'Are these my thoughts?': A 20-year prospective study of thought insertion, thought withdrawal, thought broadcasting, and their relationship to auditory verbal hallucinations.

The co-occurrence of delusions and other symptoms at the onset of psychosis is a challenge for theories about the aetiology of psychosis. This paper explores the relatedness of delusions about the experience of thinking (thought insertion, thought withdrawal, and thought broadcasting) and auditory verbal hallucinations by describing their trajectories over a 20-year period in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, affective and other psychosis, and unipolar depression nonpsychosis. The sample consisted of 407 participants who were recruited at index hospitalization and evaluated over six follow-ups over 20 years. The symptom structure associated with thought insertion included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusions of control, delusion of self-depreciation, depersonalization and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought withdrawal included somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought dissemination, delusions of control, sexual delusions, depersonalization, negative symptoms, depression, and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought broadcasting included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusion of self-depreciation, fantastic delusions, sexual delusions, and depersonalization. Auditory verbal hallucinations and delusions of self-depreciation were significantly associated with both thought insertion and thought broadcasting. Thought insertion and thought withdrawal were significantly associated with other hallucinations, delusions of control, and anxiety; thought withdrawal and thought broadcasting were significantly related to sexual delusions. We hypothesize that specific symptom constellations over time might be explained as the product of pseudo-coherent realities created to give meaning to the experience of the world and the self of individuals in psychosis based on both prior top-down and ongoing bottom-up elements.

The Psychopathology of Delusion of Control According to Subjective Experience / La psicopatología del delirio de control según la experiencia subjetiva

ABSTRACT Background: Delusion of control, including thought insertion, occurs in 20% of patients with schizophrenia. However little is known of its psychopathology, and studies involving patients are scarce. Aims: To explore the subjective experience of patients with delusion of control and to propose a psychopathological explanation based on empirical evidence. Methods: Qualitative exploratory study of 7 patients (6 with schizophrenia and 1 with schizophreniform disorder). A phenomenologically-oriented semi-structured interview was used. Results: Delusion of control is not an isolated and pure symptom; it is always immersed in the context of a persecutory delusion and other psychiatric symptoms. The patient experiences partial control, i.e. the control is never complete. In all cases, it is possible to trace the history of the narrative formation of delusion of control from its origins in persecutory delusions and other concomitant symptoms. Conclusions: The delusion of control is a narrative resulting from the joint presence of a persecutory delusion and other psychiatric symptoms. For the patient, the delusion of control is the narrative of the elaborate expression of the meaning of the anomalous experience. Delusion of control is a narrative variety of persecutory delusion.

resumen Introducción: El delirio de control, incluida la inserción de pensamientos, se presenta en el 20% de los pacientes con esquizofrenia. Sin embargo, se conoce poco de su psicopatología y los estudios que implican a pacientes son escasos. Objetivo: A partir de una serie de casos clínicos, explorar la experiencia subjetiva de pacientes con delirio de control y proponer una explicación psicopatológica con base en elementos empíricos. Métodos: Estudio exploratorio de tipo cualitativo con 7 pacientes (6 con esquizofrenia y 1 con trastorno esquizofreniforme). Se utilizó una entrevista semi estructurada de orientación fenomenológica. Resultados: El delirio de control no se presenta como síntoma aislado y puro, siempre está inmerso en el contexto de un delirio persecutorio y otros síntomas psiquiátricos. El control vivido por el paciente es parcial, nunca total. En todos los casos fue posible rastrear la historia de la constitución narrativa del delirio de control a partir del delirio persecutorio y los otros síntomas concomitantes. El delirio de control es la narrativa que expresa de manera más elaborada el sentido que la experiencia tiene para el paciente. Conclusiones: El delirio de control es una narrativa derivada de la concomitancia de un delirio persecutorio y otros síntomas psiquiátricos. Es la narrativa que expresa de manera más elaborada el sentido que tiene la experiencia anómala para el paciente. El delirio de control es una variedad narrativa del delirio persecutorio.

Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.

Delusions of thought insertion involve subjects claiming that external agents of different nature had placed thoughts into their minds/heads. However, despite being regarded as one of the most severe and complex symptoms of psychotic disorders, a number of disagreements surround the description of its most fundamental phenomenology. This work has reviewed classic and current research on thought insertion in order to examine and clarify its main experiential features as reported by patients from a first-person perspective. The review shows that such features can be grouped into two categories: (i) experiential changes characterizing the period preceding the adoption of the delusion and, (ii) subjective features of full-blown delusional cases. While the discussion of the latter set of experiential features has received some attention within literature, the examination of the former set has been largely neglected. After this, the review offers a discussion of the most important conceptual disagreements surrounding the phenomenological descriptions of the symptom. Overcoming disagreements regarding the experiential structure of thought insertion is fundamental to elaborate phenomenologically and empirically coherent explanatory theories of the symptom and advance its clinical treatment.