COVID-19 cross-border case and contact tracing activities - experiences and lessons learnt, Germany, April-December 2020.

BACKGROUND: Interruption of transmission chains has been crucial in the COVID-19 response. The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) at the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) coordinated cross-border case and contact tracing activities at the national level by sharing data with German public health authorities (PHA) and other countries. Data on these activities were not collected in the national surveillance system, and thus were challenging to quantify. Our aim was to describe cross-border COVID-19 case and contact tracing activities including lessons learnt by PHA to adapt the procedures accordingly. METHODS: Case and contact tracing events were recorded using unique identifiers. We collected data on cases, contacts, dates of exposure and/or SARS-CoV-2 positive test results and exposure setting. We performed descriptive analyses of events from 06.04.-31.12.2020. We conducted interviews with PHA to understand experiences and lessons learnt, applying a thematic approach for qualitative analysis. RESULTS: From 06.04.-31.12.2020 data on 7,527 cross-border COVID-19 case and contact tracing activities were collected. Germany initiated communication 5,200 times, and other countries 2,327 times. Communication from other countries was most frequently initiated by Austria (n = 1,184, 50.9%), Switzerland (n = 338, 14.5%), and the Netherlands (n = 168, 7.2%). Overall, 3,719 events (49.4%) included information on 5,757 cases (median 1, range: 1-42), and 4,114 events (54.7%) included information on 13,737 contacts (median: 1, range: 1-1,872). The setting of exposure was communicated for 2,247 of the events (54.6%), and most frequently included private gatherings (35.2%), flights (24.1%) and work-related meetings (20.3%). The median time delay between exposure date and contact information receipt at RKI was five days. Delay between positive test result and case information receipt was three days. Main challenges identified through five interviews were missing data or delayed accessibility particularly from flights, and lack of clear and easy to use communication channels. More and better trained staff were mentioned as ideas for improving future pandemic response preparedness. CONCLUSION: Cross-border case and contact tracing data can supplement routine surveillance but are challenging to measure. We need improved systems for cross-border event management, by improving training and communication channels, that will help strengthen monitoring activities to better guide public health decision-making and secure a good future pandemic response.

COVID-19 Outbreaks in Settings With Precarious Housing Conditions in Germany: Challenges and Lessons Learned.

Two COVID-19 outbreaks occurred in residential buildings with overcrowded housing conditions in the city of Göttingen in Germany during May and June 2020, when COVID-19 infection incidences were low across the rest of the country, with a national incidence of 2.6/100,000 population. The outbreaks increased the local incidence in the city of Göttingen to 123.5/100,000 in June 2020. Many of the affected residents were living in precarious conditions and experienced language barriers. The outbreaks were characterized by high case numbers and attack rates among the residents, many asymptomatic cases, a comparatively young population, and substantial outbreak control measures implemented by local authorities. We analyzed national and local surveillance data, calculated age-, and gender-specific attack rates and performed whole genome sequencing analysis to describe the outbreak and characteristics of the infected population. The authorities' infection control measures included voluntary and compulsory testing of all residents and mass quarantine. Public health measures, such as the general closure of schools and a public space as well as the prohibition of team sports at local level, were also implemented in the district to limit the outbreaks locally. The outbreaks were under control by the end of June 2020. We describe the measures to contain the outbreaks, the challenges experienced and lessons learned. We discuss how public health measures can be planned and implemented through consideration of the needs and vulnerabilities of affected populations. In order to avoid coercive measures, barrier-free communication, with language translation when needed, and consideration of socio-economic circumstances of affected populations are crucial for controlling infectious disease transmission in an outbreak effectively and in a timely way.

Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated non-pharmaceutical interventions on other notifiable infectious diseases in Germany: An analysis of national surveillance data during week 1-2016 - week 32-2020.

BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic and associated non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) affect healthcare seeking behaviour, access to healthcare, test strategies, disease notification and workload at public health authorities, but may also lead to a true change in transmission dynamics. We aimed to assess the impact of the pandemic and NPIs on other notifiable infectious diseases under surveillance in Germany. METHODS: We included 32 nationally notifiable disease categories with case numbers >100/year in 2016-2019. We used quasi-Poisson regression analysis on a weekly aggregated time-series incorporating trend and seasonality, to compute the relative change in case numbers during week 2020-10 to 2020-32 (pandemic/NPIs), in comparison to week 2016-01 to 2020-09. FINDINGS: During week 2020-10 to 2020-32, 216,825 COVID-19 cases, and 162,942 (-35%) cases of other diseases, were notified. Case numbers decreased across all ages and notification categories (all p<0•05), except for tick-borne encephalitis, which increased (+58%). The number of cases decreased most for respiratory diseases (from -86% for measles, to -12% for tuberculosis), gastro-intestinal diseases (from -83% for rotavirus gastroenteritis, to -7% for yersiniosis) and imported vector-borne diseases (-75% dengue fever, -73% malaria). The less affected infections were healthcare associated pathogens (from -43% infection/colonisation with carbapenem-non-susceptible Acinetobacter, to -28% for Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus invasive infection) and sexually transmitted and blood-borne diseases (from -28% for hepatitis B, to -12% for syphilis). INTERPRETATION: During the COVID-19 pandemic a drastic decrease of notifications for most infectious diseases and pathogens was observed. Our findings suggest effects of NPIs on overall disease transmission that require further investigation. FUNDING: The Robert Koch Institute is the National Public Health Institute of Germany, and is an institute within the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Health.

[COVID-19 patients in Germany: exposure risks and associated factors for hospitalization and severe disease]. / COVID-19-Patientinnen und -Patienten in Deutschland: Expositionsrisiken und assoziierte Faktoren für Hospitalisierungen und schwere Krankheitsverläufe.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) spread worldwide in 2020. By the end of June 2021, over 3.7 million people had been infected in Germany. The spread of the infection, however, is not evenly distributed across all parts of the population. Some groups are at a higher risk for SARS-CoV­2 infections or severe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) trajectories than others.This narrative review provides an overview of the parts of the population in Germany that are most affected by COVID-19. In addition, risk factors associated with hospitalization or severe courses of COVID-19 are identified.SARS-CoV­2 transmission may occur in various locations and settings. Professional settings, e.g., in the meat-processing industry, but also leisure activities and large public events are particularly affected. In the course of the pandemic, certain comorbidities associated with an increased risk for hospitalization or severe courses of COVID-19 have been identified. These include preexisting pulmonary, cardiovascular, and metabolic diseases. Patients with organ transplants and people with Down syndrome (trisomy 21) have the highest risk for hospitalization after SARS-CoV­2 infection.The identified settings that contribute to the spread of SARS-CoV­2 and the knowledge about vulnerable groups with a higher risk for hospitalization or severe disease trajectories form an important evidence base for the planning of prevention strategies and the fight against the pandemic.

Ten years of weekly epidemiological teleconference (EpiLag) - an effective and time-efficient tool for infectious disease event information, Germany, 2009-2018.

In 2009, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) and the 16 German federal state public health authorities (PHAs) established a weekly epidemiological teleconference (EpiLag) to discuss infectious disease (ID) events and foster horizontal and vertical information exchange. We present the procedure, discussed ID topics and evaluation results of EpiLag after 10 years. We analysed attendance, duration of EpiLag and the frequency of reported events. Participants (RKI and state PHA) were surveyed regarding their satisfaction with logistics, contents and usefulness of EpiLag (Likert scales). Between 2009 and 2018, RKI hosted 484 EpiLag conferences with a mean duration of 25 min (range: 4-60) and high participation (range: 9-16; mean: 15 PHAs). Overall, 2975 ID events (39% international, 9% national and 52% subnational) were presented (mean: 6.1 per EpiLag), most frequently on measles (18%), salmonellosis (8%) and influenza (5%). All responding participants (14/16 PHAs and 9/9 at RKI) were satisfied with the EpiLag's organization and minutes and deemed EpiLag useful for an overview and information distribution on ID events relevant to Germany. EpiLag is time efficient, easily applicable and useful for a low-threshold event communication. It supports PHAs in crises and strengthens the network of surveillance stakeholders. We recommend its implementation to other countries or sectors.

[Recording of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory tests in Germany]. / Erfassung der Labortestungen auf SARS-CoV-2 in Deutschland.

The collection of data on SARS-CoV­2 tests is central to the assessment of the infection rate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), data collected from various laboratory data recording systems are consolidated. First, this article aims to exemplify significant aspects regarding test procedures. Subsequently the different systems for recording laboratory tests are described and test numbers from the RKI test laboratory query and the laboratory-based SARS-CoV­2 surveillance as well as accounting data from the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians for SARS-CoV­2 laboratory tests are shown.Early in the pandemic, the RKI test laboratory query and the laboratory-based SARS-CoV­2 surveillance became available and able to evaluate data on performed tests and test capacities. By recording the positive and negative test results, statements about the total number of tests and the proportion of positive test rates can be made. While the aggregate test numbers are largely representative nationwide, they are not always representative at the state and district level. The billing data of the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians can complement the laboratory data afterwards. In addition, it can provide a retrospective assessment of the total number of SARS-CoV­2 numbers in Germany, because the services provided by statutory health insurers (around 85% of the population in Germany) are included. The various laboratory data recording systems complement one another and the evaluations flow into the recommended measures for the pandemic response.

[Adaptation of the routine surveillance system for infectious diseases in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic]. / Anpassung des Meldesystems gemäß Infektionsschutzgesetz im Jahr 2020 aufgrund von COVID-19.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic the routine surveillance system for infectious diseases had to be adapted. The disease was unknown before the first cases were reported under a catch-all notification requirement for new and threatening pathogens and diseases, but specific notification requirements for SARS-CoV­2 detection by laboratories as well as for suspect cases of COVID-19 diagnosed by physicians were soon integrated in the infectious diseases protection act. This article describes how the notification system for infectious diseases was adapted in 2020 to meet the requirements of the COVID-19 pandemic.In addition to the notification requirements, the list of data that is collected through the notification system was also amended. To facilitate the work of laboratories and local health authorities we have established the possibility for electronic reporting.Additionally, the software used for case and contact management within the local health authorities had to be adapted accordingly.COVID-19 notification data is important for the assessment of the current epidemiological situation and daily updated data was published by the Robert Koch Institute. To ensure timely data and good data quality, the IT infrastructure within the public health system has to be further modernized and the electronic notification system should be further strengthened.

COVID-19: cross-border contact tracing in Germany, February to April 2020.

IntroductionThe Robert Koch Institute (RKI) managed the exchange of cross-border contact tracing data between public health authorities (PHA) in Germany and abroad during the early COVID-19 pandemic.AimWe describe the extent of cross-border contact tracing and its challenges.MethodsWe analysed cross-border COVID-19 contact tracing events from 3 February to 5 April 2020 using information exchanged through the European Early Warning Response System and communication with International Health Regulation national focal points. We described events by PHA, number of contacts and exposure context.ResultsThe RKI processed 467 events, initiating contact to PHA 1,099 times (median = 1; interquartile range (IQR): 1-2) and sharing data on 5,099 contact persons. Of 327 (70%) events with known exposure context, the most commonly reported exposures were aircraft (n = 64; 20%), cruise ships (n = 24; 7%) and non-transport contexts (n = 210; 64%). Cruise ship and aircraft exposures generated more contacts with authorities (median = 10; IQR: 2-16, median = 4; IQR: 2-11) and more contact persons (median = 60; IQR: 9-269, median = 2; IQR: 1-3) than non-transport exposures (median = 1; IQR: 1-6 and median = 1; IQR: 1-2). The median time spent on contact tracing was highest for cruise ships: 5 days (IQR: 3-9).ConclusionIn the COVID-19 pandemic, cross-border contact tracing is considered a critical component of the outbreak response. While only a minority of international contact tracing activities were related to exposure events in transport, they contributed substantially to the workload. The numerous communications highlight the need for fast and efficient global outbreak communication channels between PHA.

[Crisis management at the Robert Koch Institute during the COVID-19 pandemic and the exchange between federal and state governments]. / Das Lagemanagement des Robert Koch-Instituts während der COVID-19-Pandemie und der Austausch zwischen Bund und Ländern.

