One-shot stimulus-control associations generalize over different stimulus viewpoints and exemplars.

Cognitive control processes are central to adaptive behavior, but how control is applied in a context-appropriate manner is not fully understood. One way to produce context-sensitive control is by mnemonically linking particular control settings to specific stimuli that demanded those settings in a prior encounter. In support of this episodic reinstatement of control hypothesis, recent studies have produced evidence for the formation of stimulus-control associations in one-shot, prime-probe learning paradigms. However, since those studies employed perceptually identical stimuli across prime and probe presentations, it is not yet known how generalizable one-shot stimulus-control associations are. In the current study, we therefore probed whether associations formed between a prime object and the control process of task-switching would generalize to probe objects seen from a different viewpoint (Experiment 1), to different exemplars of the same object type (Experiment 2), and to different members of the object category (Experiment 3). We replicated prior findings of one-shot control associations for identical prime/probe stimuli. Importantly, we additionally found that these episodic control effects are expressed regardless of changes in viewpoint and exemplar, but do not seem to generalize to other category members. These findings elucidate the scope of generalization of the episodic reinstatement of cognitive control.

Beyond stimulus-response rules: Task sets incorporate information about performance difficulty.

The capacity for goal-directed behavior relies on the generation and implementation of task sets. While task sets are traditionally defined as mnemonic ensembles linking task goals to stimulus-response mappings, we here asked the question whether they may also entail information about task difficulty: does the level of focus required for performing a task become incorporated within the task set? We addressed this question by employing a cued task-switching protocol, wherein participants engaged in two intermixed tasks with trial-unique stimuli. Both tasks were equally challenging during a baseline and a transfer phase, while their difficulty was manipulated during an intermediate learning phase by varying the proportion of trials with congruent versus incongruent response mappings between the two tasks. Comparing congruency effects between the baseline and transfer phases, Experiment 1 showed that the task with a low (high) proportion of congruent trials in the learning phase displayed reduced (increased) cross-task interference effects in the transfer phase, indicating that the level of task focus required in the learning phase had become associated with each task set. Experiment 2 indicated that strengthening of task focus level in the task with a low proportion of congruent trials was the primary driver of this effect. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility of cue-control associations mediating this effect. Taken together, our results show that task sets can become associated with the focus level required to successfully implement them, thus significantly expanding our concept of the type of information that makes up a task set. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Insights into control over cognitive flexibility from studies of task-switching.

Cognitive flexibility denotes the ability to disengage from a current task and shift one's focus to a different activity. An individual's level of flexibility is not fixed; rather, people adapt their readiness to switch tasks to changing circumstances. We here review recent studies in the task-switching literature that have produced new insights into the contextual factors that drive this adaptation of flexibility, as well as proposals regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms and learning processes. A fast-growing literature suggests that there are several different means of learning the need for, and implementing, changes in one's level of flexibility. These, in turn, have distinct consequences for the degree to which adjustments in cognitive flexibility are transferrable to new stimuli and tasks.

Learning Cognitive Flexibility: Neural Substrates of Adapting Switch-Readiness to Time-varying Demands.

An individual's readiness to switch tasks (cognitive flexibility) varies over time, in part, as the result of reinforcement learning based on the statistical structure of the world around them. Consequently, the behavioral cost associated with task-switching is smaller in contexts where switching is frequent than where it is rare, but the underlying brain mechanisms of this adaptation in cognitive flexibility are not well understood. Here, we manipulated the likelihood of switches across blocks of trials in a classic cued task-switching paradigm while participants underwent fMRI. As anticipated, behavioral switch costs decreased as the probability of switching increased, and neural switch costs were observed in lateral and medial frontoparietal cortex. To study moment-by-moment adjustments in cognitive flexibility at the neural level, we first fitted the behavioral RT data with reinforcement learning algorithms and then used the resulting trial-wise prediction error estimate as a regressor in a model-based fMRI analysis. The results revealed that lateral frontal and parietal cortex activity scaled positively with unsigned switch prediction error and that there were no brain regions encoding signed (i.e., switch- or repeat-specific) prediction error. Taken together, this study documents that adjustments in cognitive flexibility to time-varying switch demands are mediated by frontoparietal cortex tracking the likelihood of forthcoming task switches.

The reactivation of task rules triggers the reactivation of task-relevant items.

Working memory (WM) describes the temporary storage of task-relevant items and procedural rules to guide action. Despite its central importance for goal-directed behavior, the interplay between WM and long-term memory (LTM) remains poorly understood. Recent studies have shown that repeated use of the same task-relevant item in WM results in a hand-off of the storage of that item to LTM, and switching to a new item reactivates WM. To further elucidate the rules governing WM-LTM interactions, we here planned to probe whether a change in task rules, independent of a switch in task-relevant items, would also lead to WM reactivation of maintained items. To this end, we used scalp-recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) data, specifically the contralateral delay activity (CDA), to track WM item storage while manipulating repetitions and changes in task rules and task-relevant items across trials in a visual WM task. We tested two rival hypotheses: If changes in task rules result in a reactivation of the target item representation, then the CDA should increase when a task change is cued even when the same target has been repeated across trials. However, if the reactivation of a task-relevant item only depends on the mnemonic availability of the item itself instead of the task it is used for, then only the changes in task-relevant items should reactivate the representations. Accordingly, the CDA amplitude should decrease for repeated task-relevant items independently of a task change. We found a larger CDA on task-switch compared to task-repeat trials, suggesting that the reactivation of task rules triggers the reactivation of task-relevant items in WM. By demonstrating that WM reactivation of LTM is interdependent for task rules and task-relevant items, this study informs our understanding of visual WM and its interplay with LTM. PREREGISTERED STAGE 1 PROTOCOL: https://osf.io/zp9e8 (date of in-principle acceptance: 19/12/2021).

Toward an integrative account of internal and external determinants of event segmentation.

Our daily experiences unfold continuously, but we remember them as a series of discrete events through a process called event segmentation. Prominent theories of event segmentation suggest that event boundaries in memory are triggered by significant shifts in the external environment, such as a change in one's physical surroundings. In this review, we argue for a fundamental extension of this research field to also encompass internal state changes as playing a key role in structuring event memory. Accordingly, we propose an expanded taxonomy of event boundary-triggering processes, and review behavioral and neuroscience research on internal state changes in three core domains: affective states, goal states, and motivational states. Finally, we evaluate how well current theoretical frameworks can accommodate the unique and interactive contributions of internal states to event memory. We conclude that a theoretical perspective on event memory that integrates both external environment and internal state changes allows for a more complete understanding of how the brain structures experiences, with important implications for future research in cognitive and clinical neuroscience.

Task sets define boundaries of learned cognitive flexibility in list-wide proportion switch manipulations.

Different contexts in daily life often require varying levels of cognitive flexibility. Previous research has shown that people adapt their level of flexibility to match changing contextual demands for task switching in cued-switching paradigms that vary the proportion of switch trials within lists of trials. Specifically, the behavioral costs of switching as opposed to repeating tasks scale inversely with the proportion of switches-a finding referred to as the list-wide proportion switch (LWPS) effect. Previous research found that flexibility adaptations transferred across stimuli, but were specifically tied to task sets, rather than block-wide changes in flexibility state. In the current study, we conducted additional tests of the hypothesis that flexibility learning is task specific in the LWPS paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used trial-unique stimuli and unbiased task cues to control for associative learning tied to stimulus or cue features. Experiment 3 further tested whether task-specific learning occurred even for tasks performed on integrated features of the same stimuli. Across these three experiments, we found robust task-specific flexibility learning, which transferred across novel stimuli and unbiased cues and occurred regardless of stimulus-feature overlap between tasks. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Target detection does not influence temporal memory.

