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1.
Global Health ; 19(1): 2, 2023 Jan 07.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36611039

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: The commercial determinants of health include a range of practices to promote business interests, often at the expense of public health. Corporate political practices, such as lobbying and campaign donations, are used to influence policy makers and foster a political and regulatory environment conducive to business interests. Despite recognition of their public health importance, thus far there are relatively few efforts to systematically monitor commercial political practices. METHODS: A pilot study was conducted to explore the feasibility of systematically monitoring two political practices - lobbying and political contributions - for 'harmful industries' (alcohol, gambling, ultra-processed food and tobacco industries) in Australia. Potential data sources were reviewed to compare data availability and detail. Two publicly available datasets were selected for the pilot: ministerial diaries for New South Wales and annual donor filings from the Australian Electoral Commission. Google Data Studio was used to analyse and visualise findings.  RESULTS: The pilot study resulted in the creation of several interactive charts and dashboards that supported analysis and interrogation of the data. These charts helped to easily convey the volume of lobbying and political donations, as well as changes over time. For example, we found that between July 2014 and December 2020, NSW ministers had 20,607 meetings, of which 634 meetings were with harmful industries. And between 1998 and 2020, a total of $576,519,472 disclosed donations were made to political parties and other entities, of which $35,823,937 were from harmful industries. CONCLUSIONS: Opportunities to develop a program to monitor commercial political practices face several challenges including access barriers arising from poor availability and detail of data, technical barriers arising from the format of data disclosures and coding challenges arising from the diverse nature of the commercial sector. Despite these challenges, our pilot study demonstrates the potential to implement a monitoring program and to expand its scope to other commercial determinants of health.


Assuntos
Manobras Políticas , Política , Humanos , Projetos Piloto , Estudos de Viabilidade , Austrália
3.
JAMA Health Forum ; 3(10): e223801, 2022 Oct 07.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36306120

RESUMO

This cross-sectional study uses publicly available, nonpartisan data to evaluate trends in lobbying expenditures across health care industries.


Assuntos
Setor de Assistência à Saúde , Manobras Políticas , Gastos em Saúde , Reforma dos Serviços de Saúde , Indústria Farmacêutica
4.
NTM ; 30(4): 473-499, 2022 12.
Artigo em Alemão | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36279004

RESUMO

Using the example of the American motivational psychologist David C. McClelland, this article analyses how psychologists in the long 1960s acted as generous purveyors of knowledge in order to bring about far reaching social change, without having to enter the field of institutionalised politics. The article thus explores a supposedly passive form of activism beyond lobbying and consultating that was intended to encourage citizens to self-direct in order to bring about changes that were supposedly beyond the reach of structural planning policy. Using two case studies, it is argued that the principle of self-direction often associated with neoliberalism developed in parallel with planning policy in the long 1960s, rather than as a consequence of its failure in the 1970s and 1980s. Since this was often done in an entrepreneurial way, it led to the emergence of the entrepreneurial scientist who ran science, educational training and social reform as a business. Unlike political influence through lobbying, this form of scientific political activism was direct in that it directly impacted individual social groups, but it was also precarious in its chances of success, because whether those approached were willing to accept what was offered to them depended on conditions over which the scientists involved had no control. As early as the long 1960s, it is concluded, privately run programmes aimed at activating the individual were part of what we know as state-directed welfare policy.


Assuntos
Ativismo Político , Estados Unidos , Política , Manobras Políticas , Mudança Social , Seguridade Social
5.
Public Health Nutr ; 25(11): 3252-3264, 2022 11.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35993181

RESUMO

OBJECTIVE: To identify the corporate political activity (CPA) strategies used by food industry actors during the development of two public health nutrition policies in Central America: Law #570 (taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages) in Panama and Bill #5504 (labelling and food marketing regulations) in Guatemala. DESIGN: We triangulated data from publicly available information from 2018 to 2020, (e.g. industry and government materials; social media material) with semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. SETTING: Guatemala and Panama. PARTICIPANTS: Government, academia and international organisations workers in health and nutrition. DESIGN: CPA strategies were categorised according to an existing internationally used taxonomy into action-based, instrumental strategies (coalition management, information management, direct involvement and influence in policy, legal action) and discursive strategies. RESULTS: Instrumental strategies included the establishment of relationships with policymakers and direct lobbying against the proposed public policies. Discursive strategies were mainly criticising on the unfounded ground that they lacked evidence of effectiveness and will imply negative impacts on the economy. The industry pointed at individuals for making their own food choices, in order to shift the focus away from the role of its products in contributing to ill health. CONCLUSION: We provide evidence of the political practices used by the food industry to interfere with the development and implementation of public health nutrition policies to improve diets in Central America. Policymakers, public health advocates and the public should be informed about those practices and develop counterstrategies and arguments to protect the public and policies from the vested interests of the food industry.


