Obedience to authority reduces cognitive conflict before an action.

How obeying orders impacts moral decision-making remains an open question, despite its significant societal implications. The goal of this study was to determine if cognitive conflict, indexed by mid-frontal theta activity observed before an action, is influenced by the context of obedience. Participants came in pairs and were assigned roles as either agent or victim. Those in the agent role could either decide freely or follow the experimenter's instructions to administer (or refrain from administering) a mildly painful electric shock to the victim in exchange for a small monetary reward. Mid-frontal theta activity was recorded before the agent made their keypress. Results indicated that mid-frontal theta activity was reduced when participants obeyed the experimenter's orders compared to when they acted of their own volition, even though the outcomes of the actions were similar. This finding suggests that obeying orders diminishes cognitive conflict preceding moral decisions that could harm another person. This study sheds light on a potential mechanism explaining how obedience can blurr morality and lessen our natural aversion to harming others.

A novel electroencephalography-based paradigm to measure intergroup prosociality: An intergenerational study in the aftermath of the genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda.

Studying how intergroup prosociality evolves in war-torn societies is critical for gaining a better understanding of conflict perpetuation. Rwanda provides a unique example of how two groups must reconcile and manage their intergroup biases following a genocidal process. In this study, we employed a novel intended behavior task to measure intergroup prosociality among former genocide perpetrators, genocide survivors, and their children in Rwanda. Participants were required to choose between various individuals representing their own in-group or their out-group as recipients of their prosocial intentions. We measured how frequently they selected in-group or out-group individuals and to what extent choosing each individual induced cognitive conflict, as measured by reaction times (RTs) and midfrontal theta (FMθ) activity. The results indicated that survivors and their children selected former perpetrators and their offspring less frequently. Furthermore, selecting them involved a higher cognitive conflict, as evidenced by longer RT and a higher FMθ, compared to choosing their own in-group. For the group composed of former perpetrators and their children, we observed a dissociation. They selected out-group individuals more frequently, perhaps as a compensatory behavior for their past wrongdoings. Nonetheless, selecting the out-group individuals involved a higher cognitive conflict than selecting their own in-group. Importantly, we observed a similar intergroup prosociality bias in the children of both survivors and former perpetrators, mirroring that of their parents. These results are important for understanding how past conflicts influence intergroup prosociality bias and the extent to which this bias is transmitted to the next generation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Does the cowl make the monk? The effect of military and Red Cross uniforms on empathy for pain, sense of agency and moral behaviors.

According to the embodied cognition framework, cognitive functions are not confined to the brain but are also shaped by the mutual interactions between the brain, body, and external environment. In this regard, a theory developed in 2012, called enclothed cognition, suggests an effect on wearing specific clothing on various psychological processes. However, the neuro-cognitive mechanisms underlying the impact of clothing on behavior have received less systematic investigation. The present study examined the influence of clothing on prosocial behaviors, and focused on sense of agency, and empathy for pain as neuro-cognitive processes of interest. Participants (40 in total) wore civilian, military, and Red Cross uniforms. They were paired up and assigned as either agents or victims. Agents had the option to administer real electric shocks to victims for a monetary reward of +€0.05. They could choose to shock freely (free condition) or follow the experimenter's instructions (coerced condition). We measured prosocial behavior by counting the number of shocks prevented, neural empathic response using electroencephalography with the P3 and the LPP, and sense of agency through an implicit method based on interval estimates. Findings showed that wearing the Red Cross uniform led to more prosocial behavior compared to civilian clothing. The Red Cross uniform also increased neural response to pain when participants witnessed shocks, compared to civilian or military clothing. Moreover, wearing a military uniform increased the sense of agency in the free condition, as compared to civilian clothing. This study broadens our knowledge on the impact of enclothed cognition on cognitive and psychological processes.

On the impact of the genocide on the intergroup empathy bias between former perpetrators, survivors, and their children in Rwanda.

