Am I Winning or Losing? Probing the Appraisal of Partial Wins via Response Vigor.

Attempts to obtain rewards are not always successful. Despite investing much time, effort, or money, sometimes individuals may not obtain any reward. Other times they may obtain some reward, but the obtained reward may be smaller than their initial investment, such as partial wins in gambling. It remains unclear how such ambiguous outcomes are appraised. To address this question, we systematically varied the payoffs for different outcomes in a computerized scratch card task across three experiments. To test outcome appraisal, we used response vigor as a novel proxy. In the scratch card task, participants turned three cards one by one. Depending on the turned cards, they either received an amount that was higher than the wager (win), an amount lower than the wager (partial win), or nothing (loss). Overall, participants responded to partial wins more slowly than losses, but more quickly than wins. Partial wins were therefore appraised to be better than losses, but worse than wins. Importantly, further analyses showed that outcome appraisal was not based on the net win or loss amount. Instead, participants primarily used the configuration of turned cards as a cue for the relative rank of an outcome within a specific game. Outcome appraisals thus utilize simple heuristic rules, rely on salient information (such as outcome-related cues in gambling), and are specific to a local context. Together, these factors may contribute to the misperception of partial wins as real wins in gambling. Future work may examine how outcome appraisal may be modulated by the salience of certain information, and investigate the appraisal process in contexts beyond gambling.

The landscape of open science in behavioral addiction research: Current practices and future directions.

Open science refers to a set of practices that aim to make scientific research more transparent, accessible, and reproducible, including pre-registration of study protocols, sharing of data and materials, the use of transparent research methods, and open access publishing. In this commentary, we describe and evaluate the current state of open science practices in behavioral addiction research. We highlight the specific value of open science practices for the field; discuss recent field-specific meta-scientific reviews that show the adoption of such practices remains in its infancy; address the challenges to engaging with open science; and make recommendations for how researchers, journals, and scientific institutions can work to overcome these challenges and promote high-quality, transparently reported behavioral addiction research. By collaboratively promoting open science practices, the field can create a more sustainable and productive research environment that benefits both the scientific community and society as a whole.

Modeling urgency in the lab: Exploring the associations between self-reported urgency and behavioral responses to negative outcomes in laboratory gambling.

Impulsivity is a multifaceted construct that relates to different behaviors in everyday life and has been associated with many psychopathological disorders and behavioral problems, such as problematic gambling behavior. One questionnaire to measure these several facets on a trait level is the UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale. Specifically, the UPPS-P investigates five distinct facets: (a) negative urgency, (b) lack of premeditation, (c) lack of perseverance, (d) sensation seeking, and (e) positive urgency. Negative urgency at a trait level in particular seems to be associated with the development of psychopathological disorders. To date, there are no established state measures of negative urgency. However, it was recently proposed that speeding after losses might be a suitable measure. Thus, in this study, we explored the possible relationship between a state measure of negative urgency modeled through a behavioral gambling task and a trait measure of negative urgency through the UPPS-P questionnaire. We used correlational and network analyses in an aggregated database of eight samples (total N = 1216) to explore the potential relationships between post-loss speeding on the behavioral gambling task and UPPS-P scores (by combining trait vs. item-based analyses). We found that the degree of speeding after losses (post-loss speeding) did not correlate with the trait measure of impulsivity in general and negative urgency specifically, either at the latent trait level or on an item-based level. This null finding indicates that our state measure of post-loss speeding and negative urgency on a trait level does not seem to capture the same underlying constructs. Implications for personality research are discussed.

A direct and conceptual replication of post-loss speeding when gambling.

To investigate the response to suboptimal outcomes, Verbuggen et al. (Verbruggen F, Chambers CD, Lawrence NS, McLaren IPL. 2017 Winning and losing: effects on impulsive action. J. Exp. Psychol.: Hum. Percept. Perform. 43, 147. (doi:10.1037/xhp0000284)) conducted a study in which participants chose between a gamble and a non-gamble option. The non-gamble option was a guaranteed amount of points, whereas the gamble option was associated with a higher amount but a lower probability of winning. The authors observed that participants initiated the next trial faster after a loss compared to wins or non-gambles. In the present study, we directly replicated these findings in the laboratory and online. We also designed another task controlling for the number of trials per outcome. In this task, participants guessed where a reward was hidden. They won points if they selected the correct location, but lost points if they selected the incorrect location. We included neutral trials as a baseline. Again, participants sped up after a loss relative to wins and neutral trials (but only with a response choice in neutral trials and a large sample size). These findings appear inconsistent with cognitive-control frameworks, which assume that suboptimal outcomes typically lead to slower responses; instead, they suggest that suboptimal outcomes can invigorate behaviour, consistent with accounts of frustrative non-reward and impulsive action.