The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) plays a central role in Germany in the management of health hazards of biological origin. The RKI's crisis management aims to contribute to protecting the health of the population in Germany in significant epidemic situations and to maintain the RKI's working ability over a long period of time even under high load. This article illustrates the crisis management of the RKI in general as well as during the COVID-19 pandemic. The generic RKI crisis management structures and the setup of the RKI emergency operations centre (EOC), their operationalisation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting challenges as of 31 October 2020 are described in this paper. The exchange between the federal and state governments during the pandemic is also described.The COVID-19 pandemic has led to extraordinary circumstances. During the epidemic situation, good communication and coordination has been essential, both within the RKI and with other federal or state authorities and expert groups. Under great pressure, the RKI produces and regularly updates recommendations, statements and assessments on various topics. To provide operational support for all COVID-19 related activities, an EOC was activated at the RKI. During the COVID-19 pandemic, there are various challenges regarding personnel and structures. It became apparent that good preparation (e.g. existing task descriptions and premises) has an important positive impact on crisis management.

[Air and maritime transport during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany: challenges for the public health service]. / Flug- und Schiffsverkehr während der COVID-19-Pandemie in Deutschland: Herausforderungen für den Öffentlichen Gesundheitsdienst.

COVID-19 has been challenging our society since January 2020. Due to global travel, the new coronavirus has rapidly spread worldwide. This article aims to provide an overview of the challenges in implementing measures in the air and maritime transport sector from the perspective of the German Public Health Service (Öffentlicher Gesundheitsdienst, ÖGD). Significant events and measures for air and maritime transport between January and August 2020 were selected. Lessons learned are discussed.During the COVID-19 pandemic, the ÖGD has been operating in a field of tension between the dynamics of scientific knowledge, political decision-making, social acceptance and consent.There are specific challenges at points of entry such as airports and seaports. These include staff shortages and the need to implement measures with a high organisational effort at very short notice such as health authority passenger checks carried out on aircraft, the establishment of test centres at points of entry and control of compliance with quarantine measures. Aggravating the situation, passenger lists, which are necessary for effective contact tracing, are often not available or incomplete. There is also a lack of digital tools for contact tracing but also, for example, the exchange of personal data within the ÖGD. Further difficulties in outbreak management arise from the cramped conditions on board ships and from the potential psychological stress on crew members and passengers, which have not yet been sufficiently considered.In view of all these challenges, it is paramount to strengthen the German Public Health Service in general and at points of entry and to intensify the exchange between the national, federal state and local levels.

Tools for Assessment of Country Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies: A Critical Review.

Recent international communicable disease crises have highlighted the need for countries to assure their preparedness to respond effectively to public health emergencies. The objective of this study was to critically review existing tools to support a country's assessment of its health emergency preparedness. We developed a framework to analyze the expected effectiveness and utility of these tools. Through mixed search strategies, we identified 12 tools with relevance to public health emergencies. There was considerable consensus concerning the critical preparedness system elements to be assessed, although their relative emphasis and means of assessment and measurement varied considerably. Several tools identified appeared to have reporting requirements as their primary aim, rather than primary utility for system self-assessment of the countries and states using the tool. Few tools attempted to give an account of their underlying evidence base. Only some tools were available in a user-friendly electronic modality or included quantitative measures to support the monitoring of system preparedness over time. We conclude there is still a need for improvement in tools available for assessment of country preparedness for public health emergencies, and for applied research to increase identification of system measures that are valid indicators of system response capability.

Investigation of a COVID-19 outbreak in Germany resulting from a single travel-associated primary case: a case series.

