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1.
J Consult Clin Psychol ; 89(8): 668-681, 2021 Aug.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34472894

RESUMEN

Objective: Two key treatment effect modifiers-implementation variability and participant cumulative risk status-are examined as predictors of disruptive behavior outcomes in the context of a large cluster randomized controlled trial of a universal, school-based behavior management intervention. The core components of the Good Behavior Game (GBG) are classroom rules, team membership, monitoring behavior, and positive reinforcement. Children work in teams to win the game, which is played alongside a normal classroom activity, during which their teacher monitors infractions to classroom rules. Teams with four or fewer infractions at the end of the game win and are rewarded. Method: Seventy-seven English primary schools (N = 3,084 children, aged 6-7) were randomly assigned to deliver the GBG or continue their usual practice over 2 years. Results: Intent-to-treat analysis found no discernible impact of the intervention on children's disruptive behavior. Additionally, subgroup analyses revealed no differential gains among children at low, moderate or high levels of cumulative risk exposure (CRE). However, complier average causal effect estimation (CACE) using dosage as a compliance marker identified a large, statistically significant intervention effect (d = -1.35) among compliers (>1,030 min of cumulative intervention exposure). Furthermore, this compliance effect varied by participant CRE, such that children at high and low levels of exposure experienced significantly greater and lesser reductions in disruptive behavior, respectively. Conclusions: These findings highlight the importance of optimizing implementation and demonstrate the utility of CRE as a theoretically informed approach to subgroup moderator analysis. Implications are discussed and study strengths and limitations are noted. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).


Asunto(s)
Terapia Conductista/métodos , Conducta Infantil , Juegos Experimentales , Problema de Conducta , Niño , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Instituciones Académicas
2.
Neuropsychologia ; 162: 108020, 2021 11 12.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34506804

RESUMEN

Adolescents are sensitive to peer rejection but this may be dependent on their status. This study examined the role of ranking status on rejection sensitivity in adolescence using an experimental bargaining design. To manipulate ranking status, participants between ages 9-22-years (final sample n = 102) performed a reaction time task with two peers to induce high and low status. Next, participants played an iterative Ultimatum Game as high or low status proposer with an opposite status responder. Rejection of fair offers was associated with larger Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN) compared to acceptance of fair offers. An interaction between age and status group revealed that after rejection of fair offers, mid-adolescents showed a larger MFN when having a low status and smaller MFN when having a high status, relative to children and adults. These findings suggest that the MFN reacts as a neural alarm system to social prediction errors, signaling a need for vigilance to deviations from the norm, which is influenced by ranking status especially during mid-adolescence.


Asunto(s)
Electroencefalografía , Juegos Experimentales , Adolescente , Adulto , Niño , Cognición , Potenciales Evocados , Humanos , Negociación , Adulto Joven
3.
Nat Commun ; 12(1): 5698, 2021 09 29.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34588442

RESUMEN

Social conventions change when individuals collectively adopt an alternative over the status quo, in a process known as social diffusion. Our repeated trials of a multi-round experiment provided data that helped motivate the proposal of an agent-based model of social diffusion that incorporates inertia and trend-seeking, two behavioural mechanisms that are well documented in the social psychology literature. The former causes people to stick with their current decision, the latter creates sensitivity to population-level changes. We show that such inclusion resolves the contradictions of existing models, allowing to reproduce patterns of social diffusion which are consistent with our data and existing empirical observations at both the individual and population level. The model reveals how the emergent population-level diffusion pattern is critically shaped by the two individual-level mechanisms; trend-seeking guarantees the diffusion is explosive after the diffusion process takes off, but inertia can greatly delay the time to take-off.


