A Supply and Demand Management Perspective on the Accelerated Global Introductions of Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine in a Constrained Supply Market.

A total of 105 countries have introduced IPV as of September 2016 of which 85 have procured the vaccine through UNICEF. The Global Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 called for the rapid introduction of at least one dose of IPV into routine immunization schedules in 126 all OPV-using countries by the end of 2015. At the time of initiating the procurement process, demand was estimated based on global modeling rather than individual country indications. In its capacity as procurement agency for the Global Polio Eradication Initiative and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, UNICEF set out to secure access to IPV supply for around 100 countries. Based on offers received, sufficient supply was awarded to two manufacturers to meet projected routine requirements. However, due to technical issues scaling up vaccine production and an unforecasted demand for IPV use in campaigns to interrupt wild polio virus and to control type 2 vaccine derived polio virus outbreaks, IPV supplies are severely constrained. Activities to stretch supplies and to suppress demand have been ongoing since 2014, including delaying IPV introduction in countries where risks of type 2 reintroduction are lower, implementing the multi-dose vial policy, and encouraging the use of fractional dose delivered intradermally. Despite these efforts, there is still insufficient IPV supply to meet demand. The impact of the supply situation on IPV introduction timelines in countries are the focus of this article, and based on lessons learned with the IPV introductions, it is recommended for future health programs with accelerated scale up of programs, to take a cautious approach on supply commitments, putting in place clear allocation criteria in case of shortages or delays and establishing a communication strategy vis a vis beneficiaries.

Monitoring and Validation of the Global Replacement of tOPV with bOPV, April-May 2016.

The phased withdrawal of oral polio vaccine (OPV) associated with the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 began with the synchronized global replacement of trivalent OPV (tOPV) with bivalent OPV (bOPV) during April - May 2016, a transition referred to as the "switch." The World Health Organization's (WHO) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization recommended conducting this synchronized switch in all 155 OPV-using countries and territories (which collectively administered several hundred million doses of tOPV each year via several hundred thousand facilities) to reduce risks of re-emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses. Safe execution of this switch required implementation of an associated independent monitoring strategy, the primary objective of which was verification that tOPV was no longer available for administration post-switch. This strategy had to be both practical and rigorous such that tOPV withdrawal could be reasonably employed and confirmed in all countries and territories within a discreet timeframe. Following these principles, WHO recommended that designated monitors in each of the 155 countries and territories visit all vaccine stores as well as a 10% sample of highest-risk health facilities within two weeks of the national switch date, removing any tOPV vials found. National governments were required to provide the WHO with formal validation of execution and monitoring of the switch. In practice, all countries reported cessation of tOPV by 12 May 2016 and 95% of countries and territories submitted detailed monitoring data to WHO. According to these data, 272 out of 276 (99%) national stores, 3,741 out of 3.968 (94%) regional stores, 16,144 out of 22,372 (72%) district level stores, and 143,050 out of 595,401 (24%) of health facilities were monitored. These data, along with field reports suggest that monitoring and validation of the switch was efficient and effective, and that the strategies used during the process could be adapted to future stages of OPV withdrawal.

Managing the Planned Cessation of a Global Supply Market: Lessons Learned From the Global Cessation of the Trivalent Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Market.

The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 calls for the phased withdrawal of OPV, beginning with the globally synchronized cessation of tOPV by mid 2016. From a global vaccine supply management perspective, the strategy provided two key challenges; (1) the planned cessation of a high volume vaccine market; and (2) the uncertainty of demand leading and timeline as total vaccine requirements were contingent on epidemiology. The withdrawal of trivalent OPV provided a number of useful lessons that could be applied for the final OPV cessation. If carefully planned for and based on a close collaboration between programme partners and manufacturers, the cessation of a supply market can be undertaken with a successful outcome for both parties. As financial risks to manufacturers increase even further with OPV cessation, early engagement from the cessation planning phase and consideration of production lead times will be critical to ensure sufficient supply throughout to achieve programmatic objectives. As the GPEI will need to rely on residual stocks including with manufacturers through to the last campaign to achieve its objectives, the GPEI should consider to decide on and communicate a suitable mechanism for co-sharing of financial risks or other financial arrangement for the outer years.