Studying what factors influence the ability to resonate with the pain of others in the aftermath of a genocide and how this extends to the following generation is critical to better understand the perpetuation of conflicts. In the present study conducted in Rwanda, we recruited former genocide perpetrators and survivors, and their respective children and investigated how their neural response to the pain of others is modulated when they visualized pictures of former perpetrators or survivors, or their offspring. We further evaluated how the impact of the genocide and psychological factors associated with trauma influenced the results. Results showed that the intergroup empathy bias-that is, a reduced neural response to the pain of the outgroup-is present for both individuals alive during the genocide and their offspring. We also observed that a higher number of stressors experienced during the genocide was associated with a higher reduction of the neural response to the pain of others, even toward the children of one's own ingroup. Finally, we observed that a deliberate and free decision to reconcile is associated with a higher neural response to the pain of others. The results may be central to encouraging reconciliation in peacebuilding programs and to fostering empathic repair after trauma. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

On the cognitive mechanisms supporting prosocial disobedience in a post-genocidal context.

The aim of the present study was to offer a first investigation of the neuro-cognitive processes and the temporal dynamics at the neural level, together with cultural, social and psychological dimensions, that may support resistance to orders to harm another person. Using a novel experimental approach to study experimentally disobedience, we recruited individuals from the first generation born after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Seventy-two were recruited and tested in Rwanda and 72 were recruited and tested in Belgium. Results indicated that a higher neural response to the pain of others and a higher feeling of responsibility when people obeyed orders were associated with more resistance to immoral orders. We also observed that participants who had a higher processing, as measured through mid-frontal theta activity, when listening to the orders of the experimenter disobeyed less frequently to immoral orders. Further, participants experiencing a higher conflict before administering a shock to the 'victim' also disobeyed more frequently to immoral orders. Finally, a low cultural relationship to authority and a high estimated family suffering during the genocide were also associated with more disobedience to immoral orders. The present study opens new paths for interdisciplinary field research dedicated to the study of obedience.

Commanding or Being a Simple Intermediary: How Does It Affect Moral Behavior and Related Brain Mechanisms?

Psychology and neuroscience research have shown that fractioning operations among several individuals along a hierarchical chain allows diffusing responsibility between components of the chain, which has the potential to disinhibit antisocial actions. Here, we present two studies, one using fMRI (Study 1) and one using EEG (Study 2), designed to help understand how commanding or being in an intermediary position impacts the sense of agency and empathy for pain. In the age of military drones, we also explored whether commanding a human or robot agent influences these measures. This was done within a single behavioral paradigm in which participants could freely decide whether or not to send painful shocks to another participant in exchange for money. In Study 1, fMRI reveals that activation in social cognition-related and empathy-related brain regions was equally low when witnessing a victim receive a painful shock while participants were either commander or simple intermediary transmitting an order, compared with being the agent directly delivering the shock. In Study 2, results indicated that the sense of agency did not differ between commanders and intermediary, no matter whether the executing agent was a robot or a human. However, we observed that the neural response over P3 event-related potential was higher when the executing agent was a robot compared with a human. Source reconstruction of the EEG signal revealed that this effect was mediated by areas including the insula and ACC. Results are discussed regarding the interplay between the sense of agency and empathy for pain for decision-making.

A novel experimental approach to study disobedience to authority.

Fifty years after the experiments of Stanley Milgram, the main objective of the present paper is to offer a paradigm that complies with up-to-date ethical standards and that can be adapted to various scientific disciplines, ranging from sociology and (social) psychology to neuroscience. Inspired by subsequent versions of Milgram-like paradigms and by combining the strengths of each, this paper presents a novel experimental approach to the study of (dis)obedience to authority. Volunteers are recruited in pairs and take turns to be 'agents' or 'victims', making the procedure fully reciprocal. For each trial, the agents receive an order from the experimenter to send a real, mildly painful electric shock to the 'victim', thus placing participants in an ecological set-up and avoiding the use of cover stories. Depending on the experimental condition, 'agents' receive, or do not receive, a monetary gain and are given, or are not given, an aim to obey the experimenter's orders. Disobedience here refers to the number of times 'agents' refused to deliver the real shock to the 'victim'. As the paradigm is designed to fit with brain imaging methods, I hope to bring new insights and perspectives in this area of research.