Assuntos
Indústria Alimentícia , Saúde Pública , Guatemala , Humanos , Manobras Políticas , Política Nutricional
6.
BMJ Open ; 12(8): e055656, 2022 08 30.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36041766

RESUMO

INTRODUCTION: There are many case studies of corporations that have worked to undermine health policy implementation. It is unclear whether countries that are more exposed to corporate financial influence are systematically less likely to implement robust health policies that target firms' financial interests. We aim to assess the association between corporate financial influence and implementation of WHO-recommended policies to constrain sales, marketing and consumption of tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy foods. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: We will perform a cross-sectional analysis of 172 WHO Member States using national datasets from 2015, 2017 and 2020. We will use random effects generalised least squares regression to test the association between implementation status of 12 WHO-recommended tobacco, alcohol and diet policies, and corporate financial influence, a metric that combines disclosure of campaign donations, public campaign finance, corporate campaign donations, legislature corrupt activities, disclosure by politicians and executive oversight. We will control for GDP per capita, population aged >65 years (%), urbanisation (%), level of democracy, continent, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, legal origin, UN-defined 'Small Island Developing States' and Muslim population (%) (to capture alcohol policy differences). We will include year dummies to address the possibility of a spurious relationship between the outcome variable and the independent variables of interests. For example, there may be an upward global trend in policy implementation that coincides with an upward global trend in the regulation of lobbying and campaign finance. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: As this study uses publicly available data, ethics approval is not required. The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare. Findings will be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal for publication in the academic literature. All data, code and syntax will be made publicly available on GitHub.


Assuntos
Conflito de Interesses , Doenças não Transmissíveis , Estudos Transversais , Política de Saúde , Humanos , Manobras Políticas , Doenças não Transmissíveis/epidemiologia , Doenças não Transmissíveis/prevenção & controle
7.
J Stud Alcohol Drugs ; 83(4): 574-581, 2022 07.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35838435

RESUMO

OBJECTIVE: This study examines how the alcohol industry responded to developments in Irish alcohol policy leading to the 2018 Public Health (Alcohol) Act, a set of measures designed to reduce overall alcohol consumption in order to reduce harm to health and society. Previous research has emphasized the political and economic strengths of the alcohol industry in Ireland and elsewhere. This study examines the origins of and the debates over this legislation to better understand the political tactics of the alcohol industry. METHOD: The study focuses on developments between 2009 and 2018, tracing activities by industry actors to shape the policy process at different junctures. Data for the study are drawn from 18 semi-structured interviews with politicians, government advisors, public health experts, and advocates as well as from relevant primary documents, public statements, and newspaper articles. RESULTS: The study identifies three interrelated tactics used by alcohol industry actors--obstruction through participation, coalition-building and mobilizing proxies, and making use of extensive political resources in lobbying--and traces their impacts at different points in the policy process. We find that industry actors had some success in influencing policy, defeating particular provisions by averting their inclusion, and winning amendments to others, but ultimately failed to defeat the legislation. Specific opportunities and constraints present in the Irish context for alcohol industry actors are identified. CONCLUSIONS: Public health considerations withstood a range of challenges from alcohol industry interests in passing public health legislation in Ireland. The findings have important implications for the study of the alcohol industry's political tactics in Ireland and elsewhere, including the use of lobbying registry data as a potential data source.


Assuntos
Manobras Políticas , Política Pública , Indústria Alimentícia , Humanos , Indústrias , Irlanda/epidemiologia , Saúde Pública
10.
Global Health ; 18(1): 54, 2022 05 26.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35619107