Asunto(s)
Modelos Psicológicos , Conducta Social , Adolescente , Adulto , Anciano , Toma de Decisiones , Femenino , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Cambio Social , Adulto Joven
5.
Exp Brain Res ; 239(10): 3113-3121, 2021 Oct.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34406428

RESUMEN

Previous studies have proposed that holding soft objects can increase expectations to be included in a Cyberball task. The present study investigated whether effects of holding soft objects on expectations are restricted to social contexts or can appear in non-social contexts. Sixty-six participants performed a social or non-social ball task, both modified versions of the Cyberball task. In the social ball task, participants were told that they would play a ball-tossing game with computer-generated players. In the non-social ball task, participants were told that they would take part in a judgement task. During the task, participants held either soft or hard cushions, and their electroencephalographic signals were recorded to evaluate the contingent negative variation (CNV), which is considered to reflect expectation and anticipation of an imperative stimulus. The results showed that participants who performed the social ball task exhibited larger late CNV when they held the soft cushion compared to when they held the hard cushion, whereas participants who performed the non-social ball task exhibited no such difference. The results indicate that holding soft objects increases expectations to be included only in social contexts.


Asunto(s)
Juegos Experimentales , Motivación , Electroencefalografía , Humanos , Sensación , Medio Social
6.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34200370

RESUMEN

In human interactions, the facial expression of a bargaining partner may contain relevant information that affects prosocial decisions. We were interested in whether facial expressions of the recipient in the dictator game influence dictators' behavior. To test this, we conducted an online study (n = 106) based on a modified version of a dictator game. The dictators allocated money between themselves and another person (recipient), who had no possibility to respond to the dictator. Importantly, before the allocation decision, the dictator was presented with the facial expression of the recipient (angry, disgusted, sad, smiling, or neutral). The results showed that dictators sent more money to recipients with sad or smiling facial expressions and less to recipients with angry or disgusted facial expressions compared with a neutral facial expression. Moreover, based on the sequential analysis of the decision and the interaction partner in the preceding trial, we found that decision-making depends upon previous interactions.


Asunto(s)
Altruismo , Sonrisa , Toma de Decisiones , Emociones , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos
7.
Brain Behav ; 11(8): e2289, 2021 08.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34291610

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: Individuals with bipolar disorder show mood instability, including heightened anger and impulsivity. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a tool used to evaluate emotional and social decision-making strategies. We investigated behavioral and electrophysiological responses to subjectively fair or unfair offers in the UG in patients with bipolar I disorder. METHODS: Twenty-four manic patients, 20 euthymic patients, and 30 healthy controls participated in this study. We analyzed their behaviors and collected electroencephalography data with which to analyze feedback-related negativity (FRN) as they played in the UG as responders. RESULTS: Manic patients exhibited significantly higher rejection rates for unfair offers than euthymic patients and healthy controls. Healthy individuals exhibited a greater (i.e., more negative) FRN amplitude in response to unfair offers than to fair offers, whereas euthymic patients exhibited a greater FRN amplitude in response to fair offers compared with unfair offers. Manic patients exhibited no difference in FRN amplitudes between fair and unfair offers. CONCLUSIONS: The current data suggest that different behavioral responses and FRN amplitude patterns can be associated with characteristic manifestations of mood instability in manic bipolar patients. In addition, electrophysiological alterations in response to unfair offers may be a trait abnormality independent of mood state.


Asunto(s)
Trastorno Bipolar , Ira , Toma de Decisiones , Electroencefalografía , Emociones , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos , Conducta Impulsiva
8.
Sci Rep ; 11(1): 15318, 2021 07 28.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34321493

RESUMEN

Understanding how people of different ages decide in competition is a question of theoretical and practical importance. Using an experimental laboratory approach, this research investigates the ability of younger and older adults to think and act strategically with equal or unequal resources. In zero-sum games of resource allocation, younger adults (19-35 years) and older adults (65-81 years) made strategic decisions in competition against opponents of a similar age (Study 1; N = 120) or different age (Study 2; N = 120). The findings highlight people's ability to make good interpersonal decisions in complex scenarios: Both younger and older adults were aware of their relative strength (in terms of material resources) and allocated their resources adaptively. When competing against opponents of a similar age, people's gains were in line with game-theoretic predictions. However, younger adults made superior strategic allocations and won more frequently when competing against older adults. Measures of fluid cognitive and numerical abilities correlated with strategic behavior in interpersonal competition.


