Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures.

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Current and Future Status of Merit-Based Incentive Payment Systems.

The Quality Payment Program was established by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) legislation in response to repeated efforts to create a permanent so-called doc fix in response to the failures of the sustainable growth formula. This article examines the history leading up to MACRA, the current pathways associated with the Quality Payment Program, and future expectation both from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, stakeholders, and patients.

Association between specialist compensation and Accountable Care Organization performance.

OBJECTIVE: To determine if Medicare Shared Savings Program Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) using cost reduction measures in specialist compensation demonstrated better performance. DATA SOURCES: National, cross-sectional survey data on ACOs (2013-2015) linked to public-use data on ACO performance (2014-2016). STUDY DESIGN: We compared characteristics of ACOs that did and did not report use of cost reduction measures in specialist compensation and determined the association between using this approach and ACO savings, outpatient spending, and specialist visit rates. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Of 160 ACOs surveyed, 26 percent reported using cost reduction measures to help determine specialist compensation. ACOs using cost reduction in specialist compensation were more often physician-led (68.3 vs 49.6 percent) and served higher-risk patients (mean Hierarchical Condition Category score 1.09 vs 1.05). These ACOs had similar savings per beneficiary year (adjusted difference $82.6 [95% CI -77.9, 243.1]), outpatient spending per beneficiary year (-24.0 [95% CI -248.9, 200.8]), and specialist visits per 1000 beneficiary years (369.7 [95% CI -9.3, 748.7]). CONCLUSION: Incentivizing specialists on cost reduction was not associated with ACO savings in the short term. Further work is needed to determine the most effective approach to engage specialists in ACO efforts.

Can Pay-for Performance Incentive Levels be Determined Using a Cost-Effectiveness Framework?

BACKGROUND: Healthcare payers in the United States are increasingly tying provider payments to quality and value using pay-for-performance policies. Cost-effectiveness analysis quantifies value in healthcare but is not currently used to design or prioritize pay-for-performance strategies or metrics. Acute ischemic stroke care provides a useful application to demonstrate how simulation modeling can be used to determine cost-effective levels of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies and associated challenges with this approach. METHODS AND RESULTS: Our framework requires a simulation model that can estimate quality-adjusted life years and costs resulting from improvements in a quality metric. A monetary level of incentives can then be back-calculated using the lifetime discounted quality-adjusted life year (which includes effectiveness of quality improvement) and cost (which includes incentive payments and cost offsets from quality improvements) outputs from the model. We applied this framework to an acute ischemic stroke microsimulation model to calculate the difference in population-level net monetary benefit (willingness-to-pay of $50 000 to $150 000/quality-adjusted life year) accrued under current Medicare policy (stroke payment not adjusted for performance) compared with various hypothetical pay-for-performance policies. Performance measurement was based on time-to-thrombolytic treatment with tPA (tissue-type plasminogen activator). Compared with current payment, equivalent population-level net monetary benefit was achieved in pay-for-performance policies with 10-minute door-to-needle time reductions (5057 more acute ischemic stroke cases/y in the 0-3-hour window) incentivized by increasing tPA payment by as much as 18% to 44% depending on willingness-to-pay for health. CONCLUSIONS: Cost-effectiveness modeling can be used to determine the upper bound of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies, although currently, this approach is limited due to data requirements and modeling assumptions. For tPA payments in acute ischemic stroke, our model-based results suggest financial incentives leading to a 10-minute decrease in door-to-needle time should be implemented but not exceed 18% to 44% of current tPA payment. In general, the optimal level of financial incentives will depend on willingness-to-pay for health and other modeling assumptions around parameter uncertainty and the relationship between quality improvements and long-run quality-adjusted life expectancy and costs.

The Quality Measure Crunch: How CMS Topped Out Scoring and Removal Policies Disproportionately Disadvantage Radiologists.

PURPOSE: CMS implemented Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) policies to cap points and remove "topped out" quality measures having extremely high national performance. We assess such policies' impact on quality measure reporting, focusing on diagnostic radiology. METHODS: Data regarding MIPS 2019 quality measures were extracted from the CMS Quality Benchmarks File and the Quality Payment Program Explore Measures search tool and summarized by collection type and specialty. RESULTS: Among 348 MIPS measure-and-collection-type combinations, 40.5% were topped out (56.6% of those with a benchmark) and 23.3% were capped. Among measures with a benchmark, the percent topped out varied (P < .001) by collection type: claims 82.7%, qualified registry 60.4%, electronic health record 11.6%. The percent capped was also greatest for claims measures (52.3%). Among 699 Qualified Clinical Data Registry (QCDR) measures, 63 had a benchmark, of which 44.4% were topped out. The percent of measures topped out also varied significantly (P < .001) by specialty, ranging from 0.0% (electrophysiology) to 95.0% (diagnostic radiology). Among 20 unique measure-and-collection-type combinations for diagnostic radiology, only one was not topped out, and 30.0% were capped. Among 20 radiology QCDR measures, 5 had a benchmark, of which 3 were topped out. CONCLUSION: CMS topped out measure scoring and removal policies disproportionately impact radiology, which has the highest topped out percentage among all specialties and only a single non-topped out measure. This asymmetry disproportionately impairs radiologists' MIPS flexibility and is anticipated to progress in ensuing years. Current CMS policies create a looming crisis for radiologists in MIPS. The high risk of an insufficient number of available quality measures creates an urgent need for new radiology measure development.

