Age and Gender Differences in the Borrowing of Personal Stories.

BACKGROUND: In prior research, about half of undergraduate students claimed to have "borrowed" a story, by telling someone else's autobiographical memory as if it was their own. Given that borrowing stories often involves intentional fabrication, and given that there are age-related declines in lying, we hypothesized that reports of intentionally borrowing stories should decline with age. METHODS: We recruited participants who ranged in age from 18 to 86 and asked them to complete an online retrospective survey about borrowing stories. RESULTS: Consistent with our hypothesis, older age was associated with lower reports of borrowing stories. Furthermore, among people who did report borrowing a story, older age was associated with less frequent story borrowing and less recent story borrowing. CONCLUSION: These findings highlight the importance of using age-diverse samples when examining social memory phenomena. Findings based upon undergraduate students do not always replicate in other age groups.

The illusory truth effect: A review of how repetition increases belief in misinformation.

Repetition increases belief in information, a phenomenon known as the illusory truth effect. In laboratory experiments, the illusory truth effect has often been examined using general trivia statements as stimuli, but repetition also increases belief in misinformation, such as fake news headlines and conspiracy beliefs. Repetition even increases belief in claims that are implausible or that contradict prior knowledge. Repetition also has broader impacts beyond belief, such as increasing sharing intentions of news headlines and decreasing how unethical an act is perceived to be. Although the illusory truth effect is robust, some interventions reduce its magnitude, including instruction to focus on accuracy and awareness of the illusory truth effect. These strategies may be effective for reducing belief in misinformation.

The illusory truth effect requires semantic coherence across repetitions.

Repeated exposure to information increases its' perceived truth, and this illusory truth effect is often explained by two theoretical frameworks: the fluency account and the referential theory of truth. Whereas the fluency account suggests that prior activation of a single referent within a statement should increase its perceived truth, the referential theory makes no such predictions. The referential theory instead proposes that when a statement is processed, it activates the corresponding memory referents within that statement and strengthens the connection between these referents in the semantic memory network. Because repeated statements will have more coherent corresponding referents than new statements, they are perceived as relatively truer. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on testing the fluency account, with participants exposed to one or two of a statement's referents before evaluating that statement's truth. Experiments 3 and 4 focused on the referential theory by exposing participants to non-critical facts that linked together two of a critical statements' referents before evaluating the truth of the critical statements. We consistently observed a standard illusory truth effect, such that facts that repeated verbatim were rated as truer than new facts. However, perceived truth was not affected by prior exposure to the critical statement's topic (Experiment 1) or by prior exposure to non-critical facts related to the same topic(s) as the critical statement (Experiment 2). There was also no boost in perceived truth following prior exposure to non-critical facts that linked together two of the primary referents of the critical statement but did so in a semantically distinct manner from how those same referents were linked in the critical statement itself (Experiments 3 and 4). However, Experiment 4 demonstrated that perceived truth significantly increased if there was prior exposure to non-critical facts that linked two of the critical statement primary referents in a way that was semantically coherent with how those same referents were linked within the critical statement. Together, these results are consistent with the referential theory, and suggest that semantic consistency across repetitions plays a crucial role in leading to repetition-based illusory truth effects.

Age differences in affective forecasting accuracy.

Affective forecasts are people's predictions of their future feelings in response to future events. In this study, we examined whether younger and older adults differ in their affective forecasting accuracy. To do so, we recruited younger and older American voters and asked them to predict how they would feel following the 2020 U.S. presidential election. In the general feelings condition, participants predicted how they would feel, in general, following an election victory or loss. In the event-related feelings condition, participants predicted their future feelings specifically about an election victory and about an election loss. Later, these same participants reported their experienced feelings (either in general or about the election outcome). In the general feelings condition, age differences in affective forecasting accuracy varied as a function of whether participants' preferred candidate won or lost the election. Among election victors, there were age-related improvements in affective forecasting accuracy of negative feelings. In contrast, among election losers there were age-related declines in affective forecasting accuracy of both negative and positive feelings. A different pattern emerged for participants in the event-related feelings condition. These participants were highly accurate in their affective forecasts, and there were minimal age differences in forecasting accuracy. Together, these results show that age differences in affective forecasting accuracy depend upon both the type of future event, and the type of future feeling being predicted. When considered together, these results also suggest that the focusing illusion plays a key role in modulating age differences in affective forecasting accuracy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The effects of repetition spacing on the illusory truth effect.

The illusory truth effect refers to the fact that repetition increases perceptions of truth. In these experiments, we examined whether the magnitude of the illusory truth effect varies based upon repetition spacing. In Experiment 1, participants read facts that repeated twice, with a lag of 0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, or 32 intervening facts. Participants later rated the truthfulness of these facts in addition to new facts. Here, we observed a spacing effect: Truth ratings were higher when repetitions were spaced (i.e., lags of 1 through 32) rather than massed (i.e., lag of 0). We also observed a lag effect that followed a quadratic pattern: Truth ratings increased up to a lag of 16, after which they decreased. In Experiment 2 we tested whether the spacing effect in truth ratings depends upon the number of repetitions. In Experiment 2a we used a small number of repetitions (2, 3, or 4) and short lag lengths (0, 1, or 2). In Experiment 2b, we increased the number of repetitions (2 or 10) and the lag lengths (0 or 10). In Experiment 2a there was an illusory truth effect, but its magnitude did not depend upon lag length or repetition number. However, in Experiment 2b the magnitude of the illusory truth effect increased as lag length and repetition number increased, but there was no interaction between these two factors. Together, these findings show that repetition is most likely to increase perceived truth when repetitions are spaced with a moderate number of intervening items.