Neu5Gc binding loss of subtype H7 influenza A virus facilitates adaptation to gallinaceous poultry following transmission from waterbirds but restricts spillback.

Migratory waterfowl, gulls, and shorebirds serve as natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses, with potential spillovers to domestic poultry and humans. The intricacies of interspecies adaptation among avian species, particularly from wild birds to domestic poultry, are not fully elucidated. In this study, we investigated the molecular mechanisms underlying avian species barriers in H7 transmission, particularly the factors responsible for the disproportionate distribution of poultry infected with A/Anhui/1/2013 (AH/13)-lineage H7N9 viruses. We hypothesized that the differential expression of N-glycolylneuraminic acid (Neu5Gc) among avian species exerts selective pressure on H7 viruses, shaping their evolution and enabling them to replicate and transmit efficiently among gallinaceous poultry, particularly chickens. Our glycan microarray and biolayer interferometry experiments showed that AH/13-lineage H7N9 viruses exclusively bind to Neu5Ac, in contrast to wild waterbird H7 viruses that bind both Neu5Ac and Neu5Gc. Significantly, reverting the V179 amino acid in AH/13-lineage back to the I179, predominantly found in wild waterbirds, expanded the binding affinity of AH/13-lineage H7 viruses from exclusively Neu5Ac to both Neu5Ac and Neu5Gc. When cultivating H7 viruses in cell lines with varied Neu5Gc levels, we observed that Neu5Gc expression impairs the replication of Neu5Ac-specific H7 viruses and facilitates adaptive mutations. Conversely, Neu5Gc deficiency triggers adaptive changes in H7 viruses capable of binding to both Neu5Ac and Neu5Gc. Additionally, we assessed Neu5Gc expression in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tissues of seven avian species, including chickens, Canada geese, and various dabbling ducks. Neu5Gc was absent in chicken and Canada goose, but its expression varied in the duck species. In summary, our findings reveal the crucial role of Neu5Gc in shaping the host range and interspecies transmission of H7 viruses. This understanding of virus-host interactions is crucial for developing strategies to manage and prevent influenza virus outbreaks in diverse avian populations.

Outbreak of epizootic hemorrhagic disease in captive reindeer (Rangifer tarandus).

In September 2020, an outbreak of epizootic hemorrhagic disease occurred in captive reindeer (Rangifer tarandus) and was associated with neurological signs and mortality. Four reindeer died or were euthanized after acute illness over a 12-day period. Affected reindeer displayed abnormal behavior, neurologic signs, lethargy, and/or lameness. The most consistent gross finding was dark red streaks throughout the adrenal gland cortices (4/4). One animal had acute hemorrhage involving the subcutis and skeletal muscles over the ventrolateral body wall and back, and abomasal serosa. Histologically, the most common lesions were adrenal gland cortical hemorrhage (4/4) with necrosis (3/4) and lymphoplasmacytic meningoencephalitis with gliosis, glial nodules, satellitosis, and nonsuppurative perivascular cuffing (4/4). The brain lesions were most frequent in the gray matter of the cerebrum, hippocampus, and thalamus but also involved the cerebellum and brainstem. Epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus serotype 6 was detected through PCR and sequencing of the spleen in all cases.

Investigation of risk factors for introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus onto table egg farms in the United States, 2022: a case-control study.

Introduction: The 2022-2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in the United States (U.S.) is the most geographically extensive and costly animal health event in U.S. history. In 2022 alone, over 57 million commercial and backyard poultry in 47 U.S. states were affected. Over 75% of affected poultry were part of the commercial table egg production sector. Methods: We conducted a case-control study to identify potential risk factors for introduction of HPAI virus onto commercial table egg operations. Univariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to compare farm characteristics, management, and biosecurity factors on case and control farms. Results: Factors associated with increased risk of infection included being in an existing control zone, sightings of wild waterfowl, mowing or bush hogging vegetation less than 4 times a month, having an off-site method of daily mortality disposal (off-site composting or burial, rendering, or landfill), and wild bird access to feed/feed ingredients at least some of the time. Protective factors included a high level of vehicle washing for trucks and trailers entering the farm (a composite variable that included having a permanent wash station), having designated personnel assigned to specific barns, having a farm entrance gate, and requiring a change of clothing for workers entering poultry barns. Discussion: Study results improve our understanding of risk factors for HPAI infection and control measures for preventing HPAI on commercial U.S. table egg farms.

