Eye Movements, Pupil Dilation, and Conflict Detection in Reasoning: Exploring the Evidence for Intuitive Logic.

A controversial claim in recent dual process accounts of reasoning is that intuitive processes not only lead to bias but are also sensitive to the logical status of an argument. The intuitive logic hypothesis draws upon evidence that reasoners take longer and are less confident on belief-logic conflict problems, irrespective of whether they give the correct logical response. In this paper, we examine conflict detection under conditions in which participants are asked to either judge the logical validity or believability of a presented conclusion, accompanied by measures of eye movement and pupil dilation. The findings show an effect of conflict, under both types of instruction, on accuracy, latency, gaze shifts, and pupil dilation. Importantly, these effects extend to conflict trials in which participants give a belief-based response (incorrectly under logic instructions or correctly under belief instructions) demonstrating both behavioral and physiological evidence in support of the logical intuition hypothesis.

Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions.

The capacity to evaluate logical arguments intuitively is a fundamental assumption of recent dual-process theories. One observation supporting this effect is the standard conflict effect on incongruent arguments under belief instruction. Conflict arguments are evaluated less accurately than non-conflict arguments, arguably because logic is intuitive and automatic enough to interfere with belief judgments. However, recent studies have challenged this interpretation by finding the same conflict effects when a matching heuristic cues the same response as logic, even on arguments with no logically valid structures. In this study, we test the matching heuristic hypothesis across 4 experiments (total N = 409) by manipulating the arguments propositions so that matching cues a response that is either (1) aligned or (2) misaligned with logic, or (3) cues no response at all. Consistent with the predictions of the matching heuristic, standard, reversed, and no conflict effects were found in those conditions, respectively. These results indicate that intuitively correct inferences which are assumed as evidence of logical intuitions are actually driven by a matching heuristic that cues responses aligned with logic. Alleged intuitive logic effects are reversed when the matching heuristic cues an opposing logical response or disappears when there are no matching cues. Therefore, it appears as though the operation of a matching heuristic, rather than an intuitive access to logic, drives logical intuitions.

Logical intuition is not really about logic.

Recent research suggests that reasoners are able to draw simple logical or probabilistic inferences relatively intuitively and automatically, a capacity that has been termed "logical intuition" (see, e.g., De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). A key finding in support of this interpretation is that conclusion validity consistently interferes with judgments of conclusion believability, suggesting that information about logical validity is available quickly enough to interfere with belief judgments. In this study, we examined whether logical intuitions arise because reasoners are sensitive to the logical features of a problem or another structural feature that just happens to align with logical validity. In three experiments (N = 113, 137, and 254), we presented participants with logical (determinate) and pseudological (indeterminate) arguments and asked them to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion. Logical arguments had determinately valid or invalid conclusions, whereas pseudological arguments were all logically indeterminate, but some were pseudovalid (possible strong arguments) and others pseudoinvalid (possible weak arguments). Experiments 1 and 2 used simple modus ponens and affirming the consequent structures; Experiment 3 used more complex denying the antecedent and modus tollens structures. In all three experiments, we found that pseudovalidity interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as real validity. Altogether, these findings suggest that while people are able to draw inferences intuitively, and these inferences impact belief judgments, they are not logical intuitions. Rather, the intuitive inferences are driven by the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Eye tracking and the cognitive reflection test: Evidence for intuitive correct responding and uncertain heuristic responding.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has been used in thousands of studies across several fields of behavioural research. The CRT has fascinated scholars because it commonly elicits incorrect answers despite most respondents possessing the necessary knowledge to reach the correct answer. Traditional interpretations of CRT performance asserted that correct responding was the result of corrective reasoning involving the inhibition and correction of the incorrect response and incorrect responding was an indication of miserly thinking without feelings of uncertainty. Recently, however, these assertions have been challenged. We extend this work by employing novel eye-tracking techniques to examine whether people use corrective cognitive pathways to reach correct solutions, and whether heuristic respondents demonstrate gaze-based signs of uncertainty. Eye movements suggest that correct responding on the CRT is the result of intuitive not corrective cognitive pathways, and that heuristic respondents show signs of gaze-based uncertainty.

The bright homunculus in our head: Individual differences in intuitive sensitivity to logical validity.

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called "logical intuition." In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgements were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument's conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, to evaluate the extent to which "logical intuitions" were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable, and more physically bright than invalid statements. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgements (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of "logical intuition." We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict.

According to the default interventionist dual-process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment 3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings.