An attentional blink in the absence of spatial attention: a cost of awareness?

The attentional blink refers to the finding that when two visual targets appear within 200-500 ms, observers often miss the second target. In three experiments, we disentangle the roles of spatial attention to and conscious report of the first event in eliciting this cost. We show that allocating spatial attention to the first event is not necessary for a blink to occur: the full temporal pattern of the blink arises when the first event is consciously detected, despite the fact that it is not spatially attended, whereas no cost is observed when the first event is missed. We then show that spatial attention is also not sufficient for eliciting a blink, though it can deepen the blink when accompanied by conscious detection. These results demonstrate that there is no cost associated with the initiation of an attentional episode, whereas explicit conscious detection comes at a price. These findings demonstrate the temporal flexibility of attention and underscore the potential role of subjective awareness in understanding processing limitations, although this role may be contingent on the encoding in working memory necessary for conscious report.

High obsessive-compulsive individuals may have attenuated access to internal cues associated with active movement: Evidence from a head repositioning study.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: The Seeking Proxies for Internal States model of OCD posits that obsessive-compulsive (OC) individuals have attenuated access to their internal states. Consequently, they seek and rely on discernible substitutes for these internal states. Previous research has supported these conjectures. Other studies, using a variety of measures, reported a reduced sense of agency (SoA) in OCD. The current study aimed to connect these two bodies of research by focusing on internal signals associated with active movement, which are related to the SoA. We hypothesized that the performance accuracy of high OC participants would be similar for active and passive movements, while that of low OC participants would be higher when the movement is acquired actively. METHOD: Participants with high vs. low OC tendencies were asked to reposition their head to a target angle that was acquired actively or passively. This was repeated with eyes blindfolded to evaluate reliance on visual information. Accuracy of repositioning was measured with a cervical range-of-motion device. RESULTS: As predicted, while low OC participants presented a significant decrease in their accuracy after passive (compared to active) acquisition, high OC participants' accuracy did not differ between acquisition types. Contrary to our predictions, reliance on vision was similar across groups. LIMITATIONS: The generalization of our findings to OCD requires replication with a clinical sample. CONCLUSIONS: This study implies that high OC individuals have a deficient access to internal cues involved in active movement. This might contribute to their doubt regarding their actions and to their reduced SoA.