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The General Medical Council renewed its guidance on consent in 2020. In this essay, I argue that the 2020 guidance does not advance on the earlier, 2008 guidance in regard to treatments that doctors are obliged to offer to patients. In both, doctors are instructed to not provide treatments that are not in the overall benefit, or clinical interests, of the patient; although, patients are absolutely entitled to decline treatment. As such, consent has two aspects, and different standards apply to each aspect. To explore this paradigm, I propose the reconceptualisation of consent as a person's freedom to achieve treatment, using Amartya Sen's approach. Sen explains that freedom has two aspects: process and opportunity. Accordingly, a patient's freedom to achieve treatment would comprise a process for the identification of proper treatment, followed by an opportunity for the patient to accept or decline this treatment. As per Sen, the opportunity aspect is to be assessed by the standard of public reason, whereas the standard for the process aspect is variable and contingent on the task at hand. I then use this reconceptualised view of consent to analyse case law. I show that senior judges have conceived the patient's opportunity to be encompassed in information, which is to be decided by public reason. On the other hand, the process aspect relies on the private reason of medical professionals. Given the nature of professionalism, this reliance is inescapable, and it is maintained in the case law that is cited in both guidances.
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Consentimiento Informado , Autonomía Personal , Humanos , LibertadRESUMEN
The bioethics research conducted in Ibero-American countries has been very much restricted to its own realm. The aim of this study was to perform a bibliometric evaluation of bioethics papers by authors affiliated with Ibero-American institutions, and to determine how their work influences global bioethics literature. We performed a literature search in the Web of Science Core Collection (WoS CC) and Scopus. We identified a total of 5,975 documents, of which 84.3% were articles, 11.6% reviews and 4.1% book chapters. The median number of citations per paper was higher in English-language journals. Only 10 articles published between 2010 and 2019 in peer-reviewed bioethics journals and produced exclusively by authors from Ibero-American institutions garnered more than 15 citations. Our study suggests that if researchers from Ibero-American institutions want to influence global bioethical thinking, they must make the required leap in quality to be able to publish in high-quality bioethics and mainstream journals.
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Bibliometría , Bioética , Humanos , Investigadores , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
In 'Ethics of sharing medical knowledge with the community: is the physician responsible for medical outreach during a pandemic?' Strous and Karni note that the revised physician's pledge in the World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva obligates individual physicians to share medical knowledge, which they interpret to mean a requirement to share knowledge publicly and through outreach. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Strous and Karni defend a form of medical paternalism insofar as the individual physician must reach out to communities who may not want, or know to seek out, medical advice, for reasons of public health and health equity. Strous and Karni offer a novel defence of why physicians ought to intervene even in insular communities, and they offer suggestions for how this could be done in culturally sensitive ways. Yet their view rests on an unfounded interpretation of the Geneva Declaration language. More problematically, their paper confuses shared and collective responsibility, misattributing the scope of individual physician obligations in potentially harmful ways. In response, this reply delineates between shared and collective responsibility, and suggests that to defend the obligation of medical outreach Strous and Karni propose, it is better conceptualised as a collective responsibility of the medical profession, rather than a shared responsibility of individual physicians. This interpretation rejects paternalism on the part of individual providers in favour of a more sensitive and collaborative practice of knowledge sharing between physicians and communities, and in the service of collective responsibility.
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COVID-19 , Equidad en Salud , Médicos , Ética Médica , Humanos , Obligaciones Morales , Pandemias , Paternalismo , Relaciones Médico-Paciente , Responsabilidad SocialRESUMEN
After 40 years of attributing high rates of physician career dissatisfaction, attrition, alcoholism, divorce and suicide to 'burnout', there is growing recognition that these outcomes may instead be caused by moral injury. This has led to a debate about the relative diagnostic merits of these two terms, a recognition that interventions designed to treat burnout may be ineffective, and much perplexity about how-if at all-this changes anything.The current research seeks to develop the construct of moral injury outside military contexts, generate more robust validity tests and more fully describe and measure the experiences of persons exposed to moral harms. Absent from the literature is a mechanism through which to move from the collective moral injury experience of physicians to a systematic change in the structure of medical practice. To address this, after providing a brief history, definitions and contrasts between burnout, moral distress and moral injury, we review the interplay of moral and ethical codes in the context of moral injury. We conclude by suggesting that professional associations can potentially prevent moral injury by providing protections for physicians within their codes of ethics.
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The longstanding dominant view is that health care practitioners should be permitted to refrain from participating in medical interventions when they have a conscientious objection to doing so in a broad range of cases. In recent years, a growing minority have been fervently advocating a sea change. In their view, medical professionals should not be permitted to refuse to participate in medical interventions merely because doing so conflicts with their own moral or religious views. One of the most commonly offered arguments in support of this position focuses on the fact that health care practitioners knew what they were getting into when they voluntarily chose to take on their professional roles; nobody forced them to do this. I will argue that, despite its popularity among opponents of conscientious refusal, this argument from voluntariness fails to provide us with a good reason to reject broad accommodationism in favour of non-accommodationism.
