Guidelines for conscientious objection in Spain: a proposal involving prerequisites and protocolized procedure.

Healthcare professionals often face ethical conflicts and challenges related to decision-making that have necessitated consideration of the use of conscientious objection (CO). No current guidelines exist within Spain's healthcare system regarding acceptable rationales for CO, the appropriate application of CO, or practical means to support healthcare professionals who wish to become conscientious objectors. As such, a procedural framework is needed that not only assures the appropriate use of CO by healthcare professionals but also demonstrates its ethical validity, legislative compliance through protection of moral freedoms and patients' rights to receive health care. Our proposal consists of prerequisites of eligibility for CO (individual reference, specific clinical context, ethical justification, assurance of non-discrimination, professional consistency, attitude of mutual respect, assurance of patient rights and safety) and a procedural process (notification and preparation, documentation and confidentiality, evaluation of prerequisites, non-abandonment, transparency, allowance for unforeseen objection, compensatory responsibilities, access to guidance and/or consultative advice, and organizational guarantee of professional substitution). We illustrate the real-world utility of the proposed framework through a case discussion in which our guidelines are applied.

Critics Say New State "Conscience Laws" Give Physicians Carte Blanche to Refuse Patients.

This Medical News feature discusses state laws that protect physicians who refuse to provide certain services because of religious or moral beliefs.

The highly complex issue of conscientious objection to abortion: can the recent European Court of Human Rights ruling Grimmark v. Sweden redefine the notions of care before freedom of conscience?

PURPOSE: The article aims to elaborate on two recent European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions which have rejected, on grounds of non-admissibility, the appeals by two Swedish midwives who refused to carry out abortion-related services, basing their refusal on conscientious objection, and to expound upon the legal and ethical underpinnings and core standards applied to the framing process of such a ECtHR decision. MATERIALS AND METHODS: By drawing upon relevant recommendations from international institutions, the authors have aimed to assess how the ECtHR rationale could affect the balance between CO and patient rights; searches have been conducted up until December 2020. RESULTS: In both decisions the European Court has asserted that the right to exercise conscientious objection must give way to the protection of the right to health of women seeking to have an abortion. CONCLUSIONS: ECtHR judges concluded that the failure to provide for a right to conscientious objection does not constitute, in fact, a violation of the more general right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, if provided for by a state law to protect the right to health. The legal ethical and social ramifications of such a decision are of enormous magnitude.

Physician autonomy or discrimination: the risks and limits of saying "no".

Respect for patient autonomy is a critical concept in the training of all physicians. Most physicians will make clinical recommendations on a daily basis that reflect a marriage of evidence-based medical fact and the deeply felt aspirations and boundaries that patients share with them. While most physicians are well versed and comfortable managing issues of patient autonomy, many are less confident about ethical and legal guidelines for expressing their own autonomy in clinical decision-making. This paper will review the legal landscape surrounding the patient-physician relationship with a focus on when and how physicians can exercise their personal and professional autonomy in their clinical practice.

Vascular surgery-related violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act.