Clarifying the Role of Negative Emotions in the Origin and Control of Impulsive Actions.

This critical review elaborates on the origin of impulsive actions and how these can be controlled. We focus in particular on the role of negative events. First, we outline how impulsive actions often originate from negative events that are (emotionally) appraised. A discrepancy between this current state and a desired goal state leads to action tendencies. The urgency of the resulting action depends on the importance of the goal and the size of the discrepancy. Second, we discuss how such impulsive actions can be regulated or controlled e.g. by biasing competition between different options, or by completely suppressing all motor output. Importantly, such control mechanisms might also depend on emotional factors. To reconcile these findings, we present a coherent theoretical framework, taking into account various cognitive, affective, and motivational mechanisms as well as contextual factors that play a crucial role in the origin and control of impulsive actions.

The persisting influence of unattended auditory information: Negative priming in intentional auditory attention switching.

We studied negative priming (NP) in auditory attention switching. In a cued variant of dichotic listening, two spoken number words were presented, one to each ear, one spoken by a female, and one spoken by a male voice. A visual cue indicated whether the male or female voice was the target. A numerical magnitude judgement of the target number was required. The selection criterion could either switch or repeat across trials, so there were attention switch and repetition trials. Two experiments examined NP (distractor becomes target) and also included a "competitor priming" (CP) condition (target becomes distractor), relative to a "no priming" condition (target and distractor not related to previous trial). In Experiment 1, we investigated the basic priming effects. In Experiment 2, we additionally varied the response-cue interval (RCI; 100 ms vs. 1,900 ms) to examine time-related changes in priming. We found longer response times (RT) for switch trials compared with repetition trials (attention switch costs)-that is, when the internal processing context changed. In addition, we found longer RT for NP trials as well as reduced switch costs in long RCI, suggesting that previously relevant attentional settings dissipate over longer time. However, NP was not influenced by attention switches, and it was also not affected by RCI. Hence, NP in auditory attention switching does not seem strongly context or time sensitive.

Are post-error adjustments influenced by beliefs in free will? A failure to replicate Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass and Burle, 2013.

In this pre-registered study, we tried to replicate the study by Rigoni et al. 2013 Cognition 127, 264-269. In the original study, the authors manipulated the participants' belief in free will in a between-subject design and subsequently measured post-error slowing (i.e. slower responses after an incorrect trial compared with a correct trial) as a marker of cognitive control. They found less post-error slowing in the group with reduced belief in free will (anti-free will group) compared with a control group in which belief in free will was not manipulated. In the present study, we used the same task procedure and the same free will manipulation (Crick text) in an attempt to replicate these findings. However, we used an online procedure and a larger sample size in order to address concerns about statistical power. Similar to the original study, we also used a questionnaire to measure beliefs in free will as an independent manipulation check. We found a difference in the scores on the questionnaire, thus a reduced belief in free will, after reading the Crick text. However, we did not find any difference in post-error slowing between the anti-free will and control groups. Our findings are in line with several other recent findings suggesting that the Crick text manipulation affects the participants' self-reported belief in free will but not their behaviour. The present study can be considered a high-powered failed replication attempt.

Open Up - the Mission Statement of the Control of Impulsive Action (Ctrl-ImpAct) Lab on Open Science.

The present paper is the mission statement of the Control of Impulsive Action (Ctrl-ImpAct) Lab regarding Open Science. As early-career researchers (ECRs) in the lab, we first state our personal motivation to conduct research based on the principles of Open Science. We then describe how we incorporate four specific Open Science practices (i.e., Open Methodology, Open Data, Open Source, and Open Access) into our scientific workflow. In more detail, we explain how Open Science practices are embedded into the so-called 'co-pilot' system in our lab. The 'co-pilot' researcher is involved in all tasks of the 'pilot' researcher, that is designing a study, double-checking experimental and data analysis scripts, as well as writing the manuscript. The lab has set up this co-pilot system to increase transparency, reduce potential errors that could occur during the entire workflow, and to intensify collaborations between lab members. Finally, we discuss potential solutions for general problems that could arise when practicing Open Science.

A different perspective on domain-general language control using the flanker task.

Bilingual models diverge in whether they assume that language control is domain general. Most studies that investigated this claim focused on bilingual language production and relied on the comparison between language switching and task switching. In the current study, we set out to investigate whether language control is domain general in a different context (i.e., bilingual language comprehension) and with a different paradigm (i.e., the flanker task). To this end, we let French-English bilinguals perform a bilingual (flankers are words from the same or different language as the target word) and a non-linguistic (numerical magnitude with digits) flanker task. The results showed that there was no difference in the language congruency effect between participants with a high and low non-linguistic congruency effect. These results indicate that there is no substantial overlap in the mechanisms involved in comprehension-based language control and executive control.