Surveillance To Track Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2022-2023.

The reliable and timely detection of poliovirus cases through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), supplemented by environmental surveillance of sewage samples, is a critical component of the polio eradication program. Since 1988, the number of polio cases caused by wild poliovirus (WPV) has declined by >99.9%, and eradication of WPV serotypes 2 and 3 has been certified; only serotype 1 (WPV1) continues to circulate, and transmission remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This surveillance update evaluated indicators from AFP surveillance, environmental surveillance for polioviruses, and Global Polio Laboratory Network performance data provided by 28 priority countries for the program during 2022-2023. No WPV1 cases have been detected outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan since August 2022, when an importation into Malawi and Mozambique resulted in an outbreak during 2021-2022. During 2022-2023, among 28 priority countries, 20 (71.4%) met national AFP surveillance indicator targets, and the number of environmental surveillance sites increased. However, low national rates of reported AFP cases in priority countries in 2023 might have resulted from surveillance reporting lags; substantial national and subnational AFP surveillance gaps persist. Maintaining high-quality surveillance is critical to achieving the goal of global polio eradication. Monitoring surveillance indicators is important to identifying gaps and guiding surveillance-strengthening activities, particularly in countries at high risk for poliovirus circulation.

Occurrence of poliovirus and non-polio enterovirus among children with acute flaccid paralysis in Cameroon from 2015 to 2020.

INTRODUCTION: Poliovirus (PV) and non-polio enteroviruses (NPEV) belong to the Picornaviridae family. They are found worldwide and are responsible for a wide range of diseases such as acute flaccid paralysis (AFP). This study aimed to evaluate the detection rate of PV and NPEV in stool samples from children under fifteen years of age presenting with AFP in Cameroon and their distribution over time. METHODOLOGY: Stool samples were collected as part of poliovirus surveillance throughout Cameroon from 2015 to 2020. Virus isolation was performed using RD and L20B cells maintained in culture. Molecular methods such as intratypic differentiation were used to identify PVs serotypes and analysis of the VP1 genome was performed. RESULTS: A total of 12,354 stool samples were analyzed. The EV detection rate by virus isolation was 11.42% (1411/12354). This rate varied from year to year with a mean distribution of 11.41 with a 95% confidence interval [11.37; 11.44]. Of the viruses detected, suspected poliovirus accounted for 31.3% (442/1411) and NPEV 68.67% (969/1411). No wild poliovirus (WPV) was isolated. Sabin types 1 and 3 were continuously isolated. Surprisingly, from February 2020, vaccine-derived PV type 2 (VDPV2) was detected in 19% of cases, indicating its resurgence. CONCLUSIONS: This study strongly supports the successful elimination of WPV in Cameroon and the resurgence of VDPV2. However, as long as VDPV outbreaks continue to be detected in Africa, it remains essential to monitor how they spread.

Surveillance To Track Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication - Worldwide, 2021-2022.

Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was established in 1988, the number of wild poliovirus (WPV) cases has declined by >99.9%, and WPV serotypes 2 and 3 have been declared eradicated (1). By the end of 2022, WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission remained endemic only in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2,3). However, during 2021-2022, Malawi and Mozambique reported nine WPV1 cases that were genetically linked to Pakistan (4,5), and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks were detected in 42 countries (6). cVDPVs are oral poliovirus vaccine-derived viruses that can emerge after prolonged circulation in populations with low immunity allowing reversion to neurovirulence and can cause paralysis. Polioviruses are detected primarily through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), and poliovirus is confirmed through stool specimen testing. Environmental surveillance, the systematic sampling of sewage and testing for the presence of poliovirus, supplements AFP surveillance. Both surveillance systems were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic's effects on public health activities during 2020 (7,8) but improved in 2021 (9). This report updates previous reports (7,9) to describe surveillance performance during 2021-2022 in 34 priority countries.* In 2022, a total of 26 (76.5%) priority countries met the two key AFP surveillance performance indicator targets nationally compared with 24 (70.6%) countries in 2021; however, substantial gaps remain in subnational areas. Environmental surveillance expanded to 725 sites in priority countries, a 31.1% increase from the 553 sites reported in 2021. High-quality surveillance is critical to rapidly detect poliovirus transmission and enable prompt poliovirus outbreak response to stop circulation. Frequent monitoring of surveillance guides improvements to achieve progress toward polio eradication.

Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, January 2021-December 2022.

Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks* can occur when oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV, containing one or more Sabin-strain serotypes 1, 2, and 3) strains undergo prolonged circulation in under-vaccinated populations, resulting in genetically reverted neurovirulent virus (1,2). Following declaration of the eradication of wild poliovirus type 2 in 2015 and the global synchronized switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV, containing Sabin-strain types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 only) for routine immunization activities† in April 2016 (3), cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks have been reported worldwide (4). During 2016-2020, immunization responses to cVDPV2 outbreaks required use of Sabin-strain monovalent OPV2, but new VDPV2 emergences could occur if campaigns did not reach a sufficiently high proportion of children. Novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (nOPV2), a more genetically stable vaccine than Sabin OPV2, was developed to address the risk for reversion to neurovirulence and became available in 2021. Because of the predominant use of nOPV2 during the reporting period, supply replenishment has frequently been insufficient for prompt response campaigns (5). This report describes global cVDPV outbreaks during January 2021-December 2022 (as of February 14, 2023) and updates previous reports (4). During 2021-2022, there were 88 active cVDPV outbreaks, including 76 (86%) caused by cVDPV2. cVDPV outbreaks affected 46 countries, 17 (37%) of which reported their first post-switch cVDPV2 outbreak. The total number of paralytic cVDPV cases during 2020-2022 decreased by 36%, from 1,117 to 715; however, the proportion of all cVDPV cases that were caused by cVDPV type 1 (cVDPV1) increased from 3% in 2020 to 18% in 2022, including the occurrence of cocirculating cVDPV1 and cVDPV2 outbreaks in two countries. The increased proportion of cVDPV1 cases follows a substantial decrease in global routine immunization coverage and suspension of preventive immunization campaigns during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022) (6); outbreak responses in some countries were also suboptimal. Improving routine immunization coverage, strengthening poliovirus surveillance, and conducting timely and high-quality supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) in response to cVDPV outbreaks are needed to interrupt cVDPV transmission and reach the goal of no cVDPV isolations in 2024.

Epidemiology of type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks between 2016 and 2020.

The number and geographic breadth of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks detected after the withdrawal of type 2 containing oral polio vaccine (April 2016) have exceeded forecasts.Using Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) investigations and environmental surveillance (ES) data from the Global Polio Laboratory Network, we summarize the epidemiology of cVDPV2 outbreaks. Between 01 January 2016 to 31 December 2020, a total of 68 unique cVDPV2 genetic emergences were detected across 34 countries. The cVDPV2 outbreaks have been associated with 1596 acute flaccid paralysis cases across four World Health Organization regions: 962/1596 (60.3%) cases occurred in African Region; 619/1596 (38.8%) in the Eastern Mediterranean Region; 14/1596 (0.9%) in Western-Pacific Region; and 1/1596 (0.1%) in the European Region. As the majority of the cVDPV2 outbreaks have been seeded through monovalent type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV2) use in outbreak responses, the introduction of the more stable novel oral poliovirus vaccine will be instrumental in stopping emergence of new cVDPV2 lineages.

Strengthened surveillance revealed a rapid disappearance of the poliovirus serotype 2 vaccine strain in Madagascar after its removal from the oral polio vaccine.

To assess circulation of the Sabin 2 poliovirus vaccine strain in Madagascar after its withdrawal from the oral polio vaccine in April 2016, a reinforced poliovirus surveillance was implemented in three regions of Madagascar from January 2016 to December 2017. Environmental samples and stool specimens from healthy children were screened using the Global Polio Laboratory Network algorithm to detect the presence of polioviruses. Detected polioviruses were molecularly typed and their genomes fully sequenced. Polioviruses were detected during all but 4 months of the study period. All isolates were related to the vaccine strains and no wild poliovirus was detected. The majority of isolates belong to the serotype 3. The last detection of Sabin 2 occurred in July 2016, 3 months after its withdrawal. No vaccine-derived poliovirus of any serotype was observed during the study. Only few poliovirus isolates contained sequences from non-polio origin. The genetic characterization of all the poliovirus isolates did not identify isolates that were highly divergent compared to the vaccine strains. This observation is in favor of a good vaccine coverage that efficiently prevented long-lasting transmission chains between unvaccinated persons. This study underlines that high commitment in the fight against polioviruses can succeed in stopping their circulation even in countries where poor sanitation remains a hurdle.

