Infants expect friends, but not rivals, to be happy for each other when they succeed.

A friend telling you good news earns them a smile while witnessing a rival win an award may make you wrinkle your nose. Emotions arise not just from people's own circumstances, but also from the experiences of friends and rivals. Across three moderated, online looking time studies, we asked if human infants hold expectations about others' vicarious emotions and if they expect those emotions to be guided by social relationships. Ten- and 11-month-old infants (N = 154) expected an observer to be happy rather than sad when the observer watched a friend successfully jump over a wall; infants looked longer at the sad response compared to the happy response. In contrast, infants did not expect the observer to be happy when the friend failed, nor when a different, rival jumper succeeded; infants' looking times to the two emotion responses in these conditions were not reliably different. These results suggest that infants are able to integrate knowledge across social contexts to guide expectations about vicarious emotional responses. Here infants connected an understanding of agents' goals and their outcomes with knowledge of social relationships to infer an emotion response. Biased concern for friends but not adversaries is not just a descriptive feature of human relationships, but an expectation about the social world present from early in development. Further, the successful integration of these information types welcomes the possibility that infants can jointly reason about goals, emotions, and social relationships under an intuitive theory of psychology. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: 11-month-old infants use knowledge of relationships to make inferences about others' vicarious emotions. In Experiment 1 infants expected an observer to respond happily to a friend's success but not their failure. Experiments 2 and 3 varied the relationship between the observer and actor and found that infants' expectation of vicarious happiness is strongest for positive relationships and absent for negative relationships. The results may reflect an intuitive psychology in which infants expect friends to adopt concern for one another's goals and to thus experience one another's successes as rewarding.

I Feel Different, but in Every Case I Feel Proud: Distinguishing Self-Pride, Group-Pride, and Vicarious-Pride.

Various lines of research have hinted at the existence of multiple forms of self-conscious emotion pride. Thus far, it is unclear whether forms, such as self-pride, group-pride, or vicarious-pride are characterized by a similar feeling of pride, and what the communal and unique aspects are of their subjective experiences. The current research addressed this issue and examined the communal and unique characteristics of the subjective experiences of self-pride, group-pride, and vicarious-pride. Using recalled experiences, two experiments demonstrated that self-pride, group-pride, and vicarious-pride could be separated on the basis of their subjective experiences. More specifically, Experiment 2 demonstrated how self-pride, group-pride, and vicarious-pride were related to feelings of self-inflation, other-distancing vs. approaching, and other-devaluation vs. valuation. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that not only the responsibility for the achievement but also the number of people who had contributed to the achievement could influence the experience of other-oriented forms of pride. The current findings revealed that self-pride, group-pride, and vicarious-pride were all forms of pride with distinct subjective experiences. These findings provided valuable insights into the emotion of pride and might lead to divergent consequences for sociality, self-consciousness, and behavior.

The Social Neuroscience of Interpersonal Emotions.

In our daily lives, we constantly engage in reciprocal interactions with other individuals and represent ourselves in the context of our surrounding social world. Within social interactions, humans often experience interpersonal emotions such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, or pride. How interpersonal emotions are processed on the neural systems level is of major interest for social neuroscience research. While the configuration of laboratory settings in general is constraining for emotion research, recent neuroimaging investigations came up with new approaches to implement socially interactive and immersive scenarios for the real-life investigation of interpersonal emotions. These studies could show that among other brain regions the so-called mentalizing network, which is typically involved when we represent and make sense of others' states of mind, is associated with interpersonal emotions. The anterior insula/anterior cingulate cortex network at the same time processes one's own bodily arousal during such interpersonal emotional experiences. Current research aimed to explore how we make sense of others' emotional states during social interactions and investigates the modulating factors of our emotional experiences during social interactions. Understanding how interpersonal emotions are processed on the neural systems level may yield significant implications for neuropsychiatric disorders that affect social behavior such as social anxiety disorders or autism.

Evidence from pupillometry and fMRI indicates reduced neural response during vicarious social pain but not physical pain in autism.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by substantial social deficits. The notion that dysfunctions in neural circuits involved in sharing another's affect explain these deficits is appealing, but has received only modest experimental support. Here we evaluated a complex paradigm on the vicarious social pain of embarrassment to probe social deficits in ASD as to whether it is more potent than paradigms currently in use. To do so we acquired pupillometry and fMRI in young adults with ASD and matched healthy controls. During a simple vicarious physical pain task no differences emerged between groups in behavior, pupillometry, and neural activation of the anterior insula (AIC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In contrast, processing complex vicarious social pain yielded reduced responses in ASD on all physiological measures of sharing another's affect. The reduced activity within the AIC was thereby explained by the severity of autistic symptoms in the social and affective domain. Additionally, behavioral responses lacked correspondence with the anterior cingulate and anterior insula cortex activity found in controls. Instead, behavioral responses in ASD were associated with hippocampal activity. The observed dissociation echoes the clinical observations that deficits in ASD are most pronounced in complex social situations and simple tasks may not probe the dysfunctions in neural pathways involved in sharing affect. Our results are highly relevant because individuals with ASD may have preserved abilities to share another's physical pain but still have problems with the vicarious representation of more complex emotions that matter in life.