OBJECTIVE: The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) is a federal law established in 1986 to ensure that patients who present to an emergency department receive medical care regardless of means. Violations are reported to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and can result in significant financial penalties. Our objective was to assess all available EMTALA violations for vascular-related issues. METHODS: EMTALA violations in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services publicly available hospital violations database from 2011 to 2018 were evaluated for vascular-related issues. Details recorded were case type, hospital type, hospital region, reasons for violation, disposition, and mortality. RESULTS: There were 7001 patients identified with any EMTALA violation and 98 (1.4%) were deemed vascular related. The majority (82.7%) of EMTALA violations occurred at urban/suburban hospitals. Based on the Association of American Medical Colleges United States region, vascular-related EMTALA violations occurred in the Northeast (7.1%), Southern (56.1%), Central (18.4%), and Western (18.4%) United States. Case types included cerebrovascular (28.6%), aortic related (22.4%; which consisted of ruptured aortic aneurysms [8.2%], aortic dissection [11.2%], and other aortic [3.1%]), vascular trauma (15.3%), venous-thromboembolic (15.3%), peripheral arterial disease (9.2%), dialysis access (5.1%), bowel ischemia (3.1%), and other (1%) cases. Patients were transferred to another facility in 41.8% of cases. The most common reasons for violation were specialty refusal or unavailability (30.6%), inappropriate documentation (29.6%), misdiagnosis (18.4%), poor communication (17.3%), inappropriate triage (13.3%), failure to obtain diagnostic laboratory tests or imaging (12.2%), and ancillary or nursing staff issues (7.1%). The overall mortality was 19.4% and 31.6% died during the index emergency department visit. Vascular conditions associated with death were venous thromboembolism (31.6%), ruptured aortic aneurysm (21.1%), aortic dissection (21.1%), other aortic causes (10.5%), vascular trauma (10.5%), and bowel ischemia (5.3%). CONCLUSIONS: Although the frequency of vascular-related EMTALA violations was low, improvements in communication, awareness of vascular disease among staff, specialty staffing, and the development of referral networks and processes are needed to ensure that patients receive adequate care and that institutions are not placed at undue risk.

Consideraciones éticas y médico-legales sobre la limitación de recursos y decisiones clínicas en la pandemia del COVID-19 / Medico-legal and ethical considerations on resource limitation and clinical decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic

La pandemia por COVID-19 ha suscitado problemas éticos y médico-legales, entre los que destaca la asignación equitativa de recursos sanitarios, sobre todo en relación a la priorización de pacientes y el racionamiento de recursos. El establecimiento de prioridades está siempre presente en los sistemas sanitarios y depende de la teoría de justicia aplicable en cada sociedad. El racionamiento de recursos ha sido necesario en la pandemia por COVID-19, por lo que se han publicado documentos de consenso para la toma de decisiones sustentadas en cuatro valores éticos fundamentales: maximización de los beneficios, tratar a las personas igualmente, contribuir en la creación de valor social y dar prioridad a la situación más grave. De ellos derivan recomendaciones específicas: maximizar beneficios; priorizar a los trabajadores de la salud; no priorizar la asistencia por orden de llegada; ser sensible a la evidencia científica; reconocer la participación en la investigación y aplicar los mismos principios a los pacientes COVID-19 que a los no-COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised ethical and medico-legal problems, which include the equitable allocation of health resources, especially in relation to the prioritization of patients and the rationing of resources. Priority setting is always present in healthcare systems and depends on the theory of justice applicable in each society. Resource rationing has been necessary in the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore consensus documents have been published for decision-making based on four fundamental ethical values: maximization of benefits, treating people equally, contributing to creating social value and giving priority to the worst off, from which specific recommendations derive: maximize benefits; prioritize health workers; do not prioritize attendance on a first-come, first-served basis; be sensitive to scientific evidence; recognize participation in research and apply the same principles to COVID-19 patients as to non-COVID-19 patients

EMTALA: Testing the Good Faith Admission Requirement.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' March 13, 2020 decision in Williams v. Dimension Health Corporation reintroduced scrutiny on the lesser-known mandate of The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) concerning good faith admission to the hospital. EMTALA was enacted by Congress in 1986 to prevent patient dumping by prohibiting hospitals with emergency departments from refusing to provide emergency medical treatment to patients unable to pay for treatment, and prohibiting the transfer of those patients before their emergency medical conditions are stabilized. The reach of EMTALA ends when a patient is admitted and consequently becomes an inpatient, because then the hospital believes the patient would benefit from admission, and discharge and transfer would not occur as outlined in EMTALA. This paper examines the analysis of this mandate in Williams v. Dimension Health Corporation, and closely investigates one particular aspect of it: that admission must be made in good faith; otherwise, application of EMTALA's screening and stabilization requirements has not yet terminated, and hospitals can still be found culpable.

Understanding Ethical and Legal Obligations in a Pandemic: A Taxonomy of "Duty" for Health Practitioners.