Replication of SARS-CoV-2 in cell lines used in public health surveillance programmes with special emphasis on biosafety.

Background & objectives: Polio, measles, rubella, influenza and rotavirus surveillance programmes are of great public health importance globally. Virus isolation using cell culture is an integral part of such programmes. Possibility of unintended isolation of SARS-CoV-2 from clinical specimens processed in biosafety level-2 (BSL-2) laboratories during the above-mentioned surveillance programmes, cannot be ruled out. The present study was conducted to assess the susceptibility of different cell lines to SARS-CoV-2 used in these programmes. Methods: Replication of SARS-CoV-2 was studied in RD and L20B, Vero/hSLAM, MA-104 and Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cell lines, used for the isolation of polio, measles, rubella, rotavirus and influenza viruses, respectively. SARS-CoV-2 at 0.01 multiplicity of infection was inoculated and the viral growth was assessed by observation of cytopathic effects followed by real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR). Vero CCL-81 cell line was used as a positive control. Results: SARS-CoV-2 replicated in Vero/hSLAM, and MA-104 cells, whereas it did not replicate in L20B, RD and MDCK cells. Vero/hSLAM, and Vero CCL-81 showed rounding, degeneration and detachment of cells; MA-104 cells also showed syncytia formation. In qRT-PCR, Vero/hSLAM and MA-104 showed 106 and Vero CCL-81 showed 107 viral RNA copies per µl. The 50 per cent tissue culture infectious dose titres of Vero/hSLAM, MA-104 and Vero CCL-81 were 105.54, 105.29 and 106.45/ml, respectively. Interpretation & conclusions: Replication of SARS-CoV-2 in Vero/hSLAM and MA-104 underscores the possibility of its unintended isolation during surveillance procedures aiming to isolate measles, rubella and rotavirus. This could result in accidental exposure to high titres of SARS-CoV-2, which can result in laboratory acquired infections and community risk, highlighting the need for revisiting biosafety measures in public health laboratories.

Genetic Characterization of Novel Oral Polio Vaccine Type 2 Viruses During Initial Use Phase Under Emergency Use Listing - Worldwide, March-October 2021.

The emergence and international spread of neurovirulent circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) across multiple countries in Africa and Asia in recent years pose a major challenge to the goal of eradicating all forms of polioviruses. Approximately 90% of all cVDPV outbreaks are caused by the type 2 strain of the Sabin vaccine, an oral live, attenuated vaccine; cVDPV outbreaks typically occur in areas of persistently low immunization coverage (1). A novel type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (nOPV2), produced by genetic modification of the type 2 Sabin vaccine virus genome (2), was developed and evaluated through phase I and phase II clinical trials during 2017-2019. nOPV2 was demonstrated to be safe and well-tolerated, have noninferior immunogenicity, and have superior genetic stability compared with Sabin monovalent type 2 (as measured by preservation of the primary attenuation site [domain V in the 5' noncoding region] and significantly lower neurovirulence of fecally shed vaccine virus in transgenic mice) (3-5). These findings indicate that nOPV2 could be an important tool in reducing the risk for generating vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) and the risk for vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis cases. Based on the favorable preclinical and clinical data, and the public health emergency of international concern generated by ongoing endemic wild poliovirus transmission and cVDPV type 2 outbreaks, the World Health Organization authorized nOPV2 for use under the Emergency Use Listing (EUL) pathway in November 2020, allowing for its first use for outbreak response in March 2021 (6). As required by the EUL process, among other EUL obligations, an extensive plan was developed and deployed for obtaining and monitoring nOPV2 isolates detected during acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, environmental surveillance, adverse events after immunization surveillance, and targeted surveillance for adverse events of special interest (i.e., prespecified events that have the potential to be causally associated with the vaccine product), during outbreak response, as well as through planned field studies. Under this monitoring framework, data generated from whole-genome sequencing of nOPV2 isolates, alongside other virologic data for isolates from AFP and environmental surveillance systems, are reviewed by the genetic characterization subgroup of an nOPV working group of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Global nOPV2 genomic surveillance during March-October 2021 confirmed genetic stability of the primary attenuating site. Sequence data generated through this unprecedented global effort confirm the genetic stability of nOPV2 relative to Sabin 2 and suggest that nOPV2 will be an important tool in the eradication of poliomyelitis. nOPV2 surveillance should continue for the duration of the EUL.

