Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications.

Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both naturalist and normativist considerations are now viewed as important - psychiatric constructs necessitate a consideration of both facts and values. At a conceptual level, this integrative view encourages moving away from strict scientism to soft naturalism, while in clinical practice this facilitates both evidence-based and values-based mental health care. Second, in considering the nature of psychiatric science, there is now increasing emphasis on a pluralist approach, including ontological, explanatory and value pluralism. Conceptually, a pluralist approach acknowledges the multi-level causal interactions that give rise to psychopathology, while clinically it emphasizes the importance of a broad range of "difference-makers", as well as a consideration of "lived experience" in both research and practice. Third, in considering a range of questions about the brain-mind, and how both somatic and psychic factors contribute to the development and maintenance of mental disorders, conceptual and empirical work on embodied cognition provides an increasingly valuable approach. Viewing the brain-mind as embodied, embedded and enactive offers a conceptual approach to the mind-body problem that facilitates the clinical integration of advances in both cognitive-affective neuroscience and phenomenological psychopathology.

Understanding Public Opinion Is Critical for Making Public Policy Democratically.

Paul Gugiu argues that Kaplan and Baron-Epel's central idea or underlying premise is not merely wrong, but "dangerous with potentially dire consequences," particularly in our current circumstances of a pandemic and a polarized political atmosphere. We disagree in the strongest terms and believe that nothing in Kaplan and Baron-Epel's article can be fairly thought to support such a claim. We begin by addressing Gugiu's framing of Kaplan and Baron-Epel's position, before examining his criticisms of that position in turn.

Out of our heads: Addiction and psychiatric externalism.

In addiction, apparently causally significant phenomena occur at a huge number of levels; addiction is affected by biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical, social, and politico-legal factors, among many others. In such a complex, multifaceted field of inquiry, it seems very unlikely that all the many layers of explanation will prove amenable to any simple or straightforward, reductive analysis; if we are to unify the many different sciences of addiction while respecting their causal autonomy, then, what we are likely to need is an integrative framework. In this paper, we propose the theory of "Externalist" or "4E" - for extended, embodied, embedded, and enactive - cognition, which focuses on the empirical and conceptual centrality of the wider extra-neural environment to cognitive and mental processes, as a candidate for such a framework. We begin in Section 2 by outlining how such a perspective might apply to psychiatry more generally, before turning to some of the ways it can illuminate addiction in particular: Section 3 points to a way of dissolving the classic dichotomy between the "choice model" and "disease model" in the addiction literature; Section 4 shows how 4E concepts can clarify the interplay between the addict's brain and her environment; and Section 5 considers how these insights help to explain the success of some recovery strategies, and may help to inform the development of new ones.

Commentary: The Problems of Grouping All Adversity Into a Special Populations Label.

"Special populations" refer to groups of people whose needs are not fully addressed by traditional health services delivery. Greater access to these services, or tailored services, must be provided to reduce inequities in physical and mental health-care systems. Many different groups have been identified as special populations. We comment on controversies regarding the use of the term special populations in health practice and policy. Applicable conceptual issues include intersectionality, unitization, definitional drawbacks, and looping effects. There is a need to make clear the challenges posed by use of this term (e.g., discrimination, workability). An approach that acknowledges the diversity of groups and accommodates them where necessary without discrimination and unequal treatment is needed.

Ethical, philosophical, and practical considerations in adherence to therapy in sleep medicine.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: We consider a series of linked philosophical issues created by non-adherence to therapy in sleep medicine. RECENT FINDINGS: First, the difficulty of measuring rates of adherence creates an epistemic problem regarding the efficacy of prescribed treatments. Secondly, as diseases are often classified as refractory based on apparent failure of standard medicines, the validity of this classification faces a similar epistemic crisis. This in turn produces ethical issues when therapies are restricted to cases deemed refractory. It also calls into question, if the patient does not take the medicines as prescribed, what they do with them; and the prospect of potential drug diversion arises. Education of patients seems to be of limited help in addressing these issues; what may be needed is a revision of the patient-prescriber relationship to move away from blame when nonadherence occurs. We close by revisiting an ancient debate in the philosophy of action, which may shed light on what such a revised relationship would require. SUMMARY: More honest and trusting patient-physician relationships, and a much more accurate sense of when nonadherence is occurring and why, may result from a better practical and philosophical understanding of the patient's decision-making.

