detection. In three experiments, participants searched for changes to agents, shootable objects, or environments in the popular flicker paradigm. Participants trained with a simulated weapon or watched a video from the same training perspective and then searched for changes while holding a weapon or a control object. Results show an effect of training, highlighting the importance of sensorimotor experience for the action-relevant allocation of attention, and a possible interaction between training and the object held during search. Simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness. This result has implications for the interaction between tool use and attentional allocation.

Out of sight, out of mind: Matching bias underlies confirmatory visual search.

Confirmation bias has recently been reported in visual search, where observers who were given a perceptual rule to test (e.g. "Is the p on a red circle?") search stimuli that could confirm the rule stimuli preferentially (Rajsic, Wilson, & Pratt, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 41(5), 1353-1364, 2015). In this study, we compared the ability of concrete and abstract visual templates to guide attention using the visual confirmation bias. Experiment 1 showed that confirmatory search tendencies do not result from simple low-level priming, as they occurred when color templates were verbally communicated. Experiment 2 showed that confirmation bias did not occur when targets needed to be reported as possessing or not possessing the absence of a feature (i.e., reporting whether a target was on a nonred circle). Experiment 3 showed that confirmatory search also did not occur when search prompts referred to a set of visually heterogenous features (i.e., reporting whether a target on a colorful circle, regardless of the color). Together, these results show that the confirmation bias likely results from a matching heuristic, such that visual codes involved in representing the search goal prioritize stimuli possessing these features.

Much ado about nothing: Capturing attention toward locations without new perceptual events.

Popular frameworks of attention propose that visual orienting occurs through a combination of bottom-up (stimulus-driven) and top-down (goal-directed) processes. Much of the basic research on these processes adheres paradigmatically to experimental methods that introduce salient but task-irrelevant stimuli (objects or transients) to the visual environment to determine whether attention is captured to their locations. This common practice of changing or adding a stimulus to a location to determine whether it captures attention reflects a notion that locations at which new features or stimuli spontaneously appear are prioritized above all else. In this article, we challenge this notion with results from a modified additional singleton paradigm. In the critical condition, following a preview array of placeholder stimuli, 1 placeholder stimulus transforms into a target diamond and changes luminance at the same time that all other placeholders, except 1 (the truly "static singleton") change in luminance. This static singleton location, which involves neither a new stimulus nor any sensory transient, produces a clear pattern of attentional capture originating near its location. These findings violate multiple bottom-up and top-down perspectives while encouraging a new approach to studying attentional capture. (PsycINFO Database Record

Object-based selection is contingent on attentional control settings.

The visual system allocates attention in object-based and location-based modes. However, the question of when attention selects objects and when it selects locations remains poorly understood. In this article, we present variations on two classic paradigms from the object-based attention literature, in which object-based effects are observed only when the object feature matches the task goal of the observer. In Experiment 1, covert orienting was influenced by task-irrelevant rectangles, but only when the target color matched the rectangle color. In Experiment 2, the region of attentional focus was adjusted to the size of task-irrelevant objects, but only when the target color matched the object color. In Experiment 3, we ruled out the possibility that contingent object-based selection is caused by color-based intratrial priming. These demonstrations of contingent object-based attention suggest that object-based selection is neither mandatory nor default, and that object-based effects are contingent on simple, top-down attentional control settings.

Signal Detection Measures Cannot Distinguish Perceptual Biases from Response Biases.

A common conceptualization of signal detection theory (SDT) holds that if the effect of an experimental manipulation is truly perceptual, then it will necessarily be reflected in a change in d' rather than a change in the measure of response bias. Thus, if an experimental manipulation affects the measure of bias, but not d', then it is safe to conclude that the manipulation in question did not affect perception but instead affected the placement of the internal decision criterion. However, the opposite may be true: an effect on perception may affect measured bias while having no effect on d'. To illustrate this point, we expound how signal detection measures are calculated and show how all biases-including perceptual biases-can exert their effects on the criterion measure rather than on d'. While d' can provide evidence for a perceptual effect, an effect solely on the criterion measure can also arise from a perceptual effect. We further support this conclusion using simulations to demonstrate that the Müller-Lyer illusion, which is a classic visual illusion that creates a powerful perceptual effect on the apparent length of a line, influences the criterion measure without influencing d'. For discrimination experiments, SDT is effective at discriminating between sensitivity and bias but cannot by itself determine the underlying source of the bias, be it perceptual or response based.