Surveillance to Track Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2020-2021.

Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was established in 1988, the number of reported poliomyelitis cases worldwide has declined by approximately 99.99%. By the end of 2021, wild poliovirus (WPV) remained endemic in only two countries (Pakistan and Afghanistan). However, a WPV type 1 (WPV1) case with paralysis onset in 2021, was reported by Malawi a year after the World Health Organization (WHO) African Region (AFR) was certified as WPV-free and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) cases were reported from 31 countries during 2020-2021 (1,2). cVDPVs are oral poliovirus vaccine-derived viruses that can emerge after prolonged circulation in populations with low immunity and cause paralysis. The primary means of detecting poliovirus transmission is through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among persons aged <15 years, with confirmation through stool specimen testing by WHO-accredited laboratories, supplemented by systematic sampling of sewage and testing for the presence of poliovirus (environmental surveillance). The COVID-19 pandemic caused disruptions in polio vaccination and surveillance activities across WHO regions in 2020; during January-September 2020, the number of reported cases of AFP declined and the interval between stool collection and receipt by laboratories increased compared with the same period in 2019 (3). This report summarizes surveillance performance indicators for 2020 and 2021 in 43 priority countries* and updates previous reports (4). In 2021, a total of 32 (74%) priority countries† met two key surveillance performance indicator targets nationally, an improvement from 2020 when only 23 (53%) met both targets; however, substantial national and subnational gaps persist. High-performing poliovirus surveillance is critical to tracking poliovirus transmission. Frequent monitoring of surveillance indicators could help identify gaps, guide improvements, and enhance the overall sensitivity and timelines of poliovirus detection to successfully achieve polio eradication.

Characterizing Environmental Surveillance Sites in Nigeria and Their Sensitivity to Detect Poliovirus and Other Enteroviruses.

BACKGROUND: Environmental surveillance (ES) for poliovirus is increasingly important for polio eradication, often detecting circulating virus before paralytic cases are reported. The sensitivity of ES depends on appropriate selection of sampling sites, which is difficult in low-income countries with informal sewage networks. METHODS: We measured ES site and sample characteristics in Nigeria during June 2018-May 2019, including sewage physicochemical properties, using a water-quality probe, flow volume, catchment population, and local facilities such as hospitals, schools, and transit hubs. We used mixed-effects logistic regression and machine learning (random forests) to investigate their association with enterovirus isolation (poliovirus and nonpolio enteroviruses) as an indicator of surveillance sensitivity. RESULTS: Four quarterly visits were made to 78 ES sites in 21 states of Nigeria, and ES site characteristic data were matched to 1345 samples with an average enterovirus prevalence among sites of 68% (range, 9%-100%). A larger estimated catchment population, high total dissolved solids, and higher pH were associated with enterovirus detection. A random forests model predicted "good" sites (enterovirus prevalence >70%) from measured site characteristics with out-of-sample sensitivity and specificity of 75%. CONCLUSIONS: Simple measurement of sewage properties and catchment population estimation could improve ES site selection and increase surveillance sensitivity.

Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, January 2020-June 2021.

As of May 1, 2016, use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) type 2 for routine and supplementary immunization activities ceased after a synchronized global switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV; containing Sabin strain types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; containing Sabin strain types 1 and 3) subsequent to the certified eradication of wild type poliovirus (WPV) type 2 in 2015 (1-3). Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks* occur when transmission of Sabin strain poliovirus is prolonged in underimmunized populations, allowing viral genetic reversion to neurovirulence, resulting in cases of paralytic polio (1-3). Since the switch, monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2, containing Sabin strain type 2) has been used for response to cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks; tOPV is used if cVDPV2 co-circulates with WPV type 1, and bOPV is used for cVDPV type 1 (cVDPV1) or type 3 (cVDPV3) outbreaks (1-4). In November 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing procedure authorized limited use of type 2 novel OPV (nOPV2), a vaccine modified to be more genetically stable than the Sabin strain, for cVDPV2 outbreak response (3,5). In October 2021, the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (WHO's principal advisory group) permitted wider use of nOPV2; however, current nOPV2 supply is limited (6). This report updates that of July 2019-February 2020 to describe global cVDPV outbreaks during January 2020-June 2021 (as of November 9, 2021)† (3). During this period, there were 44 cVDPV outbreaks of the three serotypes affecting 37 countries. The number of cVDPV2 cases increased from 366 in 2019 to 1,078 in 2020 (7). A goal of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative's (GPEI) 2022-2026 Strategic Plan is to better address the challenges to early CVDPV2 outbreak detection and initiate prompt and high coverage outbreak responses with available type 2 OPV to interrupt transmission by the end of 2023 (8).

Surveillance to Track Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2019-2020.

When the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was established in 1988, an estimated 350,000 poliomyelitis cases were reported worldwide. In 2020, 140 wild poliovirus (WPV) cases were confirmed, representing a 99.99% reduction since 1988. WPV type 1 transmission remains endemic in only two countries (Pakistan and Afghanistan), but outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) occurred in 33 countries during 2019-2020 (1,2). Poliovirus transmission is detected primarily through syndromic surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among children aged <15 years, with confirmation by laboratory testing of stool specimens. Environmental surveillance supplements AFP surveillance and plays an increasingly important role in detecting poliovirus transmission. Within 2 weeks of COVID-19 being declared a global pandemic (3), GPEI recommended continuing surveillance activities with caution and paused all polio supplementary immunization activities (4). This report summarizes surveillance performance indicators for 2019 and 2020 in 42 priority countries at high risk for poliovirus transmission and updates previous reports (5). In 2020, 48% of priority countries* in the African Region, 90% in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, and 40% in other regions met AFP surveillance performance indicators nationally. The number of priority countries rose from 40 in 2019 to 42 in 2020.† Analysis of 2019-2020 AFP surveillance data from 42 countries at high risk for poliovirus transmission indicates that national and subnational nonpolio AFP rates and stool specimen adequacy declined in many priority countries, particularly in the African Region, suggesting a decline in surveillance sensitivity and quality. The findings in this report can be used to guide improvements to restore a sensitive surveillance system that can track poliovirus transmission and provide evidence of interruption of transmission.

Immunogenicity of seasonal inactivated influenza and inactivated polio vaccines among children in Senegal: Results from a cluster-randomized trial.

Data on influenza vaccine immunogenicity in children are limited from tropical developing countries. We recently reported significant, moderate effectiveness of a trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (IIV) in a controlled, cluster-randomized trial in children in rural Senegal during 2009, a year of H3N2 vaccine mismatch (NCT00893906). We report immunogenicity of IIV3 and inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) from that trial. We evaluated hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) and polio antibody titers in response to vaccination of three age groups (6 through 35 months, 3 through 5 years, and 6 through 8 years). As all children were IIV naïve, each received two vaccine doses, although titers were assessed after only the first dose for subjects aged 6 through 8 years. Seroconversion rates (4-fold titer rise or increase from <1:10 to ≥1:40) were 74-87% for A/H1N1, 76-87% for A/H3N2, and 54-79% for B/Yamagata. Seroprotection rates (HAI titer ≥ 1:40) were 79-88% for A/H1N1, 88-96% for A/H3N2, and 52-74% for B/Yamagata. IIV responses were lowest in the youngest age group, and they were comparable between ages 3 through 5 years after two doses and 6 through 8 years after one dose. We found that baseline seropositivity (HAI titer ≥ 1:10) was an effect modifier of IIV response. Using a seroprotective titer (HAI titer ≥ 1:160) recommended for IIV evaluation in children, we found that among subjects who were seropositive at baseline, 69% achieved seroprotection for both A/H1N1 and A/H3N2, while among those who were seronegative at baseline, seroprotection was achieved in 11% for A/H1N1 and 22% for A/H3N2. The IPV group had high baseline polio antibody seropositivity and appropriate responses to vaccination. Our data emphasize the importance of a two-dose IIV3 series in vaccine naïve children. IIV and IPV vaccines were immunogenic in Senegalese children.

