Subjective memory complaints in young people; their relationship withobjective cognitive performance and the role of neuroticism / Quejas subjetivas de memoria en jóvenes; su relación con el rendimiento cognitivo objetivo y el papel del neuroticismo

Las percepciones de olvidos recurrentes o episodios de distracción en la vida diaria se denominan quejas subjetivas de memoria (QSM). Su naturaleza se ha estudiado ampliamente en adultos mayores, pero su importancia y relación con el rendimiento neurocognitivo no se han abordado por completo en adultos más jóvenes. Se han sugerido algunos rasgos psicológicos como posibles moderadores de la asociación entre el rendimiento de la memoria objetiva y subjetiva. El primer objetivo de este estudio fue analizar la correspondencia entre la percepción objetiva y subjetiva de los fallos de memoria en jóvenes. En segundo lugar, estudiamos si el rasgo psicológico del neuroticismo podría estar influyendo en esta relación. Para ello, medimos QSM, diferentes dominios cognitivos (memoria episódica y de trabajo y funciones ejecutivas) y neuroticismo en 80 hombres y mujeres jóvenes. Los resultados mostraron que solo la memoria episódica inmediata estaba estadísticamente relacionada con los QSM. Curiosamente, las relaciones negativas entre el rendimiento de la memoria objetiva y subjetiva solo aparecieron en participantes con mayor neuroticismo. Por lo tanto, las quejas de memoria reportadas por los jóvenes podrían reflejar un peor rendimiento de la memoria episódica inmediata, mientras que el neuroticismo jugaría un papel principal en la asociación entre los déficits de memoria y las QSM. Este estudio proporciona datos que pueden ayudar a comprender mejor las QSM en los jóvenes.(AU)

Perceptions of recurrent forgetfulness or episodes of distraction in daily life are referred to as subjective memory complaints (SMCs). Their nature has been extensively studied in older adults, but their significance and relationship with neurocognitive performance have not been fully ad-dressed in younger adults. Some psychological traits have been suggested as possible moderators of the association between objective and subjective memory performance. The first aim of this study was to analyze the corre-spondence between the objective and subjective perception of memory failures in young people. Second, we studied whether the psychological trait of neuroticism could be influencing this relationship. Todo this, we measured SMCs, different cognitive domains (episodic and working memory and executive functions), and neuroticism in 80 young men and women. Results showed that only immediate episodic memory was statisti-cally related to SMCs. Interestingly, the negative relationships between ob-jective and subjective memory performance only appeared in participants with higher neuroticism. Thus, memory complaints reported by young people could reflect poorer immediate episodic memory performance, whereas neuroticism would play a main role in the association between memory deficits and SMCs. This study provides data that can help to bet-ter understand SMCs in young people.(AU)

Higher intensity exercise after encoding is more conducive to episodic memory retention than lower intensity exercise: A field study in endurance runners.

An acute bout of exercise in the moments after learning benefits the retention of new memories. This finding can be explained, at least partly, through a consolidation account: exercise provides a physiological state that is conducive to the early stabilisation of labile new memories, which supports their retention and subsequent retrieval. The modification of consolidation through non-invasive exercise interventions offers great applied potential. However, it remains poorly understood whether effects of exercise translate from the laboratory to naturalistic settings and whether the intensity of exercise determines the effect in memory. To this end, adult endurance runners were recruited as participants and completed two study sessions spaced two weeks apart. In each session, participants were presented with a list of words and asked to recall them on three occasions: (i) immediately following their presentation, (ii) after a 30-minute retention interval, and (iii) after 24 hours. Crucially, the 30-minute retention interval comprised our experimental manipulation: higher intensity exercise (running) in the first session and lower intensity exercise (walking) in the second, both completed in a naturalistic setting around participants' existing physical activity training programmes. Exertion was recorded through heart rate and rate of perceived exertion data. Alertness, mood, and arousal ratings were also collected before and after the 30-minute retention interval. Immediate memory for the two wordlists was matched, but participants retained significantly more words after 30 minutes and 24 hours when encoding was followed by higher than lower intensity exercise. Exertion data revealed that participants experienced vigorous and light exercise in the higher and lower intensity conditions, respectively. Significant improvements in alertness, mood, and arousal were observed following both exercise conditions, but especially in the higher intensity condition. These outcomes reveal that experiencing higher intensity physical activity in the field is conducive to declarative memory retention, possibly because it encourages consolidation.