Integration of cardiologists with hospitals: Effects on physician compensation and productivity.

BACKGROUND: Hospital-physician vertical integration involving employment of physicians has increased considerably over the last decade. Cardiologists are one group of specialists being increasingly employed by hospitals. Although hospital-physician integration has the potential to produce economic and societal benefits, there is concern that this consolidation may reduce competition and concentrate bargaining power among providers. In addition, hospitals may be motivated to offer cardiologists higher compensation and reduced workloads as an incentive to integrate. PURPOSE: The aim of the study was to determine if there are differences in compensation and clinical productivity, measured by work relative value units (RVUs), for cardiologists as they transition from being independent practitioners to being employed by hospitals. METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: This study was a quantitative, retrospective, longitudinal analysis, comparing the compensation and work RVUs of integrated cardiologists to their compensation and work RVUs as independent cardiologists. Data from the MedAxiom Annual Survey from 2010 to 2014 were used. Participants included 4,830 unique cardiologists that provided 13,642 pooled physician-year observations, with ownership status, compensation, work (RVUs), and other characteristics as variables for analysis. RESULTS: Results from the multivariate regressions indicate that average compensation for cardiologists increases by $129,263.1 (p < .001) when they move from independent to integrated practice. At the same time, physician work RVUs decline by 398.04 (p = .01). CONCLUSION: Our findings support the conjecture that hospitals may be offering higher pay and lower workloads to incentivize cardiologists to integrate. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: Although hospitals may have goals of quality improvement and lower costs, such goals may presently be secondary to service line growth and increased market power. There is reason to be cautious about some of the implications of hospital integration of cardiologists.

Association Between Surgeons' Technical Efficiency and Hospital Revenue.

To evaluate surgeons' performance, health care managers often use the revenues that surgeons make for the hospital. The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between surgeons' technical efficiency and their revenues by using multiple regression analysis on surgical data. The authors collected data from all the surgical procedures performed at University Hospital from April 1 through September 30 in 2013-2018. Output-oriented Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes model of data envelopment analysis was employed to calculate each surgeon's technical efficiency. Seven independent variables were selected; revenue, experience, medical school, surgical volume, sex, academic rank, and surgical specialty. Multiple regression analysis using Tobit model was used for our data. The data from a total of 17 227 surgical cases were obtained in the 36-month study period. The authors performed multiple regression on 222 surgeons. Revenue had significantly positive association with mean efficiency score (P = .000). Surgical volume had significantly negative association with mean efficiency score (P = .000). The other coefficients were statistically insignificant. An increase in revenue by 1% was associated with 0.46% to 0.52% increases in efficiency score. We demonstrated that surgeons' revenue can serve as a proxy variable for their technical efficiency.

Establishing Appropriate Agency Relationships for Providers in China.

Physicians play multiple roles in a health system. They typically serve simultaneously as the agent for patients, for insurers, for their own medical practices, and for the hospital facilities where they practice. Theoretical and empirical results have demonstrated that financial relations among these different stakeholders can affect clinical outcomes as well as the efficiency and quality of care. What are the physicians' roles as the agents of Chinese patients? The marketization approach of China's economic reforms since 1978 has made hospitals and physicians profit-driven. Such profit-driven behavior and the financial tie between hospitals and physicians have in turn made physicians more the agents of hospitals rather than of their patients. While this commentary acknowledges physicians' ethics and their dedication to their patients, it argues that the current physician agency relation in China has created barriers to achieving some of the central goals of current provider-side health care reform efforts. In addition to eliminating existing perverse financial incentives for both hospitals and physicians, the need for which is already agreed upon by numerous scholars, we argue that the success of the ongoing Chinese public hospital reform and of overall health care reform also relies on establishing appropriate physician-hospital agency relations. This commentary proposes 2 essential steps to establish such physician-hospital agency relations: (1) minimize financial ties between senior physicians and tertiary-level public hospitals by establishing a separate reimbursement system for senior physicians, and (2) establishing a comprehensive physician professionalism system underwritten by the Chinese government, professional physician associations, and major health care facilities as well as by physician leadership representatives. Neither of these suggestions is addressed adequately in current health care reform activities.

Impact of secondary care financial incentives on the quality of physical healthcare for people with psychosis: a longitudinal controlled study.