Update on Immunodeficiency-Associated Vaccine-Derived Polioviruses - Worldwide, July 2018-December 2019.

Since establishment of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative* in 1988, polio cases have declined >99.9% worldwide; extensive use of live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in routine childhood immunization programs and mass campaigns has led to eradication of two of the three wild poliovirus (WPV) serotypes (types 2 and 3) (1). Despite its safety record, OPV can lead to rare emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) when there is prolonged circulation or replication of the vaccine virus. In areas with inadequate OPV coverage, circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) that have reverted to neurovirulence can cause outbreaks of paralytic polio (2). Immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) are isolated from persons with primary immunodeficiency (PID). Infection with iVDPV can progress to paralysis or death of patients with PID, and excretion risks seeding cVDPV outbreaks; both risks might be reduced through antiviral treatment, which is currently under development. This report updates previous reports and includes details of iVDPV cases detected during July 2018-December 2019 (3). During this time, 16 new iVDPV cases were reported from five countries (Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Philippines, and Tunisia). Alongside acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance (4), surveillance for poliovirus infections among patients with PID has identified an increased number of persons excreting iVDPVs (5). Expansion of PID surveillance will facilitate early detection and follow-up of iVDPV excretion among patients with PID to mitigate the risk for iVDPV spread. This will be critical to help identify all poliovirus excretors and thus achieve and maintain eradication of all polioviruses.

Surveillance to Track Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2018-2019.

Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in 1988, the number of polio cases worldwide has declined approximately 99.99%; only two countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan) have never interrupted wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission (1). The primary means of detecting poliovirus circulation is through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among children aged <15 years with testing of stool specimens for WPV and vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) (genetically reverted strains of the vaccine virus that regain neurovirulence) in World Health Organization (WHO)-accredited laboratories (2,3). In many locations, AFP surveillance is supplemented by environmental surveillance, the regular collection and testing of sewage to provide awareness of the extent and duration of poliovirus circulation (3). This report presents 2018-2019 poliovirus surveillance data, focusing on 40 priority countries* with WPV or VDPV outbreaks or at high risk for importation because of their proximity to a country with an outbreak. The number of priority countries rose from 31 in 2018 to 40 in 2019 because of a substantial increase in the number of VDPV outbreaks† (2,4). In areas with low poliovirus immunity, VDPVs can circulate in the community and cause outbreaks of paralysis; these are known as circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) (4). In 2019, only 25 (63%) of the 40 designated priority countries met AFP surveillance indicators nationally; subnational surveillance performance varied widely and indicated focal weaknesses. High quality, sensitive surveillance is important to ensure timely detection and response to cVDPV and WPV transmission.

Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, July 2019-February 2020.

Circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can emerge in areas with low poliovirus immunity and cause outbreaks* of paralytic polio (1-5). Among the three types of wild poliovirus, type 2 was declared eradicated in 2015 (1,2). The use of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV; types 1, 2, and 3 Sabin strains) ceased in April 2016 via a 1-month-long, global synchronized switch to bivalent OPV (bOPV; types 1 and 3 Sabin strains) in immunization activities (1-4). Monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2; type 2 Sabin strain) is available for cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreak response immunization (1-5). The number and geographic breadth of post-switch cVDPV2 outbreaks have exceeded forecasts that trended toward zero outbreaks 4 years after the switch and assumed rapid and effective control of any that occurred (4). New cVDPV2 outbreaks have been seeded by mOPV2 use, by both suboptimal mOPV2 coverage within response zones and recently mOPV2-vaccinated children or contacts traveling outside of response zones, where children born after the global switch are fully susceptible to poliovirus type 2 transmission (2-4). In addition, new emergences can develop by inadvertent exposure to Sabin OPV2-containing vaccine (i.e., residual response mOPV2 or tOPV) (4). This report updates the January 2018-June 2019 report with information on global cVDPV outbreaks during July 2019-February 2020 (as of March 25, 2020)† (2). Among 33 cVDPV outbreaks reported during July 2019-February 2020, 31 (94%) were cVDPV2; 18 (58%) of these followed new emergences. In mid-2020, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) plans to introduce a genetically stabilized, novel OPV type 2 (nOPV2) that has a lower risk for generating VDPV2 than does Sabin mOPV2; if nOPV2 is successful in limiting new VDPV2 emergences, GPEI foresees the replacement of Sabin mOPV2 with nOPV2 for cVDPV2 outbreak responses during 2021 (2,4,6).

Accelerated Immunodeficiency-associated Vaccine-derived Poliovirus Serotype 3 Sequence Evolution Rate in an 11-week-old Boy With X-linked Agammaglobulinemia and Perinatal Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exposure.

Primary B-cell immunodeficiencies are risk factors for the generation of vaccine-derived polioviruses. We report immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus serotype 3 in an 11-week-old boy with X-linked agammaglobulinemia. Unique characteristics of this case include early age of presentation, high viral evolutionary rate, and the child's perinatal exposure to human immunodeficiency virus.

Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, January 2018-June 2019.

Certification of global eradication of indigenous wild poliovirus type 2 occurred in 2015 and of type 3 in 2019. Since the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988 and broad use of live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), the number of wild poliovirus cases has declined >99.99% (1). Genetically divergent vaccine-derived poliovirus* (VDPV) strains can emerge during vaccine use and spread in underimmunized populations, becoming circulating VDPV (cVDPV) strains, and resulting in outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis.† In April 2016, all oral polio vaccination switched from trivalent OPV (tOPV; containing vaccine virus types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; containing types 1 and 3) (2). Monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2) is used in response campaigns to control type 2 cVDPV (cVDPV2) outbreaks. This report presents data on cVDPV outbreaks detected during January 2018-June 2019 (as of September 30, 2019). Compared with January 2017-June 2018 (3), the number of reported cVDPV outbreaks more than tripled, from nine to 29; 25 (86%) of the outbreaks were caused by cVDPV2. The increase in the number of outbreaks in 2019 resulted from VDPV2 both inside and outside of mOPV2 response areas. GPEI is planning future use of a novel type 2 OPV, stabilized to decrease the likelihood of reversion to neurovirulence. However, all countries must maintain high population immunity to decrease the risk for cVDPV emergence. Cessation of all OPV use after certification of polio eradication will eliminate the risk for VDPV emergence.

Surveillance to Track Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2017-2018.

When the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) began in 1988, cases of poliomyelitis were reported from 125 countries. Since then, only Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan have experienced uninterrupted transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV). The primary means of detecting poliovirus is through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among children aged <15 years with testing of stool specimens for WPV and vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) in World Health Organization (WHO)-accredited laboratories of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) (1,2). AFP surveillance is supplemented by environmental surveillance for polioviruses in sewage at selected locations. Analysis of genomic sequences of isolated polioviruses enables assessment of transmission by time and place, potential gaps in surveillance, and emergence of VDPVs (3). This report presents 2017-2018 poliovirus surveillance data, focusing on 31 countries* identified as high-priority countries because of a "high risk of poliovirus transmission and limited capacity to adequately address those risks" (4). Some of these countries are located within WHO regions with endemic polio, and others are in regions that are polio-free. In 2018, 26 (84%) of the 31 countries met AFP surveillance indicators nationally; however, subnational variation in surveillance performance was substantial. Surveillance systems need continued strengthening through monitoring, supervision, and improvements in specimen collection and transport to provide sufficient evidence for interruption of poliovirus circulation.