Concept and location neurons in the human brain provide the 'what' and 'where' in memory formation.

Our brains create new memories by capturing the 'who/what', 'where' and 'when' of everyday experiences. On a neuronal level, mechanisms facilitating a successful transfer into episodic memory are still unclear. We investigated this by measuring single neuron activity in the human medial temporal lobe during encoding of item-location associations. While previous research has found predictive effects in population activity in human MTL structures, we could attribute such effects to two specialized sub-groups of neurons: concept cells in the hippocampus, amygdala and entorhinal cortex (EC), and a second group of parahippocampal location-selective neurons. In both item- and location-selective populations, firing rates were significantly higher during successfully encoded trials. These findings are in line with theories of hippocampal indexing, since selective index neurons may act as pointers to neocortical representations. Overall, activation of distinct populations of neurons could directly support the connection of the 'what' and 'where' of episodic memory.

Embodiment in episodic memory through premotor-hippocampal coupling.

Episodic memory (EM) allows us to remember and relive past events and experiences and has been linked to cortical-hippocampal reinstatement of encoding activity. While EM is fundamental to establish a sense of self across time, this claim and its link to the sense of agency (SoA), based on bodily signals, has not been tested experimentally. Using real-time sensorimotor stimulation, immersive virtual reality, and fMRI we manipulated the SoA and report stronger hippocampal reinstatement for scenes encoded under preserved SoA, reflecting recall performance in a recognition task. We link SoA to EM showing that hippocampal reinstatement is coupled with reinstatement in premotor cortex, a key SoA region. We extend these findings in a severe amnesic patient whose memory lacked the normal dependency on the SoA. Premotor-hippocampal coupling in EM describes how a key aspect of the bodily self at encoding is neurally reinstated during the retrieval of past episodes, enabling a sense of self across time.

Distinct mechanisms and functions of episodic memory.

The concept of episodic memory (EM) faces significant challenges by two claims: EM might not be a distinct memory system, and EM might be an epiphenomenon of a more general capacity for mental time travel (MTT). Nevertheless, the observations leading to these arguments do not preclude the existence of a mechanically and functionally distinct EM system. First, modular systems, like cognition, can have distinct subsystems that may not be distinguishable in the system's final output. EM could be such a subsystem, even though its effects may be difficult to distinguish from those of other subsystems. Second, EM could have a distinct and consistent low-level function, which is used in diverse high-level functions such as MTT. This article introduces the scenario construction framework, proposing that EM crucially rests on memory traces containing the gist of an episodic experience. During retrieval, EM traces trigger the reconstruction of semantic representations, which were active during the remembered episode, and are further enriched with semantic information, to generate a scenario of the past experience. This conceptualization of EM is consistent with studies on the neural basis of EM and resolves the two challenges while retaining the key properties associated with EM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The recursive grammar of mental time travel.

One apparent feature of mental time travel is the ability to recursively embed temporal perspectives across different times: humans can remember how we anticipated the future and anticipate how we will remember the past. This recursive structure of mental time travel might be formalized in terms of a 'grammar' that is reflective of but more general than linguistic notions of absolute and relative tense. Here, I provide a foundation for this grammatical framework, emphasizing a bounded (rather than unbounded) recursive function that supports mental time travel to a limited temporal depth and to actual and possible scenarios. Anticipated counterfactual thinking, for instance, entails three levels of mental time travel to a possible scenario ('in the future, I will reflect on how my past self could have taken a different future action') and is centrally implicated in complex human decision-making. This perspective calls for further research into the mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny of recursive mental time travel, and revives the question of links with other recursive forms of thinking such as theory of mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Children's mental time travel into the future: a functional perspective.

Children's episodic future-thinking is typically assessed using experimental tasks that measure whether children select an item with future utility. Although these tasks-inspired by Tulving's seminal 'spoon test' (Tulving E. 2005 Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human? In The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness [eds HS Terrace, J Metcalfe], pp. 3-56. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.001.0001])-are passed around age 4, they tell us little about the functional significance of children's episodic future-thinking in their day-to-day lives. We highlight how a naturalistic approach can shed light on this issue, and present a small study where we recruited mothers to report on their children's (N = 12, 3- and 4-year-olds and 6- and 7-year-olds) future-thinking over a 7-day period. We used a thematic analysis to understand why children express future thoughts and derived the following themes: (1) expressing future desires and/or intentions, (2) future-oriented information-seeking, (3) connecting present actions with future outcomes, and (4) predicting future mental/physiological states. We compare these themes with recent accounts of the functional significance of future-thinking in adults and conclude that children largely express their future-thinking verbally to request information or support from their parent-likely because they do not yet possess enough control/autonomy to independently act for their own future. Our findings both complement and extend an experimental approach and further elucidate the functional significance of mental time travel in children. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Is episodic-like memory like episodic memory?