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: The political activities of industry stakeholders must be understood to safeguard the development and implementation of effective public health policies. METHODS: A quantitative descriptive study was performed using data from Canada's Registry of Lobbyists to examine the frequency and governmental target of lobbying that occurred between various types of stakeholders (i.e., industry versus non-industry) and designated public office holders (DPOH) regarding Health Canada's Healthy Eating Strategy, from September/2016 to January/2021. Initiatives of interest were revisions to Canada's Food Guide, changes to the nutritional quality of the food supply, front-of-pack nutrition labelling and restrictions on food marketing to children. RESULTS: The majority of registrants (88%), and corporations and organizations (90%) represented in lobbying registrations had industry ties. Industry-affiliated stakeholders were responsible for 86% of communications with DPOH, interacting more frequently with DPOH of all ranks, compared to non-industry stakeholders. Most organizations and corporations explicitly registered to lobby on the topic of marketing to children (60%), followed by Canada's Food Guide (48%), front-of-pack nutrition labelling (44%), and the nutritional quality of the food supply (23%). The food and beverage industry, particularly the dairy industry, was the most active, accounting for the greatest number of lobbying registrations and communications, followed by the media and communication industry. CONCLUSIONS: Results suggest a strategic advantage of industry stakeholders in influencing Canadian policymakers. While some safeguards have been put in place, increased transparency would allow for a better understanding of industry discourse and help protect public health interests during the policy development process.


Assuntos
Empregados do Governo , Manobras Políticas , Canadá , Criança , Dieta Saudável , Indústria Alimentícia , Humanos , Política Nutricional
11.
Cad Saude Publica ; 37Suppl 1(Suppl 1): e00128120, 2022.
Artigo em Inglês, Português | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35319601

RESUMO

As the agenda for promoting adequate and healthy food is strengthened in Brazil, national food industries associations have changed their corporate political activity (CPA). Highlighting the Brazilian Food Industry Association (ABIA), the Brazilian Dairy Association and the Sugarcane Industry Union, and addressing the period between 2014 and 2020, this article analyzes this change in its representative, communicational and institutional dimensions. Methodologically based on the CPA identification model, the sources of the work comprise records of participant observation in the Pensar Agropecuária Institute (IPA) and in the Brazilian National Congress, notes of interviews with directors and technicians from business and political associations, in addition to various documents and websites of the associations, the State and civil society. The results show that, in the representative dimension, the food industries associations reformulated their lobbying in Congress, creating a commission in the IPA for that purpose; in the communicational dimension, there was increased prominence of a narrative of appropriation of the agenda for adequate and healthy food, a discursive strategy that was followed by two other narratives, one in opposition to the agenda, the other of shifting corporate responsibilities to individual decisions; finally, in the institutional dimension, there were notable changes in the ABIA, in addition to the creation of other associations and networks. The conclusion indicates that the CPA of the main food industries associations in the country is changing sharply to respond to criticisms of the commercial determinants of health.


Conforme se fortalece, no Brasil, a agenda de promoção da alimentação adequada e saudável, associações nacionais das indústrias de alimentos têm inflexionado sua atividade política corporativa (CPA). Destacando a Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Alimentos (ABIA), a Associação Brasileira de Laticínios e a União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar, e tratando do período entre 2014 e 2020, este artigo analisa tal inflexão em suas dimensões representativas, comunicacionais e institucionais. Fundamentado metodologicamente no modelo de identificação da CPA, o trabalho tem como fontes registros da observação participante no Instituto Pensar Agropecuária (IPA) e no Legislativo, anotações de entrevistas com dirigentes e técnicos de associações empresariais e políticos, além de diversos documentos e websites das entidades, do Estado e da sociedade civil. Os resultados demonstram que, na dimensão representativa, as associações das indústrias de alimentos reformularam seu lobbying no Legislativo, para isso criando uma comissão no IPA; na dimensão comunicacional, houve aumento da proeminência de uma narrativa de apropriação da agenda da alimentação adequada e saudável, estratégia discursiva que passou a ladear outras duas narrativas, uma de contraposição à agenda, outra de deslocamento das responsabilidades corporativas para decisões individuais; finalmente, na dimensão institucional, ocorreram notáveis transformações na ABIA, além da criação de outras associações e redes. A conclusão indica que a CPA das principais associações de indústrias de alimentos no país está se alterando de modo acentuado para responder às críticas aos determinantes comerciais da saúde.


En Brasil, conforme se fortalece la agenda de promoción de una alimentación adecuada y saludable, asociaciones nacionales de las industrias de alimentos han modificado su actividad política corporativa (CPA). Destacando la Asociación Brasileña de la Industria de Alimentos (ABIA), la Asociación Brasileña de Lácteos y la Unión de la Industria de Caña de Azúcar, y considerando el período entre 2014 y 2020, este artículo analiza esta inflexión en sus dimensiones representativas, comunicacionales e institucionales. Fundamentado metodológicamente en el modelo de identificación de la CPA, el trabajo tiene como fuentes: registros de la observación participante en el Instituto Pensar Agropecuária (IPA) y en el poder legislativo, anotaciones de entrevistas con dirigentes y técnicos de asociaciones empresariales y políticos, además de diversos documentos y sitios web de entidades, del Estado y de la sociedad civil. Los resultados demuestran que, en la dimensión representativa, las asociaciones de las industrias de alimentos reformularon su lobbying en el Legislativo, para conseguirlo crearon una comisión en el IPA; mientras que en la dimensión comunicacional hubo un aumento de la preeminencia de una narración de apropiación de la agenda de la alimentación adecuada y saludable, estrategia discursiva que pasó a flanquear otras dos narraciones: una de contraposición a la agenda, otra de desplazamiento de las responsabilidades corporativa hacia decisiones individuales; finalmente, en la dimensión institucional, se produjeron notables transformaciones en la ABIA, además de la creación de otras asociaciones y redes. La conclusión indica que la CPA de las principales asociaciones de industrias de alimentos en el país se está alterando de modo acentuado para responder a las críticas hacia los determinantes comerciales de la salud.


Assuntos
Indústria Alimentícia , Política , Brasil , Comércio , Humanos , Manobras Políticas
13.
Cad Saude Publica ; 37Suppl 1(Suppl 1): e00085220, 2022.
Artigo em Inglês, Português | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35195156

RESUMO

In the past, food industry actors tried to delay and weaken public health efforts to promote adequate and healthy diets in Brazil. This study aimed to identify the political strategies used by food industry actors in Brazil. We undertook a document analysis of publicly available information and interviews with eighteen key informants in public health nutrition. Data collection and analysis were carried between October 2018 and January 2019. In Brazil, food industry actors interacted with health organizations, communities, and the media. They disseminated information on nutrition and physical activity by scientific events and schools. The food industry also had allies within the government and lobbied high ranking officials. Finally, food industry actors intimidated some public health professionals, including by threats of litigation, which had the effect of silencing them. These strategies were facilitated by the use of arguments, such as the crucial role that the food industry plays in the economy and its support to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Personal responsibility, moderation, and education were cited as solutions to the obesity epidemic, and there was little discussion on the broader issue of inadequate and unhealthy diets. Food industry actors in Brazil used a diverse range of political strategies, which have the potential of negatively influencing public policy, research, and practice in the country. Learning about these strategies is an essential first step, and in response, it is crucial to develop robust mechanisms to address undue influence from corporations.


Assuntos
Indústria Alimentícia , Indústria de Processamento de Alimentos , Brasil , Indústria Alimentícia/legislação & jurisprudência , Humanos , Manobras Políticas , Saúde Pública
14.
J Stud Alcohol Drugs ; 83(1): 37-44, 2022 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35040758

RESUMO

OBJECTIVE: The French Évin Law was passed in 1991 to prohibit alcohol advertising in media from targeting young people and to regulate content in authorized media. This research analyzes how lobbying by the alcohol industry has undermined this law over the last 30 years. METHOD: A narrative approach, consisting of the collection and analysis of semistructured interviews with persons who recount their experience and offer interpretation, was used to analyze lobbying by the alcohol industry against the Évin Law from 1991 to 2020. We conducted 18 interviews with key French informants involved in implementing and/ or changing the Évin Law (including founders of the law) to identify strategies and arguments used by the alcohol industry. An established framework of corporate political activity specific to the alcohol industry was used to classify the findings. RESULTS: The industry tactics and arguments were found to be similar to those in other countries; however, some were specific to France, such as highlighting winegrowing as central to French culture and integrating the wine industry into decision-making bodies, alliances with parliamentarians, and circumventions of the law. These specific features may be explained by the age of the Évin Law (30 years) and the economic weight of alcohol and wine at the heart of French culture. CONCLUSIONS: The Évin Law has been continuously weakened since its initial implementation. This research analyzes the long-term lobbying strategies and arguments that have been used to erode it. The results are useful for other countries that have implemented alcohol marketing regulations to help anticipate tactics and arguments deployed by the alcohol industry to weaken marketing regulations.


Assuntos
Publicidade , Manobras Políticas , Adolescente , Adulto , Indústria Alimentícia , Humanos , Indústrias , Marketing , Política
16.
Int J Drug Policy ; 102: 103585, 2022 04.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35085854

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: The cannabis industry has an interest in creating a regulatory environment which maximizes profits at the cost of public health, similar to the tobacco, alcohol, and food industries. This study sought to describe the cannabis industry's lobbying activities in the Colorado State Legislature over time. METHODS: This retrospective observational study analyzed publicly available lobbying expenditures data from fiscal years (FY) 2010-2021. Measures included inflation-adjusted monthly lobbying expenditures by funder and lobbyist, origin of funding, and lobbyist descriptions of cannabis industry clients. This dataset was supplemented with business license documentation, legislative histories, and public testimony. RESULTS: The cannabis industry spent over $7 million (inflation adjusted) from FY 2010-2021 to lobby the Colorado legislature on 367 bills. Over $800,000 (11% of total cannabis spending) was from out-of-state clients. In 48% of lobbyist reports lobbyists did not disclose their funder's cannabis affiliation, and cannabis organizations used strategies that may have obscured the true amount and source of funding. Lobbyists and agencies concurrently represented the alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis industries, possibly facilitating inter-industry alliances when interests align. CONCLUSION: The cannabis industry dedicated significant resources towards lobbying the Colorado State Legislature on behalf of policies intended to increase cannabis use. Creating transparency about the relationships between the cannabis industry, related industries, and policymakers is essential to ensure appropriate regulation of cannabis products.


Assuntos
Cannabis , Indústria do Tabaco , Produtos do Tabaco , Colorado , Humanos , Indústrias , Manobras Políticas , Tabaco
18.
Public Health Nutr ; 25(1): 170-179, 2022 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33820589

RESUMO

OBJECTIVE: To assess the strategies, practices and arguments used by the industry to lobby legislators against sugary drinks taxation in Brazil. DESIGN: We performed a content analysis of arguments put forward by sugary drink and sugar industries against sugary drinks taxation, using the framework developed by the International Network for Food and Obesity/Non-Communicable Diseases Research, Monitoring and Action Support to assess corporate political activity of the food industry. SETTING: Two public hearings held in 2017 and 2018 in the Brazilian Legislature. PARTICIPANTS: Representatives from two prominent industry associations - one representing Big Soda and the other representing the main sugar, ethanol and bioelectricity producers. RESULTS: The 'Information and messaging' and 'Policy substitution' strategies were identified. Five practices were identified in the 'Information and messaging' strategy (four described in the original framework and an additional practice, 'Stress the environmental importance of the industry'). Mechanisms not included in the original framework identified were 'Stress the reduction of CO2 emissions promoted by the industry'; 'Question the effectiveness of regulation'; 'Suggest public-private partnerships'; 'Shift the blame away from the product' and 'Question sugary drinks taxation as a public health recommendation'. No new practices or mechanisms to the original framework emerged in the 'Policy substitution' strategy. CONCLUSIONS: The strategies and practices are used collectively and complement each other. Arguments herein identified are in line with those reported in other countries under different contexts and using different methodologies. Future research should address whether and under what conditions lobbying from this industry sector is effective in the Brazilian Legislature.


Assuntos
Bebidas Adoçadas com Açúcar , Brasil , Humanos , Manobras Políticas , Açúcares , Impostos
20.
Asian Pac J Cancer Prev ; 22(10): 3055-3060, 2021 Oct 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34710979

RESUMO

INTRODUCTION: Comprehensive tobacco control policies are lacking in Indonesia where smoking prevalence in males is among the highest in the world. This study aims to explore the knowledge, attitude, opportunities and challenges to tobacco control among local stakeholders. METHODS: This is a qualitative study using in-depth interviews. Four study areas included Bengkulu Province, Bengkulu City, Seluma District, and Kaur District. Eighteen participants interviewed were from policymakers, legislators, and civil societies during November-December 2020. Thematic data analysis was used. RESULTS: While knowledge and support of the existing Smoke Free Policy (SFP) were high, that of other policies such as outdoor tobacco advertising (OTA) ban and tobacco product display ban were low. Among others, one opportunity was there is already SFP regulation in each study area, to which such bans can be added. Among others, three major challenges were: (a) lack of enforcement of the existing SFP, (b) lack of national regulation to ban OTA and product display, and (c) counter actions by the tobacco industry. CONCLUSION: The opportunities and challenges identified could be lessons learnt for more comprehensive tobacco control especially by local governments in Indonesia and other countries with similar settings.


Assuntos
Publicidade/legislação & jurisprudência , Política Antifumo/legislação & jurisprudência , Produtos do Tabaco/legislação & jurisprudência , Comércio/legislação & jurisprudência , Feminino , Humanos , Indonésia/epidemiologia , Aplicação da Lei , Manobras Políticas , Masculino , Pesquisa Qualitativa , Fumar/epidemiologia , Participação dos Interessados , Indústria do Tabaco , Produtos do Tabaco/provisão & distribuição
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