Asunto(s)
Envejecimiento/psicología , Conducta Competitiva/fisiología , Toma de Decisiones/fisiología , Juegos Experimentales , Adulto , Afecto , Anciano , Anciano de 80 o más Años , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Modelos Psicológicos , Asignación de Recursos , Adulto Joven
9.
Sci Rep ; 11(1): 15544, 2021 07 30.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34330989

RESUMEN

People are often generous even when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so as demonstrated by numerous experiments using the dictator game (DG). More recent research using DGs has varied the number of dictators and recipients and used these games to investigate the bystander effect and congestible altruism. These studies have found that people are less generous when there are others who could be generous (the bystander effect) and also less generous when there are multiple recipients (congestible altruism) though the sum of their generosity to all recipients increases. A working hypothesis is proposed that the context-sensitive generosity observed in n-person DGs can be explained as equitable behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, explaining the evolution of equitable behavior is challenging at best. To provide an evolutionary explanation, a second working hypothesis is proposed: equitable offers evolve because they reduce resource deficits produced by variability in the accumulation of resources and thereby minimize the length of interbirth intervals (IBIs) and increase fitness. Based on this working hypothesis, an evolutionary model was developed for n-person DGs to investigate the evolution of equitable offers as a resource allocation problem when reproduction is constrained by IBIs. Simulations demonstrated that equitable offers could evolve in group-structured populations when there is a cost (i.e., longer IBIs) to running resource deficits. Mean evolved offers also varied as a function of the number of dictators and recipients in patterns consistent with the bystander effect and congestible altruism. Equitable offers evolved because they reduced resource variability among group members and thereby reduced resource deficits, which insured higher average rates of reproduction for more equitable groups of agents. Implications of these results are discussed.


Asunto(s)
Altruismo , Sistemas Políticos , Efecto Espectador , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos , Procedimientos Quirúrgicos Reconstructivos
10.
PLoS One ; 16(6): e0253296, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34157027

RESUMEN

Human behavior lies somewhere between purely self-interested homo economicus and socially-motivated homo reciprocans. The factors that cause people to choose self-interest over costly cooperation can provide insights into human nature and are essential when designing institutions and policies that are meant to influence behavior. Alcohol consumption can shed light on the inflection point between selfish and selfless because it is commonly consumed and has global effects on the brain. The present study administered alcohol or placebo (N = 128), titrated to sex and weight, to examine its effect on cooperation in a standard task in experimental economics, the public goods game (PGG). Alcohol, compared to placebo, doubled the number of free-riders who contributed nothing to the public good and reduced average PGG contributions by 32% (p = .005). This generated 64% higher average profits in the PGG for those who consumed alcohol. The degree of intoxication, measured by blood alcohol concentration, linearly reduced PGG contributions (r = -0.18, p = .05). The reduction in cooperation was traced to a deterioration in mood and an increase in physiologic stress as measured by adrenocorticotropic hormone. Our findings indicate that moderate alcohol consumption inhibits the motivation to cooperate and that homo economicus is stressed and unhappy.


Asunto(s)
Consumo de Bebidas Alcohólicas/psicología , Conducta Cooperativa , Conducta Social , Afecto/fisiología , Nivel de Alcohol en Sangre , Femenino , Teoría del Juego , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos , Relaciones Interpersonales , Masculino , Adulto Joven
11.
PLoS One ; 16(6): e0253344, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34129645

RESUMEN

Deterrence, a defender's avoidance of a challenger's attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puzzle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders' past actions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.