Target detection has been found to enhance memory for concurrently presented stimuli under dual-task conditions. This "attentional boost effect" is reminiscent of findings in the event memory literature, where conditions giving rise to event boundaries have been shown to enhance memory for boundary items. Target detection commonly requires a working memory update (e.g., adding to a covert mental target count), which is also thought to be a key contributor to creating event boundaries. However, whether target detection impacts temporal memory in similar ways as event boundaries remains unknown, because these two parallel literatures have used different types of memory tests, making direct comparisons difficult. In a preregistered experiment with sequential Bayes factor design, we examined whether target detection influences temporal binding between items by inserting target and nontarget stimuli during encoding of trial-unique object images, and then comparing subsequent temporal order and distance memory for image pairs that span a target or nontarget. We found that target detection enhanced recognition memory for target trial images but had no effect on temporal binding between items. In a follow-up experiment, we showed that when the encoding task required updating of task set rather than target count, event segmentation-related temporal memory effects were observed. These results document that target detection as such does not disrupt inter-item associations in memory, and that attention orienting in the absence of updating task sets does not create event boundaries. This suggests a key distinction between declarative and procedural working memory updates in segmenting events in memory.

When the mind's eye prevails: The Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis.

Throughout the 20th century, the psychological literature has considered attention as being primarily directed at the outside world. More recent theories conceive attention as also operating on internal information, and mounting evidence suggests a single, shared attentional focus between external and internal information. Such sharing implies a cognitive architecture where attention needs to be continuously shifted between prioritizing either external or internal information, but the fundamental principles underlying this attentional balancing act are currently unknown. Here, we propose and evaluate one such principle in the shape of the Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis: Contrary to the traditional view of attention as being primarily externally oriented, IDEA asserts that attention is inherently biased toward internal information. We provide a theoretical account for why such an internal attention bias may have evolved and examine findings from a wide range of literatures speaking to the balancing of external versus internal attention, including research on working memory, attention switching, visual search, mind wandering, sustained attention, and meditation. We argue that major findings in these disparate research lines can be coherently understood under IDEA. Finally, we consider tentative neurocognitive mechanisms contributing to IDEA and examine the practical implications of more deliberate control over this bias in the context of psychopathology. It is hoped that this novel hypothesis motivates cross-talk between the reviewed research lines and future empirical studies directly examining the mechanisms that steer attention either inward or outward on a moment-by-moment basis.

The Neural Correlates of Updating and Gating in Procedural Working Memory.

Goal-directed behavior relies on maintaining relevant goals in working memory (WM) and updating them when required. Computational modeling, behavioral, and neuroimaging work has previously identified the processes and brain regions involved in selecting, updating, and maintaining declarative information, such as letters and pictures. However, the neural substrates that underlie the analogous processes that operate on procedural information, namely, task goals, are currently unknown. Forty-three participants were therefore scanned with fMRI while performing a procedural version of the reference-back paradigm that allowed for the decomposition of WM updating processes into gate-opening, gate-closing, task switching, and task cue conflict components. Significant behavioral costs were observed for each of these components, with interactions indicating facilitation between gate-opening and task switching, and a modulation of cue conflict by gate state. In neural terms, opening the gate to procedural WM was associated with activity in medial pFC, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), the basal ganglia (BG), thalamus, and midbrain, but only when the task set needed to be updated. Closing the gate to procedural WM was associated with frontoparietal and BG activity specifically in conditions where conflicting task cues had to be ignored. Task switching was associated with activity in the medial pFC/ACC, PPC, and BG, whereas cue conflict was associated with PPC and BG activity during gate closing but was abolished when the gate was already closed. These results are discussed in relation to declarative WM and to gating models of WM.

Transfer of Learned Cognitive Flexibility to Novel Stimuli and Task Sets.