Frogs Jump Forward: Semantic Knowledge Influences the Perception of Element Motion in the Ternus Display.

The Ternus effect is a robust illusion of motion that produces element motion at short interstimulus intervals (ISIs; < 50 ms) and group motion at longer ISIs (> 50 ms). Previous research has shown that the nature of the stimuli (e.g., similarity, grouping), not just ISI, can influence the likelihood of perceiving element or group motion. We examined if semantic knowledge can also influence what type of illusory motion is perceived. In Experiment I, we used a modified Ternus display with pictures of frogs in a jump-ready pose facing forwards or backwards to the direction of illusory motion. Participants perceived more element motion with the forward-facing frogs and more group motion with the backward-facing frogs. Experiment 2 tested whether this effect would still occur with line drawings of frogs, or if a more life-like image was necessary. Experiment 3 tested whether this effect was due to visual asymmetries inherent in the jumping pose. Experiment 4 tested whether frogs in a "non-jumping," sedentary pose would replicate the original effect. These experiments elucidate the role of semantic knowledge in the Ternus effect. Prior knowledge of the movement of certain animate objects, in this case, frogs can also bias the perception of element or group motion.

Bow Your Head in Shame, or, Hold Your Head Up with Pride: Semantic Processing of Self-Esteem Concepts Orients Attention Vertically.

Embodied cognition holds that abstract concepts are grounded in perceptual-motor simulations. If a given embodied metaphor maps onto a spatial representation, then thinking of that concept should bias the allocation of attention. In this study, we used positive and negative self-esteem words to examine two properties of conceptual cueing. First, we tested the orientation-specificity hypothesis, which predicts that conceptual cues should selectively activate certain spatial axes (in this case, valenced self-esteem concepts should activate vertical space), instead of any spatial continuum. Second, we tested whether conceptual cueing requires semantic processing, or if it can be achieved with shallow visual processing of the cue words. Participants viewed centrally presented words consisting of high or low self-esteem traits (e.g., brave, timid) before detecting a target above or below the cue in the vertical condition, or on the left or right of the word in the horizontal condition. Participants were faster to detect targets when their location was compatible with the valence of the word cues, but only in the vertical condition. Moreover, this effect was observed when participants processed the semantics of the word, but not when processing its orthography. The results show that conceptual cueing by spatial metaphors is orientation-specific, and that an explicit consideration of the word cues' semantics is required for conceptual cueing to occur.

Attentional cartography: mapping the distribution of attention across time and space.

Decades of research have shown that the orienting of attention follows a reliable pattern of facilitation and then inhibition following a peripheral cue. However, the literature lacks a high-resolution spatiotemporal map of this pattern. Moreover, the use of visual placeholders to highlight potential stimulus locations is inconsistent. This is puzzling, given attention's well-known predilection for objects. In this article, we remedy these outstanding issues with a large-scale investigation charting the spatiotemporal distribution of attention. Participants detected targets presented at 121 possible locations 100, 200, 400, or 800 ms following an uninformative peripheral cue. The cued locations were presented with or without placeholders. With placeholders, the classic pattern of early facilitation and late inhibition was observed for targets appearing within the placeholders, and the spread of inhibition was severely limited to within the placeholders. Without placeholders, we observed inhibition shortly after cue presentation, upsetting the famously reliable effect of facilitation following a cue. Moreover, inhibition spread from the cued location, unlike when placeholders were present. This investigation has produced an eminently detailed spatiotemporal map of attentional orienting and illustrated the consequences of placeholder stimuli, with surprising results.

Listening to music primes space: pianists, but not novices, simulate heard actions.

Musicians sometimes report twitching in their fingers or hands while listening to music. This anecdote could be indicative of a tendency for auditory-motor co-representation in musicians. Here, we describe two studies showing that pianists (Experiment 1), but not novices (Experiment 2) automatically generate spatial representations that correspond to learned musical actions while listening to music. Participants made one-handed movements to the left or right from a central location in response to visual stimuli while listening to task-irrelevant auditory stimuli, which were scales played on a piano. These task-irrelevant scales were either ascending (compatible with rightward movements) or descending (compatible with leftward movements). Pianists were faster to respond when the scale direction was compatible with the direction of response movement, whereas novices' movements were unaffected by the scale. These results are in agreement with existing research on action-effect coupling in musicians, which draw heavily on common coding theory. In addition, these results show how intricate auditory stimuli (ascending or descending scales) evoke coarse, domain-general spatial representations.