BACKGROUND: In December, 2019, the newly identified severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in Wuhan, China, causing COVID-19, a respiratory disease presenting with fever, cough, and often pneumonia. WHO has set the strategic objective to interrupt spread of SARS-CoV-2 worldwide. An outbreak in Bavaria, Germany, starting at the end of January, 2020, provided the opportunity to study transmission events, incubation period, and secondary attack rates. METHODS: A case was defined as a person with SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by RT-PCR. Case interviews were done to describe timing of onset and nature of symptoms and to identify and classify contacts as high risk (had cumulative face-to-face contact with a confirmed case for ≥15 min, direct contact with secretions or body fluids of a patient with confirmed COVID-19, or, in the case of health-care workers, had worked within 2 m of a patient with confirmed COVID-19 without personal protective equipment) or low risk (all other contacts). High-risk contacts were ordered to stay at home in quarantine for 14 days and were actively followed up and monitored for symptoms, and low-risk contacts were tested upon self-reporting of symptoms. We defined fever and cough as specific symptoms, and defined a prodromal phase as the presence of non-specific symptoms for at least 1 day before the onset of specific symptoms. Whole genome sequencing was used to confirm epidemiological links and clarify transmission events where contact histories were ambiguous; integration with epidemiological data enabled precise reconstruction of exposure events and incubation periods. Secondary attack rates were calculated as the number of cases divided by the number of contacts, using Fisher's exact test for the 95% CIs. FINDINGS: Patient 0 was a Chinese resident who visited Germany for professional reasons. 16 subsequent cases, often with mild and non-specific symptoms, emerged in four transmission generations. Signature mutations in the viral genome occurred upon foundation of generation 2, as well as in one case pertaining to generation 4. The median incubation period was 4·0 days (IQR 2·3-4·3) and the median serial interval was 4·0 days (3·0-5·0). Transmission events were likely to have occurred presymptomatically for one case (possibly five more), at the day of symptom onset for four cases (possibly five more), and the remainder after the day of symptom onset or unknown. One or two cases resulted from contact with a case during the prodromal phase. Secondary attack rates were 75·0% (95% CI 19·0-99·0; three of four people) among members of a household cluster in common isolation, 10·0% (1·2-32·0; two of 20) among household contacts only together until isolation of the patient, and 5·1% (2·6-8·9; 11 of 217) among non-household, high-risk contacts. INTERPRETATION: Although patients in our study presented with predominately mild, non-specific symptoms, infectiousness before or on the day of symptom onset was substantial. Additionally, the incubation period was often very short and false-negative tests occurred. These results suggest that although the outbreak was controlled, successful long-term and global containment of COVID-19 could be difficult to achieve. FUNDING: All authors are employed and all expenses covered by governmental, federal state, or other publicly funded institutions.

[Sustainable strengthening of Public Health in Germany through Attractive Career Paths - Core Requirements for a Public Health Strategy for Germany in the Area of Human Resources]. / Durch attraktive Karrierewege Public Health in Deutschland nachhaltig stärken ­ Kernforderungen an eine Public-Health-Strategie für Deutschland im Bereich Human Resources.

The demand for a well-trained public health workforce is increasing in view of the increased importance of health promotion and disease prevention in Germany. However, many career paths in public health are non-transparent, which creates additional barriers for interested young professionals and contributes to the existing gap between demand and supply. Against the backdrop of international frameworks and the specific labor market situation in Germany, the working group 11 "Career Paths in Public Health" of the 3rd Symposium of the Future Forum Public Health discussed current challenges and formulated initial solutions.

Exit and Entry Screening Practices for Infectious Diseases among Travelers at Points of Entry: Looking for Evidence on Public Health Impact.

A scoping search and a systematic literature review were conducted to give an insight on entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry, by analyzing published evidence on practices, guidelines, and experiences in the past 15 years worldwide. Grey literature, PubMed. and Scopus were searched using specific terms. Most of the available data identified through the systematic literature review concerned entry screening measures at airports. Little evidence is available about entry and exit screening measure implementation and effectiveness at ports and ground crossings. Exit screening was part of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) temporary recommendations for implementation in certain points of entry, for specific time periods. Exit screening measures for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the three most affected West African countries did not identify any cases and showed zero sensitivity and very low specificity. The percentages of confirmed cases identified out of the total numbers of travelers that passed through entry screening measures in various countries worldwide for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) and EVD in West Africa were zero or extremely low. Entry screening measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not detect any confirmed SARS cases in Australia, Canada, and Singapore. Despite the ineffectiveness of entry and exit screening measures, authors reported several important concomitant positive effects that their impact is difficult to assess, including discouraging travel of ill persons, raising awareness, and educating the traveling public and maintaining operation of flights from/to the affected areas. Exit screening measures in affected areas are important and should be applied jointly with other measures including information strategies, epidemiological investigation, contact tracing, vaccination, and quarantine to achieve a comprehensive outbreak management response. Based on review results, an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed.

[Communication and Networking - Results of the Working Group 8 of the Forum Future Public Health, Berlin 2016]. / Kommunikation und Vernetzung.

Steady changes in society present challenges to constructive cooperation between stakeholders in the diverse PH landscape of Germany through individualism, globalisation, medical progress, digitalisation, etc. Working group 8 therefore suggests that the PH community should build new internal structures, in order to be able to respond jointly to external challenges, facilitate networking amongst the actors and speak with one voice, when needed. The suggestion is to establish an office that has the task to organise further meetings, harmonize written joint statements and moderate the dialogue amongst peers.