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b in wild and domestic birds: Introductions into the United States and reassortments, December 2021-April 2022.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage H5 clade 2.3.4.4b continue to have a devastating effect on domestic and wild birds. Full genome sequence analyses using 1369 H5N1 HPAIVs detected in the United States (U.S.) in wild birds, commercial poultry, and backyard flocks from December 2021 to April 2022, showed three phylogenetically distinct H5N1 virus introductions in the U.S. by wild birds. Unreassorted Eurasian genotypes A1 and A2 entered the Northeast Atlantic states, whereas a genetically distinct A3 genotype was detected in Alaska. The A1 genotype spread westward via wild bird migration and reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses. Reassortments of up to five internal genes generated a total of 21 distinct clusters; of these, six genotypes represented 92% of the HPAIVs examined. By phylodynamic analyses, most detections in domestic birds were shown to be point-source transmissions from wild birds, with limited farm-to-farm spread.

Evolution of the North American Lineage H7 Avian Influenza Viruses in Association with H7 Virus's Introduction to Poultry.

The incursions of H7 subtype low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV) from wild birds into poultry and its mutations to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) have been an ongoing concern in North America. Since 2000, 10 phylogenetically distinct H7 virus outbreaks from wild birds have been detected in poultry, six of which mutated to HPAIV. To study the molecular evolution of the H7 viruses that occurs when changing hosts from wild birds to poultry, we performed analyses of the North American H7 hemagglutinin (HA) genes to identify amino acid changes as the virus circulated in wild birds from 2000 to 2019. Then, we analyzed recurring HA amino acid changes and gene constellations of the viruses that spread from wild birds to poultry. We found six HA amino acid changes occurring during wild bird circulation and 10 recurring changes after the spread to poultry. Eight of the changes were in and around the HA antigenic sites, three of which were supported by positive selection. Viruses from each H7 outbreak had a unique genotype, with no specific genetic group associated with poultry outbreaks or mutation to HPAIV. However, the genotypes of the H7 viruses in poultry outbreaks tended to contain minor genetic groups less observed in wild bird H7 viruses, suggesting either a biased sampling of wild bird AIVs or a tendency of having reassortment with minor genetic groups prior to the virus's introduction to poultry. IMPORTANCE Wild bird-origin H7 subtype avian influenza viruses are a constant threat to commercial poultry, both directly by the disease they cause and indirectly through trade restrictions that can be imposed when the virus is detected in poultry. It is important to understand the genetic basis of why the North American lineage H7 viruses have repeatedly crossed the species barrier from wild birds to poultry. We examined the amino acid changes in the H7 viruses associated with poultry outbreaks and tried to determine gene reassortment related to poultry adaptation and mutations to HPAIV. The findings in this study increase the understanding of the evolutionary pathways of wild bird AIV before infecting poultry and the HA changes associated with adaptation of the virus in poultry.

Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 infection and associated lesions in exotic and companion animals.

Documented natural infections with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in exotic and companion animals following human exposures are uncommon. Those documented in animals are typically mild and self-limiting, and infected animals have only infrequently died or been euthanized. Through a coordinated One Health initiative, necropsies were conducted on 5 animals from different premises that were exposed to humans with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. The combination of epidemiologic evidence of exposure and confirmatory real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction testing confirmed infection in 3 cats and a tiger. A dog was a suspect case based on epidemiologic evidence of exposure but tested negative for SARS-CoV-2. Four animals had respiratory clinical signs that developed 2 to 12 days after exposure. The dog had bronchointerstitial pneumonia and the tiger had bronchopneumonia; both had syncytial-like cells with no detection of SARS-CoV-2. Individual findings in the 3 cats included metastatic mammary carcinoma, congenital renal disease, and myocardial disease. Based on the necropsy findings and a standardized algorithm, SARS-CoV-2 infection was not considered the cause of death in any of the cases. Continued surveillance and necropsy examination of animals with fatal outcomes will further our understanding of natural SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals and the potential role of the virus in development of lesions.

Pandemic lineage 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus infection in farmed mink in Utah.

Mink are susceptible to infection with influenza A virus (IAV) of swine and human origin. In 2019, a Utah mink farm had an outbreak of respiratory disease in kits caused by infection with the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus [A(H1N1)pdm09]. In 3 wk, ~325, 1-2-wk-old kits died (10% mortality in kits). All deaths occurred in a single barn that housed 640 breeding females. No clinical signs or deaths occurred among adult mink. Five dead kits and 3 euthanized female mink were autopsied. All kits had moderate-to-severe neutrophilic and lymphohistiocytic interstitial pneumonia; adult mink had minimal-to-moderate lymphohistiocytic bronchointerstitial pneumonia. Immunohistochemistry and real-time PCR targeting the matrix gene detected IAV in lung of kits and adults. Virus isolation and genetic analysis identified the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The source of the virus was not determined but is thought to be the result of reverse zoonosis. Our case emphasizes the need for close monitoring on mink farms for interspecies transmission of IAV and for safe work practices on farms and in diagnostic laboratories. Additionally, a pandemic virus may continue to circulate at low levels long after the global event is declared over.

SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant of concern detected in a pet dog and cat after exposure to a person with COVID-19, USA.

As part of a longitudinal household transmission study of pets living with persons with COVID-19 in Texas, two pets were confirmed to be infected with the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant of concern (VOC). The pets were a dog and a cat from the same household, sampled two days after their owner tested positive for COVID-19. The oral, nasal and fur swabs for both pets tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by qRT-PCR and consensus whole-genome sequences from the dog and cat were 100% identical and matched the B.1.1.7 VOC. Virus was isolated from the cat's nasal swab. One month after initial detection of infection, the pets were re-tested twice at which time only the fur swabs (both pets) and oral swab (dog only) remained positive, and neutralizing antibodies for SARS-CoV-2 were present in both animals. Sneezing by both pets was noted by the owner in the weeks between initial and follow-up testing. This study documents the first detection of B.1.1.7. in companion animals in the United States, and the first genome recovery and isolation of B.1.1.7 variant of concern globally in any animal.

Antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 in dogs and cats, USA.

To provide more complete data on SARS-CoV-2 infections in dogs and cats in the U.S., we conducted a serosurvey on convenience serum samples from dogs (n=1336) and cats (n=956) collected from 48 states of the USA in 2020. An ELISA targeting the antibody against nucleocapsid identified eleven positive and two doubtful samples in cats, and five positive and five doubtful samples in dogs. A surrogate neutralization assay detecting antibodies blocking the attachment of the spike protein to ACE2 was positive with three of the ELISA positive and doubtful samples, and one of 463 randomly selected ELISA negative samples. These four positive samples were confirmed by SARS-CoV-2 virus neutralization testing. All were from cats, in New York, Florida, and New Jersey (n=2). The serosurvey results, one of the largest yet completed on dogs and cats globally, support the OIE and CDC positions that currently there is no evidence that pets play a role in the spread of SARS CoV-2 in humans.

H7N1 Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses in Poultry in the United States During 2018.

Here, we report three detections of H7N1 low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) from poultry in Missouri (n = 2) and Texas (n = 1) during February and March 2018. Complete genome sequencing and comparative phylogenetic analysis suggest that the H7 LPAIV precursor viruses were circulating in wild birds in North America during the fall and winter of 2017 and spilled over into domestic poultry in Texas and Missouri independently during the spring of 2018.

Nota de investigación­Virus de la influenza aviar de baja patogenicidad H7N1 en avicultura, Estados Unidos, 2018. En este artículo se reportan tres detecciones del virus de influenza aviar de baja patogenicidad H7N1 (LPAIV) en avicultura en Missouri (n = 2) y Texas (n = 1) durante febrero y marzo del 2018. La secuenciación completa del genoma y el análisis filogenético comparativo sugieren que precursores de este virus de influenza de baja patogenicidad H7 circulaban en aves silvestres en América del Norte durante el otoño y el invierno de 2017 y se propagaron a las aves comerciales en Texas y Missouri de forma independiente durante la primavera del 2018.

SARS-CoV-2 Infections and Viral Isolations among Serially Tested Cats and Dogs in Households with Infected Owners in Texas, USA.

Understanding the ecological and epidemiological roles of pets in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is critical for animal and human health, identifying household reservoirs, and predicting the potential enzootic maintenance of the virus. We conducted a longitudinal household transmission study of 76 dogs and cats living with at least one SARS-CoV-2-infected human in Texas and found that 17 pets from 25.6% of 39 households met the national case definition for SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals. This includes three out of seventeen (17.6%) cats and one out of fifty-nine (1.7%) dogs that were positive by RT-PCR and sequencing, with the virus successfully isolated from the respiratory swabs of one cat and one dog. Whole-genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 obtained from all four PCR-positive animals were unique variants grouping with genomes circulating among people with COVID-19 in Texas. Re-sampling showed persistence of viral RNA for at least 25 d-post initial test. Additionally, seven out of sixteen (43.8%) cats and seven out of fifty-nine (11.9%) dogs harbored SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies upon initial sampling, with relatively stable or increasing titers over the 2-3 months of follow-up and no evidence of seroreversion. The majority (82.4%) of infected pets were asymptomatic. 'Reverse zoonotic' transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from infected people to animals may occur more frequently than recognized.

Emergence and molecular characterization of pigeon Paramyxovirus-1 in non-native Eurasian collared doves (Streptopelia decaocto) in California, USA.

Eurasian collared doves (Streptopelia decaocto) were introduced into Florida in the 1980s and have since established populations throughout the continental United States. Pigeon paramyxovirus-1 (PPMV-1), a species-adapted genotype VI Avian orthoavulavirus 1, has caused periodic outbreaks among collared doves in the U.S. since 2001 with outbreaks occasionally involving native doves. In California, PPMV-1 mortality events were first documented in Riverside County in 2014 with subsequent outbreaks in 23 additional counties from southern to northern California between 2015 and 2019. Affected collared doves exhibited torticollis and partial paralysis. Pale kidneys were frequently visible on gross necropsy (65.4%; 51/78) while lymphoplasmacytic interstitial nephritis often with acute tubular necrosis (96.0%; 24/25) and pancreatic necrosis (80.0%; 20/25) were common findings on histopathology. In total, PPMV-1 was confirmed by rRT-PCR and sequence analysis from oropharyngeal and/or cloacal swabs in 93.0% (40/43) of the collared doves tested from 16 California counties. In 2017, Avian orthoavulavirus 1 was confirmed in a native mourning dove (Zenaida macroura) found dead during a PPMV-1 outbreak in collared doves by rRT-PCR from formalin-fixed paraffin-embedded (FFPE) tissues, after the initial rRT-PCR from swabs failed to detect the virus. Molecular sequencing of the fusion protein of isolates collected from collared doves during outbreaks in 2014, 2016, and 2017 identified two distinct subgenotypes, VIa and VIn. Subgenotype VIn has been primarily isolated from collared doves in the southern U.S., while VIa has been isolated from mixed avian species in the northeastern U.S., indicating two independent introductions into California. While populations of collared doves are not expected to be substantially impacted by this disease, PPMV-1 may pose a threat to already declining populations of native columbids. This threat could be assessed by monitoring native and non-native columbids for PPMV-1. Based on our study, swab samples may not be sufficient to detect infection in native columbids and may require the use of non-traditional diagnostic approaches, such as FFPE tissues, to ensure virus detection.

Estimating epidemiological parameters using diagnostic testing data from low pathogenicity avian influenza infected turkey houses.

Limiting spread of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) during an outbreak is critical to reduce the negative impact on poultry producers and local economies. Mathematical models of disease transmission can support outbreak control efforts by estimating relevant epidemiological parameters. In this article, diagnostic testing data from each house on a premises infected during a LPAI H5N2 outbreak in the state of Minnesota in the United States in 2018 was used to estimate the time of virus introduction and adequate contact rate, which determines the rate of disease spread. A well-defined most likely time of virus introduction, and upper and lower 95% credibility intervals were estimated for each house. The length of the 95% credibility intervals ranged from 11 to 22 with a mean of 17 days. In some houses the contact rate estimates were also well-defined; however, the estimated upper 95% credibility interval bound for the contact rate was occasionally dependent on the upper bound of the prior distribution. The estimated modes ranged from 0.5 to 6.0 with a mean of 2.8 contacts per day. These estimates can be improved with early detection, increased testing of monitored premises, and combining the results of multiple barns that possess similar production systems.

From People to Panthera: Natural SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Tigers and Lions at the Bronx Zoo.

Despite numerous barriers to transmission, zoonoses are the major cause of emerging infectious diseases in humans. Among these, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and ebolaviruses have killed thousands; the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) has killed millions. Zoonoses and human-to-animal cross-species transmission are driven by human actions and have important management, conservation, and public health implications. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which presumably originated from an animal reservoir, has killed more than half a million people around the world and cases continue to rise. In March 2020, New York City was a global epicenter for SARS-CoV-2 infections. During this time, four tigers and three lions at the Bronx Zoo, NY, developed mild, abnormal respiratory signs. We detected SARS-CoV-2 RNA in respiratory secretions and/or feces from all seven animals, live virus in three, and colocalized viral RNA with cellular damage in one. We produced nine whole SARS-CoV-2 genomes from the animals and keepers and identified different SARS-CoV-2 genotypes in the tigers and lions. Epidemiologic and genomic data indicated human-to-tiger transmission. These were the first confirmed cases of natural SARS-CoV-2 animal infections in the United States and the first in nondomestic species in the world. We highlight disease transmission at a nontraditional interface and provide information that contributes to understanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission across species.IMPORTANCE The human-animal-environment interface of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is an important aspect of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic that requires robust One Health-based investigations. Despite this, few reports describe natural infections in animals or directly link them to human infections using genomic data. In the present study, we describe the first cases of natural SARS-CoV-2 infection in tigers and lions in the United States and provide epidemiological and genetic evidence for human-to-animal transmission of the virus. Our data show that tigers and lions were infected with different genotypes of SARS-CoV-2, indicating two independent transmission events to the animals. Importantly, infected animals shed infectious virus in respiratory secretions and feces. A better understanding of the susceptibility of animal species to SARS-CoV-2 may help to elucidate transmission mechanisms and identify potential reservoirs and sources of infection that are important in both animal and human health.

Tissue Tropisms of Avian Influenza A Viruses Affect Their Spillovers from Wild Birds to Pigs.

Wild aquatic birds maintain a large, genetically diverse pool of influenza A viruses (IAVs), which can be transmitted to lower mammals and, ultimately, humans. Through phenotypic analyses of viral replication efficiency, only a small set of avian IAVs were found to replicate well in epithelial cells of the swine upper respiratory tract, and these viruses were shown to infect and cause virus shedding in pigs. Such a phenotypic trait of the viral replication efficiency appears to emerge randomly and is distributed among IAVs across multiple avian species and geographic and temporal orders. It is not determined by receptor binding preference but is determined by other markers across genomic segments, such as those in the ribonucleoprotein complex. This study demonstrates that phenotypic variants of viral replication efficiency exist among avian IAVs but that only a few of these may result in viral shedding in pigs upon infection, providing opportunities for these viruses to become adapted to pigs, thus posing a higher potential risk for creating novel variants or detrimental reassortants within pig populations.IMPORTANCE Swine serve as a mixing vessel for generating pandemic strains of human influenza virus. All hemagglutinin subtypes of IAVs can infect swine; however, only sporadic cases of infection with avian IAVs are reported in domestic swine. The molecular mechanisms affecting the ability of avian IAVs to infect swine are still not fully understood. From the findings of phenotypic analyses, this study suggests that the tissue tropisms (i.e., in swine upper respiratory tracts) of avian IAVs affect their spillovers from wild birds to pigs. It was found that this phenotype is determined not by receptor binding preference but is determined by other markers across genomic segments, such as those in the ribonucleoprotein complex. In addition, our results show that such a phenotypic trait was sporadically and randomly distributed among IAVs across multiple avian species and geographic and temporal orders. This study suggests an efficient way for assessment of the risk posed by avian IAVs, such as in evaluating their potentials to be transmitted from birds to pigs.

First Reported Cases of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Companion Animals - New York, March-April 2020.

On April 22, CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported cases of two domestic cats with confirmed infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). These are the first reported companion animals (including pets and service animals) with SARS-CoV-2 infection in the United States, and among the first findings of SARS-CoV-2 symptomatic companion animals reported worldwide. These feline cases originated from separate households and were epidemiologically linked to suspected or confirmed human COVID-19 cases in their respective households. Notification of presumptive positive animal test results triggered a One Health* investigation by state and federal partners, who determined that no further transmission events to other animals or persons had occurred. Both cats fully recovered. Although there is currently no evidence that animals play a substantial role in spreading COVID-19, CDC advises persons with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 to restrict contact with animals during their illness and to monitor any animals with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and separate them from other persons and animals at home (1).

Complete Genome Sequence of SARS-CoV-2 in a Tiger from a U.S. Zoological Collection.

This report describes the identification and characterization of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in a Malayan tiger in a U.S. zoo.

Updated unified phylogenetic classification system and revised nomenclature for Newcastle disease virus.

Several Avian paramyxoviruses 1 (synonymous with Newcastle disease virus or NDV, used hereafter) classification systems have been proposed for strain identification and differentiation. These systems pioneered classification efforts; however, they were based on different approaches and lacked objective criteria for the differentiation of isolates. These differences have created discrepancies among systems, rendering discussions and comparisons across studies difficult. Although a system that used objective classification criteria was proposed by Diel and co-workers in 2012, the ample worldwide circulation and constant evolution of NDV, and utilization of only some of the criteria, led to identical naming and/or incorrect assigning of new sub/genotypes. To address these issues, an international consortium of experts was convened to undertake in-depth analyses of NDV genetic diversity. This consortium generated curated, up-to-date, complete fusion gene class I and class II datasets of all known NDV for public use, performed comprehensive phylogenetic neighbor-Joining, maximum-likelihood, Bayesian and nucleotide distance analyses, and compared these inference methods. An updated NDV classification and nomenclature system that incorporates phylogenetic topology, genetic distances, branch support, and epidemiological independence was developed. This new consensus system maintains two NDV classes and existing genotypes, identifies three new class II genotypes, and reduces the number of sub-genotypes. In order to track the ancestry of viruses, a dichotomous naming system for designating sub-genotypes was introduced. In addition, a pilot dataset and sub-trees rooting guidelines for rapid preliminary genotype identification of new isolates are provided. Guidelines for sequence dataset curation and phylogenetic inference, and a detailed comparison between the updated and previous systems are included. To increase the speed of phylogenetic inference and ensure consistency between laboratories, detailed guidelines for the use of a supercomputer are also provided. The proposed unified classification system will facilitate future studies of NDV evolution and epidemiology, and comparison of results obtained across the world.

Pathogenicity and transmission of virulent Newcastle disease virus from the 2018-2019 California outbreak and related viruses in young and adult chickens.

In May of 2018, virulent Newcastle disease virus was detected in sick, backyard, exhibition chickens in southern California. Since, the virus has affected 401 backyard and four commercial flocks, and one live bird market in California, and one backyard flock in Utah. The pathogenesis and transmission potential of this virus, along with two genetically related and widely studied viruses, chicken/California/2002 and chicken/Belize/2008, were evaluated in both 3-week- and 62-week-old chickens given a low, medium, or high challenge dose. All three viruses were highly virulent causing clinical signs, killing all the chickens in the medium and high dose groups, and efficiently transmitting to contacts. The three viruses also replicated in the reproductive tract of the adult hens. Virus shedding for all viruses was detected 24 hours after challenge, peaking with high titers at day 4 post challenge. Although not genetically identical, the studied isolates were shown to be phenotypically very similar, which allows the utilization of the available literature in the control of the current outbreak.

Transmission Dynamics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus A(H5Nx) Clade 2.3.4.4, North America, 2014-2015.

Eurasia highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5 clade 2.3.4.4 emerged in North America at the end of 2014 and caused outbreaks affecting >50 million poultry in the United States before eradication in June 2015. We investigated the underlying ecologic and epidemiologic processes associated with this viral spread by performing a comparative genomic study using 268 full-length genome sequences and data from outbreak investigations. Reassortant HPAIV H5N2 circulated in wild birds along the Pacific flyway before several spillover events transmitting the virus to poultry farms. Our analysis suggests that >3 separate introductions of HPAIV H5N2 into Midwest states occurred during March-June 2015; transmission to Midwest poultry farms from Pacific wild birds occurred ≈1.7-2.4 months before detection. Once established in poultry, the virus rapidly spread between turkey and chicken farms in neighboring states. Enhanced biosecurity is required to prevent the introduction and dissemination of HPAIV across the poultry industry.