The WHO Foundation in global health governance: Depoliticizing corporate philanthropy.

The creation of the WHO Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic represents a significant institutional development in the politics of financing the World Health Organization (WHO). In the context of longstanding acute financial pressures, the objective of the WHO Foundation is to widen WHO's resource base by attracting philanthropic donations from the commercial sector. In placing funding decisions 'at one remove' from WHO, the stated expectation is that the WHO Foundation will act as an intermediary, insulating the WHO from potential conflicts of interest and reputational risk through a combination of strategic distance from WHO and proximity with its norms and rules of engagement with non-state actors. Yet, whether this model has translated into practice remains understudied. In this article, we focus on emerging institutional practices within the WHO Foundation, highlighting a drift from its stated governance model. Based on analysis of WHO Foundation documents, we demonstrate how due diligence and transparency practices within the Foundation have been redesigned in ways that contradict or subvert its claims to applying alignment with WHO's governance norms, notably relating to its engagement with health harming industries such as alcohol and petrochemical companies. While this situation may seem paradoxical, we argue that, in placing funding decisions 'at one remove' from the formal institutions and structures of WHO, the creation of the Foundation has served to displace this issue to a more secluded arena where drifts in practice are less exposed to political oversight and scrutiny. Focusing on the discursive aspects of this process of depoliticisation, we contend that the Foundation has strategically managed 'fictional expectations' of accountable and transparent governance in order to mitigate concerns about its mandate and functions. This assessment provides new and important insights into the depoliticizing functions of the WHO Foundation and the significant implications this may have for global health governance.

Advancing whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control: Article 5.3 and the challenge of policy coordination in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda.

INTRODUCTION: Despite an extensive evidence base on the diverse economic, environmental and social benefits of tobacco control, difficulties in establishing coordinated national approaches remain a defining challenge for Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) implementation. Minimising tobacco industry interference is seen as key to effective coordination, and this paper analyses implementation of Article 5.3 guidelines, exploring implications for whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda. METHODS: Based on 131 semistructured interviews with government officials and other key stakeholders, we explore barriers and facilitators for promoting: (1) horizontal coordination across health and other policy spheres, and (2) vertical coordination across national and subnational governments on Article 5.3 implementation. RESULTS: Our analysis identifies common barriers to coordination across diverse geographical contexts and varying approaches to implementation. They highlight broadly shared experiences of limited understanding and engagement beyond health agencies; restricted responsibility and uncertainty amid conflicting mandates; tensions with wider governance practices and norms; limited capacity and authority of coordination mechanisms; and obstacles to vertical coordination across local, state and national governments. Interview data also indicate important opportunities to advance coordination across sectors and government levels, with Article 5.3 measures capable of informing changes in practices, building support in other sectors, allowing for 'bottom-up' innovation and being shaped by engagement with civil society. CONCLUSION: Supporting effective implementation of Article 5.3 is key to advancing multisectoral approaches to FCTC implementation and tobacco control's contributions to global health and sustainable development.

'A contradiction between our state and the tobacco company': conflicts of interest and institutional constraints as barriers to implementing Article 5.3 in Bangladesh.

INTRODUCTION: Bangladesh has not yet adopted measures to implement Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The National Tobacco Control Cell (NTCC) has drafted a guideline for implementation, but progress has stalled amid high levels of tobacco industry interference in public policy. This paper examines the barriers to minimising industry interference in a context of close relationships between government officials and tobacco companies. METHODS: In-depth interviews were conducted with government officials, representatives from civil society, think tank and media organisations, and academic researchers. The data were analysed using a '3 Is' framework developed within the political sciences, emphasising the interactive role of ideas, interests and institutions in policy change. RESULTS: The findings indicate that policy ideas about protecting public health policy making from tobacco industry interests are largely restricted to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and the NTCC specifically. Both individual and institutional conflicts of interest emerge as key barriers to progress to minimising industry interference and for tobacco control governance more broadly. The data also suggest that development of an Article 5.3 guideline has been shaped by the perceived interests of political actors and institutions, and the institutional position of the NTCC, constrained by limits on its resources, authority and isolation from other ministries. CONCLUSION: NTCC's initiatives towards implementing Article 5.3 constitute an important opportunity to address conflicts of interest that restrict tobacco control in Bangladesh. Progress in minimising industry interference is essential to realising the commitment to being smoke free by 2040.