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BACKGROUND: In the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission declared that allowing medical providers to advertise directly to consumers would be "providing the public with truthful information about the price, quality or other aspects of their service." However, our understanding of the advertising content is highly limited. OBJECTIVE: To assess whether direct-to-consumer medical service advertisements provide relevant information on access, quality and cost of care, a content analysis was conducted. METHOD: Television and online advertisements for medical services directly targeting consumers were collected in two major urban centres in Nevada, USA, identifying 313 television advertisements and 200 non-duplicate online advertisements. RESULTS: Both television and online advertisements reliably conveyed information about the services provided and how to make an appointment. At the same time, less than half of the advertisements featured insurance information and hours of operation and less than a quarter of them contained information regarding the quality and price of care. The claims of quality were substantiated in even fewer advertisements. The scarcity of quality and cost information was more severe in television advertisements. CONCLUSION: There is little evidence that medical service advertising, in its current form, would contribute to lower prices or improved quality of care by providing valuable information to consumers.
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Healthcare professionals' capacity to protect themselves, while caring for infected patients during an infectious disease pandemic, depends on their ability to practise universal precautions. In turn, universal precautions rely on the availability of personal protective equipment (PPE). During the SARS-CoV2 outbreak many healthcare workers across the globe have been reluctant to provide patient care because crucial PPE components are in short supply. The lack of such equipment during the pandemic was not a result of careful resource allocation decisions in the global north, where the short supply could be explained through their high cost. Instead, they were the result of democratically elected governments prioritising low tax regimes over an adequate resourcing of their healthcare delivery systems. Such decisions were made despite global health experts warning about the high probability of pandemics like SARS-CoV2 occurring during our lifetimes. Avoidable allocation decisions by democratically elected political leaders resulted in a lack of sufficient PPE for healthcare professionals. After discussing and discounting various ethical arguments in support of a professional obligation to treat, even without or with suboptimal PPE, I conclude that these policy decisions were sufficiently grave that they provide a sound ethical rationale to justify healthcare workers' refusal to provide care to infected patients.
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COVID-19 , Pandemias , Atención a la Salud , Personal de Salud , Humanos , Pandemias/prevención & control , Equipo de Protección Personal , ARN Viral , SARS-CoV-2RESUMEN
The current COVID-19 pandemic has raised many questions and dilemmas for modern day ethicists and healthcare providers. Are physicians, nurses and other healthcare workers morally obligated to put themselves in harm's way and treat patients during a pandemic, occurring a great risk to themselves, their families and potentially to other patients? The issue was relevant during the 1918 influenza epidemic and more recently severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic in 2003. Since the risk to the healthcare workers was great, there was tension between the ethical duty and responsibility to treat and the risk to one's own life. This tension was further noted during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa that left hundreds of healthcare workers dead. The AMA Code of Ethics states that physicians are to 'provide urgent medical care during disasters even in the face of greater than usual risk to physicians' own safety, health or life.'1 Classic Jewish sources have dealt with this question as well. There is an obligation 'to not stand by idly when your friends life is in danger'; however, the question arises as to whether there are limits to this obligation? Is one required to risk one's own life to save another's? There is a consensus that one is not required but the question open to debate is whether it is praiseworthy to do so. However, regarding healthcare workers, there is agreement for ethical, professional and societal reasons that they are required to put themselves in harm's way to care for their patients.
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Infecciones por Coronavirus/epidemiología , Personal de Salud/ética , Judíos/psicología , Judaísmo/psicología , Neumonía Viral/epidemiología , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Humanos , Obligaciones Morales , Pandemias , Medición de Riesgo , SARS-CoV-2RESUMEN
Conflicts of interests (COI) are typically divided into those that are financial and those that are not. While there is general agreement that financial COIs have a significant impact on decisions and need to be declared and managed, the status of non-financial COIs continues to be disputed. In a recent BMJ feature article it was proposed that religious beliefs should be routinely declared as an interest. The article generated over 41 responses from the medical community and health researchers, which put forward diverse and opposing views. In this paper, we analyse the discourse to shed further light on the reasons put forward for and against declaring religious beliefs. We argue for a middle path in which only material beliefs should be declared, and then only when there are no extenuating circumstances. To this end, we present a framework to help evaluate the materiality of interests that can be used for both financial and non-financial interests.
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In a globalised world, healthcare professionals will inevitably find themselves caring for patients whose first language differs from their own. Drawing on experiences in Australia, this paper examines a specific problem that can arise in medical consultations using professional interpreters: whether the moral objections of interpreters should be accommodated as conscientious objections if and when their services are required in contexts where healthcare professionals have such entitlements, most notably in relation to consultations concerning termination of pregnancy and voluntary assisted dying. We argue that existing statements of professional ethics suggest that interpreters should not be accorded such rights. The social organisation of healthcare and interpreting services in Australia may mean those who have serious objections to particular medical practices could provide their services in restricted healthcare contexts. Nevertheless, as a general rule, interpreters who have such objections should avoid working within healthcare.
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Conciencia , Negativa al Tratamiento , Atención a la Salud , Ética Profesional , Femenino , Humanos , Principios Morales , EmbarazoRESUMEN
Conscientious objection in healthcare has come under heavy criticism on two grounds recently, particularly regarding abortion provision. First, critics claim conscientious objection involves a refusal to provide a legal and beneficial procedure requested by a patient, denying them access to healthcare. Second, they argue the exercise of conscientious objection is based on unverifiable personal beliefs. These characteristics, it is claimed, disqualify conscientious objection in healthcare. Here, we defend conscientious objection in the context of abortion provision. We show that abortion has a dubitable claim to be medically beneficial, is rarely clinically indicated, and that conscientious objections should be accepted in these circumstances. We also show that reliance on personal beliefs is difficult to avoid if any form of objection is to be permitted, even if it is based on criteria such as the principles and values of the profession or the scope of professional practice.
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Aborto Inducido , Conciencia , Actitud del Personal de Salud , Femenino , Humanos , Embarazo , Negativa al TratamientoRESUMEN
It is often claimed that medical professionals are subject to conflicting duties in their role morality. Some hold that the overridden duty taints the professional and generates a patient claim to a form of moral compensation. This paper challenges such a 'compensation view' of conflict and argues that it misleadingly makes the role morality into a personal contract between professional and patient. Two competing views are therefore considered. The 'unity view' argues that there are no real conflicts between professional duties. Hence, there can be no residual duties that are impossible to discharge and no special claim on the part of the patient. It is argued that this fails because the institutional nature of the role morality requires us to accept possibility of conflict. The paper articulates and defends a third view, where conflict triggers a professional duty of restitution. This duty is not a matter of making amends for a previous wrong, but rather a matter of rebuilding a trusting relationship that has been damaged due to blameless circumstances.
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Relaciones Médico-Paciente/ética , Confianza , Confidencialidad/ética , Conflicto de Intereses , Ética Médica , Humanos , Mala Praxis , Obligaciones Morales , Principios Morales , Derechos del Paciente/ética , Autonomía Personal , Rol del Médico , Responsabilidad SocialRESUMEN
What should authorities establish as the job of ethics committees and review boards? Two answers are: (1) review of proposals for consistency with the duly established and applicable code and (2) review of proposals for ethical acceptability. The present paper argues that these two jobs come apart in principle and in practice. On grounds of practicality, publicity and separation of powers, it argues that the relevant authorities do better to establish code-consistency review and not ethics-consistency review. It also rebuts bad code and independence arguments for the opposite view. It then argues that authorities at present variously specify both code-consistency and ethics-consistency jobs, but most are also unclear on this issue. The paper then argues that they should reform the job of review boards and ethics committees, by clearly establishing code-consistency review and disestablishing ethics-consistency review, and through related reform of the basic orientation, focus, name, and expertise profile of these bodies and their actions.
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Revisión Ética , Comités de Ética en Investigación , Experimentación Humana/ética , Ensayos Clínicos como Asunto , Códigos de Ética , Humanos , Sujetos de InvestigaciónRESUMEN
Medical personnel sometimes face a seeming conflict between a duty to respect patient confidentiality and a duty to warn or protect endangered third parties. The conventional answer to dilemmas of this sort is that, in certain circumstances, medical professionals have an obligation to breach confidentiality. Kenneth Kipnis has argued, however, that the conventional wisdom on the nature of medical confidentiality is mistaken. Kipnis argues that the obligation to respect patient confidentiality is unqualified or absolute, since unqualified policies can save more lives in the long run. In this paper, I identify the form of Kipnis's argument and present a challenge to it. I conclude that, as matters stand now, a qualified confidentiality policy is the more rational choice.
