RESUMEN
El uso de agentes biológicos con fines terroristas constituye una amenaza singular. Aunque poco probable, su materialización puede ser difícilmente evitable en el futuro. Este artículo revisa el fenómeno del bioterrorismo, examinando los posibles riesgos y vulnerabilidades, los mecanismos de respuesta y las nuevas amenazas para la bioseguridad. (AU)
The use of biological agents for terrorist purposes is a unique threat. Although unlikely, it may be difficult to prevent in the future. This article provides an overview of the phenomenon of bioterrorism, examining potential risks and vulnerabilities, response mechanisms and emerging threats to biosecurity. (AU)
Asunto(s)
Humanos , Bioterrorismo/ética , Bioterrorismo/legislación & jurisprudencia , Armas Biológicas/ética , Armas Biológicas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/ética , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudenciaAsunto(s)
Genes Sintéticos , Medidas de Seguridad/legislación & jurisprudencia , Biología Sintética/legislación & jurisprudencia , Animales , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Bioterrorismo/prevención & control , California , Pollos , Medidas de Seguridad/normas , Biología Sintética/normasRESUMEN
Unit 731, a biological warfare research organisation that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 1940s, conducted brutal experiments on thousands of unconsenting subjects. Because of the US interest in the data from these experiments, the perpetrators were not prosecuted and the atrocities are still relatively undiscussed. What counts as meaningful moral repair in this case-what should perpetrators and collaborator communities do decades later? We argue for three non-ideal but realistic forms of moral repair: (1) a national policy in Japan against human experimentation without appropriate informed and voluntary consent; (2) the establishment of a memorial to the victims of Unit 731; and (3) US disclosure about its use of Unit 731 data and an apology for failing to hold the perpetrators accountable.
Asunto(s)
Guerra Biológica , Complicidad , Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos , Medicina Militar , Experimentación Humana no Terapéutica , Crímenes de Guerra , Guerra Biológica/ética , Guerra Biológica/historia , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Códigos de Ética , Ética Médica , Gobierno Federal/historia , Historia del Siglo XX , Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos/ética , Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos/historia , Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Consentimiento Informado , Japón , Medicina Militar/historia , Obligaciones Morales , Experimentación Humana no Terapéutica/ética , Experimentación Humana no Terapéutica/historia , Experimentación Humana no Terapéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Política , Responsabilidad Social , Estados Unidos , Crímenes de Guerra/ética , Crímenes de Guerra/historia , Crímenes de Guerra/legislación & jurisprudenciaAsunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Investigación Biomédica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles/legislación & jurisprudencia , Enfermedades Transmisibles/virología , Unión Europea , Virología/legislación & jurisprudencia , Animales , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Enfermedades Transmisibles/transmisión , Unión Europea/organización & administración , Humanos , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/genética , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/patogenicidad , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/prevención & control , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/transmisión , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/virología , Edición/legislación & jurisprudencia , Zoonosis/prevención & control , Zoonosis/transmisión , Zoonosis/virologíaRESUMEN
In the run-up to his reelection, Russian president Vladimir Putin outlined 28 tasks to be undertaken by his administration, including one that commanded the development of weapons based on "genetic principles." Political pressure must be applied by governments and professional societies to ensure that there is not a modern reincarnation of the Soviet biological warfare program.
Asunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Programas de Gobierno , Humanos , Federación de RusiaRESUMEN
The dual-use dilemma in the life sciences-that illicit applications draw on the same science and technology base as legitimate applications-makes it inherently difficult to control one without inhibiting the other. Since before the September 11 attacks, the science and security communities in the United States have struggled to develop governance processes that can simultaneously minimize the risk of misuse of the life sciences, promote their beneficial applications, and protect the public trust. What has become clear over that time is that while procedural steps can be specified for assessing and managing dual-use risks in the review of research proposals, oversight of ongoing research, and communication of research results, the actions or decisions to be taken at each of these steps to mitigate dual-use risk defy codification. Yet the stakes are too high to do nothing, or to be seen as doing nothing. The U.S. government should therefore adopt an oversight framework largely along the lines recommended by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity almost 5 years ago-one that builds on existing processes, can gain buy-in from the scientific community, and can be implemented at modest cost (both direct and opportunity), while providing assurance that a considered and independent examination of dual-use risks is being applied. Without extraordinary visibility into the actions of those who would misuse biology, it may be impossible to know how well such an oversight system will actually succeed at mitigating misuse. But maintaining the public trust will require a system to be established in which reasonably foreseeable dual-use consequences of life science research are anticipated, evaluated, and addressed.
Asunto(s)
Disciplinas de las Ciencias Biológicas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Armas Biológicas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Defensa Civil/legislación & jurisprudencia , Regulación Gubernamental , Investigación/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medidas de Seguridad/legislación & jurisprudencia , Acceso a la Información/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Cooperación Internacional , Formulación de Políticas , Edición/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, was held in Geneva in December 2011. On 7 December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became the highest-ranking US government official to address a BWC meeting. Secretary Clinton told the assembled delegation that 'we view the risk of bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority'. At the same time, she warned that a large-scale disease outbreak 'could cripple an already fragile global economy'. Secretary Clinton's speech reflected a new understanding that the range of biological threats to international security has expanded from state-sponsored biological warfare programmes to include biological terrorism, dual-use research and naturally occurring infectious diseases such as pandemics. Recognizing these changes, President Barack Obama released a new national strategy for countering biological threats in 2009. This strategy represents a shift in thinking away from the George W. Bush administration's focus on biodefence, which emphasized preparing for and responding to biological weapon attacks, to the concept of biosecurity, which includes measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. The Obama administration's biosecurity strategy seeks to reduce the global risk of naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks through prevention, international cooperation, and maximizing synergies between health and security. The biosecurity strategy is closely aligned with the Obama administration's broader approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes the pragmatic use of smart power, multilateralism and engagement to further the national interest. This article describes the Obama administration's biosecurity strategy; highlights elements of continuity and change from the policies of the Bush administration; discusses how it fits into Obama's broader foreign policy agenda; and analyses critical issues that will have to be addressed in order to implement the strategy successfully.
