Axiomatic opportunities and obstacles for inferring a species tree from gene trees.

The reconstruction of a central tendency "species tree" from a large number of conflicting gene trees is a central problem in systematic biology. Moreover, it becomes particularly problematic when taxon coverage is patchy, so that not all taxa are present in every gene tree. Here, we list four apparently desirable properties that a method for estimating a species tree from gene trees could have (the strongest property states that building a species tree from input gene trees and then pruning leaves gives a tree that is the same as, or more resolved than, the tree obtained by first removing the taxa from the input trees and then building the species tree). We show that although it is technically possible to simultaneously satisfy these properties when taxon coverage is complete, they cannot all be satisfied in the more general supertree setting. In part two, we discuss a concordance-based consensus method based on Baum's "plurality clusters", and an extension to concordance supertrees.

Objective and subjective probability in gene expression.

In this paper I address the question of whether the probabilities that appear in models of stochastic gene expression are objective or subjective. I argue that while our best models of the phenomena in question are stochastic models, this fact should not lead us to automatically assume that the processes are inherently stochastic. After distinguishing between models and reality, I give a brief introduction to the philosophical problem of the interpretation of probability statements. I argue that the objective vs. subjective distinction is a false dichotomy and is an unhelpful distinction in this case. Instead, the probabilities in our models of gene expression exhibit standard features of both objectivity and subjectivity.

Species concepts should not conflict with evolutionary history, but often do.

Many phylogenetic systematists have criticized the Biological Species Concept (BSC) because it distorts evolutionary history. While defences against this particular criticism have been attempted, I argue that these responses are unsuccessful. In addition, I argue that the source of this problem leads to previously unappreciated, and deeper, fatal objections. These objections to the BSC also straightforwardly apply to other species concepts that are not defined by genealogical history. What is missing from many previous discussions is the fact that the Tree of Life, which represents phylogenetic history, is independent of our choice of species concept. Some species concepts are consistent with species having unique positions on the Tree while others, including the BSC, are not. Since representing history is of primary importance in evolutionary biology, these problems lead to the conclusion that the BSC, along with many other species concepts, are unacceptable. If species are to be taxa used in phylogenetic inferences, we need a history-based species concept.