Parsing placebo treatments: a response to Barnhill and Miller.

Anne Barnhill and Franklin Miller dispute my claim that the prescriptions of placebo treatments to patients are not typically deceptive, and do not typically violate the patients' informed consent. However, Barnhill and Miller seriously mischaracterise my position in two ways, as well as failing to show that the procedure I discuss requires a physician to act wrongfully in deceiving her patient. Accordingly, I find their argument unpersuasive.

Placebo treatments, informed consent and 'the grip of a false picture'.

It is widely supposed that the prescription of placebo treatments to patients for therapeutic purposes is ethically problematic on the grounds that the patient cannot give informed consent to the treatment, and is therefore deceived by the physician. This claim, I argue, rests on two confusions: one concerning the meaning of 'informed consent' and its relation to the information available to the patient, and another concerning the relation of body and mind. Taken together, these errors lead naturally to the conclusion that the prescription of placebos to unwitting patients is unethical. Once they are dispelled, I argue, we can see that providing 'full' information against a background of metaphysical confusion may make a patient less informed and that the 'therapeutic' goal of relieving the patient of such confusions is properly the duty of the philosopher rather than the physician. Therapeutic placebos therefore do not violate the patient's informed consent or the ethical duties of the doctor.

Perspectives on Erving Goffman's "Asylums" fifty years on.

Erving Goffman's "Asylums" is a key text in the development of contemporary, community-orientated mental health practice. It has survived as a trenchant critique of the asylum as total institution, and its publication in 1961 in book form marked a further stage in the discrediting of the asylum model of mental health care. In this paper, some responses from a range of disciplines to this text, 50 years on, are presented. A consultant psychiatrist with a special interest in cultural psychiatry and mental health legislation, two collaborating psychotherapists in adult and forensic mental health, a philosopher, and a recent medical graduate, present their varying responses to the text. The editors present these with the hope of encouraging further dialogue and debate from service users, carers, clinicians, and academics and researchers across a range of disciplines.

Kind-Making, objectivity, and political neutrality; the case of Solastalgia.

Politics and science, it is customarily and broadly assumed, should not mix. I investigate a purported "new mental illness" arising from psychological stress associated with environmental damage. Previous assessments have concluded that the diagnosis of "solastalgia", which is clearly intended to advance a political agenda, may thereby lack scientific validity. Building on work by Ian Hacking and Nelson Goodman, and drawing comparisons with the history of "political medicine"--in particular, the scientific study of Child Abuse and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome--I argue that the political consequences of such a diagnosis may plausibly help to justify it as a distinct objective scientific kind, by demarcating it from alternative classifications. That science should be objective, then, does not require that it be politically neutral.

Tolerance and illness: the politics of medical and psychiatric classification.

In this paper, I explore the links between liberal political theory and the evaluative nature of medical classification, arguing for stronger recognition of those links in a liberal model of medical practice. All judgments of medical or psychiatric "dysfunction," I argue, are fundamentally evaluative, reflecting our collective willingness or reluctance to tolerate and/or accommodate the conditions in question. Illness, then, is "socially constructed." But the relativist worries that this loaded phrase evokes are unfounded; patients, doctors, and communities will agree in the vast majority of cases about what counts as illness. Where they cannot come to agreement, however, we are faced with precisely the sort of dispute about values and ways of life that the institutions of the liberal state are designed to accommodate. I accordingly sketch a model of medical practice, based loosely on Jürgen Habermas's political theories, designed to maximize both our awareness and our understanding of these disputes.

Dolphin natures, human virtues: MacIntyre and ethical naturalism.

Can biological facts explain human morality? Aristotelian 'virtue' ethics has traditionally assumed so. In recent years Alasdair MacIntyre has reintroduced a form of Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology' into his ethics. He argues that the ethological study of dependence and rationality in other species--dolphins in particular--sheds light on how those same traits in the typical lives of humans give rise to the moral virtues. However, some goal-oriented dolphin behaviour appears both dependent and rational in the precise manner which impresses MacIntyre, yet anything but ethically 'virtuous'. More damningly, dolphin ethologists consistently refuse to evaluate such behaviour in the manner MacIntyre claims is appropriate to moral judgement. In light of this, I argue that virtues--insofar as they name a biological or ethological category--do not name a morally significant one.