The conceptual injustice of the brain death standard.
Theor Med Bioeth
; 45(4): 261-276, 2024 Aug.
Article
in En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-38714610
ABSTRACT
Family disputes over the diagnosis of brain death have caused much controversy in the bioethics literature over the conceptual validity of the brain death standard. Given the tenuous status of brain death as death, it is pragmatically fruitful to reframe intractable debates about the metaphysical nature of brain death as metalinguistic disputes about its conceptual deployment. This new framework leaves the metaphysical debate open and brings into focus the social functions that are served by deploying the concept of brain death. In doing so, it highlights the epistemic injustice of medicolegal authorities that force people to uniformly accept brain death as a diagnosis of death based on normative considerations of institutional interests, such as saving hospital resources and organ supplies, rather than empirical evidence of brain death as death, which is insufficient at best and nonexistent at worst. In light of this injustice, I propose the rejection of the uniform standard of brain death in favor of a choice-based system that respects families' individualized views of death.
Key words
Full text:
1
Collection:
01-internacional
Database:
MEDLINE
Main subject:
Social Justice
/
Brain Death
Limits:
Humans
Language:
En
Journal:
Theor Med Bioeth
Journal subject:
ETICA
Year:
2024
Document type:
Article
Affiliation country: