Prevalence of Medical Payment Products Promoted on US Hospitals' Websites.

This cross-sectional study examines the prevalence of hospital-promoted medical payment products (MPPs) by whether hospitals offered any MPP or an interest-bearing MPP.

Fostering Flexibility: How Medicare Advantage Potentially Accelerated Telehealth Benefits.

In 2018, the US Congress enacted a policy permitting Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to cover telehealth services in a beneficiary's home and through audio-only means as part of the basic benefit package of services, where prior to the policy change such benefits were only allowed to be covered as a supplemental benefit. MA plans were afforded 2 years of lead time for strategizing, negotiating, and capital investment prior to the start date (January 1, 2020) of the new coverage option. Our data analysis found basic benefit telehealth was offered by plans comprising 71% of enrollment in 2020 and increased to 95% in 2021. At the same time, remote access telehealth was offered as a supplemental benefit for 69% of enrollees in 2020, a decrease of 23% compared to 2019. These efforts by MA plans may have enabled traditional Medicare (TM) to leverage an existing telehealth infrastructure as a solution to the access issues created by public health policies requiring sheltering in place and social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The success of this MA policy prompts consideration of additional flexibility beyond the standard basic benefit package, and whether such benefits reduce costs while improving access and/or outcomes in the context of a managed care environment like MA. Subject to oversight, such flexibility could potentially improve value in MA, and facilitate future changes in TM, as appropriate.

Part D beneficiaries' incentives and responses under preferred pharmacy networks.

OBJECTIVES: The share of Medicare stand-alone prescription drug plans with a preferred pharmacy network has grown from less than 9% in 2011 to 98% in 2021. This article assesses the financial incentives that such networks created for unsubsidized and subsidized beneficiaries and their pharmacy switching. STUDY DESIGN: We analyzed prescription drug claims data for a nationally representative 20% sample of Medicare beneficiaries from 2010 through 2016. METHODS: We evaluated the financial incentives for using preferred pharmacies by simulating unsubsidized and subsidized beneficiaries' annual out-of-pocket spending differentials between using nonpreferred and preferred pharmacies for all their prescriptions. We then compared beneficiaries' use of pharmacies before and after their plans adopted preferred networks. We also examined the amount of money that beneficiaries left on the table under such networks, based on their pharmacy use. RESULTS: Unsubsidized beneficiaries faced substantial incentives-on average, $147 annually in out-of-pocket spending-and moderately switched toward preferred pharmacies, whereas subsidized beneficiaries were insulated from the incentives and demonstrated little switching. Among those who continued to mainly use nonpreferred pharmacies (half of the unsubsidized and about two-thirds of the subsidized), on average, the unsubsidized paid more out of pocket ($94) relative to if they had used preferred pharmacies, whereas Medicare bore the extra spending ($170) for the subsidized through cost-sharing subsidies. CONCLUSIONS: Preferred networks have important implications for beneficiaries' out-of-pocket spending and the low-income subsidy program. Further research is needed about the impact on the quality of beneficiaries' decision-making and cost savings to fully evaluate preferred networks.

Substantial Growth In Medicare Advantage And Implications For Reform.

Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollment increased by 22.2 million beneficiaries (337.0 percent) from 2006 through 2022, whereas traditional Medicare enrollment declined by 1.0 million (-2.9 percent) over that period. In 2022, adjusted MA penetration was 49.9 percent nationally, and 24.0 percent of Medicare beneficiaries with Parts A and B lived in a county with adjusted MA penetration equal to or exceeding 60 percent.

Ground Ambulance Billing And Prices Differ By Ownership Structure.

The No Surprises Act prohibits most surprise billing but notably does not apply to ground ambulance services. In this study we created a novel data set that identifies the ownership structure of ground ambulance organizations to compare pricing and billing between private- and public-sector ambulances, with a specific focus on organizations owned by private equity or publicly traded companies. Overall, we found that 28 percent of commercially insured emergency ground ambulance transports during the period 2014-17 resulted in a potential surprise bill. Our analysis illustrates that being transported by a private-sector ambulance in an emergency comes with substantially higher allowed amounts, patient cost sharing, and potential surprise bills compared with being transported by a public-sector ambulance. Further, allowed amounts and cost sharing tended to be higher for private equity- or publicly traded company-owned ambulances than other private-sector ambulances. These findings highlight substantial patient liability and important differences in pricing and billing patterns between public- and private-sector ground ambulance organizations.

Comparison of Estimated No Surprises Act Qualifying Payment Amounts and Payments to In-Network and Out-of-Network Emergency Medicine Professionals.

Importance: The No Surprises Act (NSA), which took effect on January 1, 2022, applies a qualifying payment amount (QPA) as an out-of-network payment reference point. An understanding of how QPA measures compare with the in-network and out-of-network payments physicians received before the NSA implementation may be useful to policy makers and stakeholders. Objective: To estimate the QPA for geographic and funding markets and compare QPA estimates with in-network and out-of-network payments for 2019 emergency medicine claims. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study of US commercial insurance claims assessed the Health Care Cost Institute's 2019 commercial professional emergency medicine claims (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] codes 99281-99285 and 99291) and included enrollees in commercial health maintenance organizations, exclusive provider organizations, point of service, and preferred provider organizations self-funded and fully insured through Aetna, Humana, and some Blue Health Intelligence plans. Claims with missing or inconsistent data fields were excluded. Data were analyzed November 1, 2021, to April 7, 2022. Main Outcomes and Measures: The QPA was calculated as the median allowed amount of all observed claims within strata defined by geographic region, CPT code, and funding market. For each stratum, the ratio of mean in-network allowed amounts to QPAs and mean out-of-network allowed amounts to QPAs were calculated. Then the volume-weighted mean of these ratios was computed across CPT codes within each geographic and funding market stratum. Results: The analytic sample included 7 556 541 professional emergency claims with a mean (SD) allowed amount of $313 ($306) and mean (SD) QPA of $252 ($133). Among the 650 geographic and market strata in the sample, the mean in-network allowed amounts were 14% (ratio, 0.96) higher than the estimated QPA. For the subset of strata with a sufficient sample of out-of-network claims (n = 227), the mean out-of-network payments were 112% (ratio, 2.12) higher than the QPA. More generous out-of-network payments were from self-funded plans (120% [ratio, 2.20] higher than the QPA estimate) vs fully insured plans (43% [ratio, 1.43] higher than the QPA estimate). Mean in-network allowed amounts for nonphysician clinicians were 4% (ratio, 1.04) lower than the QPA, whereas mean in-network allowed amounts for physicians were 15% (ratio, 1.15) higher than the QPA estimates. These differences remained after adjusting for geographic region. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this cross-sectional study of US commercial insurance claims suggest that the NSA may have heterogeneous implications for out-of-network payments and negotiating leverage experienced by emergency medicine physicians in different geographic markets, with the potential for greater implications in the self-funded market.

Insurers negotiate lower hospital prices for HIX than for commercial groups.

OBJECTIVES: This study investigates a sample of the pricing data released by hospitals under the price transparency law effective January 2021 to better understand the prices paid by health insurance exchange (HIX) plans relative to commercial group and Medicare Advantage plans. STUDY DESIGN: Cross-sectional analysis of hospital pricing data. METHODS: We compared allowed amounts for 25 common inpatient services and 56 common outpatient services across 22 hospital-insurer dyads, selected by the availability of plan-specific pricing data from the top 100 hospitals by bed counts and the top 100 hospitals by gross revenue based on 2017 CMS data. RESULTS: Insurers in our sample generally negotiated allowed amounts for their HIX plans that were lower than their commercial group rates and well above their Medicare Advantage contracts within the same hospital. CONCLUSIONS: Allowed amounts for HIX plans were generally lower than commercial group rates and higher than Medicare Advantage rates. Better information on HIX pricing is needed as the federal government and states consider additional ways to expand health care coverage, such as public options or expanded Medicaid or Medicare eligibility.

Medicare Advantage Plans Pay Large Markups To Consolidated Dialysis Organizations.

The 21st Century Cures Act of 2016 lifted regulations prohibiting Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollment after patients initiate dialysis, starting in 2021, and early reports indicate increased MA enrollment among such patients. Large shifts into Medicare Advantage could disrupt the market because the consolidated dialysis industry can negotiate payment from MA plans that is higher than that for fee-for-service Medicare. For three large insurers representing 48 percent of the 2016-17 MA market, we found that MA plans paid 27 percent more than fee-for-service Medicare. Larger dialysis center chains commanded higher markups. Virtually all facilities of the two largest chains were in network, suggesting that they leverage their market power into all-or-nothing negotiations with plans. Policy makers should consider regulations that limit market consolidation among dialysis providers, as well as their ability to exercise that power in the MA market.

Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government.

CONTEXT: Reforming the Medicare Part D program-which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries-has emerged as a key policy priority. METHODS: The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit. FINDINGS: Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government. CONCLUSIONS: Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries.

