RÉSUMÉ
BACKGROUND: The public order and safety (POS) sector remains susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreaks, as workplace attendance is typically compulsory and close physical contact is often needed. Here, we report on a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak with an attack rate of 39% (9/23), which occurred between 19 and 29 June 2021 among a cohort of new POS recruits participating in a mandatory 18-week training programme in England. METHODS: The COVID-OUT (COVID-19 Outbreak investigation to Understand Transmission) study team undertook a multidisciplinary outbreak investigation, including viral surface sampling, workplace environmental assessment, participant viral and antibody testing, and questionnaires, at the two associated training facilities between 5 July and 24 August 2021. RESULTS: Environmental factors, such as ventilation, were deemed inadequate in some areas of the workplace, with carbon dioxide (CO2) levels exceeding 1,500 ppm on multiple occasions within naturally ventilated classrooms. Activities during safety training required close contact, with some necessitating physical contact, physical exertion, and shouting. Furthermore, most participants reported having physical contact with colleagues (67%) and more than one close work contact daily (97%). CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation suggests that site- and activity-specific factors likely contributed to the transmission risks within the POS trainee cohort. Potential interventions for mitigating SARS-CoV-2 transmission in this POS training context could include implementing regular rapid lateral flow testing, optimizing natural ventilation, using portable air cleaning devices in classrooms, and expanding use of well-fitted FFP2/FFP3 respirators during activities where prolonged close physical contact is required.
Sujet(s)
COVID-19 , Épidémies de maladies , SARS-CoV-2 , Lieu de travail , Humains , COVID-19/transmission , COVID-19/épidémiologie , Angleterre/épidémiologie , Épidémies de maladies/prévention et contrôle , Mâle , Adulte , Femelle , Exposition professionnelle/prévention et contrôle , Ventilation/méthodesRÉSUMÉ
An outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 (1 March to 10 May 2021) with an attack rate of 26.5% among approximately 1150 workers at a storage and distribution centre in England prompted a multidisciplinary outbreak investigation (5 May to 6 August 2021), with the aim of better understanding worker- and workplace-related risk factors for viral transmission in the warehousing sector. Overall, environmental factors (e.g., ventilation, humidity and temperature) were assessed to be appropriate at the facility. Nevertheless, 39 (51.3%) surface samples from across the site tested positive for low/ very low levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA (Ct value ≥ 32.0 for all). Among the study participants, of whom 35.6% were confirmed or suspected cases, 95.5% reported having received COVID-19 prevention training, 100.0% reported handwashing, and 80.0% reported use of face coverings at work. Notably, 43.9% and 19.0% reported working with a symptomatic and a positive contact respectively. Furthermore, 80.5% and 46.3% had concerns regarding reduction in their income and future unemployment, respectively, due to self-isolation. The findings of this study suggest that, in addition to targeted workplace infection control measures and tailored work area specific risk assessments, an enhanced and equitable sick leave policy may help limit presenteeism and viral transmission in large workplaces.
Sujet(s)
COVID-19 , Épidémies de maladies , SARS-CoV-2 , Lieu de travail , Humains , COVID-19/épidémiologie , COVID-19/transmission , COVID-19/prévention et contrôle , COVID-19/virologie , Angleterre/épidémiologie , Facteurs de risque , Adulte , SARS-CoV-2/isolement et purification , Mâle , Femelle , Adulte d'âge moyen , Jeune adulte , Sujet âgéRÉSUMÉ
AIMS: To utilize environmental surface sampling to evaluate areas of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) contamination within workplaces to identify trends and improve local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) control measures. METHODS AND RESULTS: Surface sampling was undertaken at 12 workplaces that experienced a cluster of COVID-19 cases in the workforce between March 2021 and March 2022. A total of 7.4% (61/829) samples collected were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA by the quantitative PCR (qPCR) with only 1.8% (15/829) of samples identified with crossing threshold (Ct) values <35.0. No sample returned whole-genome sequence inferring RNA detected was degraded. CONCLUSIONS: Few workplace surface samples were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA and positive samples typically contained low levels of nucleic acid. Although these data may infer a low probability of fomite transmission within the workplace, Ct values may have been lower at the time of contamination. Workplace environmental sampling identified lapses in COVID-19 control measures within individual sites and showed trends throughout the pandemic.