The obedient mind and the volitional brain: A neural basis for preserved sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion.

Milgram's classical studies famously suggested a widespread willingness to obey authority, even to the point of inflicting harm. Important situational factors supporting obedience, such as proximity with the victim, have been established. Relatively little work has focused on how coercion affects individual cognition, or on identifying the cognitive factors that underlie inter-individual differences in the tendency to yield to coercion. Here, we used fMRI to investigate the neural systems associated with changes in volitional processes associated with sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion. Participants either freely chose, or were instructed by the experimenter, to give mildly painful electric shocks to another participant, or to refrain from doing so. We have previously shown that coercion reduces temporal binding, which has been proposed as an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency. We tested how reduced agency under coercion related to differences in neural activity between free choice and coercion. In contrast to previous studies and to participants performing the task outside the MRI scanner, on average there was no effect of coercion on agency for participants in the scanner. However, greater activity in the medial frontal gyrus was reliably associated with greater agency under coercion. A similar association was found using explicit responsibility ratings. Our findings suggest that medial frontal processes, perhaps related to volition during action planning and execution, may help to preserve a sense of accountability under coercion. Further, participants who administered more shocks under free choice showed reduced activity during free choice trials in brain areas associated with social cognition. Possibly, this might reflect participants cognitively distancing themselves from the recipient of the shocks under free choice, whereas this was not observed under coercion.

How using brain-machine interfaces influences the human sense of agency.

Brain-machine interfaces (BMI) allows individuals to control an external device by controlling their own brain activity, without requiring bodily or muscle movements. Performing voluntary movements is associated with the experience of agency ("sense of agency") over those movements and their outcomes. When people voluntarily control a BMI, they should likewise experience a sense of agency. However, using a BMI to act presents several differences compared to normal movements. In particular, BMIs lack sensorimotor feedback, afford lower controllability and are associated with increased cognitive fatigue. Here, we explored how these different factors influence the sense of agency across two studies in which participants learned to control a robotic hand through motor imagery decoded online through electroencephalography. We observed that the lack of sensorimotor information when using a BMI did not appear to influence the sense of agency. We further observed that experiencing lower control over the BMI reduced the sense of agency. Finally, we observed that the better participants controlled the BMI, the greater was the appropriation of the robotic hand, as measured by body-ownership and agency scores. Results are discussed based on existing theories on the sense of agency in light of the importance of BMI technology for patients using prosthetic limbs.

The effect of military training on the sense of agency and outcome processing.

Armed forces often rely on strict hierarchical organization, where people are required to follow orders. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigate whether or not working in a military context influences the sense of agency and outcome processing, and how different durations (junior cadets vs senior cadets) and types (cadets vs privates) of military experience may modulate these effects. Participants could administer painful electrical shocks to a 'victim' in exchange for money, either by their own free choice, or following orders of the experimenter. Results indicate that working in a strictly hierarchical structure may have a generalized negative impact on one's own sense of agency and outcome processing by reducing it, even when participants could freely decide their action. However, trained officers showed an enhanced sense of agency and outcome processing. This study offers insights on the potential for training the sense of agency and outcome processing.

Obeying orders reduces vicarious brain activation towards victims' pain.

