Expressões de homofobia e conflito intergrupal entre fãs de league of legends / Expressions of homophobia and intergroup conflict between league of legends fans / Expresiones de homofobia y conflicto intergrupal entre aficionados de league of legends

Os jogos digitais são considerados um ambiente de privilégio masculino que exalta o padrão heteronormativo de masculinidade. A partir da Teoria das Representações Sociais, buscamos identificar as diferentes formas de expressão e ancoragens da homofobia a partir de princípios organizadores, nos discursos dos fãs do jogo League of Legends (LoL) na rede social Facebook. Foram selecionados 470 comentários publicados em 2017, os quais foram analisados com apoio do Iramuteq (software de análise lexicométrica) por meio de uma classificação hierárquica descendente, resultando em quatro classes: "Debate sobre a sexualidade dos campeões" (14,9%), "Representatividade no LoL" (29,8%), "Confronto entre as histórias de Varus" (39%), e "Estratégia empresarial" (16,2%). Os resultados evidenciam a existência de um conflito intergrupal, mediado pelo processo de ameaça simbólica: enquanto alguns comentários, realizados majoritariamente por homens heterossexuais, se utilizam do preconceito sutil para perpetuar a manutenção da heteronormatividade, outros comentários reforçam a importância da representação da diversidade nos jogos digitais.(AU)

Digital games are considered an environment of male privilege that promotes heteronormative standard of masculinity. Based on the Theory of Social Representations, we seek to identify, based on organizing principles, the forms of expression and anchorages processes related to homophobia within the speeches of the fans of the game League of Legends (LoL), on Facebook. A total of 470 comments published in 2017 were selected to be then analyzed with support from IRAMUTEQ software (lexicometric analysis software), which resulted in four classes: "Debate on the sexuality of champions" (14.9%), "Representativeness in LoL" (29.8%), "Confrontation between the stories of Varus" (39%), and "Business strategy" (16.2%). The results show intergroup conflict that is mediated by the process of symbolic threat: some comments, which are mostly from heterosexual men, carry aspects of covert prejudice to perpetuate the maintenance of heteronormative standards, whereas other comments reinforce the importance of representing diversity in digital games.(AU)

Los juegos digitales son un entorno de privilegio masculino que enaltece el estándar heteronormativo de la masculinidad. Con base en la Teoría de las Representaciones Sociales, buscamos identificar las formas de expresión y anclaje de la homofobia a partir de principios organizativos en los discursos de aficionados del juego League of Legends (LoL) en la red social Facebook. Se seleccionaron 470 comentarios publicados en 2017, que pasaron por el análisis en IRAMUTEQ (software de análisis lexicométrico) mediante una clasificación jerárquica descendiente la cual dio como resultado cuatro clases: "Debate sobre la sexualidad de campeones" (14,9%), "Representatividad en LoL" (29,8%), "Confrontación entre las historias de Varus" (39%) y "Estrategia comercial" (16,2%). Los resultados muestran un conflicto intergrupal, mediado por la amenaza simbólica; mientras que algunos comentarios, hechos en su mayoría por hombres heterosexuales, utilizan prejuicios sutiles para perpetuar el mantenimiento de la heteronormatividad, otros comentarios refuerzan la importancia de representar la diversidad en los juegos digitales.(AU)

Entrando no campo da desinformação: emoções conflitantes e os limites da relativização / Entering the field of misinformation: conflicting emotions and the limits of relativisation

Resumo Este artigo aborda o papel das emoções dos pesquisadores e de seus interlocutores na pesquisa de campo sobre desinformação, a partir de uma investigação sobre os usos do Telegram na circulação e apropriação de informações sobre covid-19. Partindo de uma reflexão sobre o emocional na construção do conhecimento antropológico e os limites da relativização no contato com grupos considerados "anticiência" por meio da antropologia digital, o estudo debate o lugar das emoções conflitantes e em jogo na relação entre nós e os sujeitos observados durante a pesquisa. Propomos, por fim, uma mudança conceitual: do negacionismo, como sistema explicativo da negação de princípios considerados básicos de conhecimentos e evidências científicas, para o afirmativismo, que destaca a afirmação de grupos sociais, de seus valores, crenças e cosmovisões.