Communications, Immunization, and Polio Vaccines: Lessons From a Global Perspective on Generating Political Will, Informing Decision-Making and Planning, and Engaging Local Support.

The requirements under objective 2 of the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018-to introduce at least 1 dose of inactivated poliomyelitis vaccine (IPV); withdraw oral poliomyelitis vaccine (OPV), starting with the type 2 component; and strengthen routine immunization programs-set an ambitious series of targets for countries. Effective implementation of IPV introduction and the switch from trivalent OPV (containing types 1, 2, and 3 poliovirus) to bivalent OPV (containing types 1 and 3 poliovirus) called for intense global communications and coordination on an unprecedented scale from 2014 to 2016, involving global public health technical agencies and donors, vaccine manufacturers, World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund regional offices, and national governments. At the outset, the new program requirements were perceived as challenging to communicate, difficult to understand, unrealistic in terms of timelines, and potentially infeasible for logistical implementation. In this context, a number of core areas of work for communications were established: (1) generating awareness and political commitment via global communications and advocacy; (2) informing national decision-making, planning, and implementation; and (3) in-country program communications and capacity building, to ensure acceptance of IPV and continued uptake of OPV. Central to the communications function in driving progress for objective 2 was its ability to generate a meaningful policy dialogue about polio vaccines and routine immunization at multiple levels. This included efforts to facilitate stakeholder engagement and ownership, strengthen coordination at all levels, and ensure an iterative process of feedback and learning. This article provides an overview of the global efforts and challenges in successfully implementing the communications activities to support objective 2. Lessons from the achievements by countries and partners will likely be drawn upon when all OPVs are completely withdrawn after polio eradication, but also may offer a useful model for other global health initiatives.

Resource Needs for the Trivalent Oral Polio to Bivalent Oral Polio Vaccine Switch in Indonesia.

Background: We present an empirical economic cost analysis of the April 2016 switch from trivalent (tOPV) to bivalent (bOPV) oral polio vaccine at the national-level and 3 provinces (Bali, West Sumatera and Nusa Tenggara) for Indonesia's Expanded Program on Immunization. Methods: Data on the quantity and prices of resources used in the 4 World Health Organization guideline phases of the switch were collected at the national-level and in each of the sampled provinces, cities/districts, and health facilities. Costs were calculated as the sum of the value of resources reportedly used in each sampled unit by switch phase. Results: Estimated national-level costs were $46 791. Costs by health system level varied from $9062 to $34 256 at the province-level, from $4576 to $11 936 at the district-level , and from $3488 to $29 175 at the city-level. Estimated national costs ranged from $4 076 446 (Bali, minimum cost scenario) to $28 120 700 (West Sumatera, maximum cost scenario). Conclusions: Our findings suggest that the majority of tPOV to bOPV switch costs were borne at the subnational level. Considerable variation in reported costs among health system levels surveyed indicates a need for flexibility in budgeting for globally synchronized public health activities.

The push to eradicate poliomyelitis in the Eastern Mediterranean Region (Editorial).

The Eastern Mediterranean Region, and the world, has never been closer to eradicating poliomyelitis. Wild poliovirus transmission is at the lowest levels in history and is limited to a few zones in the two remaining polio-endemic countries - Afghanistan and Pakistan. As at 30 October 2017, only 13 cases of poliomyelitis due to wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV 1) had been reported in the Region in 2017: 8 from Afghanistan and 5 from Pakistan. These two countries collectively reported 33 cases in 2016, 74 in 2015, and 334 in 2014.

Characterization of outbreak response strategies and potential vaccine stockpile needs for the polio endgame.