Asunto(s)
Conducta Cooperativa , Castigo/psicología , Conflicto Familiar , Teoría del Juego , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos , Teoría Psicológica
14.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int ; 28(39): 54852-54862, 2021 Oct.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34019211

RESUMEN

Considering the bargaining power of enterprises, this paper distinguishes between "Offering Bribes Voluntarily" (OBV) and "Offering Bribes under Pressure from Environmental Inspectors" (NOBV). An evolutionary game model between environmental inspectors and enterprises is constructed to study the corruption of environmental inspectors in the process of environmental tax collection under the system of upward accountability. At the same time, numerical simulations are carried out using China's pollution discharge data and pollution discharge fee collection standards in 2017. The results show that when enterprises have different bargaining powers, there are differences in the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the process of environmental tax collection. Enterprises with weak bargaining power may adopt "OBV" strategy. Under the system of upward accountability, it is difficult for the public to form adequate supervision over polluting enterprises and environmental inspectors. Only with the power of the upper-level government can the public's supervisory role be brought into play. High audit costs and environmental tax rates may be objective incentives for environmental inspectors' corruption and enterprises' bribery.


Asunto(s)
Fraude , Gobierno , Impuestos , China , Juegos Experimentales
15.
Games Health J ; 10(2): 95-108, 2021 Apr.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33818135

RESUMEN

Objective: Over the past decade, serious games (SGs) have played a growing role in medical education and health promotion; however, little is known about their use in the field of oral health. This study provides a comprehensive synthesis about SGs developed for training oral health professionals or for health promotion in oral health. Material and Methods: A systematic search was conducted. The following electronic databases were reviewed: MEDLINE (1966 to September 2019), Embase (1980 to September 2019), and Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), LILACS and Scopus from inception to September 2019. Two reviewers independently screened and assessed the study's quality and extracted data. The Sardi and collaborators' tool was used to assess the quality of the evidence presented. Results: A total of 19 studies (25 articles) were selected. Games were divided into two categories: for specific educational purposes and for oral health promotion. Most studies involved oral health professions' students (n = 9) or school/preschool children (n = 9). Two studies included preschool children and parents. Interactive SGs were as effective as traditional noninteractive methods in improving oral health outcomes. Nonetheless, participants' feedback reflected a higher level of satisfaction in learning through games. The quality of the studies was limited due to the lack of a proper technical description of the games and the absence of discussion of the limitations and challenges of the games. Conclusion: The use of SGs in oral health is limited, and little valid empirical evidence is available to confirm their effectiveness. Further studies are required for using more rigorous designs, evaluation, and follow-ups.


Asunto(s)
Odontología/métodos , Educación en Odontología/normas , Juegos Experimentales , Educación en Odontología/tendencias , Humanos
16.
PLoS One ; 16(4): e0249283, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33852603

RESUMEN

Saving money is important but challenging. To spur financial saving intentions, we propose a new strategy-gamification. Specifically, we investigate the effectiveness of competitive leaderboards in increasing individuals' saving intentions. The results of two studies (total N = 618) show consistently that people's saving intentions are higher when presented with a leaderboard than when not. Further, as leaderboards elicit social comparison, we explore whether the height of the comparison standard and individuals' social comparison orientation moderate the effect. We find that the effect of leaderboards on saving intentions is more pronounced when people compare with a higher (as compared to a lower) standard (Study 1), but that the effect is not influenced by individuals' social comparison orientation (Study 2). Taken together, this research provides a new and simple-to-implement strategy to facilitate saving intentions in order to help improve people's financial well-being.


Asunto(s)
Conducta Competitiva , Economía del Comportamiento , Adulto , Comportamiento del Consumidor , Femenino , Juegos Experimentales , Humanos , Liderazgo , Masculino
17.
PLoS One ; 16(4): e0249217, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33852605

RESUMEN

Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players' real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.