Episodic memory involves the conscious recollection of personally experienced events and when absent, results in profound losses to the typical human conscious experience. Over the last 2.5 decades, the debate surrounding whether episodic memory is unique to humans has seen a lot of controversy and accordingly has received significant research attention. Various behavioural paradigms have been developed to test episodic-like memory; a term designed to reflect the behavioural characteristics of episodic memory in the absence of evidence for consciously experienced recall. In this review, we first outline the most influential paradigms that have been developed to assess episodic-like memory across a variety of non-human taxa (including mammals, birds and cephalopods), namely the what-where-when memory, incidental encoding and unexpected question, and source memory paradigms. Then, we examine whether various key features of human episodic memory are conceptually represented in episodic-like memory across phylogenetically and neurologically diverse taxa, identifying similarities, differences and gaps in the literature. We conclude that the evidence is mixed, and as episodic memory encompasses a variety of cognitive structures and processes, research on episodic-like memory in non-humans should follow this multifaceted approach and assess evidence across various behavioural paradigms that each target different aspects of human episodic memory.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research.

40 years ago, Endel Tulving published his hugely influential Elements of Episodic Memory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). For the first time, this discussed the details of episodic memory (i.e. the ability to remember personal past events), including a specific conscious experience. Ten years later, Tulving defined the ability to mentally project oneself in time to be the critical feature distinguishing episodic from semantic memory ('What is episodic memory?' Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 2, 67-70, doi:10.1111/1467-8721.ep10770899). In this conception, the conscious experience of episodic memory captures the experience of reliving a personal event as it was experienced in the past, while the same ability allows a potential symmetry between remembering the past, and our ability to project into an imagined future. With the recent passing of Endel Tulving, this theme issue offers an opportunity to question our understanding of mental time travel in full.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Schema-driven prediction effects on episodic memory across the lifespan.

The predictive processing framework posits that one of the main functions of the brain is to anticipate the incoming information. Internal models facilitate interactions with the world by predicting future states against which actual evidence is compared. The difference between predicted and actual states, the prediction error (PE), signals novel information. However, how PE affects cognitive processing downstream is not fully understood: one such aspect pertains to how PE influences episodic memories, and whether those effect on memory differ across the lifespan. We examine the relationship between PE and episodic memory in children, young and older adults. We use a novel paradigm whereby rich visual narratives are used to build action schemas that enable probing different mnemonic aspects. To create different levels of PE, we manipulate the story endings to be either expected, neutral or unexpected with respect to the unfolded action. We show that (i) expected endings are better encoded than neutral endings and (ii) unexpected endings improve the encoding of mismatching events and other aspects of the narrative. These effects are differentially modulated across the lifespan with PE-driven encoding being more prominent in children and young adults and with schema integration playing a larger role on memory encoding in older adults. These results highlight the role of predictions by enriching past experiences and informing future anticipations.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Beyond the episodic-semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations.

Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness.

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Measuring episodic memory and mental time travel: crossing the species gap.

Mental time travel is the projection of the mind into the past or future, and relates to experiential aspects of episodic memory, and episodic future thinking. Framing episodic memory and future thinking in this way causes a challenge when studying memory in animals, where demonstration of this mental projection is prevented by the absence of language. However, there is good evidence that non-human animals pass tests of episodic memory that are based on behavioural criteria, meaning a better understanding needs to be had of the relationship between episodic memory and mental time travel. We argue that mental time travel and episodic memory are not synonymous, and that mental time travel is neither a requirement of, nor an irrelevance to, episodic memory. Mental time travel can allow improved behavioural choices based on episodic memory, and work in all species (including humans) should include careful consideration of the behavioural outputs being measured. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The history of episodic memory.