Sujet(s)
COVID-19 , Humains , COVID-19/épidémiologie , SARS-CoV-2/génétique , ARN viral/génétique , Lieu de travail , Épidémies de maladies , Royaume-Uni/épidémiologieRÉSUMÉ
Surfaces contaminated with infectious SARS-CoV-2 particles have the potential to cause human infection and any increase in surface survivability of a SARS-CoV-2 variant may increase its prevalence over other variants. This study investigated whether there were differences in surface persistence between Delta and Omicron variants leading to Omicron's dominance globally. Stainless steel coupons were inoculated with suspensions of either Delta or Omicron variant and exposed to typical environmental conditions within a containment level 3 laboratory. Coupons were recovered at different timepoints and enumerated using plaque assay. Both variants were recoverable for >48 h on the coupons. Omicron showed a greater reduction of viability after 48 h compared to Delta with a 20-fold decrease versus 15-fold respectively, but this difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.424). These results indicate that Omicron's surface persistence is unlikely to contribute to it becoming the dominant variant over Delta.
Sujet(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Humains , SARS-CoV-2/génétique , Température , Dosage biologiqueRÉSUMÉ
BACKGROUND: An outbreak of monkeypox virus infections in non-endemic countries was recognised on May 12, 2022. As of September 29, more than 67â000 infections have been reported globally, with more than 3400 confirmed cases in the UK by September 26. Monkeypox virus is believed to be predominantly transmitted through direct contact with lesions or infected body fluids, with possible involvement of fomites and large respiratory droplets. A case of monkeypox in a health-care worker in the UK in 2018 was suspected to be due to virus exposure while changing bedding. We aimed to measure the extent of environmental contamination in the isolation rooms of patients with symptomatic monkeypox. METHODS: We investigated environmental contamination with monkeypox virus from infected patients admitted to isolation rooms at the Royal Free Hospital (London, UK) between May 24 and June 17, 2022. Surface swabs of high-touch areas in five isolation rooms, of the personal protective equipment (PPE) of health-care workers in doffing areas in three rooms, and from air samples collected before and during bedding changes in five rooms were analysed using quantitative PCR to assess monkeypox virus contamination levels. Virus isolation was performed to confirm presence of infectious virus in selected positive samples. FINDINGS: We identified widespread surface contamination (56 [93%] of 60 samples were positive) in occupied patient rooms (monkeypox DNA cycle threshold [Ct] values 24·7-37·4), on health-care worker PPE after use (Ct 26·1-35·6), and in PPE doffing areas (Ct 26·3-36·8). Of 20 air samples taken, five (25%) were positive. Three (75%) of four air samples collected before and during a bedding change in one patient's room were positive (Ct 32·7-36·2). Replication-competent virus was identified in two (50%) of four samples selected for viral isolation, including from air samples collected during bedding change. INTERPRETATION: These data show contamination in isolation facilities and potential for suspension of monkeypox virus into the air during specific activities. PPE contamination was observed after clinical contact and changing of bedding. Contamination of hard surfaces in doffing areas supports the importance of cleaning protocols, PPE use, and doffing procedures. FUNDING: None.
Sujet(s)
Transmission de maladie infectieuse du patient au professionnel de santé , Orthopoxvirose simienne , Humains , Virus de la variole simienne/génétique , Orthopoxvirose simienne/épidémiologie , Hôpitaux , Royaume-Uni/épidémiologieRÉSUMÉ
Most studies on surface persistence of SARS-CoV-2 have been conducted at temperatures between 20°C and 30°C. There is limited data on the survival of SARS-CoV-2 at low temperatures. In this study, the stability of SARS-CoV-2 Alpha and Delta variants on stainless steel was investigated at two temperatures (4°C and 24°C). The results show that both variants decayed more rapidly at 24°C compared with 4°C. At 24°C, Alpha and Delta variants showed reductions of 0.33 log10 and 1.02 log10, respectively, within the first 2.5 h. However, at 4°C, Alpha variant showed a reduction of 0.16 log10 within the first 2.5 h while no reduction was observed with Delta variant. After remaining in situ for 24 h at 24°C, log10 reductions of 2.66 (Alpha) and 3.11 (Delta) were observed. No viable Alpha and Delta variant was recovered after 48 h and 72 h, respectively. After 24 h in a refrigerated environment (4°C) log10 reductions of 1.16 (Alpha) and 0.95 (Delta) were observed. Under these experimental conditions, both viruses survived on stainless steel for at least 1 week. No viable Alpha and Delta variant was recovered after 10 days. These findings support the potential for increased fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during winter months in colder regions worldwide and in some industrial sectors. IMPORTANCE Human transmission is believed to occur primarily through direct transfer of infectious droplets or aerosols. However, fomite transmission through contact with contaminated surfaces may also play an important role. This study provides novel evidence comparing the stability of Alpha and Delta variants on stainless steel surfaces at 4°C and 24°C. At 4°C both variants were found to be still detectable for up to 7 days. At 24°C Delta variant could be recovered over 2 days compared with Alpha variant which could not be recovered after 2 days. This has implications for fomite transmission interventions for people living and working in cold environments.