From the ethics perspective, "duty of care" is a difficult and contested term, fraught with misconceptions and apparent misappropriations. However, it is a term that clinicians use frequently as they navigate COVID-19, somehow core to their understanding of themselves and their obligations, but with uncertainty as to how to translate or operationalize this in the context of a pandemic. This paper explores the "duty of care" from a legal perspective, distinguishes it from broader notions of duty on professional and personal levels, and proposes a working taxonomy for practitioners to better understand the concept of "duty" in their response to COVID-19.

The Charlie Gard Case, and the Ethics of Obstructing International Transfer of Seriously Ill Children.

In 2017, the court case over medical treatment of UK infant, Charlie Gard, reached global attention. In this article, I will analyze one of the more distinctive elements of the case. The UK courts concluded that treatment of Charlie Gard was not in his best interests and that it would be permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, in addition, the court ruled that Charlie should not be transferred overseas for the treatment that his parents sought, even though specialists in Italy and the US were willing to provide that treatment. Is it ethical to prevent parents from pursuing life-prolonging treatment overseas for their children? If so, when is it ethical to do this? I will outline arguments in defense of obstructing transfer in some situations. I will argue, however, that this is only justified if there is good reason to think that the proposed treatment would cause harm.

Conscientious Objection in Healthcare: Neither a Negative Nor a Positive Right.

Conscientious objection in healthcare is often granted by many legislations regulating morally controversial medical procedures, such as abortion or medical assistance in dying. However, there is virtually no protection of positive claims of conscience, that is, of requests by healthcare professionals to provide certain services that they conscientiously believe ought to be provided, but that are ruled out by institutional policies. Positive claims of conscience have received comparatively little attention in academic debates. Some think that negative and positive claims of conscience deserve equal protection in terms of measures that institutions ought to take to accommodate them. However, in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics (JCE), Abram Brummett argues against this symmetry thesis.1 He suggests that the relevant distinction is not between negative and positive claims of conscience, but between negative and positive rights of conscience. He argues that conscientious refusals and positive claims of conscience are both already protected as negative rights of conscience, but that this does not require institutions to accommodate positive claims of conscience. In this article I will argue that both Brummett and the authors he criticizes share a wrong view about the existence of conscience rights in healthcare. I will argue that there is no right to conscientious objection in healthcare, whether positive or negative. Thus, contra Brummett, I argue that the question whether such rights are positive or negative is as irrelevant as the question whether the claims of conscience are positive or negative.

Which Legal Approaches Help Limit Harms to Patients From Clinicians' Conscience-Based Refusals?

This article canvasses laws protecting clinicians' conscience and focuses on dilemmas that occur when a clinician refuses to perform a procedure consistent with the standard of care. In particular, the article focuses on patients' experience with a conscientiously objecting clinician at a secular institution, where patients are least likely to expect conscience-based care restrictions. After reviewing existing laws that protect clinicians' conscience, the article discusses limited legal remedies available to patients.

Critical Care Nurses' Perceptions of Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition at the End-of-Life in South Korea.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this study was to explore the perceptions of critical care nurses regarding the withdrawal or withholding of enteral nutrition (EN) and parenteral nutrition (PN) at the end-of-life, which is not allowed according to the current law in South Korea. METHODS: This was a cross-sectional study utilizing a self-report survey. The participants in the study were 141 nurses working in the intensive care units of a tertiary university hospital. The critical care nurses' general attitudes about EN and PN at the end-of-life were measured using the questionnaires developed by Lubart, Leibovitz, and Habot. The nurses responded to additional questions on whether withdrawal or withholding of EN or PN at the end-of-life should be legally allowed. RESULTS: The mean scores of the general attitude items on EN ranged between 3.03 and 3.35 on a 5-point Likert scale where a value of 1 represents "strongly disagree" and a value of 5 represents "strongly agree," while those for PN ranged between 2.89 and 3.65. Respecting attitudes toward EN and PN, critical care nurses had more negative attitudes about stopping PN than EN. Regarding attitudes about whether patients should be legally able to refuse EN, 34.3% agreed, while 25.7% disagreed. For PN, 40.0% agreed, while 24.3% disagreed. CONCLUSION: Discussions about making the withdrawal and withholding of artificial nutrition legal should be initiated. Moreover, education regarding evidence about the outcomes of EN and PN during end-of-life care and up-to-date clinical guidelines about it should be provided.