Adaptive behavior requires learning about the structure of one's environment to derive optimal action policies, and previous studies have documented transfer of such structural knowledge to bias choices in new environments. Here, we asked whether people could also acquire and transfer more abstract knowledge across different task environments, specifically expectations about cognitive control demands. Over three experiments, participants (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers; N = ~80 adults per group) performed a probabilistic card-sorting task in environments of either a low or high volatility of task rule changes (requiring low or high cognitive flexibility, respectively) before transitioning to a medium-volatility environment. Using reinforcement-learning modeling, we consistently found that previous exposure to high task rule volatilities led to faster adaptation to rule changes in the subsequent transfer phase. These transfers of expectations about cognitive flexibility demands were both task independent (Experiment 2) and stimulus independent (Experiment 3), thus demonstrating the formation and generalization of environmental structure knowledge to guide cognitive control.

Context-independent scaling of neural responses to task difficulty in the multiple-demand network.

The multiple-demand (MD) network is sensitive to many aspects of cognitive demand, showing increased activation with more difficult tasks. However, it is currently unknown whether the MD network is modulated by the context in which task difficulty is experienced. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined MD network responses to low, medium, and high difficulty arithmetic problems within 2 cued contexts, an easy versus a hard set. The results showed that MD activity varied reliably with the absolute difficulty of a problem, independent of the context in which the problem was presented. Similarly, MD activity during task execution was independent of the difficulty of the previous trial. Representational similarity analysis further supported that representational distances in the MD network were consistent with a context-independent code. Finally, we identified several regions outside the MD network that showed context-dependent coding, including the inferior parietal lobule, paracentral lobule, posterior insula, and large areas of the visual cortex. In sum, a cognitive effort is processed by the MD network in a context-independent manner. We suggest that this absolute coding of cognitive demand in the MD network reflects the limited range of task difficulty that can be supported by the cognitive apparatus.

Hippocampal convergence during anticipatory midbrain activation promotes subsequent memory formation.

The hippocampus has been a focus of memory research since H.M's surgery abolished his ability to form new memories, yet its mechanistic role in memory remains debated. Here, we identify a candidate memory mechanism: an anticipatory hippocampal "convergence state", observed while awaiting valuable information, and which predicts subsequent learning. During fMRI, participants viewed trivia questions eliciting high or low curiosity, followed seconds later by its answer. We reasoned that encoding success requires a confluence of conditions, so that hippocampal states more conducive to memory formation should converge in state space. To operationalize convergence of neural states, we quantified the typicality of multivoxel patterns in the medial temporal lobes during anticipation and encoding of trivia answers. We found that the typicality of anticipatory hippocampal patterns increased during high curiosity. Crucially, anticipatory hippocampal pattern typicality increased with dopaminergic midbrain activation and uniquely accounted for the association between midbrain activation and subsequent recall. We propose that hippocampal convergence states may complete a cascade from motivation and midbrain activation to memory enhancement, and may be a general predictor of memory formation.

Assessing the Durability of One-Shot Stimulus-Control Bindings.

It has been proposed that cognitive control processes may be implemented in a contextually appropriate manner through the encoding, and cued retrieval, of associations between stimuli and the control processes that were active during their encoding, forming "stimulus-control bindings" as part of episodic event files. Prior work has found strong evidence for such a mechanism by observing behavioral effects of stimulus-control bindings based on a single pairing (one-shot learning). Here, we addressed the important question of how durable these one-shot stimulus-control bindings are. Over three experiments, we investigated the durability of one-shot stimulus-control bindings in relation to both the passage of time and the number of intervening events between the encoding (prime) and retrieval (probe) of the stimulus-control bindings. We found that stimulus-control bindings are quite robust to temporal decay, lasting at least up to 5 minutes in the absence of similar intervening events. By contrast, binding effects were more short-lived in the face of interference from the encoding of similar events between the prime and probe, with a maximum duration of ~2 minutes. Together, these results shed new light on the characteristics of the binding mechanisms underlying the integration of internal control processes in episodic event files and highlight that interference, rather than temporal decay, may be the main limiting factor on long-term effects of item-specific one-shot control learning.

Learning from mistakes: Incidental encoding reveals a time-dependent enhancement of posterror target processing.

