Fisheries subsidies reform in China.

Subsidies are widely criticized in fisheries management for promoting global fishing capacity growth and overharvesting. Scientists worldwide have thus called for a ban on "harmful" subsidies that artificially increase fishing profits, resulting in the recent agreement among members of the World Trade Organization to eliminate such subsidies. The argument for banning harmful subsidies relies on the assumption that fishing will be unprofitable after eliminating subsidies, incentivizing some fishermen to exit and others to refrain from entering. These arguments follow from open-access governance regimes where entry has driven profits to zero. Yet many modern-day fisheries are conducted under limited-access regimes that limit capacity and maintain economic profits, even without subsidies. In these settings, subsidy removal will reduce profits but perhaps without any discernable effect on capacity. Importantly, until now, there have been no empirical studies of subsidy reductions to inform us about their likely quantitative impacts. In this paper, we evaluate a policy reform that reduced fisheries subsidies in China. We find that China's subsidy reductions accelerated the rate at which fishermen retired their vessels, resulting in reduced fleet capacity, particularly among older and smaller vessels. Notably, the reduction of harmful subsidies was only partly responsible for reducing fleet capacity; an increase in vessel retirement subsidies was also a necessary driver of capacity reduction. Our study demonstrates that the efficacy of removing harmful subsidies depends on the policy environment in which removals occur.

When are no-take zones an economically optimal fishery management strategy?

Discussions on the use of marine reserves (no-take zones) and, more generally, spatial management of fisheries are, for the most part, devoid of analyses that consider the ecological and economic effects simultaneously. To fill this gap, we develop a two-patch ecological-economic model to investigate the effects of spatial management on fishery profits. Because the fishery effects of spatial management depend critically on the nature of the ecological connectivity, our model includes both juvenile and adult movement, with density dependence in settlement differentiating the two types of dispersal. Rather than imposing a reserve on our system and measuring its effect on profits, we ask: "When does setting catch levels to maximize system-wide profits imply that a reserve should be created?" Closing areas to fishing is an economically optimal solution when the value derived from spillover from the reserve outweighs the value of fishing in the patch. The condition, while simple to state in summary form, is complex to interpret because it depends on the settlement success of the dispersing organisms, the nature of the costs of the fishing, the economic and ecological heterogeneity of the system, the discount rate, and growth characteristics of the fish population. The condition is more likely to be satisfied when the closed area is a net exporter of biomass and has higher costs of fishing, and for fish populations with density-independent settlement ("adult movement") than with density-dependent settlement ("larval dispersal"). Rather surprisingly, there are circumstances whereby closing low biological productivity areas, and even sometimes low cost areas to fish, can result in greater fishing profits than when both areas are open to fishing.