ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Patients with brain injury who are unresponsive to commands may perform cognitive tasks that are detected on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). This phenomenon, known as cognitive motor dissociation, has not been systematically studied in a large cohort of persons with disorders of consciousness. METHODS: In this prospective cohort study conducted at six international centers, we collected clinical, behavioral, and task-based fMRI and EEG data from a convenience sample of 353 adults with disorders of consciousness. We assessed the response to commands on task-based fMRI or EEG in participants without an observable response to verbal commands (i.e., those with a behavioral diagnosis of coma, vegetative state, or minimally conscious state-minus) and in participants with an observable response to verbal commands. The presence or absence of an observable response to commands was assessed with the use of the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R). RESULTS: Data from fMRI only or EEG only were available for 65% of the participants, and data from both fMRI and EEG were available for 35%. The median age of the participants was 37.9 years, the median time between brain injury and assessment with the CRS-R was 7.9 months (25% of the participants were assessed with the CRS-R within 28 days after injury), and brain trauma was an etiologic factor in 50%. We detected cognitive motor dissociation in 60 of the 241 participants (25%) without an observable response to commands, of whom 11 had been assessed with the use of fMRI only, 13 with the use of EEG only, and 36 with the use of both techniques. Cognitive motor dissociation was associated with younger age, longer time since injury, and brain trauma as an etiologic factor. In contrast, responses on task-based fMRI or EEG occurred in 43 of 112 participants (38%) with an observable response to verbal commands. CONCLUSIONS: Approximately one in four participants without an observable response to commands performed a cognitive task on fMRI or EEG as compared with one in three participants with an observable response to commands. (Funded by the James S. McDonnell Foundation and others.).
Subject(s)
Brain Injuries , Consciousness Disorders , Dissociative Disorders , Persistent Vegetative State , Adult , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Young Adult , Brain/diagnostic imaging , Brain/physiopathology , Brain Injuries/physiopathology , Brain Injuries/complications , Brain Injuries/diagnostic imaging , Cognition/physiology , Consciousness Disorders/diagnostic imaging , Consciousness Disorders/etiology , Consciousness Disorders/physiopathology , Electroencephalography , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Persistent Vegetative State/diagnostic imaging , Persistent Vegetative State/etiology , Persistent Vegetative State/physiopathology , Prospective Studies , Dissociative Disorders/diagnostic imaging , Dissociative Disorders/etiology , Dissociative Disorders/physiopathologyABSTRACT
In this article, we consider the intersection of cognitive motor dissociation (CMD) and artificial intelligence (AI), hence when CMD meets AI. In covert consciousness, there is a discordance between the observed behavior, the traditional bedside mode of assessment, and the response to volitional commands as depicted by neuroimaging or EEG studies. This alphabet soup of acronyms represents both the promise and peril of nascent technology in covert consciousness. On the diagnostic side, there is the complexity and uncertainty of identifying the discordance between cognitive activity and overt behavior. On the therapeutic side, when AI is used to generate speech, there is the possibility of misrepresenting the thoughts and intentions of those who are otherwise voiceless. This concordance of factors makes the application of AI to CMD worthy of deeper consideration. We offer this analysis in the spirit of anticipatory governance, a prudential process by which one plans to prevent or mitigate unintended consequences of novel technology. We first consider the normative challenges posed by CMD for clinical practice, neuroethics, and the law. We then explore the history of covert consciousness and the relationship of severe brain injury to the right-to-die movement, before introducing three biographies of brain injury that highlight the potential impact of disability bias or ableism in clinical practice, assistive technology, and translational research. Subsequently, we explore how AI might give voice to conscious individuals who are unable to communicate and the ethical challenges that this technology must overcome to promote human flourishing drawing upon what Nussbaum and Sen have described as a "capabilities approach" to promote normative reasoning.
Subject(s)
Artificial Intelligence , Consciousness , Humans , Consciousness/physiology , Disabled PersonsABSTRACT
Patient narratives from two investigational deep brain stimulation trials for traumatic brain injury and obsessive-compulsive disorder reveal that injury and illness rob individuals of personal identity and that neuromodulation can restore it. The early success of these interventions makes a compelling case for continued post-trial access to these technologies. Given the centrality of personal identity to respect for persons, a failure to provide continued access can be understood to represent a metaphorical identity theft. Such a loss recapitulates the pain of an individual's initial injury or illness and becomes especially tragic because it could be prevented by robust policy. A failure to fulfill this normative obligation constitutes a breach of disability law, which would view post-trial access as a means to achieve social reintegration through this neurotechnological accommodation.
Subject(s)
Deep Brain Stimulation , Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder , Humans , Deep Brain Stimulation/methods , Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder/therapy , Duty to Recontact , Aftercare , Moral ObligationsABSTRACT
It is helpful to think about the needs of patients with moderate to severe brain injury through the lens of disability law. However, there are limitations to current disability law that contribute to ongoing segregation and marginalization of individuals with severe brain injury. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of American jurisprudence is that more clear constitutional protections accrue to those who have definitively immutable conditions. Thus, as neuroscience brings new therapies to those with brain injury, they may become less protected by the constitutional elements of disability law because their conditions have changed and become mutable. This is the clinical progress that brain injury professionals all seek to achieve, but ironically these advances could potentially degrade the legal protections of patients who benefit from emerging treatments. In this paper, we will critically examine this paradox at the interface of medicine and the law and suggest that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) could be nicely complemented by legislation we have named the Americans with Abilities Act (AWAA). Instead of focusing on disabilities that need protection, the AWAA seeks to sustain and foster newfound abilities made possible by the fruits of medicine and neuroscience.