BACKGROUND: Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation. METHODS: We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies. RESULTS: Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25% probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation. CONCLUSIONS: Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation.

The Challenge of Global Poliomyelitis Eradication.

In the United States during the 1950's, polio was on the forefront of every provider and caregiver's mind. Today, most providers in the United States have never seen a case. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), which began in 1988 has reduced the number of cases by over 99%. The world is closer to achieving global eradication of polio than ever before but as long as poliovirus circulates anywhere in the world, every country is vulnerable. The global community can support the polio eradication effort through continued vaccination, surveillance, enforcing travel regulations and contributing financial support, partnerships and advocacy.

Polio inactivated vaccine costs into routine childhood immunization in Brazil.

OBJECTIVE To analyze the costs of vaccination regimens for introducing inactivated polio vaccine in routine immunization in Brazil. METHODS A cost analysis was conducted for vaccines in five vaccination regimens, including inactivated polio vaccine, compared with the oral polio vaccine-only regimen. The costs of the vaccines were estimated for routine use and for the "National Immunization Days", during when the oral polio vaccine is administered to children aged less than five years, independent of their vaccine status, and the strategic stock of inactivated polio vaccine. The presented estimated costs are of 2011. RESULTS The annual costs of the oral vaccine-only program (routine and two National Immunization Days) were estimated at US$19,873,170. The incremental costs of inclusion of the inactivated vaccine depended on the number of vaccine doses, presentation of the vaccine (bottles with single dose or ten doses), and number of "National Immunization Days" carried out. The cost of the regimen adopted with two doses of inactivated vaccine followed by three doses of oral vaccine and one "National Immunization Day" was estimated at US$29,653,539. The concomitant replacement of the DTPw/Hib and HepB vaccines with the pentavalent vaccine enabled the introduction of the inactivated polio without increasing the number of injections or number of visits needed to complete the vaccination. CONCLUSIONS The introduction of the inactivated vaccine increased the annual costs of the polio vaccines by 49.2% compared with the oral vaccine-only regimen. This increase represented 1.13% of the expenditure of the National Immunization Program on the purchase of vaccines in 2011.

Cross-border collaboration between China and Myanmar for emergency response to imported vaccine derived poliovirus case.

BACKGROUND: This report describes emergency response following an imported vaccine derived poliovirus (VDPV) case from Myanmar to Yunnan Province, China and the cross-border collaboration between China and Myanmar. Immediately after confirmation of the VDPV case, China disseminated related information to Myanmar with the assistance of the World Health Organization. METHODS: A series of epidemiological investigations were conducted, both in China and Myanmar, including retrospective searches of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases, oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) coverage assessment, and investigation of contacts and healthy children. RESULTS: All children <2 years of age had not been vaccinated in the village where the VDPV case had lived in the past 2 years. Moreover, most areas were not covered for routine immunization in this township due to vaccine shortages and lack of operational funds for the past 2 years. CONCLUSIONS: Cross-border collaboration may have prevented a potential outbreak of VDPV in Myanmar. It is necessary to reinforce cross-border collaboration with neighboring countries in order to maximize the leverage of limited resources.

Experiences from polio supplementary immunization activities in Anambra State, Nigeria.