Asunto(s)
Conducta Cooperativa , Economía del Comportamiento , Juegos Experimentales , Adulto , Toma de Decisiones , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Recompensa
18.
PLoS One ; 16(4): e0250384, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33861813

RESUMEN

INTRODUCTION: Technologies provide a brilliant opportunity to promote social-emotional competences, well-being and adjustment in adolescence. Game-based programmes and serious games are digital tools that pursue an educational goal in an attractive environment for adolescents. The purpose of this study was therefore to determine the effectiveness of emoTIC, a game-based social-emotional programme designed according to Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey's model of emotional intelligence. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The participants were 119 adolescents between 11 and 15 years, randomly assigned to the experimental group and the control group. The adolescents completed questionnaires to assess their emotional intelligence, self-esteem, affect balance, difficulties, prosocial behaviour, depression, anxiety and stress. RESULTS: The MANCOVA results showed that adolescents who completed the game-based programme had improved self-esteem, affect balance, emotional symptoms, behavioural problems, and hyperactivity (Wilks' λ = .77; F = 2.10; p = .035). Hierarchical multiple regression indicated that adolescents in the experimental group had a greater change in self-esteem and affect balance (positive ß), while their emotional problems and hyperactivity decreased (negative ß). Anxiety moderated the influence of the intervention on self-esteem (b = .04; t = -2.55; p ≤ .05; LLCI = -0.43, ULCI = -0.05). Adolescents with low or medium anxiety improved their self-esteem with the intervention, while those with high anxiety did not develop it. CONCLUSIONS: The use of technology in social-emotional programmes could be the first step in increasing adolescents' interest in emotions and emoTIC could be considered a useful programme which influences their personal, emotional and social factors. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Clinical Trial identifier: NCT04414449.


Asunto(s)
Juegos Experimentales , Aprendizaje , Juegos de Video , Adolescente , Niño , Inteligencia Emocional , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Autoimagen , Encuestas y Cuestionarios
19.
PLoS One ; 16(4): e0250668, 2021.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33914785

RESUMEN

We demonstrate the possibility of conducting synchronous, repeated, multi-game economic decision-making experiments with hundreds of subjects in-person or remotely with live streaming using entirely mobile platforms. Our experiment provides important proof-of-concept that such experiments are not only possible, but yield recognizable results as well as new insights, blurring the line between laboratory and field experiments. Specifically, our findings from 8 different experimental economics games and tasks replicate existing results from traditional laboratory experiments despite the fact that subjects play those games/task in a specific order and regardless of whether the experiment was conducted in person or remotely. We further leverage our large subject population to study the effect of large (N = 100) versus small (N = 10) group sizes on behavior in three of the scalable games that we study. While our results are largely consistent with existing findings for small groups, increases in group size are shown to matter for the robustness of those findings.


Asunto(s)
Teléfono Celular , Juegos Experimentales , Adulto , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Tamaño de la Muestra
20.
Sci Rep ; 11(1): 9312, 2021 04 29.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33927301

RESUMEN

Social primates face conflicts of interest with other partners when their individual and collective interests collide. Despite living in small, primarily bonded, groups compared to other social primates, gibbons are not exempt from these conflicts in their everyday lives. In the current task, we asked whether dyads of gibbons would solve a conflict of interest over food rewards. We presented dyads of gibbons with a situation in which they could decide whether to take an active role and pull a handle to release food rewards at a distance or take a passive role and avoid action. In this situation, the passive partner could take an advantageous position to obtain the rewards over the active partner. Gibbons participated in three conditions: a control condition with no food rewards, a test condition with indirect food rewards and a test condition with direct food rewards. In both test conditions, five rewards were released at a distance from the handle. In addition, the active individual could obtain one extra food reward from the handle in the direct food condition. We found that gibbons acted more often in the two conditions involving food rewards, and waited longer in the indirect compared to the direct food condition, thus suggesting that they understood the task contingencies. Surprisingly, we found that in a majority of dyads, individuals in the active role obtained most of the payoff compared to individuals in the passive role in both food conditions. Furthermore, in some occasions individuals in the active role did not approach the location where the food was released. These results suggest that while gibbons may strategize to maximize benefits in a competitive food task, they often allowed their partners to obtain better rewards. Our results highlight the importance of social tolerance and motivation as drivers promoting cooperation in these species.


Asunto(s)
Conducta Competitiva , Conducta Cooperativa , Juegos Experimentales , Hylobates/psicología , Animales , Femenino , Masculino , Recompensa
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