Abstract This article addresses the role of researchers' and their interlocutors' emotions in field research on misinformation, based on an investigation into the uses of Telegram in the circulation and appropriation of information about COVID-19. Starting from a reflection on the emotional in the construction of anthropological knowledge and the limits of relativization in engaging with groups considered "anti-science" from digital anthropology, the study discusses the place of conflicting emotions in the relationship between us and the subjects observed during the research. Finally, we propose the need for a conceptual shift: from denialism as an explanatory system for the denial of principles considered fundamental to knowledge and scientific evidence, to affirmationism, which highlights the affirmation of social groups, their values, beliefs, and worldviews.

Rethinking ethical oversight in the era of the learning health system.

Opportunities to advance science increasingly arise through investigations embedded within routine clinical practice in the form of learning health systems. Such activities challenge conventional approaches to research regulation that have not caught up with those opportunities, often imposing burdens generalized from riskier research. We analyze the rules and conventions in the US, demonstrating how even those rules are compatible with a much more flexible approach to participant risk, institutional oversight, participant consent, and disclosure for low-risk learning activities in all jurisdictions.

Global bioethics and respect for cultural diversity: how do we avoid moral relativism and moral imperialism?

One of the major concerns of advocates of common morality is that respect for cultural diversity may result in moral relativism. On their part, proponents of culturally responsive bioethics are concerned that common morality may result in moral imperialism because of the asymmetry of power in the world. It is in this context that critics argue that global bioethics is impossible because of the difficulties to address these two theoretical concerns. In this paper, I argue that global bioethics is possible if we adopt a culturally responsive and self-critical attitude towards our moral values and those of others. I use the example of women's reproductive autonomy in indigenous African culture to show that the difference between the leading Euro-American and indigenous African construal of autonomy is that the former ascribes greater weight on individual self-determination while the latter emphasizes responsibilities towards the community. One develops dignity in virtue of their capacity for communing with others. Hence, women have rights, but as members of the community, they also have obligations including the duty to procreate. The involvement of the family in reproductive decisions does not contravene women's dignity and human rights. In applying the principle of autonomy in this communitarian context, one has to be sensitive to these ontological and moral specificities. The aim of global bioethics should not be to reach common grounds at all costs; any common norms should be the result of a negotiated democratic dialogue between cultures and not the result of imposition by the preponderant culture(s).

COVID-19 and Moral Imperialism in Multinational Clinical Research.

A TV debate in April 2020 between two French doctors regarding the benefits of testing a coronavirus vaccine in Africa where there are no masks or treatments available has led to international criticism. This case highlights a problematic ethical double standard in multinational clinical research: trials that would be considered unethical in high income countries (e.g., placebo-controlled where there is an existing treatment) are nonetheless justified in low-and-middle-income countries because the existing standards of care are less (i.e., no access to a treatment). Underlying this ethical double standard in some multinational clinical trials is a moral imperialism and persistent colonialist thinking that must be rejected.

Relativism or tolerance? Defining, assessing, connecting, and distinguishing two moral personality features with prominent roles in modern societies.

OBJECTIVE: This work disentangles moral tolerance from moral relativism and reveals their distinct personological meanings. Both constructs have long been of interest to moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and everyday people, and they may play prominent roles in the feasibility of modern diverse societies. However, they have been criticized as devaluing morality and as producing overly permissive societies. Moreover, although they lack necessary conceptual implications for each other, they are easily (and often) conflated. METHOD: Three studies included nine samples (total N > 3,200, 40%-50% female, Mage  = 38-40, 83% white). Participants completed (online) new measures of moral tolerance and moral relativism, along with measures of 40 additional constructs. RESULTS: Results reveal robust psychometric quality of the new measures (the Moral Relativism Scale and the Moral Tolerance Scale), demonstrate that the constructs are empirically overlapping but separable, and highlight their distinct personological networks. Moral relativism was associated with liberal political views and a lowered valuing/enacting of moral values. Moral tolerance was weakly associated with liberal political views but was strongly related to a broad range of both liberal and conservative moral values. CONCLUSION: This work yields new tools for investigating moral character, and it reveals the differential meaning of two important moral constructs.

[Science, truth and beliefs]. / Science, vérité et croyances.

This article aims at discussing some aspects of the relationship between science, truth and belief. I will primarily focus on the scientific activity in the biological and medical sciences and how it relates to the notion of truth and belief and not discuss the relationship with specific religions. Science has specific methodologies to obtain knowledge. Philosophers have analyzed how scientific knowledge is acquired and have tried to identify its characteristics and to establish some general rules of how knowledge through science is gained. Radical theorists have disputed the value of the scientific method despite science's indisputable successes. If science is a rational activity, it is not free from belief. Belief can have a positive and negative impact on the acquisition of scientific knowledge and the idea of human nature. These different issues will be discussed in depth in this article.

Rethinking bias and truth in evidence-based health care.

In modern philosophy, the concept of truth has been problematized from different angles, yet in evidence-based health care (EBHC), it continues to operate hidden and almost undisputed through the linked concept of "bias." To prevent unwarranted relativism and make better inferences in clinical practice, clinicians may benefit from a closer analysis of existing assumptions about truth, validity, and reality. In this paper, we give a brief overview of several important theories of truth, notably the ideal limit theorem (which assumes an ultimate and absolute truth towards which scientific inquiry progresses), the dominant way truth is conceptualized in the discourse and practice of EBHC. We draw on Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers' work to demonstrate that bias means one thing if one assumes a world of hard facts "out there," waiting to be collected. It means something different if one takes a critical view of the knowledge-power complex in research trials. Bias appears to have both an unproductive aspect and a productive aspect as argued by Stengers and others: Facts are not absolute but result from an interest, or interesse: a bias towards a certain line of questioning that cannot be eliminated. The duality that Stengers' view invokes draws attention to and challenges the assumptions underlying the ideal limit theory of truth in several ways. Most importantly, it casts doubt on the ideal limit theory as it applies to the single case scenario of the clinical encounter, the cornerstone of EBHC. To the extent that the goal of EBHC is to support inferencing in the clinical encounter, then the ideal limit as the sole concept of truth appears to be conceptually insufficient. We contend that EBHC could usefully incorporate a more pluralist understanding of truth and bias and provide an example how this would work out in a clinical scenario.

Père-version: the relativization of the Name-of-the-Father / Père-version: a relativização do nome-do-pai

O jogo de palavras père-version é utilizado por Lacan para aproximar os conceitos de sinthoma e perversão. Em seus desdobramentos teóricos, ele indica a dimensão real subjacente ao pai simbólico e serve para relativizar quatro diferentes aspectos do Nome-do-Pai: abstração, universalidade, normatividade e efetividade. Essa relativização, que se inicia por ocasião da primeira proposta de pluralização dos Nomes-do-Pai, torna-se passível de ser completada quando, no âmbito da topologia dos nós, o simbólico claramente perde a preeminência em relação aos outros registros.

The wordplay père-version is used by Lacan to bring together the concepts of sinthome and perversion. In its theoretical developments, it indicates the real dimension which underlies the symbolic father and serves to relativize four different aspects of the Name-of-the-Father: abstraction, universality, normativity, and effectiveness. This relativization, which begins with the pluralization of the Names-of-the-Father, can be completed when, in the scope of the topology of nodes, the symbolic clearly loses prevalence in relation to the other registers.

Evaluating the quality of medical evidence in real-world contexts.

How should the quality of medical evidence be evaluated? Proponents of evidence-based medicine advocate the use evidence hierarchies to rank the quality of evidence on the basis that certain methods produce more reliable evidence. Some criticisms of this approach focus on whether certain methods deserve their place in the hierarchy, while others claim that evidence hierarchies should be abandoned in favour of other evidence assessment techniques. We claim that this debate pays insufficient attention to the real-world contexts in which medical decisions are made. To address this limitation, we explore the value of using evidence hierarchies and other evidence assessment techniques in differing contexts of medical decision making and argue that the way in which the quality of medical evidence should be evaluated depends on context. Focusing the discussion of the evaluation of medical evidence on real-world contexts has implications for the viability of the principle of total evidence.