Preventing conscientious objection in medicine from running amok: a defense of reasonable accommodation.

A US Department of Health and Human Services Final Rule, Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care (2019), and a proposed bill in the British House of Lords, the Conscientious Objection (Medical Activities) Bill (2017), may well warrant a concern that-to borrow a phrase Daniel Callahan applied to self-determination-conscientious objection in health care has "run amok." Insofar as there are no significant constraints or limitations on accommodation, both rules endorse an approach that is aptly designated "conscience absolutism." There are two common strategies to counter conscience absolutism and prevent conscientious objection in medicine from running amok. One, non-toleration, is to decline to accommodate physicians who refuse to provide legal, professionally accepted, clinically appropriate medical services within the scope of their clinical competence. The other, compromise or reasonable accommodation, is to impose constraints on accommodation. Several arguments for non-toleration are critically analyzed, and I argue that none warrants its acceptance. I maintain that non-toleration is an excessively blunt instrument to prevent conscientious objection in medicine from running amok. Instead, I defend a more nuanced contextual approach that includes constraints on accommodation.

Abortion in Chile: The Long Road to Legalization and its Slow Implementation.

Until as recently as September 2017, Chile was one of the few countries in the world that did not permit abortion under any circumstances. Although the Health Code had permitted therapeutic abortion (i.e., on health grounds) from 1931, this was repealed in 1989 as one of General Pinochet's last acts in office. It took more than 25 years to reverse the ban. Finally, a new act was approved allowing abortion on three grounds: when a woman's life is in danger, when there are fetal anomalies incompatible with life, and in the case of rape. Since the law allows abortion only in limited cases, most women must continue to seek illegal abortions, as previously. In this paper, we explore the historical context in which Chile's 2017 bill was finally passed. We then analyze the legislative debate leading up to the passage of the law. Lastly, we present the results of a community-based participatory research effort carried out by an alliance between feminist and human rights organizations. Chile's law was passed almost two years ago, and this research shows the persistence of various obstacles that hinder women's access to legal abortion, such as the use of conscientious objection, a lack of trained health care providers, and a lack information for women.

Conscience, tolerance, and pluralism in health care.

Increasingly, physicians are being asked to provide technical services that many (in some cases, most) believe are morally wrong or inconsistent with their beliefs about the meaning and purposes of medicine. This controversy has sparked persistent debate over whether practitioners should be permitted to decline participation in a variety of legal practices, most notably physician-assisted suicide and abortion. These debates have become heavily politicized, and some of the key words and phrases are being used without a clear understanding of their meaning. In this essay, I endeavor, firstly, to clarify the meaning of some of these terms: conscience, conscientious action, professional judgment, conscientious objection, conscience clauses, civil disobedience, and tolerance. I argue that use of the term conscientious objection to describe these refusals by health care professionals is mistaken and confusing. Secondly, relying on a proper understanding of the moral and technical character of medical judgment, the optimal deference that the state and markets ought to have toward professions, and general principles of Lockean tolerance for a diversity of practices and persons in a flourishing, pluralistic, democratic society, I offer a defense of tolerance with respect to the deeply held convictions of physicians and other health care professionals who hold minority views on contested but legal medical practices.

Protecting reasonable conscientious refusals in health care.

Recently, debate over whether health care providers should have a protected right to conscientiously refuse to offer legal health care services-such as abortion, elective sterilization, aid in dying, or treatments for transgender patients-has grown exponentially. I advance a modified compromise view that bases respect for claims of conscientious refusal to provide specific health care services on a publicly defensible rationale. This view requires health care providers who refuse such services to disclose their availability by other providers, as well as to arrange for referrals or facilitate transfers of care. This requirement raises the question of whether providers are being forced to be complicit in the provision of services they deem to be morally objectionable. I conclude by showing how this modified compromise view answers the most significant objections mounted by critics of the right to conscientious refusal and safeguards providers from having to offer services that most directly threaten their moral integrity.