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2.
Schizophr Bull ; 46(6): 1367-1381, 2020 12 01.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33099644

RESUMEN

Bereaved people often report having sensory and quasi-sensory experiences of the deceased (SED), and there is an ongoing debate over whether SED are associated with pathology, such as grief complications. Research into these experiences has been conducted in various disciplines, including psychiatry, psychology, and anthropology, without much crossover. This review brings these areas of research together, drawing on the expertise of an interdisciplinary working group formed as part of the International Consortium for Hallucination Research (ICHR). It examines existing evidence on the phenomenology, associated factors, and impact of SED, including the role of culture, and discusses the main theories on SED and how these phenomena compare with unusual experiences in other contexts. The review concludes that the vast majority of these experiences are benign and that they should be considered in light of their biographical, relational, and sociocultural contexts.

4.
Psychopathology ; 50(1): 90-97, 2017.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28132055

RESUMEN

"Atmospheric" alterations are key aspects of altered subjectivity in mental disorder. Karl Jaspers famously described the "delusional mood": a sense of uncanny salience and ominousness that often precedes the onset of schizophrenic psychosis or of delusions. Such experiences, he writes, involve "a transformation in our total awareness of reality" that often verges on ineffability. In psychiatry, these experiential alterations are often referred to in terms of "derealization." Though derealization most obviously refers to a decline in the sense of objective presence or felt actuality, it can also refer to other unusual experiences in which things seem unlike normal or standard reality, including altered familiarity, vitality, meaning, or relevance. This paper first describes two complementary ways of approaching these phenomena: the notion of an "ontological" dimension (Sass) and that of "existential feeling" (Ratcliffe). It then offers a wider-ranging synopsis of work in phenomenological psychopathology that has sought to address atmospheric alterations believed to be especially characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum conditions, focusing on the themes of a diminished sense of reality, altered sense of meaning, disrupted feeling of familiarity, and diminished vitality and relevance.


Asunto(s)
Esquizofrenia/diagnóstico , Psicología del Esquizofrénico , Deluciones , Despersonalización , Emociones , Existencialismo , Humanos , Entrevista Psicológica , Masculino , Reconocimiento en Psicología
5.
Conscious Cogn ; 39: 48-58, 2016 Jan.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-26683229

RESUMEN

Verbal hallucinations are often associated with pronounced feelings of anxiety, and it has also been suggested that anxiety somehow triggers them. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological or 'personal-level' account of how it does so. We show how anxious anticipation of one's own thought contents can generate an experience of their being 'alien'. It does so by making an experience of thinking more like one of perceiving, resulting in an unfamiliar kind of intentional state. This accounts for a substantial subset of verbal hallucinations, which are experienced as falling within one's psychological boundaries and lacking in auditory qualities.


Asunto(s)
Anticipación Psicológica/fisiología , Ansiedad/fisiopatología , Alucinaciones/fisiopatología , Pensamiento/fisiología , Ansiedad/psicología , Alucinaciones/psicología , Humanos , Modelos Psicológicos , Narración
6.
World Psychiatry ; 14(2): 176-8, 2015 Jun.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-26043330
7.
J Conscious Stud ; 22(11-12): 246-269, 2015.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28123340

RESUMEN

'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain experiences of 'verbal hallucination' and show that they amount to different descriptions of the same phenomenon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We conclude by sketching an account of how this might happen.

8.
Front Psychol ; 5: 1026, 2014.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-25278917

RESUMEN

One of the symptoms of trauma is said to be a "sense of foreshortened future." Without further qualification, it is not clear how to interpret this. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological account of what the experience consists of. To do so, we focus on the effects of torture. We describe how traumatic events, especially those that are deliberately inflicted by other people, can lead to a loss of "trust" or "confidence" in the world. This undermines the intelligibility of one's projects, cares, and commitments, in a way that amounts to a change in the structure of temporal experience. The paper concludes by briefly addressing the implications of this for how we respond to trauma, as well as offering some remarks on the relationship between trauma and psychosis.

9.
Med Health Care Philos ; 17(2): 269-80, 2014 May.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-23775337

RESUMEN

This paper seeks to illuminate the nature of empathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutual empathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon the example of depression, I argue that empathy is not principally a matter of 'simulating' another person's experience. It is better conceived of as a perception-like exploration of others' experiences that develops progressively through certain styles of interpersonal interaction.


Asunto(s)
Depresión/psicología , Empatía , Humanos , Relaciones Interpersonales , Filosofía Médica , Percepción Social
10.
J Med Philos ; 37(2): 114-38, 2012 Apr.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-22474140

RESUMEN

People with depression often report alterations in their experience of time, a common complaint being that time has slowed down or stopped. In this paper, I argue that depression can involve a range of qualitatively different changes in the structure of temporal experience, some of which I proceed to describe. In addition, I suggest that current diagnostic categories such as "major depression" are insensitive to the differences between these changes. I conclude by briefly considering whether the kinds of temporal experience associated with depression are specific to depression.


Asunto(s)
Trastorno Depresivo/psicología , Percepción del Tiempo , Trastorno Depresivo Mayor/psicología , Humanos , Motivación , Filosofía Médica
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