Realism and Relativism in the Development of Nursing as a Discipline.

In today's era of nursing, the role of a unique disciplinary knowledge that is grounded in philosophy is essential to inform nursing practice, fill knowledge gaps, improve the quality of nursing education, and guide the theoretical development of nursing. Realism and relativism have contributed to the development of the nursing discipline by providing the basis of evidence-based nursing practice, nursing research, nursing education, and theoretical construction. This article explores the role of realism and relativism in the development of the discipline of nursing and presents their contributions to the work of nurse clinicians, nurse researchers, nurse educators, and nurse theorists.

Reconciling female genital circumcision with universal human rights.

One of the most challenging issues in cross-cultural bioethics concerns the long-standing socio-cultural practice of female genital circumcision (FGC), which is prevalent in many African countries and the Middle East as well as in some Asian and Western countries. It is commonly assumed that FGC, in all its versions, constitutes a gross violation of the universal human rights of health, physical integrity, and individual autonomy and hence should be abolished. This article, however, suggests a mediating approach according to which one form of FGC, the removal of the clitoris foreskin, can be made compatible with the high demands of universal human rights. The argument presupposes the idea that human rights are not absolutist by nature but can be framed in a meaningful, culturally sensitive way. It proposes important limiting conditions that must be met for the practice of FGC to be considered in accordance with the human rights agenda.

Bioethics and multiculturalism: nuancing the discussion.

In his recent analysis of multiculturalism, Tom Beauchamp has argued that those who implement multicultural reasoning in their arguments against common morality theories, such as his own, have failed to understand that multiculturalism is neither a form of moral pluralism nor ethical relativism but is rather a universalistic moral theory in its own right. Beauchamp's position is indeed on the right track in that multiculturalists do not consider themselves ethical relativists. Yet, Beauchamp tends to miss the mark when he argues that multiculturalism is in effect a school of thought that endorses a form of moral universalism that is akin to his own vision of a common morality. As a supporter of multiculturalism, I would like to discuss some aspects of Beauchamp's comments on multiculturalism and clarify what a multicultural account of public bioethics might look like. Ultimately, multiculturalism is purported as a means of managing diversity in the public arena and should not be thought of as endorsing either a version of moral relativism or a universal morality. By simultaneously refraining from the promotion of a comprehensive common moral system while it attempts to avoid a collapse into relativism, multiculturalism can serve as the ethico-political framework in which diverse moralities can be managed and in which opportunities for ethical dialogue, debate and deliberation on the prospects of common bioethical norms are made possible.

Disclosing details about the medical treatment of a deceased public figure in a book: Who should have consented to the disclosures in Mandela's Last Days?

A recently published book by the head of Nelson Mandela's medical team made personal disclosures about his treatment of the late president in his final years up until his death. The author claimed that he had written the book at the request of family members. This was contested by some family members and the executors of Mandela's estate, and the book was subsequently withdrawn by the publishers. The Mandela book case raises ethical and legal questions about who should consent to publication of medical information about public figures after their death. The ethical rules of conduct of the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) state that confidential information about a deceased person should only be divulged 'with the written consent of his or her next of kin or the executor of his or her estate'. 'Next of kin' is not defined, however, and problems arise when family members and the executors are divided about giving such written consent. It is recommended that in such cases the specific order of priority for consent by relatives in the National Health Act be followed. However, conduct that is unethical under the rules of the HPCSA may not necessarily be actionable under the law. For instance, the law does not protect the confidentiality of deceased persons, and generally when people die their constitutional and common-law personality rights - including their right to privacy and confidentiality - die with them. This means that the next of kin or executors of the estates of deceased persons may not bring actions for damages on behalf of such persons for breaches of confidentiality arising after their deaths. The next of kin may, however, sue in their personal capacity if they can show that the disclosures were an unlawful invasion of their own privacy. Conversely, if the privacy of interests of the next of kin are not harmed where there has been publication without their consent, they will not be able to sue for damages.