Psychological reactance and vaccine uptake: a longitudinal study.

OBJECTIVE: In most countries, vaccine uptake is a voluntary decision. If people experience threats to this freedom, for example, by pro-vaccination media campaigns or government pressure, psychological reactance may be induced. To regain freedom, the opposite behaviour (vaccine refusal) may become more attractive, forming a vaccination barrier. It remains unclear how state reactance fluctuates and how it relates to vaccination intention versus behaviour. Therefore, this pre-registered longitudinal study aimed to gain insight in the changes in state reactance during a COVID-19 vaccination programme and its relationship with vaccine uptake. METHODS: A representative sample of Dutch adults under 60 completed questionnaires before being eligible for vaccination, shortly before they were invited for vaccination, and after the opportunity for vaccination. RESULTS: Data were analysed using regression analyses (N = 1411). Reactance did not change as hypothesised, but remained stable over time. As hypothesised, reactance predicted lower subsequent vaccination intention. Controlling for intentions, however, reactance did not predict vaccine uptake. Furthermore, reactance predicted lower decision confidence about vaccination, except for people who strongly opposed vaccination. CONCLUSION: Reactance has a sustained role in anticipation of a vaccination decision. Although reactance seems to affect the process towards the decision, this does not determine the final choice.

Scientific-Consensus Communication About Contested Science: A Preregistered Meta-Analysis.

Scientific-consensus communication is among the most promising interventions to minimize the gap between experts' and the public's belief in scientific facts. There is, however, discussion about its effectiveness in changing consensus perceptions and beliefs about contested science topics. This preregistered meta-analysis assessed the effects of communicating the existence of scientific consensus on perceived scientific consensus and belief in scientific facts. Combining 43 experiments about climate change, genetically modified food, and vaccination, we found that a single exposure to consensus messaging had a positive effect on perceived scientific consensus (g = 0.55) and on belief in scientific facts (g = 0.12). Consensus communication yielded very similar effects for climate change and genetically modified food, whereas the low number of experiments about vaccination prevented conclusions regarding this topic. Although these effects are small, communicating scientific consensus appears to be an effective way to change factual beliefs about contested science topics.

Situating desire: Situational cues affect desire for food through eating simulations.

How do situations influence food desire? Although eating typically occurs in rich background situations, research on food desire often focuses on the properties of foods and consumers, rather than on the situations in which eating takes place. Here, we take a grounded cognition perspective and suggest that a situation that is congruent with consuming a food increases simulations of eating it, which, in turn, affect desire, and the expected and actual liking of the food. We tested this idea in four pre-registered experiments (N = 524). Participants processed an image of a food presented in a congruent situation, an incongruent situation, or no background situation. Compared to the incongruent situation, the congruent situation increased expected liking of the food and desire, and this was partially or fully mediated by eating simulations. The congruent situation also increased salivation, a physiological indicator of preparing to eat. However, there was only weak and indirect evidence for congruence effects on actual liking of the food when tasted. These findings show that situational cues can affect desire for food through eating simulations. Thus, background situations play an important but understudied role in human food desires. We address implications for research using food images, and for applications to promote healthy and sustainable eating behaviour.

Boosting Understanding and Identification of Scientific Consensus Can Help to Correct False Beliefs.

Some people hold beliefs that are opposed to overwhelming scientific evidence. Such misperceptions can be harmful to both personal and societal well-being. Communicating scientific consensus has been found to be effective in eliciting scientifically accurate beliefs, but it is unclear whether it is also effective in correcting false beliefs. Here, we show that a strategy that boosts people's understanding of and ability to identify scientific consensus can help to correct misperceptions. In three experiments with more than 1,500 U.S. adults who held false beliefs, participants first learned the value of scientific consensus and how to identify it. Subsequently, they read a news article with information about a scientific consensus opposing their beliefs. We found strong evidence that in the domain of genetically engineered food, this two-step communication strategy was more successful in correcting misperceptions than merely communicating scientific consensus. The data suggest that the current approach may not work for misperceptions about climate change.

Investigating and Improving the Accuracy of US Citizens' Beliefs About the COVID-19 Pandemic: Longitudinal Survey Study.

BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 infodemic, a surge of information and misinformation, has sparked worry about the public's perception of the coronavirus pandemic. Excessive information and misinformation can lead to belief in false information as well as reduce the accurate interpretation of true information. Such incorrect beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic might lead to behavior that puts people at risk of both contracting and spreading the virus. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was two-fold. First, we attempted to gain insight into public beliefs about the novel coronavirus and COVID-19 in one of the worst hit countries: the United States. Second, we aimed to test whether a short intervention could improve people's belief accuracy by empowering them to consider scientific consensus when evaluating claims related to the pandemic. METHODS: We conducted a 4-week longitudinal study among US citizens, starting on April 27, 2020, just after daily COVID-19 deaths in the United States had peaked. Each week, we measured participants' belief accuracy related to the coronavirus and COVID-19 by asking them to indicate to what extent they believed a number of true and false statements (split 50/50). Furthermore, each new survey wave included both the original statements and four new statements: two false and two true statements. Half of the participants were exposed to an intervention aimed at increasing belief accuracy. The intervention consisted of a short infographic that set out three steps to verify information by searching for and verifying a scientific consensus. RESULTS: A total of 1202 US citizens, balanced regarding age, gender, and ethnicity to approximate the US general public, completed the baseline (T0) wave survey. Retention rate for the follow-up waves- first follow-up wave (T1), second follow-up wave (T2), and final wave (T3)-was high (≥85%). Mean scores of belief accuracy were high for all waves, with scores reflecting low belief in false statements and high belief in true statements; the belief accuracy scale ranged from -1, indicating completely inaccurate beliefs, to 1, indicating completely accurate beliefs (T0 mean 0.75, T1 mean 0.78, T2 mean 0.77, and T3 mean 0.75). Accurate beliefs were correlated with self-reported behavior aimed at preventing the coronavirus from spreading (eg, social distancing) (r at all waves was between 0.26 and 0.29 and all P values were less than .001) and were associated with trust in scientists (ie, higher trust was associated with more accurate beliefs), political orientation (ie, liberal, Democratic participants held more accurate beliefs than conservative, Republican participants), and the primary news source (ie, participants reporting CNN or Fox News as the main news source held less accurate beliefs than others). The intervention did not significantly improve belief accuracy. CONCLUSIONS: The supposed infodemic was not reflected in US citizens' beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic. Most people were quite able to figure out the facts in these relatively early days of the crisis, calling into question the prevalence of misinformation and the public's susceptibility to misinformation.