It has been known for >50 years that making an error leads to subsequent changes in performance, yet the exact nature of posterror adjustments in cognition remains debated. We posit that this is in large part due to traditional performance indices, like mean posterror response time and accuracy, being insensitive measures of trial-by-trial stimulus processing. To overcome this limitation, we devised a novel object flanker task that employed trial-unique target and distracter stimuli and was followed by a surprise recognition memory test. This allowed us to determine how errors influence incidental target and distracter encoding in a trial-specific manner. We used this approach to test the "adaptive orienting theory" of posterror processing, according to which an error triggers an initial inhibition of task processing-facilitating orienting to the error source-followed by a controlled retuning of attention to the task. To characterize the time-course of the posterror processing cascade, we combined our task with a manipulation of the response-stimulus interval (RSI), across four experiments (RSIs: 300 ms, 650 ms, ~1,000 ms; N = 96-100 per experiment). We document, for the first time, that making an error leads to a substantial (~10%) enhancement of target (but not distracter) memory on the subsequent trial, which interacts with RSI: Posterror targets were remembered better than postcorrect targets at the long (650 ms, ~1,000 ms) but not the short (300 ms) RSIs. These findings provide clear support for the adaptive orienting theory by demonstrating a novel cognitive phenomenon: a time-dependent posterror enhancement of target encoding (PETE). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

No need to choose: Independent regulation of cognitive stability and flexibility challenges the stability-flexibility trade-off.

Adaptive behavior requires the ability to focus on a current task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability), as well as the ability to rapidly switch to another task in light of changing circumstances (cognitive flexibility). Cognitive stability and flexibility have been conceptualized as opposite endpoints on a stability-flexibility trade-off continuum, implying an obligatory reciprocity between the two: Greater flexibility necessitates less stability, and vice versa. Surprisingly, rigorous empirical tests of this critical assumption are lacking. Here, we acquired simultaneous measurements of cognitive stability (congruency effects) and flexibility (switch costs) on the same stimuli within the same task while independently varying contextual demands on these functions with block-wise manipulations of the proportion of incongruent trials and task switches, respectively. If cognitive stability and flexibility are reciprocal, increases in flexibility in response to higher switch rates should lead to commensurate decreases in stability, and increases in stability in response to more frequent incongruent trials should result in decreased flexibility. Across three experiments, using classic cued task-switching (Experiments 1 and 3) and attentional set-shifting (Experiment 2) protocols, we found robust evidence against an obligatory stability-flexibility trade-off. Although we observed the expected contextual adaptation of stability and flexibility to changing demands, strategic adjustments in stability had little influence on flexibility, and vice versa. These results refute the long-held assumption of a stability-flexibility trade-off, documenting instead that the cognitive processes mediating these functions can be regulated independently-it is possible to be both stable and flexible at the same time. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Retrieval context determines whether event boundaries impair or enhance temporal order memory.

Meaningful changes in context create "event boundaries", segmenting continuous experience into distinct episodes in memory. A foundational finding in this literature is that event boundaries impair memory for the temporal order of stimuli spanning a boundary compared to equally spaced stimuli within an event. This seems surprising in light of intuitions about memory in everyday life, where the order of within-event experiences (did I have coffee before the first bite of bagel?) often seems more difficult to recall than the order of events per se (did I have breakfast or do the dishes first?). Here, we aimed to resolve this discrepancy by manipulating whether stimuli carried information about their encoding context during retrieval, as they often do in everyday life (e.g., bagel-breakfast). In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that stimuli inherently associated with a unique encoding context produce a "flipped" order memory effect, whereby temporal memory was superior for cross-boundary than within-event item pairs. In Experiments 3 and 4, we added context information at retrieval to a standard laboratory event memory protocol where stimuli were encoded in the presence of arbitrary context cues (colored frames). We found that whether temporal order memory for cross-boundary stimuli was enhanced or impaired relative to within-event items depended on whether the context was present or absent during the memory test. Taken together, we demonstrate that the effect of event boundaries on temporal memory is malleable, and determined by the availability of context information at retrieval.

