Influence of male's facial attractiveness, vocal attractiveness and social interest on female's decisions of fairness.

The present study employed dictator game and ultimatum game to investigate the effect of facial attractiveness, vocal attractiveness and social interest in expressing positive ("I like you") versus negative signals ("I don't like you") on decision making. Female participants played against male recipients in dictator game and ultimatum game while played against male proposers in ultimatum game. Results showed that participants offered recipients with attractive faces more money than recipients with unattractive faces. Participants also offered recipients with attractive voices more money than recipients with unattractive voices, especially under the positive social interest condition. Moreover, participants allocated more money to recipients who expressed positive social interest than those who expressed negative social interest, whereas they would also expect proposers who expressed positive social interest to offer them more money than proposers who expressed negative social interest. Overall, the results inform beauty premium for faces and voices on opposite-sex economic bargaining. Social interest also affects decision outcomes. However, the beauty premium and effect of social interest varies with participants' roles.

Voice attractiveness and decision making in third-party punishment.

This study examined the impact of an attractive voice compared to an unattractive voice in an economic game. Results showed that proposers with an attractive voice were perceived as more reasonable in their monetary allocations and were less likely to receive punishment for unfair allocation.

The moderating effect of appearance on the impact of performance rankings in the live streaming market.

The live streaming market is becoming increasingly competitive, and relative performance information regarding broadcasters is available to all participants in the live streaming industry, exacerbating the level of competition. Using data from 42,166 live streams by 293 broadcasters, we investigated two benefits of relative performance information in relation to the live streaming business and how these effects vary when the broadcaster appears competent, trustworthy, likable, or attractive. On the basis of economic and social comparison theory, as well as insights from the herd behavior and beauty premium literature, we predicted and found that relative performance information can improve live streaming performance by either increasing broadcaster effort (the effort-eliciting effect) or encouraging viewer participation (the informational effect), with these effects being stronger when broadcasters look more competent, trustworthy, likable, or attractive. The findings of this study contribute to the live streaming literature by demonstrating that providing relative performance information in the live streaming business can yield both effort-eliciting and informational benefits.

The "beauty premium" effect of voice attractiveness of long speech sounds in outcome-evaluation event-related potentials in a trust game.

Previous research suggested that people with attractive voices had an advantage in economic games, even if the voices were only presented for 400 ms. The present study investigated the influence of voice attractiveness on the cooperative trust behavior with longer exposure times to the voices. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded during the feedback outcome evaluation. Participants heard a voice of the partner for 2,040 ms and decided whether to invest to the partner for a possibility to gain more money. The results showed that participants made more invest choices to the attractive partners, replicating the "beauty premium" effect of the attractive voices. Moreover, participants were more likely to invest to male partners. The ERP analysis for the outcome showed that the difference waves of feedback-related negativity (FRN) amplitude were smaller in the attractive voice condition than in the unattractive voice condition, suggesting that the rewarding effect of attractive voices weakened the frustrating feelings of the loss. In sum, the present study confirms that attractive voices with longer presentation durations facilitate cooperative behavior and modulate the processing of feedback evaluations.

Vocal Attractiveness Matters: Social Preferences in Cooperative Behavior.

Research has shown the phenomenon that "what sounds beautiful is good" is a stereotype. It is not clear whether vocal attractiveness affects social decision-making in economic games. Using a modified trust game task, we investigated the neural mechanism of the influence of vocal attractiveness on cooperative decision-making. Participants first heard the voice (attractive or unattractive) of the partner. They had enough time to decide whether to cooperate with the partner for a chance to earn monetary rewards. The behavioral results showed that participants made more invest choices in the attractive partner condition, and they were more likely to cooperate with the female partners in the unattractive voice condition. The event-related potential (ERP) analysis for voice stimuli showed that attractive voices induced larger N1 amplitude than unattractive voices only in the male voice condition. And female voices elicited smaller N1 and larger P2 amplitudes than male voices in both the attractive and unattractive voices condition. A larger P3 amplitude was evoked by female voices and attractive voices. In addition, a more positive late positive complex (LPC) was induced by male voices and attractive voices. This study suggested that attractive voices facilitated cooperative behavior, providing evidence for the "beauty premium" effect of the attractive voices. Moreover, participants were more likely to cooperate with female partners. In the early stage, gender information and male vocal attractiveness were processed automatically, suggesting that male vocal attractiveness was processed preferentially than the female voice. In the late stage, participants allocated attention to both male and female vocal attractiveness.