Sujet(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Humains , SARS-CoV-2/génétique , Acier inoxydable , TempératureRÉSUMÉ
Little is understood about the impact of nebulisation on the viability of SARS-CoV-2. In this study, a range of nebulisers with differing methods of aerosol generation were evaluated to determine SARS-CoV-2 viability following aerosolization. The aerosol particle size distribution was assessed using an aerosol particle sizer (APS) and SARS-CoV-2 viability was determined after collection into liquid media using All-Glass Impingers (AGI). Viable particles of SARS-CoV-2 were further characterised using the Collison 6-jet nebuliser in conjunction with novel sample techniques in an Andersen size-fractioning sampler to predict lung deposition profiles. Results demonstrate that all the tested nebulisers can generate stable, polydisperse aerosols (Geometric standard deviation (GSD) circa 1.8) in the respirable range (1.2 to 2.2 µm). Viable fractions (VF, units PFU/particle, the virus viability as a function of total particles produced) were circa 5 × 10-3. VF and spray factors were not significantly affected by relative humidity, within this system where aerosols were in the spray tube an extremely short time. The novel Andersen sample collection methods successfully captured viable virus particles across all sizes; with most particle sizes below 3.3 µm. Particle sizes, in MMAD (Mass Median Aerodynamic Diameters), were calculated from linear regression of log10-log10 transformed cumulative PFU data, and calculated MMADs accorded well with APS measurements and did not differ across collection method types. These data will be vital in informing animal aerosol challenge models, and infection prevention and control policies.
Sujet(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Aérosols , Animaux , Nébuliseurs et vaporisateurs , Taille de particuleRÉSUMÉ
The transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to occur through a number of routes, including contact with contaminated surfaces. Many studies have used reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) analysis to detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA on surfaces, but seldom has viable virus been detected. This paper investigates the viability over time of SARS-CoV-2 dried onto a range of materials and compares viability of the virus to RNA copies recovered and whether virus viability is concentration dependent. Viable virus persisted for the longest time on surgical mask material and stainless steel, with a 99.9% reduction in viability by 122 and 114 h, respectively. Viability of SARS-CoV-2 reduced the fastest on a polyester shirt, with a 99.9% reduction within 2.5 h. Viability on the bank note was reduced second fastest, with 99.9% reduction in 75 h. RNA on all surfaces exhibited a 1-log reduction in genome copy number recovery over 21 days. The findings show that SARS-CoV-2 is most stable on nonporous hydrophobic surfaces. RNA is highly stable when dried on surfaces, with only 1-log reduction in recovery over 3 weeks. In comparison, SARS-CoV-2 viability reduced more rapidly, but this loss in viability was found to be independent of starting concentration. Expected levels of SARS-CoV-2 viable environmental surface contamination would lead to undetectable levels within 2 days. Therefore, when RNA is detected on surfaces, it does not directly indicate the presence of viable virus, even at low cycle threshold values. IMPORTANCE This study shows the impact of material type on the viability of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces. It demonstrates that the decay rate of viable SARS-CoV-2 is independent of starting concentration. However, RNA shows high stability on surfaces over extended periods. This has implications for interpretation of surface sampling results using RT-PCR to determine the possibility of viable virus from a surface, where RT-PCR is not an appropriate technique to determine viable virus. Unless sampled immediately after contamination, it is difficult to align RNA copy numbers to quantity of viable virus on a surface.