Distinct but correlated latent factors support the regulation of learned conflict-control and task-switching.

Cognitive control is guided by learning, as people adjust control to meet changing task demands. The two best-studied instances of "control-learning" are the enhancement of attentional task focus in response to increased frequencies of incongruent distracter stimuli, reflected in the list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effect, and the enhancement of switch-readiness in response to increased frequencies of task switches, reflected in the list-wide proportion switch (LWPS) effect. However, the latent architecture underpinning these adaptations in cognitive stability and flexibility - specifically, whether there is a single, domain-general, or multiple, domain-specific learners - is currently not known. To reveal the underlying structure of control-learning, we had a large sample of participants (N = 950) perform LWPC and LWPS paradigms, and afterwards assessed their explicit awareness of the task manipulations, as well as general cognitive ability and motivation. Structural equation modeling was used to evaluate several preregistered models representing different plausible hypotheses concerning the latent structure of control-learning. Task performance replicated standard LWPC and LWPS effects. Crucially, the model that best fit the data had correlated domain- and context-specific latent factors. Thus, people's ability to adapt their on-task focus and between-task switch-readiness to changing levels of demand was mediated by distinct (though correlated) underlying factors. Model fit remained good when accounting for speed-accuracy trade-offs, variance in individual cognitive ability and self-reported motivation, as well as self-reported explicit awareness of manipulations and the order in which different levels of demand were experienced. Implications of these results for the cognitive architecture of dynamic cognitive control are discussed.

Neural Dynamics of Context-sensitive Adjustments in Cognitive Flexibility.

To adaptively interact with the uncertainties of daily life, we must match our level of cognitive flexibility to situations that place different demands on our ability to focus on the current task while remaining sensitive to cues that signal other, more urgent tasks. Such cognitive-flexibility adjustments in response to changing contextual demands (metaflexibility) have been observed in cued task-switching paradigms, where the performance cost incurred by switching versus repeating tasks (switch cost) scales inversely with the proportion of switches (PS) within a block of trials. However, the neural underpinnings of these adjustments in cognitive flexibility are not well understood. Here, we recorded 64-channel EEG measures of electrical brain activity as participants switched between letter and digit categorization tasks in varying PS contexts, from which we extracted ERPs elicited by the task cue and EEG alpha-power differences during both the cue-to-target interval and the resting precue period. The temporal resolution of EEG/ERPs allowed us to test whether contextual adjustments in cognitive flexibility are mediated by tonic changes in processing mode, or by changes in phasic, task-cue-triggered processes. We observed reliable modulation of behavioral switch cost by PS context that were mirrored in both cue-evoked ERP and time-frequency effects, but not in blockwide precue EEG changes. These results indicate that different levels of cognitive flexibility are instantiated in response to the presentation of task cues, rather than by being maintained as a tonic neural-activity state difference between low- and high-switch contexts.

Stimulus variability and task relevance modulate binding-learning.

Classical theories of attention posit that integration of features into object representation (or feature binding) requires engagement of focused attention. Studies challenging this idea have demonstrated that feature binding can happen outside of the focus of attention for familiar objects, as well as for arbitrary color-orientation conjunctions. Detection performance for arbitrary feature conjunction improves with training, suggesting a potential role of perceptual learning mechanisms in the integration of features, a process called "binding-learning". In the present study, we investigate whether stimulus variability and task relevance, two critical determinants of visual perceptual learning, also modulate binding-learning. Transfer of learning in a visual search task to a pre-exposed color-orientation conjunction was assessed under conditions of varying stimulus variability and task relevance. We found transfer of learning for the pre-exposed feature conjunctions that were trained with high variability (Experiment 1). Transfer of learning was not observed when the conjunction was rendered task-irrelevant during training due to pop-out targets (Experiment 2). Our findings show that feature binding is determined by principles of perceptual learning, and they support the idea that functions traditionally attributed to goal-driven attention can be grounded in the learning of the statistical structure of the environment.