Health Care Costs in Patients with and without Secondary Hyperparathyroidism in Spain.

OBJECTIVE: To analyze the economic burden of secondary hyperparathyroidism (sHPT) in Spain by quantifying differences in costs of pharmacological treatments and associated cardiovascular events (CVE) between renal patients with and without sHPT. METHODS: We used data collected in the NEFRONA cohort study and obtained treatment and CVE costs from the BOT PLUS database and Hospital Discharge Records in the Spanish Health System (CMBD-H), respectively. We examined data from 2445 renal patients followed during 2 years for chronic kidney disease (CKD) progression and 4 years for CVE, stratifying by presence of sHPT. Patient characteristics, administered treatments and CVE were directly extracted from NEFRONA registries. Dosage for each treatment regimen was assumed based on guidelines and multiplied by official unit costs to obtain treatment costs. Costs of CVE were based on ICD-9-CM. RESULTS: Prevalence of sHPT in the cohort was 65.6% (63.6; 67.6). Average yearly pharmacological costs for patients without sHPT were 610.33€, while costs were 1483.17€ for sHPT patients (average increase of 143.0%). Two hundred three patients registered CVE, resulting in 4-year average costs of 582.57€ for non-sHPT patients compared to 941.87€ for sHPT patients (61.7% average increase). Bivariate analyses considering presence of dialysis, hypercalcemia or hyperphosphatemia and stratified by sHPT showed higher costs for sHPT patients. CONCLUSIONS: These results show that sHPT is associated with substantially higher costs of both, pharmacological treatments and associated CVEs. Preventing the development of sHPT with early management in the course of CKD could possibly lead to better health outcomes and cost balance for health care systems.

Reverse payments, patent strength, and asymmetric information.

Reverse payments (pay-for-delay) are payments from an originator to a generic pharmaceutical producer to settle a potential litigation. In many jurisdictions, these payments are banned. This study shows that when the parties' investments are considered and the information about the patent strength is asymmetric, reverse payments increase both the possibility of generic entry and the litigation rate-both of which increase consumer surplus and do not necessarily delay generic entry. Reverse payments typically increase consumer surplus when the asymmetry between the parties is low, the competitiveness in the market is soft, and their size is small. Results suggest that a ban per se may be suboptimal.