Update From the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices.

The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), a group of medical and public health experts, meets 3 times per year to develop recommendations for vaccine use in the United States. The group has 15 voting members, and each member's term is 4 years. ACIP members and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention staff discuss the epidemiology of vaccine-preventable diseases and vaccine research, effectiveness, safety data, and clinical trial results. Representatives from the American Academy of Pediatrics (J. D. C. and D. W. K.) and the Pediatric Infectious Diseases Society (S. T. O.) are present as liaisons to the ACIP. The ACIP met on June 20 and 21, 2018, to discuss influenza vaccine effectiveness and safety, anthrax vaccination in the setting of a mass exposure, human papillomavirus vaccine, mumps vaccine, Japanese encephalitis vaccine, and pneumococcal vaccination among adults.

The anthrax vaccine and research: reactions from postal workers and public health professionals.

During the 2001 anthrax attacks, public health agencies faced operational and communication decisions about the use of antibiotic prophylaxis and the anthrax vaccine with affected groups, including postal workers. This communication occurred within an evolving situation with incomplete and uncertain data. Guidelines for prophylactic antibiotics changed several times, contributing to confusion and mistrust. At the end of 60 days of taking antibiotics, people were offered an additional 40 days' supply of antibiotics, with or without the anthrax vaccine, the former constituting an investigational new drug protocol. Using data from interviews and focus groups with 65 postal workers in 3 sites and structured interviews with 16 public health professionals, this article examines the challenges for public health professionals who were responsible for communication with postal workers about the vaccine. Multiple factors affected the response, including a lack of trust, risk perception, disagreement about the recommendation, and the controversy over the military's use of the vaccine. Some postal workers reacted with suspicion to the vaccine offer, believing that they were the subjects of research, and some African American workers specifically drew an analogy to the Tuskegee syphilis study. The consent forms required for the protocol heightened mistrust. Postal workers also had complex and ambivalent responses to additional research on their health. The anthrax attacks present us with an opportunity to understand the challenges of communication in the context of uncertain science and suggest key strategies that may improve communications about vaccines and other drugs authorized for experimental use in future public health emergencies.

Evaluation of public health interventions for Anthrax: a report to the secretary's council on Public Health Preparedness.

To aid in understanding how best to respond to a bioterror anthrax attack, we analyze a system of differential equations that includes a disease progression model, a set of spatially distributed queues for distributing antibiotics, and vaccination (pre-event and/or post-event). We derive approximate expressions for the number of casualties as a function of key parameters and management levers, including the time at which the attack is detected, the number of days to distribute antibiotics, the adherence to prophylactic antibiotics, and the fraction of the population that is preimmunized. We compare a variety of public health intervention policies in the event of a hypothetical anthrax attack in a large metropolitan area. Modeling assumptions were decided by the Anthrax Modeling Working Group of the Secretary's Council on Public Health Preparedness. Our results highlight the primary importance of rapid antibiotic distribution and lead us to argue for ensuring post-attack surge capacity to rapidly produce enough anthrax vaccine for an additional 100 million people.