Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs.

Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity-variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity-estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs-indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.

Beyond lottery-evoked ambiguity aversion: The neural signature of the types and the sources of uncertainty.

Studies on decision-making under uncertainty have mainly focused on understanding preferences for either risk or ambiguity using standard lottery designs. However, people often face uncertainty that directly stems from interacting with other people, which may be processed differently from lottery-based uncertainty. Here, we substantially extend the investigation of uncertainty by examining a fourfold pattern of the sources and the types of uncertainty, assessing behavioral and neural responses to both risk and ambiguity across both social and non-social contexts. A key element in our research design was to control for participants' naturally occurring social beliefs, and taking these a priori beliefs into account allow us to elicit individual preferences in accordance with economic approaches that stress the dynamics of ambiguity preference as a function of underlying likelihoods. Using this design, we find a behavioral main effect of ambiguity aversion, with increasing ambiguity aversion as a function of higher beliefs regarding the likelihood of reciprocity, and related neural activity in the right IPS. This brain region was primarily involved when participants experienced lottery-based uncertainty as opposed to social uncertainty. However, we found that the right IFG was more involved when participants made decisions under social, as compared to non-social, uncertainty. Overall, therefore, the IPS may activate an analytic mindset, which might resonate more with a lottery than a social context, whereas the IFG is engaged when the context requires players to resolve uncertainty, such as unraveling the intentions behind the choice of another person.

Subjective Beliefs About Trust and Reciprocity Activate an Expected Reward Signal in the Ventral Striatum.

There is overwhelming evidence that the evaluation of both reward decisions and their associated outcomes are closely linked with bilateral activation of the ventral striatum, with these insights stemming from tasks such as the monetary incentive delay task for lotteries and multiround Trust Games for social settings. The essential element in these tasks is an externally provided cue associated with specific gains/trustworthy partners and losses/non-trustworthy partners. However, in reality people typically use their own beliefs to guide their decision-making and assess the likelihood of positive or and negative outcomes. As when participants assess the relationship between cues and rewards, individuals should anticipate rewards in correspondence to their beliefs, i.e., the higher the belief of obtaining a reward in the future, the higher the anticipation of reward. In this study, we use decision-makers' own, naturally occurring, beliefs about both social and non-social contexts to examine the subsequent outcome of their choices. We hypothesize that mechanisms of belief-mediated reward processing are mediated by neural activation in the ventral striatum. An essential feature of our design is the elicitation of individuals' beliefs prior to the decision-making task itself. Furthermore, our incentivized, non-deceptive, decision-making task distinguishes between social - implemented by a Trust Game - and non-social sources, as well as risk and ambiguity as underlying types of uncertainty. Our main result shows that individual beliefs regarding reciprocity likelihoods in both the Trust Game and the lottery influence the amount invested. Subsequently, only the investment amount in the Trust Game parametrically modulates anticipatory reward and outcome evaluation in the ventral striatum. This study demonstrates a first approach at using participants' subjective sets of beliefs to examine reward processing. We discuss its potential promise, outline some limitations, and propose follow-up studies to extend the current approach.

Economic principles in communication: an experimental study.

This paper experimentally investigates how economic principles affect communication. In a simple sender-receiver game with common interests over payoffs, the sender can send a signal without a pre-given meaning in an infrequent or frequent state of the world. When the signal is costly, several theories (focal point theory, the intuitive criterion, evolutionary game theory) predict an efficient separating equilibrium, where the signal is sent in the infrequent state of the world (also referred to as Horn׳s rule). To analyze whether Horn׳s rule applies, and if so, which theory best explains it, we develop and test variants of the sender-receiver game where the theories generate discriminatory hypotheses. In costly signaling variants, our participants follow Horn׳s rule most of the time, in a manner that is best explained by focal point theory. In costless signaling variants, evolutionary game theory best explains our results. Here participants coordinate significantly more (less) often on a separating equilibrium where the signal is sent in the frequent state if they are primed to associate the absence of a signal with the infrequent (frequent) state of the world. We also find indications that a similar priming effect applies to costly signals. Thus, while the frequency with which participants follow Horn׳s rule in costly signaling variants is best explained by Horn׳s rule, the priming effect shows that some of our participants׳ behavior is best explained by evolutionary game theory even when signals are costly.