Past historical events and experimental research have shown complying with the orders from an authority has a strong impact on people's behaviour. However, the mechanisms underlying how obeying orders influences moral behaviours remain largely unknown. Here, we test the hypothesis that when male and female humans inflict a painful stimulation to another individual, their empathic response is reduced when this action complied with the order of an experimenter (coerced condition) in comparison with being free to decide to inflict that pain (free condition). We observed that even if participants knew that the shock intensity delivered to the 'victim' was exactly the same during coerced and free conditions, they rated the shocks as less painful in the coerced condition. MRI results further indicated that obeying orders reduced activity associated with witnessing the shocks to the victim in the ACC, insula/IFG, TPJ, MTG and dorsal striatum (including the caudate and the putamen) as well as neural signatures of vicarious pain in comparison with being free to decide. We also observed that participants felt less responsible and showed reduced activity in a multivariate neural guilt signature in the coerced than in the free condition, suggesting that this reduction of neural response associated with empathy could be linked to a reduction of felt responsibility and guilt. These results highlight that obeying orders has a measurable influence on how people perceive and process others' pain. This may help explain how people's willingness to perform moral transgressions is altered in coerced situations.

Only giving orders? An experimental study of the sense of agency when giving or receiving commands.

In human societies, agents are assumed to experience being the author of their own actions. These basic motoric experiences of action are influenced by social hierarchies, leading to surprising and morally significant results. Here we ask whether, under coercion, the sense of agency and responsibility pass from the person who receives orders to the person who gives them. Volunteers took turns to play the roles of 'commander', 'agent' or 'victim' in a task where the commander coerced the agent to deliver painful shocks to the 'victim'. We used 'intentional binding' as an implicit measure of sense of agency in both commanders and agents, in conditions of coercion and free-choice. We observed a reduced sense of agency when agents received coercive instructions, relative to when they freely chose which action to execute. We also found that sense of agency in the commanders was reduced when they coerced agents to administer the shock on their behalf, relative to when they acted by themselves. This last effect was associated with the commander's self-reported level on a psychopathy scale. Thus, coercion resulted in neither commander nor agent feeling agency for the effect of the action, as measured through implicit methods. Our results could have profound implications for social decision-making and social regulation of moral behaviour.

[Coercion and loss of agency]. / Coercition et perte d'agentivité.

The experiments conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram have shown the extent to which people behaviours can be modified under coercion. Nonetheless, the mechanisms that could explain how coercion influences moral behaviours have been largely unexplored. In the present article, I propose a new perspective to try to understand these mechanisms: this involves the neuroscience of consciousness and how consciousness can influence our behaviours.

The Power of Suggestion: Posthypnotically Induced Changes in the Temporal Binding of Intentional Action Outcomes.

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one's voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e., when voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived to occur closer together in time than involuntary actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, during which strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that this reduced binding results from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends on awareness of intentions. This finding shows that changes in metacognition of intentions affect perception.

The Influence of (Dis)belief in Free Will on Immoral Behavior.

One of the hallmarks of human existence is that we all hold beliefs that determine how we act. Amongst such beliefs, the idea that we are endowed with free will appears to be linked to prosocial behaviors, probably by enhancing the feeling of responsibility of individuals over their own actions. However, such effects appear to be more complex that one might have initially thought. Here, we aimed at exploring how induced disbeliefs in free will impact the sense of agency over the consequences of one's own actions in a paradigm that engages morality. To do so, we asked participants to choose to inflict or to refrain from inflicting an electric choc to another participant in exchange of a small financial benefit. Our results show that participants who were primed with a text defending neural determinism - the idea that humans are a mere bunch of neurons guided by their biology - administered fewer shocks and were less vindictive toward the other participant. Importantly, this finding only held for female participants. These results show the complex interaction between gender, (dis)beliefs in free will and moral behavior.

The Sense of Agency as Tracking Control.

Does sense of agency (SoA) arise merely from action-outcome associations, or does an additional real-time process track each step along the chain? Tracking control predicts that deviant intermediate steps between action and outcome should reduce SoA. In two experiments, participants learned mappings between two finger actions and two tones. In later test blocks, actions triggered a robot hand moving either the same or a different finger, and also triggered tones, which were congruent or incongruent with the mapping. The perceived delay between actions and tones gave a proxy measure for SoA. Action-tone binding was stronger for congruent than incongruent tones, but only when the robot movement was also congruent. Congruent tones also had reduced N1 amplitudes, but again only when the robot movement was congruent. We suggest that SoA partly depends on a real-time tracking control mechanism, since deviant intermediate action of the robot reduced SoA over the tone.

Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study.

The sense of controlling one's own actions is fundamental to normal human mental function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one's own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another's action might change the perceived temporal relationship between one's own voluntary actions and their outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another's action. In the observational group, each participant could see the other's actions. Multivariate analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants' actions from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents. Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world.

Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain.

People may deny responsibility for negative consequences of their actions by claiming that they were "only obeying orders." The "Nuremberg defense" offers one extreme example, though it is often dismissed as merely an attempt to avoid responsibility. Milgram's classic laboratory studies reported widespread obedience to an instruction to harm, suggesting that social coercion may alter mechanisms of voluntary agency, and hence abolish the normal experience of being in control of one's own actions. However, Milgram's and other studies relied on dissembling and on explicit measures of agency, which are known to be biased by social norms. Here, we combined coercive instructions to administer harm to a co-participant, with implicit measures of sense of agency, based on perceived compression of time intervals between voluntary actions and their outcomes, and with electrophysiological recordings. In two experiments, an experimenter ordered a volunteer to make a key-press action that caused either financial penalty or demonstrably painful electric shock to their co-participant, thereby increasing their own financial gain. Coercion increased the perceived interval between action and outcome, relative to a situation where participants freely chose to inflict the same harms. Interestingly, coercion also reduced the neural processing of the outcomes of one's own action. Thus, people who obey orders may subjectively experience their actions as closer to passive movements than fully voluntary actions. Our results highlight the complex relation between the brain mechanisms that generate the subjective experience of voluntary actions and social constructs, such as responsibility.

The relationship between human agency and embodiment.

Humans regularly feel a sense of agency (SoA) over events where the causal link between action and outcome is extremely indirect. We have investigated how intermediate (here, a robotic hand) events that intervene between action and outcome may alter SoA, using intentional binding measures. The robotic hand either performed the same movement as the participant (active congruent), or performed a similar movement with another finger (active incongruent). Binding was significantly reduced in the active incongruent relative to the active congruent condition, suggesting that altered embodiment influences SoA. However, binding effects were comparable between a condition where the robot hand made a congruent movement, and conditions where no robot hand was involved, suggesting that intermediate and embodied events do not reduce SoA. We suggest that human sense of agency involves both statistical associations between intentions and arbitrary outcomes, and an effector-specific matching of sensorimotor means used to achieve the outcome.

"Free will": are we all equal? A dynamical perspective of the conscious intention to move.

In their seminal (1983) study, Libet and colleagues suggested that awareness of one's intention to act has a postdictive character in that it occurs long after cerebral activity leading to action has been initiated. Crucially, Libet et al. further suggested that the time window (±200 ms) between the conscious experience of the intention to act and the action itself offers people the possibility of "vetoing" the unfolding action. This raises the question of whether there are individual differences in the duration of this "veto window" and which components of the readiness potential (RP) and the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) explain this variability. It has been reported that some psychiatric diseases lead to shorter intervals between conscious intentions and actions. However, it is unclear whether such patients suffer from impairment of the sense of volition, thus experiencing voluntary movements as involuntary, or whether voluntary inhibition of action is actually reduced, since conscious intention occurs later. We had two aims in the present paper. First, we aimed at clarifying the role of consciousness in voluntary actions by examining the relation between the duration of the veto window and impulsivity. Second, we sought to examine different components of the RP and LRP waveforms so as to attempt to explain observed variability in W judgments. Our results indicate (1) that impulsive people exhibit a shorter delay between their intention and the action than non-impulsive people, and (2) that this difference can hardly be attributed to a difference in time perception. Electroencephalography indicated that the rate of growth of the RP is relevant to explain differences in W judgments, since we observed that the RP at the moment of conscious intention is lower for people with late conscious intention than for people with early conscious intention. The onset and the intercept of these waveforms were less interpretable. These results bring new light on the role that consciousness plays in voluntary action.