BACKGROUND: Concerns have repeatedly been expressed about the quality of physical healthcare that people with psychosis receive. AIMS: To examine whether the introduction of a financial incentive for secondary care services led to improvements in the quality of physical healthcare for people with psychosis. METHOD: Longitudinal data were collected over an 8-year period on the quality of physical healthcare that people with psychosis received from 56 trusts in England before and after the introduction of the financial incentive. Control data were also collected from six health boards in Wales where a financial incentive was not introduced. We calculated the proportion of patients whose clinical records indicated that they had been screened for seven key aspects of physical health and whether they were offered interventions for problems identified during screening. RESULTS: Data from 17 947 people collected prior to (2011 and 2013) and following (2017) the introduction of the financial incentive in 2014 showed that the proportion of patients who received high-quality physical healthcare in England rose from 12.85% to 31.65% (difference 18.80, 95% CI 17.37-20.21). The proportion of patients who received high-quality physical healthcare in Wales during this period rose from 8.40% to 13.96% (difference 5.56, 95% CI 1.33-10.10). CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study suggest that financial incentives for secondary care mental health services are associated with marked improvements in the quality of care that patients receive. Further research is needed to examine their impact on aspects of care that are not incentivised.

Financial incentives and physician prescription behavior: Evidence from dispensing regulations.

In many health care markets, physicians can respond to changes in reimbursement schemes by changing the volume (volume response) and the composition of services provided (substitution response). We examine the relative importance of these two behavioral responses in the context of physician drug dispensing in Switzerland. We find that dispensing increases drug costs by 52% for general practitioners and 56% for specialists. This increase is mainly due to a volume increase. The substitution response is negative on average, but not significantly different from zero for large parts of the distribution. In addition, our results reveal substantial effect heterogeneity.

Facility-Based Measurement in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: A Potential Safety Net for Which Most Radiologists Will Be Eligible.

OBJECTIVE. The purpose of this study was to assess the percentage and characteristics of radiologists who meet criteria for facility-based measurement in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). MATERIALS AND METHODS. The Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier Public Use File was used to identify radiologists who bill 75% or more of their Medicare Part B claims in the facility setting. RESULTS. Among 31,217 included radiologists nationwide, 71.0% met the eligibility criteria for facility-based measurement as individuals in MIPS. The percentage of predicted eligibility was slightly higher for male than female radiologists (72.9% vs 64.5%). The percentage decreased slightly with increasing years in practice (from 78.8% for radiologists with < 10 years in practice to 67.3% for radiologists with ≥ 25 years in practice). The eligibility percentage was also higher for radiologists in rural as opposed to urban practices (81.6% vs 71.3%) and in academic as opposed to nonacademic practices (77.2% vs 70.3%). However, the percentages were similar across practices of varying sizes. There was also a greater degree of heterogeneity by state, ranging from 50.9% in Minnesota to 94.0% in West Virginia. By overall geographic region, the percentage of predicted eligibility was lowest in the Northeast (64.7%) and highest in the Midwest (78.3%). A higher percentage of generalists met the 75% facility-based threshold than did subspecialists (77.3% vs 65.4%). When stratified by subspecialty, however, facility-based eligibility was lowest for musculoskeletal radiologists (38.1%) and breast imagers (45.1%) and highest for cardiothoracic radiologists (85.1%). For other subspecialties, predicted eligibility ranged from 66.0% to 77.8%. CONCLUSION. Most radiologists will be eligible for facility-based reporting for MIPS in 2019, with some variation by demographic and specialty characteristics. The facility-based option provides a safety net for radiologists who face challenges accessing hospital data for reporting quality measures. In general, radiologists should not alter their current MIPS strategy but should instead consider facility-based measurement as a contingency plan that could result in a higher final score.

Distribution of monetary incentives in health insurance scheme influences acupuncture treatment choices: An experimental study.

BACKGROUND: Understanding how doctors respond to occupational and monetary incentives in health care payment systems is important for determining the effectiveness of such systems. This study examined changes in doctors' behaviors in response to monetary incentives within health care payment systems in a ceteris paribus setting. METHODS: An online experiment was developed to analyze the effect of monetary incentives similar to fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP) on doctors' prescription patterns. In the first session, no monetary values were presented. In the second session conducted 1 week later, doctors were randomly assigned to one of two monetary incentive groups (FFS group: n = 25, CAP group: n = 25). In all sessions, doctors were presented with 10 cases and asked to determine the type and number of treatments. RESULTS: In the first session with no monetary incentives, there was no significant difference between the FFS and CAP groups in the number of treatments. When monetary incentives were provided, doctors in the CAP group prescribed fewer treatments than the FFS group. The perceived severity of the cases did not change significantly between sessions and between groups. linear mixed-effects regression model indicated the treatment choices were influenced by monetary incentives, but not by the perceived severity of the patient's symptoms. CONCLUSION: The monetary values incentivized the doctors' treatment choices, but not their professional evaluation of patients. Monetary values designed within health care systems influence the doctor's decisions in the form of external rewards, in addition to occupational values, and can thus be adjusted by more effective incentives.