Pharmacy switching in response to preferred pharmacy networks in Medicare Part D.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the effects of preferred pharmacy networks-a tool that Medicare Part D plans have recently adopted to steer patients to lower cost pharmacies-on the use of preferred pharmacies and factors underlying beneficiaries' decisions on whether to switch to preferred pharmacies. DATA SOURCES: Medicare claims data were collected for a nationally representative 20% sample of beneficiaries during 2010-2016 and merged with annual Part D pharmacy network files. STUDY DESIGN: We examined preferred networks' impact on pharmacy choice by estimating a difference-in-differences model comparing preferred pharmacies' claim share before and after implementation among unsubsidized and subsidized beneficiaries. Additionally, we evaluated the factors affecting whether a beneficiary switched from mainly using nonpreferred to preferred pharmacies. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: We examined stand-alone drug plans that adopted a preferred network during 2011-2016. Our main sample included beneficiaries 65 years and older who stayed in their plan in both the first year of implementation and the year before and whose cost-sharing subsidy status and ZIP code remained unchanged during the 2-year period. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Unsubsidized Part D beneficiaries faced an average difference of $129 per year in out-of-pocket spending between using nonpreferred and preferred pharmacies, while subsidized beneficiaries were insulated from these cost differences. The implementation of preferred networks resulted in a 3.7-percentage point (95% CI: 3.3, 4.2) increase in preferred pharmacies' claim share in the first year among the unsubsidized. Existing relationships with preferred pharmacies, the size of financial incentives, proximity to preferred pharmacies, and urban residence were positively associated with beneficiaries' decisions to switch to these pharmacies. CONCLUSIONS: Preferred pharmacy networks caused a moderate shift on average towards preferred pharmacies among unsubsidized beneficiaries, although stronger financial incentives correlated with more switching. Researchers and policymakers should better understand plans' cost-sharing strategies and assess whether communities have equitable access to preferred pharmacies.

Commercial and Medicare Advantage payment for anesthesiology services.

OBJECTIVES: Anesthesiology services are a focal point of policy making to address surprise medical billing. However, allowed amounts and charges for anesthesiology services have been understudied due to the specialty's unique conversion factor (CF) unit of payment and complex provider structures involving anesthesiologists and certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs). This study compares payments for common outpatient anesthesiology services by commercial health plans, Medicare Advantage (MA), and traditional Medicare. STUDY DESIGN: Analysis of 2016-2017 claims from Health Care Cost Institute. METHODS: We derived allowed amount and charge CFs for commercial and MA claims using the base units assigned to each procedure code, time units, and modifiers. We computed the ratio of the allowed amount and charge CFs relative to the traditional Medicare CF. We described these payment measures by provider structure and network status. RESULTS: Mean in-network commercial allowed amount CFs for anesthesiology services ($70) are 314% of the traditional Medicare rate ($22), whereas mean commercial charge CFs ($148) are 659% of the Medicare rate. Commercial payments vary widely and are higher to anesthesiologists than to CRNAs and higher out of network than in network. MA plan payments align with traditional Medicare with payment parity between anesthesiologists and CRNAs, both in network and out of network. CONCLUSIONS: Common payment measures for anesthesia services-commercial allowed amounts, charges, or traditional Medicare-are highly divergent. MA plans' relatively low payments likely reflect the cost-containing influence of competition with traditional Medicare and MA's prohibition on balance billing. Out-of-network benchmarks for anesthesia services, such as the "qualifying payment amount" used in the No Surprises Act as a guidepost for arbitrators, may benefit from considering commercial payment differences across independent anesthesiologist, independent CRNA, or anesthesiologist-CRNA dyad provider structures.

Emergency Physicians Recover A Higher Share Of Charges From Out-Of-Network Care Than From In-Network Care.

Surprise medical bills occur when a patient unexpectedly or involuntarily receives care from an out-of-network provider and is billed for the amount not covered by insurance. Past studies were unable to observe whether bills for such care were sent to patients and, if so, how much patients paid directly to out-of-network providers. We used data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to measure how much privately insured emergency patients paid when they likely received a surprise bill and how much physicians received in these situations. Physicians collected 65 percent of the charged amount for likely surprise bills compared with 52 percent for other cases. Patients who likely received a surprise out-of-network bill for emergency care paid physicians more than ten times as much as other emergency patients paid, on average.

Arbitration Over Out-Of-Network Medical Bills: Evidence From New Jersey Payment Disputes.

In 2018 New Jersey implemented a final-offer arbitration system to resolve payment disputes between insurers and out-of-network providers over surprise medical bills. Similar proposals are being considered by Congress and other states. In this article we examine how arbitration decisions compare with other relevant provider payment amounts by linking administrative data from New Jersey arbitration cases to Medicare and commercial insurance claims data. We find that decisions track closely with one of the metrics that arbitrators are shown-the eightieth percentile of provider charges-with the median decision being 5.7 times prevailing in-network rates for the same services. It is not a foregone conclusion that arbitrators will select winning offers based on proximity to this target, although our findings suggest that it is a strong anchor. The amount that providers can expect to receive through the arbitration process also affects their bargaining leverage with insurers, which could affect in-network negotiated rates more broadly. Therefore, basing arbitration decisions or a payment standard on unilaterally set provider-billed charges appears likely to increase health care costs relative to other surprise billing solutions and perversely incentivizes providers to inflate their charges over time.

Incorporating Prescription Drug Utilization Information Into the Marketplace Risk Adjustment Model Improves Payment Accuracy and Reduces Adverse Selection Incentives.

Beginning with the 2018 benefit year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services started incorporating select prescription drug utilization information into the Marketplace risk adjustment model. There has been little evidence about the impact of this change on payment accuracy and the mechanisms through which it may occur. Using commercial claims in 2017 from a large national health insurer, we find that the policy change improves payment accuracy in our sample and would help mitigate insurers' selection incentives for some enrollees through two channels: imputing missing diagnoses and varying risk scores to better capture the heterogeneity in expenditures among patients with certain health conditions. However, while improving payment accuracy overall, there are potential perverse incentives that could distort treatment choice for marginal patients. Additionally, overcompensation and undercompensation persists for certain patient subgroups, suggesting an opportunity to further refine and improve the model.

Policies to address surprise billing can affect health insurance premiums.

OBJECTIVES: To quantify the proportion of health plan spending on services for which surprise billing is common-provided by radiologists, anesthesiologists, pathologists, emergency physicians, emergency ground ambulances, and emergency outpatient facilities-and estimate the potential impact of proposed policies to address surprise billing on health insurance premiums. STUDY DESIGN: Analysis of 2017 commercial claims data from the Health Care Cost Institute, comprising 568.5 million claims from 44.8 million covered lives in 3 large US insurers: UnitedHealthcare, Aetna, and Humana. METHODS: We calculate the share of total health plan claims spending attributable to ancillary and emergency services. Next, we estimate the premium impact of proposed federal policies to address surprise billing, which, by removing provider leverage stemming from the ability to surprise-bill, could reduce in- and out-of-network payments for these services, in turn affecting premiums. Specifically, we model the premium impact of reducing payment for these services (1) by 15% and (2) to 150% of traditional Medicare payment rates. RESULTS: More than 10% of health plan spending is attributable to ancillary and emergency services that commonly surprise-bill. Reducing payment for these services by 15% would reduce premiums by 1.6% ($67 per member per year), and reducing average payment to 150% of traditional Medicare rates-the high end of payments to other specialists-would reduce premiums by 5.1% ($212 per member per year). These savings would reduce aggregate premiums for the nation's commercially insured population by approximately $12 billion and $38 billion, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: Addressing surprise billing could substantially affect commercial insurance premiums.

Out-of-Network Air Ambulance Bills: Prevalence, Magnitude, and Policy Solutions.

Policy Points Out-of-network air ambulance bills are a type of surprise medical bill and are driven by many of the same market failures behind other surprise medical bills, including patients' inability to choose in-network providers in an emergency or to avoid potential balance billing by out-of-network providers. The financial risk to consumers is high because more than three-quarters of air ambulances are out-of-network and their prices are high and rising. Consumers facing out-of-network air ambulance bills have few legal protections owing to the Airline Deregulation Act's federal preemption of state laws. Any federal policies for surprise medical bills should also address surprise air ambulance bills and should incorporate substantive consumer protections-not just billing transparency-and correct the market distortions for air ambulances. CONTEXT: Out-of-network air ambulance bills are a growing problem for consumers. Because most air ambulance transports are out-of-network and prices are rising, patients are at risk of receiving large unexpected bills. This article estimates the prevalence and magnitude of privately insured persons' out-of-network air ambulance bills, describes the legal barriers to curtailing surprise air ambulance bills, and proposes policies to protect consumers from out-of-network air ambulance bills. METHODS: We used the Health Care Cost Institute's 2014-2017 data from three large national insurers to evaluate the share of air ambulance claims that are out-of-network and the prevalence and magnitude of potential surprise balance bills, focusing on rotary-wing transports. We estimated the magnitude of potential balance bills for out-of-network air ambulance services by calculating the difference between the provider's billed charges and the insurer's out-of-network allowed amount, including the patient's cost-sharing. For in-network air ambulance transports, we calculated the average charges and allowed amounts, both in absolute magnitude and as a multiple of the rate that Medicare pays for the same service. FINDINGS: We found that less than one-quarter of air ambulance transports of commercially insured patients were in-network. Two-in-five transports resulted in a potential balance bill, averaging $19,851. In the latter years of our data, in-network rates for transports by independent (non-hospital-based) carriers averaged $20,822, or 369% of the Medicare rate for the same service. CONCLUSIONS: Because the states' efforts to curtail air ambulance balance billing have been preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, a federal solution is needed. Owing to the failure of market forces to discipline either prices or supply, out-of-network air ambulance rates should be benchmarked to a multiple of Medicare rates or, alternatively, air ambulance services could be delivered and financed through an approach that combines competitive bidding and public utility regulation.