Asunto(s)
Armas Biológicas , Guerra Biológica , Bioterrorismo , Defensa Civil , Brotes de Enfermedades , Gobierno , Salud Pública , Guerra Biológica/economía , Guerra Biológica/etnología , Guerra Biológica/historia , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/psicología , Armas Biológicas/economía , Armas Biológicas/historia , Armas Biológicas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Bioterrorismo/economía , Bioterrorismo/etnología , Bioterrorismo/historia , Bioterrorismo/legislación & jurisprudencia , Bioterrorismo/psicología , Defensa Civil/economía , Defensa Civil/educación , Defensa Civil/historia , Defensa Civil/legislación & jurisprudencia , Brotes de Enfermedades/economía , Brotes de Enfermedades/historia , Brotes de Enfermedades/legislación & jurisprudencia , Gobierno/historia , Historia del Siglo XXI , Cooperación Internacional/historia , Cooperación Internacional/legislación & jurisprudencia , Pandemias/economía , Pandemias/historia , Pandemias/legislación & jurisprudencia , Salud Pública/economía , Salud Pública/educación , Salud Pública/historia , Salud Pública/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medidas de Seguridad/economía , Medidas de Seguridad/historia , Medidas de Seguridad/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados Unidos/etnologíaAsunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles/legislación & jurisprudencia , Salud Global , Cooperación Internacional , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles/métodos , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles/organización & administración , Humanos , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A , Gripe Humana/prevención & control , Vigilancia de la Población , Medidas de Seguridad , Estados Unidos , Virus de la ViruelaRESUMEN
Terrorism has existed for millennia and is a phenomenon well-known to many parts of the world. Americans were forced to recognize this phenomenon, and our vulnerability to it, by two sets of events in 2001: the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, and the anthrax mailings that followed shortly thereafter. Psychiatry, psychology, and other behavioral and social sciences have been looked to for assistance in collecting and analyzing intelligence data, understanding terrorism, and developing strategies to combat terrorism. In addition to reviewing areas in which the behavioral sciences have made contributions in addressing this problem, this article discusses the developing roles for behavioral scientists in this field.
Asunto(s)
Ciencias de la Conducta/legislación & jurisprudencia , Testimonio de Experto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Trastornos Mentales/diagnóstico , Terrorismo/legislación & jurisprudencia , Carbunco , Ciencias de la Conducta/ética , Guerra Biológica/ética , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Deber de Advertencia/ética , Deber de Advertencia/legislación & jurisprudencia , Ética Médica , Testimonio de Experto/ética , Homicidio/ética , Homicidio/legislación & jurisprudencia , Homicidio/psicología , Humanos , Defensa por Insania , Trastornos Mentales/psicología , Defensa del Paciente/ética , Defensa del Paciente/legislación & jurisprudencia , Trastornos Psicóticos/diagnóstico , Trastornos Psicóticos/psicología , Ataques Terroristas del 11 de Septiembre/ética , Terrorismo/ética , Terrorismo/prevención & control , Terrorismo/psicología , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Investigadores/legislación & jurisprudencia , Investigadores/psicología , Rickettsia prowazekii , Animales , Vacunas Bacterianas , Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Embrión de Pollo , Francia , Federación de Rusia , Viaje , Tifus Epidémico Transmitido por Piojos/microbiologíaRESUMEN
Half-heartedly acknowledged by the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union ran the world's largest offensive program for biological weapons, breaching the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Russia criminalized biological weapons in 1993 only to decriminalize them in 1996, but in 2003 president Putin partly recriminalized them. None of these changes were declared within the Convention. Several well-known official statements, when reviewed in their context, turned out to admit to neither an offensive program nor a breach of the Convention. Thus, the Russian biological weapons policy is more ambiguous than usually depicted, and various policy shapers can be discerned.
Asunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Carbunco/epidemiología , Guerra Biológica/historia , Bioterrorismo/legislación & jurisprudencia , Brotes de Enfermedades/historia , Programas de Gobierno/historia , Historia del Siglo XX , Historia del Siglo XXI , Humanos , Política Pública , Federación de Rusia , U.R.S.S./epidemiologíaAsunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Guías como Asunto , Cooperación Internacional , Investigación/legislación & jurisprudencia , Ciencia/legislación & jurisprudencia , Ciencia/organización & administración , Congresos como Asunto/organización & administración , Adhesión a Directriz/legislación & jurisprudenciaAsunto(s)
Guerra Biológica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Guerra Química/legislación & jurisprudencia , Planificación en Desastres/organización & administración , Salud Pública , Organización Mundial de la Salud , Guerra Biológica/prevención & control , Guerra Química/prevención & control , Planificación en Desastres/normas , Humanos , Cooperación Internacional , Salud Pública/legislación & jurisprudencia , Salud Pública/normas , Control Social Formal , Terrorismo/legislación & jurisprudencia , Terrorismo/prevención & controlRESUMEN
Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents.