When knowledge hurts: humans are willing to receive pain for obtaining non-instrumental information.

Humans and other animals value information that reduces uncertainty or leads to pleasurable anticipation, even if it cannot be used to gain tangible rewards or change outcomes. In exchange, they are willing to incur significant costs, sacrifice rewards or invest effort. We investigated whether human participants were also willing to endure pain-a highly salient and aversive cost-to obtain such information. Forty participants performed a computer-based task. On each trial, they observed a coin flip, with each side associated with different monetary rewards of varying magnitude. Participants could choose to endure a painful stimulus (low, moderate or high pain) to learn the outcome of the coin flip immediately. Importantly, regardless of their choice, winnings were always earned, rendering this information non-instrumental. Results showed that agents were willing to endure pain in exchange for information, with a lower likelihood of doing so as pain levels increased. Both higher average rewards and a larger variance between the two possible rewards independently increased the willingness to accept pain. Our results show that the intrinsic value of escaping uncertainty through non-instrumental information is sufficient to offset pain experiences, suggesting a shared mechanism through which these can be directly compared.

Paradoxical choice and the reinforcing value of information.

Signals that reduce uncertainty can be valuable because well-informed decision-makers can better align their preferences to opportunities. However, some birds and mammals display an appetite for informative signals that cannot be used to increase returns. We explore the role that reward-predictive stimuli have in fostering such preferences, aiming at distinguishing between two putative underlying mechanisms. The 'information hypothesis' proposes that reducing uncertainty is reinforcing per se, somewhat consistently with the concept of curiosity: a motivation to know in the absence of tractable extrinsic benefits. In contrast, the 'conditioned reinforcement hypothesis', an associative account, proposes asymmetries in secondarily acquired reinforcement: post-choice stimuli announcing forthcoming rewards (S+) reinforce responses more than stimuli signalling no rewards (S-) inhibit responses. In three treatments, rats faced two equally profitable options delivering food probabilistically after a fixed delay. In the informative option (Info), food or no food was signalled immediately after choice, whereas in the non-informative option (NoInfo) outcomes were uncertain until the delay lapsed. Subjects preferred Info when (1) both outcomes were explicitly signalled by salient auditory cues, (2) only forthcoming food delivery was explicitly signalled, and (3) only the absence of forthcoming reward was explicitly signalled. Acquisition was slower in (3), when food was not explicitly signalled, showing that signals for positive outcomes have a greater influence on the development of preference than signals for negative ones. Our results are consistent with an elaborated conditioned reinforcement account, and with the conjecture that both uncertainty reduction and conditioned reinforcement jointly act to generate preference.

Does openness/intellect predict sensitivity to the reward value of information?

A recent theory proposes that the personality trait openness/intellect is underpinned by differential sensitivity to the reward value of information. This theory draws on evidence that midbrain dopamine neurons respond to unpredicted information gain, mirroring their responses to unpredicted primary rewards. Using a choice task modelled on this seminal work (Experiment 1, N = 139, 69% female), we examined the relation between openness/intellect and willingness to pay for non-instrumental information (i.e., information with no secondary utility). We also assessed whether any such relation was moderated by the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpiride (Experiment 2, N = 164, 100% male). Unexpectedly, most measures of openness/intellect were unrelated to costly information preference in both experiments, and some predicted a decreased willingness to incur a cost for information. In Experiment 2, this cost-dependent association between openness/intellect and information valuation appeared in the placebo condition but not under sulpiride. In addition, participants were more willing to pay for moderately costly information under sulpiride compared to placebo, consistent with a dopaminergic basis to information valuation. Potential refinements to the information valuation theory of openness/intellect are discussed in the light of these and other emerging findings.