A touchy subject: advancing the modulated visual pathways account of altered vision near the hand.

A growing body of evidence demonstrates that human vision operates differently in the space near and on the hands; for example, early findings in this literature reported that rapid onsets are detected faster near the hands, and that objects are searched more thoroughly. These and many other effects were attributed to enhanced attention via the recruitment of bimodal visual-tactile neurons representing the hand and near-hand space. However, recent research supports an alternative account: stimuli near the hands are preferentially processed by the action-oriented magnocellular visual pathway at the expense of processing in the parvocellular pathway. This Modulated Visual Pathways (MVP) account of altered vision near the hands describes a hand position-dependent trade-off between the two main retinal-cortical visual pathways between the eye and brain. The MVP account explains past findings and makes new predictions regarding near-hand vision supported by new research.

Altered attention for stimuli on the hands.

Attention operates in the space near the hands with unique, action-related priorities. Here, we examined how attention treats objects on the hands themselves. We tested two hypotheses. First, attention may treat stimuli on the hands like stimuli near the hands, as though the surface of the hands were the proximal case of near-hand space. Alternatively, we proposed that the surface of the hands may be attentionally distinct from the surrounding space. Specifically, we predicted that attention should be slow to orient toward the hands in order to remain entrained to near-hand space, where the targets of actions are usually located. In four experiments, we observed delayed orienting of attention on the hands compared to orienting attention near or far from the hands. Similar delayed orienting was also found for tools connected to the body compared to tools disconnected from the body. These results support our second hypothesis: attention operates differently on the functional surfaces of the hand. We suggest this effect serves a functional role in the execution of manual actions.

Uncovering the connection between artist and audience: viewing painted brushstrokes evokes corresponding action representations in the observer.

Observed actions are covertly and involuntarily simulated within the observer's motor system. It has been argued that simulation is involved in processing abstract, gestural paintings, as the artist's movements can be simulated by observing static brushstrokes. Though this argument is grounded in theory, empirical research has yet to examine the claim. Five experiments are described wherein participants executed arm movements resembling the act of painting horizontal brushstrokes while observing paintings featuring broad, discernable brushstrokes. Participants responded faster when their movement was compatible with the observed brushstrokes, even though the paintings were irrelevant to their task. Additional results suggest that this effect occurs outside of awareness. These results provide evidence that observers can simulate the actions of the painter by simply observing the painting, revealing a connection between artist and audience hitherto undemonstrated by cognitive science.

Action-specific effects in a social context: others' abilities influence perceived speed.

According to the action-specific account of perception, perceivers see the environment relative to their ability to perform the intended action. For example, in a modified version of the computer game Pong, balls that were easier to block looked to be moving slower than balls that were more difficult to block (Witt & Sugovic, 2010). It is unknown, however, if perception can be influenced by another person's abilities. In the current experiment, we examined whether another person's ability to block a ball influenced the observer's perception of ball speed. Participants played and observed others play the modified version of Pong where the task was to successfully block the ball with paddles that varied in size, and both the actor and observer estimated the speed of the ball. The results showed that both judged the ball to be moving faster when it was harder to block. However, the same effect of difficulty on speed estimates was not found when observers watched a computer play, suggesting the effect is specific to people and not to the task. These studies suggest that the environment can be perceived relative to another person's abilities.

Action-specific effects underwater.

Action-specific effects on perception are apparent in terrestrial environments. For example, targets that require more effort to walk, jump, or throw to look farther away than when the targets require less effort. Here, we examined whether action-specific effects would generalize to an underwater environment. Instead, perception might be geometrically precise, rather than action-specific, in an environment that is novel from an evolutionary perspective. We manipulated ease to swim by giving participants swimming flippers or taking them away. Those who estimated distance while wearing the flippers judged underwater targets to be closer than did participants who had taken them off. In addition, participants with better swimming ability judged the targets to be closer than did those with worse swimming ability. These results suggest perceived distance underwater is a function of the perceiver's ability to swim to the targets.

When walls are no longer barriers: perception of wall height in parkour.

Through training, skilled parkour athletes (traceurs) overcome everyday obstacles, such as walls, that are typically insurmountable. Traceurs and untrained novices estimated the height of walls and reported their anticipated ability to climb the wall. The traceurs perceived the walls as shorter than did novices. This result suggests that perception is scaled by the perceiver's anticipated ability to act, and is consistent with the action-specific account of perception.