BACKGROUND: Routine immunization coverage is low in some States in Nigeria and contributes to the transmission of wild poliovirus. Anambra State has been polio-free since 2004. However, the risk of importation of poliovirus from travelers and migrants is a public health concern due to the commercial nature of the State. This paper reported experiences and lessons from supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) conducted in the State that will be useful to other settings experiencing low uptake of routine immunization. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The SIAs were conducted simultaneously in the 21 local government areas (LGAs) in Anambra State during January, March, and November 2010. Data were entered and analyzed in Excel spreadsheet and findings were summarized as frequencies and proportions. RESULTS: A total of 1,187,866 children were vaccinated in January, 1,260,876 in March and 1,225,187 in November 2010. The State's cumulative coverage exceeded the target coverage of >90% in the three SIAs. All LGAs met the >90% target in January and March, but one LGA achieved 79% coverage in November. The proportion of zero-dose children decreased from 6% to 4.7%, and the vaccine wastage rate ranged from 6% to 6.6%. In that same year, the state did not achieve the target coverage of >80% for routine oral polio vaccine (OPV 3 ) immunization in any of the months and only 29% of the LGAs exceeded the routine OPV 3 target. CONCLUSION: The State achieved high polio vaccination coverage through the SIAs, but coverage through routine immunization was low. Adopting proper planning and supervision, financial and political support, community involvement, improved vaccine logistics, and other measures utilized during the SIAs could help to improve routine immunization.

Progress toward poliomyelitis eradication in Nigeria.

BACKGROUND: Transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) has never been interrupted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Since 2003, infections with WPV of Nigerian origin have been detected in 25 polio-free countries. In 2012, the Nigerian government created an emergency operations center and implemented a national emergency action plan to eradicate polio. The 2013 revision of this plan prioritized (1) improving the quality of supplemental immunization activities (SIAs), (2) implementing strategies to reach underserved populations, (3) adopting special approaches in security-compromised areas, (4) improving outbreak response, (5) enhancing routine immunization and activities implemented between SIAs, and (6) strengthening surveillance. This report summarizes implementation of these activities during a period of unprecedented insecurity and violence, including the killing of health workers and the onset of a state of emergency in the northeast zone. METHODS: This report reviews management strategies, innovations, trends in case counts, vaccination and social mobilization activities, and surveillance and monitoring data to assess progress in polio eradication in Nigeria. RESULTS: Nigeria has made significant improvements in the management of polio eradication initiative (pei) activities with marked improvement in the quality of SIAs, as measured by lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS). Comparing results from February 2012 with results from December 2013, the proportion of local government areas (LGAs) conducting LQAS in the 11 high-risk states at the ≥90% pass/fail threshold increased from 7% to 42%, and the proportion at the 80%-89% threshold increased from 9% to 30%. During January-December 2013, 53 polio cases were reported from 26 LGAs in 9 states in Nigeria, compared with 122 cases reported from 13 states in 2012. No cases of WPV type 3 infection have been reported since November 2012. In 2013, no polio cases due to any poliovirus type were detected in the northwest sanctuaries of Nigeria. In the second half of 2013, WPV transmission was restricted to Kano, Borno, Bauchi, and Taraba states. Despite considerable progress, 24 LGAs in 2012 and 7 LGAs in 2013 reported ≥2 cases, and WPV continued to circulate in 8 LGAs that had cases in 2012. Campaign activities were negatively impacted by insecurity and violence in Borno and Kano states. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to interrupt transmission remain impeded by poor SIA implementation in localized areas, anti-polio vaccine sentiment, and limited access to vaccinate children because of insecurity. Sustained improvement in SIA quality, surveillance, and outbreak response and special strategies in security-compromised areas are needed to interrupt WPV transmission in 2014.

[Gestation and conduct of the First National Campaign of oral polio vaccination in Spain]. / Gestación y realización de la Primera Campaña Nacional de vacunación antipoliomielítica oral en España.

This paper presents the intervention of Dr Luis Valenciano Clavel in the act that was held on July 2, 2013 under the title Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of poliovirus vaccination campaigns in Spain. (Tribute to Dr D Florencio Perez Gallardo), in Ernest Lluch Hall of the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality. Dr Luis Valenciano Clavel describes his experience and direct participation, along with Florencio Pérez Gallardo, during the first oral polio vaccination campaign in Spain, after returning from his stay in health centers of Germany and assuming the leadership of the Polio Diagnostic Laboratory of theNational School of Public Health. The success of the polio vaccination campaign, it gave rise to the current National Center of Virology, pivot of the current Institute of Health Carlos III.