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MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 68(39): 851-854, 2019 Oct 04.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31581162

RESUMO

Infection prevention and control (IPC) in health care facilities is essential to protecting patients, visitors, and health care personnel from the spread of infectious diseases, including Ebola virus disease (Ebola). Patients with suspected Ebola are typically referred to specialized Ebola treatment units (ETUs), which have strict isolation and IPC protocols, for testing and treatment (1,2). However, in settings where contact tracing is inadequate, Ebola patients might first seek care at general health care facilities, which often have insufficient IPC capacity (3-6). Before 2014-2016, most Ebola outbreaks occurred in rural or nonurban communities, and the role of health care facilities as amplification points, while recognized, was limited (7,8). In contrast to these earlier outbreaks, the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak occurred in densely populated urban areas where access to health care facilities was better, but contact tracing was generally inadequate (8). Patients with unrecognized Ebola who sought care at health care facilities with inadequate IPC initiated multiple chains of transmission, which amplified the epidemic to an extent not seen in previous Ebola outbreaks (3-5,7). Implementation of robust IPC practices in general health care facilities was critical to ending health care-associated transmission (8). In August 2018, when an Ebola outbreak was recognized in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), neighboring countries began preparing for possible introduction of Ebola, with a focus on IPC. Baseline IPC assessments conducted in frontline health care facilities in high-risk districts in Uganda found IPC gaps in screening, isolation, and notification. Based on findings, additional funds were provided for IPC, a training curriculum was developed, and other corrective actions were taken. Ebola preparedness efforts should include activities to ensure that frontline health care facilities have the IPC capacity to rapidly identify suspected Ebola cases and refer such patients for treatment to protect patients, staff members, and visitors.


Assuntos
Infecção Hospitalar/prevenção & controle , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Administração de Instituições de Saúde , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/prevenção & controle , Controle de Infecções/organização & administração , República Democrática do Congo/epidemiologia , Pesquisa sobre Serviços de Saúde , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Humanos , Medição de Risco , Uganda
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