Role effect on beauty premium: Female as proposer may gain more fairness.

Beauty premium permeates every aspect of life. However, whether females' roles, as proposers or as recipients/responders, have an influence on the marginal effect of beauty remains unclear and was explored in the current study. Dictator game and ultimate game were employed to investigate the effect of females' roles on beauty premium from males. Participants played against female recipients and proposers in Study 1. Linear regression models of social preferences with respect to female attractiveness showed a strongly positive marginal effect of beauty, and the effect was significantly higher when participants played against female recipients than female proposers. Study 2 with ultimate games only was conducted for further testing the effect of strategic behavior on beauty premium. A probabilistic method was established to handle issues on comparison between participants' behaviors as proposers and as recipients/responders. The results of these studies suggest that there are significant money forgone differences between females as proposers and as recipients/responders financially regardless of the strategy-or-not decision difference. All the findings indicate that the beauty premium varies with female roles.

Beauty perks: Physical appearance, earnings, and fringe benefits.

While the existence of a beauty premium is documented for many labour markets, there has been no study on the association of attractiveness with fringe benefits. This is a significant limitation of the extant literature, since fringe benefits are increasingly acknowledged as an integral part of the employees' compensation, and a main indicator of job quality. Using the Canadian General Social Survey of 2016, the present paper examines how a self-rated measure of attractiveness associates with both labour earnings and fringe benefits. Employing a rich set of controls, no evidence for a beauty premium is found for men, while there is some evidence for a beauty penalty for women. However, attractiveness is found to positively predict the number of fringe benefits of both men and women. Therefore, at equal level of earnings, more attractive individuals appear able to secure higher quality jobs, as measured by the number of fringe benefits. The results, hence, suggest that the effects of attractiveness on labour market outcomes cannot be fully captured by a separate examination of earnings and the hiring process.

Evolving beauty-Creating and transforming inequalities.

Society has always been fascinated by beauty, an interest that has a psychological and evolutionary basis. Studies across various fields have shown that being beautiful can result in emotional well-being and privilege in one's career and personal life. However, beauty is not equally distributed in our society, leading people to pursue aesthetic treatments and procedures to meet the beauty standard. Over time and with the influence of media, the societally accepted beauty standard has evolved. It is essential for clinicians to be aware of societal implications of beauty as they may serve as a motivation for patients seeking cosmetic procedures.

Rational civil servant interviewers: evidence from an event-related potential study of beauty premiums in Chinese civil servant interviews.

Physical attractiveness can greatly influence business job applications (the "beauty premium" effect). However, little is known about whether and how physical attractiveness influences interviewers' evaluations of Chinese civil servant applicants, given that many characteristics of civil service appear to be different from those of business jobs. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), the current study investigated how female job candidates' physical attractiveness influenced interviewers' evaluations in Chinese civil servant interviews for both technical and managerial positions. The behavioral results showed that for the managerial positions, attractive female candidates had a much higher acceptance rate than unattractive candidates. However, for the technical positions, no significant difference was found between attractive and unattractive candidates. At the brain level, for the managerial positions, pairs of attractive faces with managerial posts elicited smaller N400 and larger late positive potential (LPP) amplitudes than did pairs of unattractive faces with managerial posts. However, this relationship was not observed for technical posts. The negative correlation between N400 amplitude and acceptance rate as well as the positive correlation between LPP amplitude and acceptance rate further confirmed these results. The present study suggests that beauty could potentially influence if candidates are accepted in real Chinese civil servant interviews, as observed experimentally in this research.

How beauty works. Theoretical mechanisms and two empirical applications on students' evaluation of teaching.

Plenty of studies show that the physical appearance of a person affects a variety of outcomes in everyday life. However, due to an incomplete theoretical explication and empirical problems in disentangling different beauty effects, it is unclear which mechanisms are at work. To clarify how beauty works we present explanations from evolutionary theory and expectation states theory and show where both perspectives differ and where interlinkage appears promising. Using students' evaluations of teaching we find observational and experimental evidence for the different causal pathways of physical attractiveness. First, independent raters strongly agree over the physical attractiveness of a person. Second, attractive instructors receive better student ratings. Third, students attend classes of attractive instructors more frequently - even after controlling for teaching quality. Fourth, we find no evidence that attractiveness effects become stronger if rater and ratee are of the opposite sex. Finally, the beauty premium turns into a penalty if an attractive instructor falls short of students' expectations.