Over the course of his research, Endel Tulving offered a number of somewhat different characterizations of episodic memory. Do they indicate that he changed his mind over time as to what episodic memory is, or did his core understanding of the nature of episodic memory stay the same? In this article, we offer some support for the latter claim, and in particular for thinking that, throughout his life, Tulving took as a defining feature of episodic memory the distinctive awareness of the self in time it involves. We argue that it is easier to see the continuities rather than the discontinuities in Tulving's writings once their historical context is taken into account, where this involves both the authors who influenced his thinking, as well as the intellectual climate at the different times he was writing. We also discuss two recent bodies of work on episodic memory that take aspects of Tulving's writings as their point of departure, but try to factor out into separate ingredients what he arguably saw as a unitary phenomenon. Considering aspects of the dialectic between them and Tulving's view might shed further light on some of the motivations behind the latter.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Transitional gradation and the distinction between episodic and semantic memory.

In this article, we explore various arguments against the traditional distinction between episodic and semantic memory based on the metaphysical phenomenon of transitional gradation. Transitional gradation occurs when two candidate kinds A and B grade into one another along a continuum according to their characteristic properties. We review two kinds of arguments-from the gradual semanticization of episodic memories as they are consolidated, and from the composition of episodic memories during storage and recall from semantic memories-that predict the proliferation of such transitional forms. We further explain why the distinction cannot be saved from the challenges of transitional gradation by appealing to distinct underlying memory structures and applying our perspective to the impasse over research into 'episodic-like' memory in non-human animals. On the whole, we recommend replacing the distinction with a dynamic life cycle of memory in which a variety of transitional forms will proliferate, and illustrate the utility of this perspective by tying together recent trends in animal episodic memory research and recommending productive future directions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Elements of episodic memory: insights from artificial agents.

Many recent artificial intelligence (AI) systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these 'episodic-inspired' AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory while differing in important respects and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory's operations and function. However, further work is needed to validate them as models of episodic memory and isolate the contributions of their memory systems to their behaviour. More immediately, we propose that these systems have a role to play in directing episodic memory research by highlighting novel or neglected hypotheses as pursuit-worthy. In this vein, we propose that the evidence reviewed here highlights two pursuit-worthy hypotheses about episodic memory's function: that it plays a role in planning that is independent of future-oriented simulation, and that it is adaptive in virtue of its contributions to fast learning in novel, sparse-reward environments. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Episodic recombination and the role of time in mental travel.

Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for 'representational continuism': the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Mental time travel in the rat.

I outline the perspective that searching the contents of memory is a form of mental time travel (MTT) in non-humans that is relatively tractable because it focuses on the contents of memory. I propose that an animal model of MTT requires three elements: (i) the animal remembers multiple events using episodic memory, (ii) the order of events in time is included in the representation, and (iii) the sequence of events can be searched to find a target that occurred at a particular time. I review experiments suggesting that rats represent multiple items in episodic memory (element 1) in order of occurrence (element 2) and engage in memory replay to search representations in episodic memory in sequential order to find information at particular points in the sequence (element 3). The cognitive building blocks needed for MTT may be quite old in the evolutionary timescale.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Eliminating episodic memory?

In Tulving's initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research programme has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the 'common system' view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there are no processes unique to memory to support robust generalizations with inductive potential. Eliminativism about episodic memory seems to follow from the claim that it has no dedicated neurocognitive system of its own. After identifying this under-noticed threat, we push back against modern eliminativists by surveying recent evidence that still indicates specialized mechanisms, computations and representations that are distinctly mnemic in character. We argue that contemporary realists about episodic memory can retain lessons of the common system approach while resisting the further move to eliminativism. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Synthesizing the temporal self: robotic models of episodic and autobiographical memory.

Episodic memories are experienced as belonging to a self that persists in time. We review evidence concerning the nature of human episodic memory and of the sense of self and how these emerge during development, proposing that the younger child experiences a persistent self that supports a subjective experience of remembering. We then explore recent research in cognitive architectures for robotics that has investigated the possibility of forms of synthetic episodic and autobiographical memory. We show that recent advances in generative modeling can support an understanding of the emergence of self and of episodic memory, and that cognitive architectures which include a language capacity are showing progress towards the construction of a narrative self with autobiographical memory capabilities for robots. We conclude by considering the prospects for a more complete model of mental time travel in robotics and the implications of this modeling work for understanding human episodic memory and the self in time. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.