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Confidencialidad/ética , Deber de Advertencia/ética , Rol del Médico/psicología , Relaciones Médico-Paciente/ética , Revelación de la Verdad/ética , Disentimientos y Disputas , Deber de Advertencia/psicología , Ética Médica , Humanos , Obligaciones Morales , Justicia SocialRESUMEN
By way of a case story, two common presuppositions in the academic debate on conscientious objection in healthcare are challenged. First, the debate typically presupposes a sharp division between conscience-based refusals based on personal core moral beliefs and refusals based on professional (eg, medical) reasons. Only the former might involve the moral gravity to warrant accommodation. The case story challenges this division, and it is argued that just as much might sometimes be at stake morally in refusals based on professional reasons. The objector's moral integrity might be equally threatened in objections based on professional reasons as in objections based on personal beliefs. Second, the literature on conscientious objection typically presupposes that conflicts of conscience pertain to well-circumscribed and typical situations which can be identified as controversial without attention to individualising features of the concrete situation. However, the case shows that conflicts of conscience can sometimes be more particular, born from concrete features of the actual situation, and difficult, if not impossible, to predict before they arise. Guidelines should be updated to address such 'situation-based' conscientious refusals explicitly.
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Actitud del Personal de Salud , Conciencia , Atención a la Salud/ética , Ética Profesional , Obligaciones Morales , Negativa al Tratamiento/ética , Disentimientos y Disputas , Humanos , Prescripciones , PsiquiatríaAsunto(s)
Complicidad , Derechos Humanos , Mala Conducta Profesional/ética , Ética Médica , Humanos , Obligaciones Morales , Rol del MédicoRESUMEN
High-value care (HVC) is en vogue, but the ethics of physicians' roles in the growing number of HVC recommendations demands further attention. In this brief report, we argue that, from the standpoint of individual physicians' primary commitments and duties to individual patients, not all HVC is ethically equal. Our analysis suggests that the ethical case for HVC may be both stronger and weaker than is ordinarily supposed. In some cases, HVC is not merely a 'good thing to do' but is actually ethically obligatory. In others, it is merely permissible-or even ethically suspect. More importantly, we suggest further that understanding HVC as ethically 'obligatory, permissible, or suspect' has implications for the design and implementation of strategies that promote HVC. For example, it questions the use of adherence to certain HVC recommendations as a physician performance metric, which may already be occurring in some contexts. Properly construed, ethics does not threaten HVC but can instead help shape HVC in ways that preserve the fundamental values of the medical profession.
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Atención a la Salud/normas , Adhesión a Directriz/ética , Relaciones Médico-Paciente/ética , Pautas de la Práctica en Medicina/ética , Calidad de la Atención de Salud/normas , Atención a la Salud/ética , Humanos , Obligaciones Morales , Rol del Médico , Guías de Práctica Clínica como Asunto , Calidad de la Atención de Salud/éticaAsunto(s)
Técnicos Medios en Salud/ética , Pena de Muerte/legislación & jurisprudencia , Ética Clínica , Inyecciones , Enfermeras Practicantes/ética , Médicos/ética , Rol Profesional , Pena de Muerte/métodos , Muerte , Disentimientos y Disputas , Ética Médica , Ética en Enfermería , Personal de Salud/ética , Humanos , Legislación Médica , North CarolinaRESUMEN
It is argued that the current policy of the British Medical Association (BMA) on conscientious objection is not aligned with recent human rights developments. These grant a right to conscientious objection to doctors in many more circumstances than the very few recognised by the BMA. However, this wide-ranging right may be overridden if the refusal to accommodate the conscientious objection is proportionate. It is shown that it is very likely that it is lawful to refuse to accommodate conscientious objections that would result in discrimination of protected groups. It is still uncertain, however, in what particular circumstances the objection may be lawfully refused, if it poses risks to the health and safety of patients. The BMA's policy has not caught up with these human rights developments and ought to be changed.
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Conciencia , Política de Salud/legislación & jurisprudencia , Derechos Humanos , Médicos , Negativa al Tratamiento/ética , Sociedades Médicas , Actitud del Personal de Salud , Derechos Humanos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Médicos/ética , Médicos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Formulación de Políticas , Guías de Práctica Clínica como Asunto , Negativa al Tratamiento/legislación & jurisprudencia , Sociedades Médicas/ética , Sociedades Médicas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Reino UnidoRESUMEN
The feasibility of a common European code of medical ethics is discussed, with consideration and evaluation of the difficulties such a project is going to face, from both the legal and ethical points of view. On the one hand, the analysis will underline the limits of a common European code of medical ethics as an instrument for harmonising national professional rules in the European context; on the other hand, we will highlight some of the potentials of this project, which could be increased and strengthened through a proper rulemaking process and through adequate and careful choice of content. We will also stress specific elements and devices that should be taken into consideration during the establishment of the code, from both procedural and content perspectives. Regarding methodological issues, the limits and potentialities of a common European code of medical ethics will be analysed from an ethical point of view and then from a legal perspective. The aim of this paper is to clarify the framework for the potential but controversial role of the code in the European context, showing the difficulties in enforcing and harmonising national ethical rules into a European code of medical ethics.